Lawyers and DNA : understanding and challenging the evidence by Cashman, KE
Lawyers and DNA: 
Understanding and Challenging the Evidence 
by 
Katherine Cashman B Comm LLB (Hons) (University of Tasmania) 
Faculty of Law and Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Law) 
University of Tasmania, October 2017 

 iii
Statements and Declarations 
Declaration of Originality 
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or 
any other institutes, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, 
and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another 
person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis 
contain any material that infringes copy right. 
Authority of Access 
This thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying and communication in accordance with 
the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
Statement of Ethical Conduct 
The research associated with this thesis abides by the international and Australian codes on human 
and animal experimentation, the guidelines by the Australian Government’s Office of the Gene 
Technology Regulator and the rulings of the Safety, Ethics and Institutional Biosafety Committees of 
the University.  
Statement of Publication 
This research was introduced in the following peer-reviewed research paper: 
Kate Cashman and Terese Henning, ‘Lawyers and DNA: Issues in Understanding and Challenging the 
Evidence’ (2012) 24 (1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 69. 
It does not form part of the text or Appendix of this thesis. 




I returned from a year in Africa in late 2009 with the seed of an idea to embark on postgraduate 
research, and began this research project in April of 2010. Seven and a half amazing years have passed 
since that day and in that time, I have married Ben — the most incredible man I know, moved homes 
twice, renovated, been a house sitter for many years and most importantly, become a mother to two 
incredible children: Spencer and Poppy. My candidature may not have taken the ‘usual route’ but I 
would not have done it any differently — my life has been rich with experiences, knowledge, lessons 
and learning. 
I do know that without Ben’s unwavering support, belief in me and commitment to our family that 
this would never have been finished. I love him and what we have created in that time, including of 
course our two strong, independent and adventurous children. My PhD is for these three beautiful 
souls. We have travelled and created a life around this work and I could not have finished it without 
the perspective and adventure they give my life every day and along the way. 
My mother Lucinda, father Anthony and grandmother, Rosemary must be acknowledged for helping 
me with the kids when I needed to work, travel, write or just have a break. It takes a village and I’m 
proud to be part of a strong and loving one. 
I have been blessed with an incredible supervision team. Ms Terese Henning, Associate Professor 
Roberta Julian and Dr Sally Kelty have all supported me in different ways. Terese was always honest, 
thorough and encouraging in her feedback and guidance. Roberta was patient, her door was always 
open and she had an incredible ‘big picture’ view of where my research fit into the forensic studies 
space. Sally gave me direction and support particularly in the early stages of gathering my research 
and she helped me to understand the various professional worlds in which this research took place. I 
have had intelligent, hardworking and kind supervisors who are blazing a trial in their respective fields. 
I have met, interviewed and run focus groups with many police officers, lawyers, judges, forensic 
scientists, academics and students in Victoria, the ACT and at national and international conferences 
over the past seven years. Thank you to each of these people for their time, experiences, energy and 
information. This PhD was funded as part of an Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage Grant and I 
thank the ARC and all our industry partners in the University of Technology Sydney, the University of 
Canberra, the National Institute of Forensic Science, the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, Victoria 
Police and the Australian Federal Police. In particular, I would like to thank Professor James Robertson 
vi 
and Alastair Ross who were always very welcoming and generous with their time, knowledge and skills 
on the dance floor of many conference events.  
Being a member of staff at the University of Tasmania’s Faculty of Law has played a very important 
role in my professional and personal experience. In particular, I would like to thank the Faculty for 
their support of me in receiving the Andrew Inglis Clark Scholarship in Law and History postgraduate 
scholarship in 2012, to travel and collect data and make connections overseas in this field. I have been 
incredibly blessed to have been part of such an amazing group of academics and students. The UTas 
Law School is a very special place. In particular, I would like to thank Professor Kate Warner (currently 
the Governor of Tasmania) who has been a supportive mentor for me over the past seven years and 
Dr Olivia Rundle who has always been there for a cup of tea and sage advice when I needed it most. 
The Law Dean, Professor Margaret Otlowski, is an inspiring and kind leader and her support of 
postgraduates is unrivalled elsewhere in Australia. To Deb, Chris, Caroline, Moira and other library 
staff — you keep the students and staff moving forward and we couldn’t do any of what we do or have 
done without you. Thank you for the cups of tea and conversations about life and work.  
There is nothing more reassuring than hearing that what you are feeling and experiencing is par for 
the course and normal for postgraduate research work from those who have been or are going 
through the PhD process. My fellow UTas law postgraduates have been an inspiring and supportive 
group of people and we have walked this path together. I am truly grateful for the cups of tea, cake 
breaks, conversations in the hallway, workshops and writing groups. A special thank you to Drs Dean 
Giosio, Sam Perkins and Belinda Hopwood — you trod the path before me, always offered sage advice 
and wisdom and were always there to offer a supportive ear in times of confusion or doubt. 
I think it is important to finish with an acknowledgement that where I have written my PhD has had a 
profound effect on my productivity. Like my adventurous life, the following words have been written 
from a variety of venues including home, the Law Faculty, many parks around the world, hotel rooms, 
restaurants, in the car and more recently (and more productively) the Coal River Farm near where I 
live in Tasmania. Thank you goes to Mel, Daniel and their lovely staff for offering me taste tests of your 
various wares, letting me take the window seats, feeding me chai lattes and just generally providing 
one of the best views for writing inspiration in southern Tasmania. It really did help in getting this 
finished. 
I dedicate this thesis to Cubba — my late grandfather, Stewart ‘Buster’ Cavill. His thirst for knowledge 
and love for me went hand in hand and they have shaped so much of who I am today. I hope he would 
have been proud.  
 vii
Table of Contents 
1 Introduction .......................................................................................... 1
Introduction and rationale .................................................................................................... 1 
Overall research project and industry partners .................................................................... 2 
Overview of thesis and its potential contribution ................................................................. 2 
Unique contribution .............................................................................................................. 4 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 5 
2 Justifications for the research ................................................................ 6
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 6 
Previous research .................................................................................................................. 7 
2.2.1 Lawyers ......................................................................................................................... 8 
2.2.2 Juries ............................................................................................................................. 9 
2.2.3 Forensic scientists ....................................................................................................... 11 
2.2.4 Judges and the judiciary .............................................................................................. 12 
2.2.5 DNA evidence generally .............................................................................................. 13 
The use of DNA in criminal trials ......................................................................................... 16 
2.3.1 Expression of DNA evidence ........................................................................................ 20 
2.3.2 Probability ratios and statistics ................................................................................... 25 
2.3.3 Standard of proof: beyond reasonable doubt ............................................................. 31 
Reviews of forensic process ................................................................................................ 35 
2.4.1 Vincent Report (Victoria) ............................................................................................. 35 
2.4.2 NAS Report (United States) ......................................................................................... 40 
2.4.3 Australian Royal Commissions and overseas reports .................................................. 42 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 44 
3 DNA in a legal context ......................................................................... 46
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 46 
Forensic science and DNA expert evidence ......................................................................... 47 
3.2.1 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) ....................................................................................... 47 
viii 
3.2.2 Emerging areas of DNA Analysis .................................................................................. 49 
3.2.3 What is forensic science? ............................................................................................ 52 
3.2.4 The role of a forensic scientist .................................................................................... 53 
The adversarial system ........................................................................................................ 55 
The human rights framework .............................................................................................. 57 
3.4.1 Human Rights Instruments .......................................................................................... 59 
3.4.2 Case law ...................................................................................................................... 60 
3.4.3 Legal representation ................................................................................................... 61 
3.4.4 Prosecutorial duties arising from the right to a fair trial ............................................. 62 
Expert evidence and the opinion rule ................................................................................. 68 
3.5.1 The opinion rule .......................................................................................................... 68 
3.5.2 Exceptions to the opinion rule .................................................................................... 69 
3.5.3 Managing and communicating expert evidence ......................................................... 73 
Rules governing criminal procedure.................................................................................... 76 
3.6.1 Victoria ........................................................................................................................ 77 
3.6.2 ACT .............................................................................................................................. 78 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 79 
4 Methodology ....................................................................................... 81
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 81 
Interpretive paradigm ......................................................................................................... 81 
Rationale for research design.............................................................................................. 82 
Research questions ............................................................................................................. 83 
4.4.1 Key areas explored in the research ............................................................................. 84 
Qualitative research methods ............................................................................................. 87 
4.5.1 Ethics approval ............................................................................................................ 88 
4.5.2 Interviews .................................................................................................................... 88 
4.5.3 Focus groups ............................................................................................................... 92 
Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 95 
4.6.1 Preliminary analysis ..................................................................................................... 96 
4.6.2 Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS): NVivo ................................. 96 
 ix
4.6.3 Development of codes and thematic analysis ............................................................. 99 
Validity and reliability of qualitative interviews and focus groups .................................... 100 
4.7.1 Internal validity ......................................................................................................... 101 
4.7.2 Reliability ................................................................................................................... 104 
4.7.3 External validity and generalisability ......................................................................... 105 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 106 
5 The realities of legal practice for Australian criminal lawyers ............... 107
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 107 
DNA evidence is common, but is it contentious? .............................................................. 108 
Identifying contentious DNA: is it the science or the investigative procedure? ................ 112 
5.3.1 Scientific understanding ............................................................................................ 112 
5.3.2 Understanding investigative forensic procedures ..................................................... 115 
Is DNA evidence exclusionary evidence that rarely excludes? .......................................... 118 
Is DNA evidence really ‘just another piece of circumstantial evidence’? .......................... 120 
5.5.1 Limitations of DNA evidence as circumstantial evidence .......................................... 122 
5.5.2 DNA evidence as ‘conclusive’ .................................................................................... 124 
5.5.3 Exposing deficiencies in investigative procedures ..................................................... 125 
5.5.4 Decision to prosecute ................................................................................................ 126 
The nature of working on a case-by-case basis ................................................................. 128 
Does your side count? ....................................................................................................... 131 
5.7.1 Casting doubt ............................................................................................................ 131 
5.7.2 Lack of DNA evidence ................................................................................................ 133 
5.7.3 Timing ....................................................................................................................... 133 
5.7.4 Avoiding experts and trial by ambush ....................................................................... 134 
Prosecution and defence considerations .......................................................................... 136 
5.8.1 Lack of defence experts ............................................................................................. 136 
5.8.2 Lawyer competence .................................................................................................. 138 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 141 
6 Difficulties with DNA evidence ............................................................ 143
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 143 
x 
Difficulty with science ....................................................................................................... 145 
6.2.1 Probability ratios and Bayesian statistics .................................................................. 145 
6.2.2 Mixed profiles ........................................................................................................... 155 
Difficulty with pre-trial procedure .................................................................................... 156 
6.3.1 Identifying errors ....................................................................................................... 156 
6.3.2 Investigating and challenging DNA evidence pre-trial ............................................... 158 
6.3.3 Contamination .......................................................................................................... 162 
Procedural difficulties during trial ..................................................................................... 163 
6.4.1 Examining and cross-examining experts in court ...................................................... 164 
6.4.2 The roles and responsibilities of lawyers and experts — blurred boundaries? ......... 168 
Difficulty with communication .......................................................................................... 171 
6.5.1 Forensic reports ........................................................................................................ 172 
6.5.2 Explaining DNA evidence in court ............................................................................. 174 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 180 
7 Educating lawyers about DNA evidence .............................................. 182
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 182 
Formal sources of DNA education ..................................................................................... 183 
7.2.1 Law Institutes and Societies ...................................................................................... 183 
7.2.2 Private CPD course providers .................................................................................... 185 
Lawyers experiences of CPD.............................................................................................. 191 
7.3.1 Talking to other professionals ................................................................................... 195 
7.3.2 Reading and online research ..................................................................................... 201 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 207 
8 Conclusions and recommendations ..................................................... 209
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 209 
Original contribution ......................................................................................................... 209 
Research conclusions ........................................................................................................ 211 
Lawyers’ understanding of DNA evidence ......................................................................... 212 
8.4.1 Limitations of DNA evidence ..................................................................................... 214 
8.4.2 Lawyers’ effectiveness .............................................................................................. 215 
    xi
8.4.3 The process involved ................................................................................................. 216 
8.4.4 Difficulties with DNA evidence .................................................................................. 216 
8.4.5 Legal education ......................................................................................................... 217 
 Recommendations for policy and practice ........................................................................ 218 
8.5.1 Recommendations: the adversarial nature of criminal trials .................................... 218 
8.5.2 Recommendations: DNA education .......................................................................... 220 
8.5.3 Recommendations: the communication of DNA evidence ........................................ 223 
8.5.4 Recommendations: pre-trial information.................................................................. 224 
 Application of the research outside Victoria and the ACT ................................................. 225 
 Further research ............................................................................................................... 225 
 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 226 
9 Appendices ........................................................................................ 228 
 Appendix A – University of Tasmania ethics approval....................................................... 228 
 Appendix B – Victoria Police ethics approval .................................................................... 230 
 Appendix C – Participant information sheet ..................................................................... 231 
 Appendix D – Interview consent form ............................................................................... 236 
 Appendix E – Focus group consent form ........................................................................... 238 
 Appendix F – Interview Questions .................................................................................... 240 
 Appendix G – Focus group questions ................................................................................ 242 
10 Bibliography ....................................................................................... 243 
 
  
  xii 
Abstract 
Multi-disciplinary research into the use of forensic evidence in the criminal justice system allows for 
greater understanding of the processes employed by professionals from the crime scene through to 
the courtroom. Courts have accepted DNA evidence as robust and reliable forensic evidence for over 
30 years. More recently, however, there have been investigations into miscarriages of justice and 
other criminal cases that demonstrate the risks of assuming that DNA evidence is unproblematic. 
These cases have identified a failure by lawyers to challenge and understand this type of evidence. 
Criminal lawyers must ensure that DNA evidence, like all evidence, is explained correctly to the court 
and given the appropriate weight by the fact-finder. Lawyers have been criticised not only for a lack 
of understanding of DNA evidence but also for their lack of effective communication with expert 
witnesses.  
This thesis explores how lawyers understand and challenge DNA evidence in criminal trials in Victoria 
and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). Until this study was conducted, Australian lawyers had not 
been consulted about the criticisms directed towards the profession in Australian and international 
forensic reports. Nor had they been asked about their practical experiences in managing DNA evidence 
in an adversarial criminal justice system. The research for this thesis makes an original contribution to 
the field of forensic and legal studies in several ways. It shares these practical experiences, uncovers 
the tensions that exist in using DNA evidence in an adversarial legal system, assesses the greatest 
areas of difficulty for lawyers and judges in dealing with DNA evidence and evaluates current 
education initiatives aimed at improving lawyers’ knowledge of DNA evidence. This research also 
reveals how the organisational culture of professionals within an adversarial legal system influences 
their use of DNA evidence in criminal trials.  
This thesis analyses these experiences within a legal context. In exploring how lawyers manage and 
use DNA evidence, this thesis seeks answers to two primary research questions. First, what are 
lawyers’ understandings of DNA evidence and what difficulties do they have in dealing with this type 
of evidence in criminal trials?; and second, what training opportunities and resources are available to 
lawyers on DNA evidence and what are lawyers’ views about the value of those opportunities and 
resources? 
Forty practising criminal lawyers were interviewed for this qualitative study. The lawyers were drawn 
from several sources — both private and governmental organisations, law firms and the Private Bar in 
Victoria and the ACT. The perspective of those who observe or interact with criminal lawyers who use 
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DNA evidence in criminal cases was also important. Judges overseeing criminal cases and forensic 
scientists who present DNA evidence in court also took part in a series of focus groups. These groups 
are qualified to reflect on how criminal lawyers present and use DNA evidence both pre-trial and in 
the courtroom. 
This is the first qualitative study to apply a criminological and legal lens to the practical use of DNA 
evidence in an adversarial criminal justice system. The results reveal that most lawyers understand 
the investigative procedures for DNA evidence and the chain of evidence requirements for DNA 
evidence — those areas where error is most likely to lead to miscarriages of justice. More significantly, 
the results suggest that a lack of competence is not the only explanation for lawyers’ mismanagement 
or miscommunication of DNA evidence in criminal trials.  
This thesis argues that cultural and systemic explanations for lawyers’ disengagement with DNA 
evidence and choice to avoid communication with forensic scientists about this evidence should be 
considered when assessing lawyers’ roles in relation to it. The adversarial nature of the Australian 
criminal justice system influences lawyers’ practice and how they learn about DNA evidence. 
Continuing legal education (CLE) providers do not always provide information that is relevant and 
accessible to lawyers when they have the greatest need for this information in their daily practice. 
This thesis makes recommendations for the development of education programs on DNA evidence for 
lawyers. These and other recommendations recognise and consider how lawyers best learn about 
complex evidence and the type of learning environment they are most likely to engage with.  
  xiv 
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1 Introduction 
 Introduction and rationale 
In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences Report Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: 
A Path Forward 1 (NAS Report) in the United States was published and the miscarriage of justice in R v 
Jama2 was exposed, investigated and presented in the Inquiry into the Circumstances that Led to the 
Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama3 (Vincent Report). Both reports recommended that lawyers 
improve their knowledge of forensic evidence, and in Jama’s case, DNA evidence specifically. The key 
criticism? That lawyers do not know enough about DNA evidence to examine and cross-examine 
experts competently or pick up errors pre-trial.  
This thesis seeks to answer the question of how to achieve the recommendations made in the NAS 
and Vincent Reports in order to create lasting change in policy and education on DNA evidence, change 
that will benefit lawyers and that will improve their practice with DNA evidence in criminal trials. This 
is the first research project to ask lawyers about their everyday practice with and use of DNA evidence. 
With this knowledge, policy makers and educators can implement necessary initiatives to reduce the 
problems identified in the NAS and Vincent reports. 
The core of this research is formed by consultation with three key data sets with two jurisdictions. The 
first is interview data obtained from Victorian and Australian Capital Territory (ACT) criminal lawyers. 
The second is focus group data obtained from forensic scientists who test and analyse DNA evidence 
in the laboratory and work with lawyers as expert witnesses. The third data set was obtained from 
focus groups with judges in Victoria and the ACT who arbitrate cases and oversee lawyers using DNA 
evidence. Participants came from these jurisdictions because of Victorian and ACT research partners 
funding the core research grant for this project.4  
                                                             
1 National Research Council Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009) National Academy of Sciences 
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf>. 
2 R v Jama [2008] VCC 0886. 
3 Frank Vincent, Inquiry into the Circumstances that Led to the Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama 
(2010) Parliament of Victoria <http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/papers/govpub/VPARL2006-
10No301.pdf>. 
4 See project information at Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies, Effectiveness of Forensic Science 
in the Criminal Justice System (13 April 2016) University of Tasmania 
<http://www.utas.edu.au/tiles/research/current-projects2/the-effectiveness-of-forensic-science-in-the-
criminal-justice-system>. 
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This research may be distinguished from other studies because it focuses on the practical use of DNA 
evidence by lawyers and provides insight into how and why lawyers act the way that they do in relation 
to this evidence. It uncovers the practical realities and tensions that lawyers face between how they 
‘should’ use DNA evidence and how they do use DNA evidence. This thesis presents crucial information 
for lawyers, policy makers and educators to close the gap between ‘ideal’ practice and how lawyers 
really work. Its aim is to assist in the prevention of further miscarriages of justice in Australia resulting 
from lawyers’ misunderstanding, incompetent handling or misuse of DNA evidence. 
All defendants have the right to a fair trial. Miscarriages of justice clearly subvert that right. Innocent 
people may be convicted of crimes and this undermines community faith in the criminal justice 
system. Lawyers and the courts must understand DNA evidence so that cases with inadequate or 
substandard evidence do not progress to unsafe convictions. The legal profession has a responsibility 
to ensure that DNA evidence is sound and justifiably admitted in trials. Having an understanding and 
working knowledge of DNA evidence is important in ensuring they uphold that this responsibility.  
 Overall research project and industry partners 
The research for this thesis was undertaken as part of an Australian Research Council (ARC) Linkage 
Project called ‘The Effectiveness of Forensic Science in the Criminal Justice System’5 with the 
Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies at the University of Tasmania.6 Industry partners who 
supported this research were Victoria Police, the Australian Federal Police and the National Institute 
of Forensic Science, as well as the academic partners, the University of Technology, Sydney and the 
University of Lausanne, Switzerland.  
 Overview of thesis and its potential contribution 
This thesis involves an interdisciplinary investigation into the relationship between scientific and legal 
milieus. It is crucial to introduce and explain the relevant features of both disciplines to understand 
the context in which this research took place. Chapter 2 locates this research within existing research 
and the problems with DNA evidence identified in criminal cases. Previous research and case law 
suggest that there is room for improvement in lawyers’ knowledge and use of DNA evidence. Formal 
                                                             
5 See Chapter 4 for more information on the research grant and overall project. 
6 University of Tasmania, Research (6 November 2014) Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies 
<www. utas.edu.au/tiles/research>. 
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reviews like the NAS and Vincent reports also provide justification for this investigation as they urge 
lawyers to improve their knowledge of DNA evidence.  
Chapter 3 then introduces forensic science as a discipline and DNA evidence as expert opinion 
evidence under the framework of the Australian uniform evidence legislation.7 It then explains the 
adversarial legal system that Victorian and ACT criminal lawyers work within. This chapter also 
demonstrates the importance of lawyers’ understanding of DNA evidence as part of the right to a fair 
trial under domestic and international law. Finally, the ACT and Victorian rules governing criminal 
procedure are introduced.  
For this research, a qualitative research study was designed to gather the personal experiences and 
insights of lawyers, forensic scientists and judges who work with DNA evidence. Chapter 4 explains 
the methodology used including the interpretive paradigm employed, the rationale for using a 
qualitative approach and the research questions underpinning this project. Analysis was assisted by 
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) software and checks on the validity and 
reliability of the qualitative research ensured rigour and transparency.  
Chapter 5 is the first of the data and analysis chapters. it provides an explanation of how the legal 
culture of working within an adversarial system influences the everyday practice of lawyers when they 
use DNA evidence. The ‘realities’ that lawyers face in using and understanding DNA evidence is 
presented in this chapter. It is important to explore these realities for Victorian and ACT lawyers, in 
order to ensure that the recommendations made in Chapter 8 are relevant and realistic both 
theoretically, for academics, policy makers and educators, and practicably, for lawyers in practice.  
Chapter 6 presents data and analysis on the difficulties lawyers experience with DNA evidence. This 
chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explains and explores in detail the difficulties 
that lawyers have with the scientific principles of DNA evidence. The second section deals with 
difficulties identified in pre-trial and trial procedure and the third section explores difficulties they 
encounter with the communication of DNA evidence in written reports, in explaining DNA evidence in 
court and in asking the right questions of forensic biologists as expert witnesses.  
The NAS and Vincent reports criticised lawyers for their lack of knowledge and misuse of DNA evidence 
and therefore recommended that lawyers should invest in further education in this area. For this 
thesis, this prompted an investigation of the educational options currently available to lawyers in 
                                                             
7 Those Acts included in the uniform evidence schedule are the following: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Evidence 
Act 2004 (Norfolk Island); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT); 
Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic). The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) applies in the ACT. 
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Victoria and the ACT. These are presented, analysed and compared with educational offerings 
elsewhere in Australia and overseas in Chapter 7. Formal and informal sources of education are 
explained and lawyers’ views of their own experience with Continuing Professional Development 
(CPD) are presented. 
Conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter 8. This chapter brings together the 
threads of the earlier chapters by revisiting research questions and summarising how each of the 
chapters has answered them. Two general recommendations are made. The first reiterates that 
change can and will only occur if relevant information and resources that help lawyers to learn about 
DNA evidence are available to them on a case-by-case basis. Those who educate lawyers need to 
consider how adults, and specifically lawyers, learn about new information. It is also clear that 
information to support knowledge acquisition must be available in various formats including via direct 
communication with experts or other lawyers, from online sources and texts or journal articles on 
relevant topics. The second recommendation aims to achieve improved communication between 
lawyers and experts by suggesting that greater opportunity be provided for both prosecution and 
defence lawyers to form relationships with forensic scientists and gain greater confidence in asking 
questions about DNA and other forensic evidence. These recommendations reference the analysis 
presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7 and the data obtained from interviewees and focus group 
participants. Special care must be taken to implement initiatives that take into account how lawyers 
work in an adversarial system on a case-by-case basis.  
 Unique contribution 
This thesis offers original insights because it makes both a practical and theoretical contribution to 
existing knowledge in this area. It assists lawyers by presenting relevant information on DNA evidence 
and various educational programs and materials available both online and in person. The thesis may 
provide a framework for lawyers to improve their knowledge and use of DNA evidence in the trial 
context. This research has theoretical and practical relevance because it identifies the practicalities, 
difficulties and logistical issues faced by lawyers in Victoria and the ACT in using DNA evidence. It also 
provides some explanation as to why miscarriages of justice like that which occurred in Jama continue 
to happen, despite an increase in the lawyers’ knowledge about DNA evidence. By identifying the 
current opportunities for lawyers to engage in DNA evidence education and by assessing the 
usefulness of these training opportunities, this thesis recommends and promotes an evidence-based 
approach to educating lawyers. 
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 Conclusion 
This thesis introduces cases in Chapter 2 that demonstrate that DNA evidence remains problematic in 
Victoria and the ACT. These cases, and subsequent investigation and reporting on their outcomes 
provide the rationale for the research presented in this thesis into how lawyers understand and deal 
with DNA evidence. This thesis explains, however, that it is not merely a lack of understanding that 
influences lawyers’ behaviour in dealing with DNA evidence. Legal culture and tensions arising from 
working within an adversarial system also shape lawyers’ approach to this evidence. Although legal 
culture cannot excuse misuse or misunderstanding of DNA evidence, it can provide insight into how 
lawyers might improve their communication skills with forensic biologists and so obtain greater 
knowledge of that evidence. Lawyers needed to be asked about education on DNA evidence as well 
and given the ability to respond to criticisms of their level of knowledge and how legal education works 
in practice for criminal lawyers. 
Chapter 2 explores the justification for the research questions explored in this research. It discusses 
the previous research that has been conducted in this area, formal reports produced by research 
bodies and independent legal commissioners and the relevant case law from Victoria and the ACT in 
this area.  
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2 Justifications for the research 
 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the previous research on lawyers in the field of forensic science, forensic 
scientists and their views of lawyers using DNA evidence, judges understanding and the impact of the 
evidence on jurors. It also explores case law involving DNA evidence and reports into miscarriages of 
justice and the use of forensic evidence in criminal cases, all of which provide justification for this 
study on lawyers’ perceptions and management of DNA evidence in criminal cases. Research in this 
area crosses the divide between the forensic and legal worlds. However, there has been little research 
that focuses on lawyers’ perceptions and management of DNA evidence within the criminal justice 
system. The research to date suggests that lawyers lack comprehensive understanding of DNA 
evidence, they have a lack of confidence in dealing with DNA evidence and they fail to communicate 
effectively with DNA experts pre-trial. These topics comprise the central components of this study. 
Analysis of Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and High Court case law over the last five years provides 
evidence of confusion by lawyers and the legal system about DNA analysis generally, probability ratios 
and statistics.1 This influenced the research and interview questions on probability ratios and statistics 
and prompted investigation into the areas that lawyers found difficult to understand in practice.  
Major investigations into, and consequent reports about, miscarriages of justice in cases involving 
DNA evidence have recommended that lawyers need to improve their knowledge and understanding 
of DNA evidence. These recommendations provide an important justification for this study. The 
chapter begins by introducing relevant previous research with lawyers, juries, forensic scientists and 
the judiciary, and DNA evidence more generally. It continues with a summary of the case law with 
issues arising in the areas of expression of DNA evidence using probability ratios and statistics and the 
relationships between the standard of proof and how lawyers manage DNA evidence in their criminal 
cases. Finally, it introduces formal reviews of the forensic process in this area, including the Inquiry 
into the Circumstances that Led to the Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama (Vincent Report)2 into 
the Jama case in Victoria,3 the Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 
                                                             
1 A review of Victorian case law suggests that this is not as great an issue with DNA evidence in that jurisdiction, 
but the miscarriage of justice in R v Jama [2008] VCC 0886 provides more than adequate justification for 
research to be conducted into the use of DNA evidence in criminal trials in Victoria. 
2 Frank Vincent, Inquiry into the Circumstances that Led to the Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama (2010) 
Parliament of Victoria <http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/papers/govpub/VPARL2006-10No301.pdf>. 
3 R v Jama [2008] VCC 0886. 
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repot (NAS Report) in the United States4 and other relevant Australian and overseas Royal 
Commissions and reports.  
 Previous research 
Research on the use of DNA evidence in criminal cases is slowly becoming more widely published in 
the legal and forensic science literature in Australia and overseas. Recent studies have investigated 
jurors’ perceptions pre- and post-trial of DNA evidence,5 forensic scientists’ opinions of lawyers’ 
understanding of DNA evidence,6 and criticisms by the judiciary on how lawyers examine and cross-
examine expert witnesses, including forensic biologists in criminal trials.7 Fewer studies have 
investigated lawyers’ experiences with DNA evidence.8 Nevertheless, existing research does suggest 
that there is room for improvement in lawyers’ knowledge and management of DNA evidence.  
The research questions investigated in this study9 were constructed on the basis of prior research in 
this area as it consistently suggests that although lawyers and jurors attach a high level of importance 
to DNA evidence, they often lack understanding of that evidence, or in the case of lawyers, deal with 
the evidence unsatisfactorily. The combined effect of earlier research suggests that lawyers are not 
performing their role competently in introducing DNA experts and their evidence to the court. 
Moreover, this appears to be a view held not only by other participants in the trial process — jurors, 
expert witnesses and judicial officers — but also by lawyers themselves. The relevant studies are 
discussed below and their implications for lawyers and the present research are considered. 
                                                             
4 National Research Council Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009) National Academy of Sciences. 
5 Jane Goodman-Delahunty and Lindsay Hewson, ‘Improving Jury Understanding and Use of Expert DNA 
Evidence’ (2010) 37 AIC Reports, Technical and Background Paper Series, 1–68; Rhonda Wheate, Jury 
Comprehension and Use of Forensic Science (D Phil Thesis, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence 
Force Academy, 2007); Lisa Smith, Ray Bull and Robyn Holliday, ‘Understanding Juror Perceptions of Forensic 
Evidence: Investigating the Impact of Case Context on Perceptions of Forensic Evidence Strength’ (2011) 
56(2) Journal of Forensic Sciences 409; Michael Briody, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on Sexual Offence Cases 
in Court’ (2002) 14(2) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 159; Michael Briody, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on 
Homicide Cases in Court’ (2004) 37(2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 231.  
6 Wheate, above n 5. 
7 Ian Freckelton, Prasuna Reddy and Hugh Selby, Australian Judicial Perspectives on Expert Evidence: An 
Empirical Study (The Australian Institute of Judicial Administration Incorporated, 1999); Briody, ‘The Effects 
of DNA Evidence on Sexual Offence Cases in Court’, above n 5; Briody, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on 
Homicide Cases in Court’, above n 5. 
8 Victoria Grace et al, Forensic DNA Evidence on Trial: Science and Uncertainty in the Courtroom (ISCE 
Publishing, 2011); Mark Findlay and Julia Grix, ‘Challenging Forensic Evidence? Observations on the use of 
DNA in Certain Criminal Trials’ (2003) 14(3) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 269. 
9 See 4.4: Research questions. 
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2.2.1 Lawyers 
There have been relatively few studies on lawyers and their perceptions and handling of DNA 
evidence. In 2008, Wheate noted a dearth of literature in this area directed at the legal and scientific 
communities.10 The research that has been undertaken has focussed primarily on learning about 
lawyers’ perceptions of DNA evidence. It suggests that lawyers have high expectations of DNA 
evidence, often believing it to be certain, yet this necessarily hampers their ability to manage the same 
misconception held by jurors.  
Research conducted by the Environmental and Science Research (ESR) group11 in New Zealand found 
that, like investigators and lay people, lawyers believe that DNA evidence is 100% certain.12 Findlay 
and Grix,13 in their 2003 review of the Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 (NSW), found that lawyers 
in New South Wales consider DNA to be crucial identification evidence for the prosecution case. The 
implications of this finding lie in the importance of ascertaining whether this belief influences how 
they manage and understand the evidence in their day-to-day practice. Findlay and Grix interviewed 
prosecutors, defence barristers and judicial officers and observed trials to establish how legal 
professionals perceive DNA evidence in New South Wales.14 Their research relied on interviews and 
observational data of lawyers managing DNA evidence in criminal trials. They suggest that legal 
counsel have a responsibility to manage bias demonstrated by jurors in favour of DNA evidence and 
this gives them the ‘unenviable role of presenting evidence beyond the ordinary purview of the law 
itself to jurors who have already formed often incorrect ideas about the evidence.’15 Lawyers are 
unlikely to be able to do this if they themselves share the same biased views of DNA evidence.  
Grace, Midgley, Veth and Ahuriri-Driscoll’s research in New Zealand in 2010 considers how lawyers 
deal with DNA evidence. It too suggests that lawyers have unrealistic expectations of the certainty of 
DNA results and this has underpinned the creation of research and interview questions that asked 
lawyers if they felt there were any limitations to DNA evidence16 and the level of certainty they felt 
                                                             
10 Rhonda Wheate, ‘Australian Forensic Scientists: A View From the Witness Box’ (2008) 40(2) Australian 
Journal of Forensic Sciences 123, 124. 
11 Johanna Veth, Annabel Ahuriri-Driscoll, Victoria Grace and Gerald Midgley, ‘Lay and Professional 
Understandings of Forensic DNA Evidence’ as cited in James Wallman, Claude Roux and Chris Lennard (2011) 
7(1) Forensic Science, Medicine and Pathology 75-138. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Findlay and Grix, above n 8, 270. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid 276. 
16 See 4.4.1 Research question 2A. 
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the evidence provided for their criminal cases by asking what they understood DNA evidence to mean 
for their criminal practice.17 
Data collected and conclusions drawn by these researchers and others in researching juries, forensic 
scientists and judicial officers also suggest a gap in our understanding of how lawyers practically 
manage and understand DNA evidence in criminal trials. These studies are discussed briefly below. 
2.2.2 Juries 
Research that reveals jurors’ perceptions of DNA evidence is important because it will help denote 
lawyers’ responsibilities or the nature of the tasks facing lawyers when dealing with DNA evidence in 
jury trials. Further research into jurors’ perceptions of how lawyers handle DNA evidence is important 
because it reveals whether lawyers are discharging their duties as advocates in presenting cogent, 
reliable, conceptually available evidence, free from misconceptions, and/or whether they effectively 
challenge evidence where that is necessary. Jury research on DNA evidence reveals that jurors neither 
convict nor acquit more often with the presence or absence of DNA evidence.18 Even if it were 
influencing jurors, the effect of the so called ‘CSI effect’19 is potentially reduced as knowledge about 
DNA is increased with more visual presentation of the evidence, for example using a PowerPoint 
presentation for the basic scientific propositions for DNA evidence testing and analysis.  
Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson conducted extensive research on juror understanding of DNA 
evidence for the Australian Institute of Criminology.20 Their 2010 study was the first to consider 
whether a tutorial about DNA evidence actually helps jurors in understanding the evidence and assists 
in their deliberations.21 The tutorial used for their study was 18 minutes long and cognitively-
sequenced,22 presenting uncontested information on DNA profiling and the random match 
probabilities and statistics used in trials.23 It was delivered as part of a simulated trial and based on 
                                                             
17 See 4.4.1 Research question 1A. 
18 Rachel Diosa-Villa, ‘Is there Evidence of a CSI Effect?’ in Kevin J Strom and Matthew J Hickman, ‘Forensic 
Science and the Administration of Justice’ (Sage, 2015) 21.  
19 When there is an unrealistic expectation of what forensic evidence can prove generated by popular crime 
shows. See Simon A Cole and Rachel Diosa-Villa, ‘CSI and Its Effects: Media, Juries and the Burden of Proof’ 
(2007) 41(3) New England Law Review 435. 
20 Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson, above n 5, 1. 
21 Warren Young, ‘Possible Changes to Jury Trial Practice’ (Paper presented at the Australian Institute of Judicial 
Administration Criminal Trial Reform Conference, Melbourne, 24 March 2000). 
22 Referring to presenting the information in an order that flowed from the collection of the trace evidence 
through to testing and analysis of the evidence in a laboratory and by a statistician. 
23 Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson, above n 5, 1, viii–ix. 
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real case facts and transcripts from a homicide matter. The DNA sample in question suggested a 
‘strong link’ to the defendant but was adduced in an otherwise weak circumstantial case. 
Important for this research, was the key finding that the presence of DNA evidence increased 
conviction rates and that the tutorial increased juror knowledge of DNA evidence.24 Using visual aids 
to assist presentation of DNA evidence also assisted and facilitated learning by members of the jury. 
Mock jury members taking part in this research were found to lack insight into their own experiences 
with DNA evidence prior to viewing the PowerPoint presentation.25 This begs the question whether 
lawyers can assess and control jury bias toward DNA evidence if jury members themselves are unable 
to recognise the influence of DNA evidence on their own trial experience. The finding that visual 
tutorials increased knowledge of DNA evidence by jurors might go some way to answering this 
question. It demonstrates that communication of the evidence (by lawyers) is important.  
Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson’s work is further supported by that of Findlay and Grix who found 
that jury confusion about DNA evidence stems from conceptual difficulties they experience arising 
from the presentation of the evidence and problems they have in determining how much weight to 
give to the evidence at trial.26 Many of the mock jurors surveyed before the trial took place, exhibited 
strong pre-existing assumptions about how DNA evidence determines guilt or innocence in criminal 
cases.27 Post-trial jurors were still confused about DNA evidence, despite the introduction of DNA 
evidence by lawyers and forensic scientists in the mock trial.28 
This suggests that lawyers are presenting DNA evidence to jurors who are confused about how much 
weight to attribute to DNA evidence and what it can prove.29 At the same time, the proliferation of 
modern crime television programs30 and the documented ‘CSI effect’31 appear to embed perceptions 
among lay people that DNA evidence has a high degree of certainty and reliability. This research 
accepts that lawyers are presenting evidence to jurors with often very high expectations of DNA 
evidence and this places an even greater responsibility on lawyers to understand and competently 
introduce and challenge the evidence in court. One of the core aims of this study was to identify where 
                                                             
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid ix–xi. 
26 Findlay and Grix, above n 8, 275. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Findlay and Grix, above n 8, 276. 
30 For example, television shows such as CSI: New York, CSI: Miami, Bones and Criminal Minds.  
31 When there is an unrealistic expectation of what forensic evidence can prove as a result of popular crime 
shows, see Diosa-Villa, above n 18; and Cole and Diosa-Villa, above n 19. 
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lawyers struggled with the evidence so that they might improve the way they manage DNA evidence 
in criminal trials and meet that responsibility more competently. 
2.2.3 Forensic scientists 
It is important to know what studies of forensic scientists reveal in this area because they present 
evidence to lawyers and the courtroom as expert witnesses and they are in an excellent position to 
comment on how well lawyers manage their evidence in the courtroom. The overall tenor of the 
conclusions of research in this area are that forensic scientists generally view lawyers as being ill-
equipped to present and/or challenge DNA at trial. This is attributed to significant gaps in their 
knowledge and understanding of DNA evidence and their failure to engage in useful communication 
with forensic scientists prior to trial.  
Lawyers’ perceived inadequate preparation for trials and presentation of DNA evidence is of particular 
concern to Australian forensic scientists.32 Additionally, they consider lawyers to have problems 
communicating discipline-specific terminology and jargon to jurors and the judiciary.33 According to 
forensic scientists, lawyers fail to understand basic forensic principles associated with DNA evidence34 
and miscomprehend the role of crime scene examiners at the crime scene, forensic biologists in the 
laboratory and statisticians who work with probability ratios in the analysis phase.35 
Flaws in communication and the eliciting of evidence at trial were linked by some forensic scientists 
in Wheate’s study to the adversarial nature of the criminal trial. They found defence lawyers’ 
behaviour to be counterproductive in this regard in that they were ‘gleeful, rude, loud, sarcastic and 
offensive.’36 Forensic scientists also criticised lawyers for inadequate questioning techniques. Their 
questions left forensic scientists feeling that inappropriate weight or unintended meaning might be 
given to their answers. The structure, logic, relevance and sense of questions and the overall 
examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination of forensic scientists were major issues 
for the scientists involved.37 They often found that they were unable to adequately elucidate their 
evidence due to the nature of the questions put to them, and they lost control of how the evidence 
was presented so that in their minds what was presented in court was not entirely accurate. While 
                                                             
32 Wheate, above n 10. 
33 Ibid 125–128. 
34 Ibid; Simon Walsh, ‘Legal Perceptions of Forensic DNA Profiling Part I: A Review of the Legal Literature’ (2005) 
155(1) Forensic Science International 51. 
35 Wheate, above n 10. 
36 Ibid 131. 
37 Ibid.  
 
Lawyers and DNA: Understanding and challenging the evidence 
 12 
many forensic scientists were more positive about judicial officers’ ability to understand or willingness 
to seek clarification of forensic evidence,38 many judges, nevertheless, were believed to be confused 
by conflicting expert opinion. These views were also found in earlier research surveying the entire 
Australian judiciary in 1999.39 
There is a manifest need for ongoing dialogue between lawyers and experts in criminal cases, if the 
former are to understand and not to surprise the latter and vice versa. In Wheate’s study, Australian 
and New Zealand lawyers did not have sufficient contact with forensic scientists pre-trial,40 did not ask 
appropriate questions in order to elicit the most accurate and relevant information from forensic 
scientists41 and did not understand the language of the forensic disciplines.42 This research focused 
primarily on the collection of evidence; how forensic scientists deal with legal counsel before and 
during legal proceedings; and their interactions with judges, juries and other forensic experts when 
giving expert evidence.43 
In relation to lawyers’ inadequate knowledge and understanding of DNA evidence, Wheate 
recommends that lawyers attend training to ensure they are updated about developments in DNA 
evidence and are aware of its limitations. Lawyers’ views about their interactions with forensic 
scientists in criminal cases involving DNA evidence have not been canvassed in Australian research. 
The present study aims to fill that gap. It also aims to provide recommendations for training providers 
and legal organisations in making legal education about DNA evidence both relevant and useful for 
lawyers. 
2.2.4 Judges and the judiciary 
Research on the judiciary has called for further training for lawyers to assist in the presentation of 
evidence, including DNA evidence, by expert witnesses.  
Freckelton, Reddy and Selby44 conducted a comprehensive survey of Australian judges and magistrates 
to gauge their views on the presentation of expert evidence in court. Their 1999 study, although 
conducted more than fifteen years ago, recommended that lawyers complete training on how to 
                                                             
38 Ibid 134–135. 
39 Freckelton, Reddy and Selby, above n 7. 
40 Wheate, above n 10, 126. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid 128–129. 
43 Wheate, above n 5. 
44 Freckelton, Reddy and Selby, above n 7. 
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introduce or cross-examine experts.45 This was based on judges’ opinions of how lawyers questioned 
expert witnesses46 and dealt with irreconcilable expert testimony.47 The recommendation for further 
training for lawyers in this area is a common one. It continues to be made in forensic science 
literature,48 reviews into miscarriage of justice cases49 and reviews of forensic process around the 
world.50 
2.2.5 DNA evidence generally 
Research conducted into the use of DNA evidence generally, has found that DNA evidence has a 
marked effect on court outcomes — in particular, convictions — and under-prepared legal counsel 
may play a role in allowing miscarriages of justice to occur.  
Briody conducted research into the effect of DNA evidence in two types of criminal cases — homicide 
and sexual assault cases.51 His research focused on the overall effect that DNA evidence had on court 
outcomes.52 This makes it relevant for lawyers presenting this evidence in such trials. One hundred 
and fifty completed cases that had been recommended by police for prosecution in Queensland were 
examined in Briody’s homicide study. Half of these cases were used as a control group, without DNA 
evidence, and the other half involved DNA evidence in some way.  
Two independent variables were found to be significant predictors of homicide cases proceeding to 
trial: DNA evidence and the accused being male.53 This result confirmed the hypothesis that a higher 
proportion of homicide cases would reach court if DNA evidence was presented.54 DNA evidence was 
found to be a strong predictor of decisions to prosecute by the Office of the Department of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP). The study found that the odds of a case reaching trial were more than 14 (14.69) 
times higher when there was DNA evidence than when there was not.55 
                                                             
45 Ibid 5. 
46 Ibid 2. 
47 Ibid 4. 
48 Wheate, above n 5. 
49 Vincent Report, above n 2, 32. 
50 NAS Report, above n 4. 
51 Briody, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on Sexual Offence Cases in Court’, above n 5; Briody, ‘The Effects of 
DNA Evidence on Homicide Cases in Court’, above n 5. 
52 Briody, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on Sexual Offence Cases in Court’, above n 5; Briody, ‘The Effects of 
DNA Evidence on Homicide Cases in Court’, above n 5. 
53 Briody, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on Homicide Cases in Court’, above n 5, 245. 
54 The sample size in this study was, however, only 75 cases, so the generalisability of the findings is limited.  
55 Briody, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on Homicide Cases in Court’, above n 5, 245. 
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Briody also found that juries were more likely to convict where the prosecution adduces DNA evidence 
in homicide cases,56 and the odds of a conviction in cases with DNA evidence are much higher than 
without.57 This finding supports Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson’s conclusion58 that, in particular 
case configurations, the addition of DNA evidence was found to change the predicted jury outcomes 
from acquittals to convictions.59 
Briody’s sexual assault research involved 200 closed cases in Queensland — 102 presented DNA 
evidence and 98 did not and acted as a control group.60 There were correlations found between DNA 
evidence in sexual assault matters and the decision to prosecute, the jury’s verdict, whether an 
offender received a prison sentence and slightly longer prison sentences when an offender was found 
guilty.61 The significance of this research for the present study is that it shows the existence of DNA 
evidence may result in erroneous convictions. This means that lawyers have a duty to ensure that this 
evidence is reliable. Understanding how lawyers deal with DNA evidence in criminal trials is an 
important step toward improving their use and understanding of this evidence and preventing flawed 
decision-making. 
In the United States, Collins and Jarvis reviewed case files from 283 post-conviction exonerations that 
occurred between 1989 and 2007 as part of the Innocence Project.62 Their research examined the 
degree to which forensic science was found to be responsible for the wrongful convictions.63 The 
leading cause in fact, was found to be eyewitness misidentifications, followed by false confessions.64 
Problematic forensic evidence, including DNA evidence was not one of the causes of conviction 
discussed in this research. However, of significance for the present research is the finding that in three 
of the 283 reviewed cases, ‘bad lawyering and government misconduct’ was considered to be the 
reason behind the unsafe conviction.65 Preliminary evidence suggests however, that nearly ‘all of the 
                                                             
56 Ibid 250. 
57 Ibid, 237. The author warns of using these results as conclusive evidence due to the small sample size.  
58 Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson, above n 5. 
59 Briody, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on Homicide Cases in Court’, above n 5. 
60 Briody, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on Sexual Offence Cases in Court’, above n 5, 161. 
61 Ibid 179. 
62 The first Innocence Project was begun by Barry C Scheck and Peter J Neufeld at the Benjamin N Cardozo 
School of Law, University of New York City in 1992. See <www.innocenceproject.org> for information on over 
300 cases of exonerated individuals and the work conducted by this and other innocence projects. 
63 John Collins and Jay Jarvis, ‘The Wrongful Conviction of Forensic Science’ (2009) 1 Forensic Science Policy & 
Management: An International Journal 17. 
64 Ibid 25.  
65 Ibid. 
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overturned convictions could have been prevented by more competent and ethical legal counsel on 
both sides.’66  
Also in the United States is the work of Garrett, who examined the first 250 cases of wrongfully 
convicted people who were later exonerated due to DNA testing. His findings suggest that 
incompetence, abuse of process and error on the part of crime scene examiners, police and lawyers 
were responsible for a majority of the convictions.67 These findings suggest that knowledgeable and 
competent legal counsel may prevent wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice from occurring 
in certain criminal cases.  
In similar American research by Saks and Koehler,68 forensic science identification errors and false or 
misleading testimony from forensic scientists was responsible for errors in 63% and 27% respectively 
of a sample of wrongful convictions taken from the Innocence Project. Although these findings were 
based on a smaller sample size than that of Collins and Jarvis’s study, it nevertheless signifies the 
powerful effect of forensic evidence on court outcomes. 
Of concern is the scarcity of research into what lawyers understand about the science or presentation 
of DNA evidence, particularly given the results of the research studies discussed above. Collins and 
Jarvis’ American research demonstrates that lawyers play an influential role in wrongful convictions 
in that jurisdiction — supporting the argument that competent lawyers with good understanding of 
the evidence presented might protect people from miscarriage of justice convictions.  
If that is also the case in Australia, then cases with DNA evidence are at risk of becoming miscarriages 
of justice — purely because lawyers may not be dealing competently with the evidence and expert 
witnesses in court. If jurors are increasingly relying on DNA evidence, then the role lawyers play in 
questioning expert witnesses and explaining how DNA evidence affects criminal cases becomes even 
more important. These studies present lawyers with the challenge of managing the expectations of 
jurors, the judiciary and forensic scientists, all while presenting the strength of DNA evidence 
accurately. What is missing is research that explores lawyers’ experiences of DNA evidence and the 
difficulties associated with its interpretation and presentation in criminal trials. This research aims to 
fill that gap. 
                                                             
66 Ibid.  
67  Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong (Harvard University 
Press, 2011) 
68 Michael J Saks and Jonathan J Koelher, ‘The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science’ (2005) 
309 Science 892. 
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 The use of DNA in criminal trials 
A study that explores the use of DNA evidence by lawyers in criminal trials, requires an investigation 
into the relevant case law in the jurisdictions that are under examination. Case law in other 
jurisdictions provides further evidence of some of the current issues facing lawyers in dealing with 
DNA evidence in Australian courts. Courts are increasingly and routinely accepting DNA evidence.69 
DNA evidence, analysed by qualified forensic biologists in accredited laboratories, is seen by the courts 
as a reliable form of expert evidence under s 79 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), Evidence Act 2008 
(Victoria) and Evidence Act 2005 (Cth). There are ongoing issues, however, with the presentation or 
interpretation of DNA evidence in court — as evidenced by the discussions of the case law below and 
the research outlined above.70 
Courts are increasingly routinely accepting DNA evidence.71 Experts are increasingly demonstrating 
the validity of their investigative techniques and because laboratories used for DNA testing are 
accredited, DNA evidence is generally accepted by the court as a reliable form of evidence (although 
there are calls for improvements in relation to forensic disciplines other than DNA evidence).72 There 
are still issues, however, with the presentation or interpretation of DNA evidence in court. Yet case 
law and research present only a small sample of the problems still being identified by practitioners, 
scientists and academics as to the use of DNA. The present study aims to investigate several of the 
concerns identified in the research and case law and those not yet considered by Australian research. 
Haesler J, when Deputy Senior Public Defender in New South Wales, regularly published information 
on the use of DNA in criminal trials on the New South Wales Public Defender’s website,73 in journal 
                                                             
69 Henry Roberts, ‘Interpretation of DNA Evidence in Courts of Law: A Survey of the Issues’ (1998) 30 Australian 
Journal of Forensic Sciences 29. 
70 Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson, above n 5; Wheate, above n 5; Briody, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on 
Sexual Offence Cases in Court’, above n 5; Briody, ‘The Effects of DNA Evidence on Homicide Cases in Court’, 
above n 5; all of the studies that suggest issues with presentation or interpretation of DNA evidence by any 
of the legal institutions. 
71 Roberts, above n 69. 
72 See Gary Edmond, ‘The admissibility of forensic science and medicine evidence under the Uniform Evidence 
Law’ (2014) 38 Criminal Law Journal 136; Gary Edmond, ‘Impartiality, Efficiency or Reliability? A Critical 
Response to Expert Evidence Law and Procedure in Australia’ (2010) 42(2) Australian Journal of Forensic 
Sciences 83; Also see Gary Edmond, ‘Actual Innocents? Legal Limitations and their Implications for Forensic 
Science and Medicine’ (2011) 43(2-3) Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 177. 
73 See Andrew Haesler, DNA for Defence Lawyers (25 May 2011) NSW Public Defender’s Office 
<http://www.publicdefenders.nsw.gov.au/Documents/dnafordefencelawyers.pdf>; Andrew Haesler, DNA 
in the Local Court (February 2009) NSW Public Defender’s Office 
<http://www.publicdefenders.nsw.gov.au/Pages/public_defenders_research/Papers%20by%20Public%20D
efenders/public_defenders_dna_local_court.aspx>; and Andrew Haesler, DNA in the Local Court – the CSI 
Effect (September 2010) NSW Public Defender’s Office, 
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articles74 and at academic conferences.75 He argued that defence counsel often failed to scrutinise 
areas of potential weakness that might undermine the validity of DNA evidence, including, partial 
matches, weak readings with stutter or drop out, mixtures, contamination, bias in the lab, inadvertent 
or second transfer and problems with the statistics.76 Haesler’s publications on the NSW Public 
Defender’s website were also reportedly used by lawyers, including prosecutors, from jurisdictions 
outside NSW.77 
The acceptability of DNA technology depends on the coherence of those testifying and their 
effectiveness as communicators.78 Although it is extremely important for experts to communicate 
their evidence effectively, it is equally important for lawyers who question experts and summarise 
their evidence to the court, to explain clearly the legal implications of the results to jurors. Trial lawyers 
also have a responsibility to ‘test’ the evidence that is introduced by expert witnesses.79 
Edwards suggests a detailed checklist of issues for lawyers to consider when they work with DNA 
evidence.80 This is intended to alert lawyers to the fallibility of DNA results and the frequency of 
contamination and error in the interpretation and presentation of statistics. Edwards aims to prevent 
blind acceptance of laboratory results and reports and encourages careful scrutiny of DNA results.81 
The check list provides important information about DNA contamination and laboratory error 
including, but not limited to the following: 
• that it happens a lot;  
• that it happens in Australia;  
• that it can and does happen at every stage of the evidentiary process;  
• that sometimes it cannot be detected; and  
                                                             
<http://www.publicdefenders.nsw.gov.au/Pages/public_defenders_research/Papers%20by%20Public%20D
efenders/public_defenders_dna_local_court_csi_effect.aspx>.  
74 Andrew Haesler, ‘DNA in Court’ (2008) 8(1) Judicial Review 121. 
75 See for example, Andrew Haesler, ‘Issues in Gathering, Interpreting and Delivering DNA Evidence’ (Paper 
presented at Expert Evidence Conference, Canberra, February 2011) <http://njca.com.au/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/Judge-Andrew-Haesler-SC-Issues-in-Gathering-Interpreting-and-Delivering-DNA-
Evidence-paper.pdf>.  
76 Haesler, above n 74. 
77 Interview with L2 (21 June 2011).  
78 Ian Freckelton, ‘DNA Profiling: Forensic Science Under the Microscope’ (1990) 14(1) Criminal Law Journal 23.  
79 Ibid. 
80 Kirsten Edwards, ‘Ten Things Lawyers Should Know About DNA Evidence’ (2005) 29 Criminal Law Journal 71. 
81 Ibid. 
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• that it is not too hard for a lawyer to understand the risks of human error.82 
The presentation of statistical probabilities has also proved to be problematic in some cases. In 
Australia, trial judges and lawyers are constrained in their ability to define the term ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’83 when addressing juries. However, what they say about DNA evidence may very 
well influence the way jurors approach the task of assessing it either alone or in conjunction with other 
evidence,84 and ultimately decide the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the early years of DNA 
evidence, it was ruled in several cases that such evidence was inadmissible on the basis that its 
probative value was outweighed by its tendency to produce a misleading and confusing impression 
for the jury.85 The more modern view, however, is that DNA evidence is probative, in most cases 
reliable, and is a common item of evidence in criminal cases worldwide.  
DNA evidence may be presented as a match probability — for example, ‘the chance that a particular 
individual related to the defendant will match the DNA profile from the crime sample is 1 in 400,000.’ 
It may also be presented as a likelihood ratio — the probability of a match given the defendant is guilty 
against the probability of a match given the defendant is innocent.86 Essentially two questions may be 
asked of DNA evidence —  
1. What is the probability that the defendant’s DNA profile will match the profile from the crime 
sample, given that he or she is innocent? 
2. What is the probability that the defendant is innocent, given that his or her DNA profile 
matches the profile from the crime sample? 
The first question focuses on the assumption that the accused is innocent and then asks what the 
chances are of a match. The second question is of relevance to the courts because it focuses on the 
likelihood of innocence or guilt if in fact the sample is deemed to ‘match’ the accused’s profile. The 
‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ arises when the answer to the first question is given as the answer to the 
second.87 Two examples of the prosecutor’s fallacy are contained in the following statements: that 
                                                             
82 Ibid. 
83 See Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584; Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28. 
84 Jeremy Gans and Gregor Urbas, ‘DNA Identification in the Criminal Justice System’ (2002) 226 Australian 
Institute of Criminology: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1, 4. 
85 See R v Tran (1980) 50 A Crim R 233; R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109; and R v Percerep [1993] 2 VR 109. 
86 David J Balding and Peter Donnell, ‘The Prosecutors Fallacy and DNA Evidence’ (1994) Criminal Law Review 
711. The term ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ was created by William C. Thompson and Edward L. Shumann, 
‘Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's 
Fallacy’ (1987) 2 (3) Law and Human Behavior 167.  
87 Ibid 716. 
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‘the chance that the DNA in the crime scene sample came from someone other than the defendant is 
1 in 300,000’ and ‘the probability that the defendant is innocent given the DNA evidence is 1 in 
300,000.’88 The correct statement is that the ‘chance of a match to a random member of the 
population (i.e. not the accused) is 1 in 300,000.’  
Another example of the prosecutor’s fallacy was given in R v Doheny and Adams: 
It is easy if one eschews rigorous analysis, to draw the following conclusion: 
(i) Only one person in a million will have a DNA profile which matches that of the crime stain. 
(ii) The defendant has a DNA profile which matches the crime stain. 
(iii) Ergo there is a million to one probability that the defendant left the crime stain and is guilty of 
the crime.89 
The existence of the fallacy is now well recognised.90 There is also the defence counsel’s fallacy. This 
suggests that ‘associative statistical evidence is irrelevant regardless of the matching.’91 This fallacy 
fails to take into account the circumstance that the majority of the pool of people with relevant, or 
potentially relevant, DNA matches are not suspects in the case being tried. So, although it is possible 
that there are others who might have the same DNA profile as that left at a scene, the real impact of 
the likelihood ratio is for persons who have been shown, in the majority of cases, to have had the 
opportunity to commit the crime, or where there is other evidence to suggest their involvement.92 
Neither will apply in DNA evidence-only trials. Nevertheless, it is important for counsel to understand 
both the prosecutors and defence counsel’s fallacy when they present DNA evidence in court.  
The use of DNA evidence by lawyers, forensic scientists and the jury has been discussed in several 
recent cases in the ACT and the High Court of Australia. These are the cases of Aytugrul v The Queen,93 
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R v Whyms,94 R v Meyboom,95 R v Hillier,96 and Forbes v R.97 The Victorian case of R v Jama98 provides 
further insight into the court’s approach to DNA evidence, but is discussed in the reports of 
miscarriages of justice section below.99 These cases have significant implications for the presentation 
of DNA evidence at trial. Some consistent themes emerge from these cases, three of which will be 
explored here. The first is the intelligibility and expression of DNA evidence generally, as discussed in 
Aytugrul and Whyms. Meyboom and Forbes highlight a second area of concern — the presentation of 
probability ratios and statistics specifically. Finally, Forbes and Hillier give insight into how DNA 
evidence is used to prove cases ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. Several of these cases highlight more 
than one of these themes. Each case will be briefly summarised with important facts and items of 
evidence explained before the themes present in each of the judgments are explored. 
2.3.1 Expression of DNA evidence 
Although each of the cases discussed below deliberate to some extent upon the difficulties associated 
with the expression of DNA evidence in the trial context, this matter was the central issue in the 
appeals in Aytugrul and Whyms.  
Aytugrul 
Yusuf Aytugrul100 was charged and convicted of murder in 2012 in the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales. He appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal arguing that the presentation of the DNA evidence 
as an exclusion percentage carried a residual risk of unfairness and that that presentation should have 
been excluded under s 137 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) as its probative value was outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice. Alternatively, he argued that it should have been excluded under s 135 
as its probative value was outweighed by the danger that it might have been misleading or 
confusing.101 The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected the appeal. The appellant then sought special leave 
to appeal to the High Court. The majority of the Court, French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ, also 
dismissed the appeal.  
The DNA evidence in this case was taken from a single hair found under the deceased’s thumbnail, 
which was subjected to mitochondrial DNA testing. Traditional DNA testing was not possible. Because 
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this form of DNA testing is not as individualised as traditional DNA analysis (in mtDNA the DNA is all 
inherited from a person’s mother rather than mother and father) the statistical approaches used for 
nuclear DNA testing could not be used. The standard North American database was used to compare 
the hair sample with mtDNA profiles on the database.  
Three experts gave evidence and agreed that the appellant could not be excluded as the donor of the 
hair found under the deceased’s thumbnail. However, they differed as to the weight that could be 
given to that conclusion.102 Two of the experts gave a population frequency ratio for the mtDNA in the 
hair found on the deceased of 1 in 1000 people from the general population.103 The third expert gave 
a frequency ratio of 1 in 1600 people, making it slightly more unlikely someone other than the 
defendant would have the same mtDNA result. This expert also gave evidence that 99.9% of people 
would not be expected to have the DNA profile matching that of the hair. It was this latter expression, 
the so-called ‘exclusion percentage’, to which Aytugrul took objection. He claimed that the impact 
upon the jury of subliminally rounding 99.9% up to 100% was unfairly prejudicial. 
The essence of the appellant’s argument was that the expression of DNA evidence as an ‘exclusion 
percentage’ was more persuasive to jurors than its expression as a frequency ratio and that the jury 
were more likely to convict based on that percentage. Aytugrul’s argument is reflected in the 
dissenting judgment of McClellan CJ at CL of the Court of Criminal Appeal who raised the issue of the 
intelligibility of DNA evidence and juror comprehension of statistical evidence.104 His Honour referred 
to published articles105 on the persuasive power to lay people of language and probabilistic 
statements.106 He found that ‘certain forms of expressing [DNA] statistics carry greater persuasive 
potential than others.’107  
The appellant sought to have the proposition that DNA evidence expressed as an ‘exclusion ratio’ 
should be excluded under s 137 elevated to a general rule, relying on those articles. The majority High 
Court judges declined to accept that proposition, finding that, ‘[n]o sufficient foundation was laid, at 
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trial or on appeal (whether to the Court of Criminal Appeal or this court) for the creation or application 
of a general rule of the kind described.’108 
With respect to the articles relied upon by the appellant, the majority judges held that it was ‘neither 
necessary, nor appropriate’109 to consider whether the articles and their research findings supported 
this proposition. They did note, however, that no proof had been attempted of the opinions they 
expressed and that without such proof a court could not adopt a general rule of the kind proposed by 
the appellant ‘based only on [its] own researches suggesting the existence of a body of skilled opinion 
that would support it.’110 Similarly, their Honours declined to resolve the absence of proof problem by 
taking ‘judicial notice’ of this material as establishing such a proposition because it did not meet the 
requirements of s 144 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). In this regard, they held that ‘knowledge of 
the proposition in question could not be said to be “not reasonably open to question” and “common 
knowledge” or “capable of verification by reference to a document the authority of which cannot 
reasonably be questioned”’.111 Further, the majority stated (noting that the field in question is 
psychology not law) that it had not been demonstrated that the methods used in the studies relied 
upon, and their results had attained, such a degree of general acceptance amongst experts in relevant 
disciplines as to permit a court to take judicial notice of some general proposition about human 
understanding or behaviour said to be revealed by them.112 
With regard to the specific evidence in question, the majority judges found that there was no reason 
to reject it under s 137 or s 135. They held that because the exclusion percentage and frequency ratio 
were ‘no more than different ways of expressing the one statistical statement,’ the probative value of 
the percentage had to be the same as that of the frequency ratio.113 With regard to the residual risk 
of unfair prejudice deriving from the jury subliminally rounding up the exclusion percentage to 100, 
they held that it had been all but eliminated by the explanation of the evidence provided to the jury. 
Aytugrul supports the proposition that evidence of exclusionary percentages is prima facie admissible, 
regardless of the research that demonstrates that jurors’ understanding is often compromised when 
exclusionary language is used by experts to present DNA analysis in criminal trials. Lawyers are left 
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with a number of options in presenting mtDNA evidence (and arguably all DNA evidence) — by using 
frequency ratios or exclusionary percentages, or both.  
Whyms 
Whyms also explored the expression of DNA evidence, though in this case the focus was specifically 
on the intelligibility of probability ratios. Whyms provides an example of how the expression of DNA 
evidence through probability ratios may be confusing for lawyers.114 
David Whyms115 was charged with trespass and burglary in 2008 in Canberra. The trial was conducted 
as a judge-alone trial before Refshauge J in 2012.116 Two items of DNA evidence were adduced — a 
sample taken from the crime scene and a sample from Whyms. Other evidence adduced by the 
prosecution included eye witness evidence of a car at the crime scene that was identical to the car in 
which the police found Mr Whyms’ personal possessions and items that had been stolen from the 
crime scene. Refshauge J noted that while there were circumstances pointing to Mr Whyms’ possible 
involvement in the offences, the critical evidence was the DNA evidence. 
There was no challenge to the forensic procedure adopted by forensic investigators and police for the 
DNA evidence. Refshauge J also accepted the forensic expert’s testimony that it was ‘23 billion times 
more likely that the DNA analysed from the blood on the broken window came from Whyms than 
from an unrelated and unknown member of the general population.’117 In making this statement 
Refshauge himself commits the prosecutor’s fallacy as DNA evidence cannot support that conclusion. 
It could only support a conclusion that it was 23 billion times more likely if the DNA came from Whyms 
than an unrelated person. Whether the fallacy was committed by his Honour in interpreting the 
forensic scientist’s report or by the forensic scientist in their initial reporting, lawyers need to be alert 
to the fallacy: in avoiding making it themselves and recognising when others incorrectly state the 
effect of DNA evidence in this way. Refshauge then held, following cases such as Forbes, that the DNA 
evidence would ordinarily be sufficient to convict Mr Whyms.118 However, the evidence then became 
problematic because it went further. In explaining that the blood found on the window was 23 billion 
times more likely to come from Whyms, the expert witness testified that such a probability was 
consistent with the finding of an adventitious match in a population of 18 000.119 Furthermore, the 
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expert witness said that it was not unexpected ‘that there would be a match to Mr Whyms’ DNA 
profile in the population of the ACT and Queanbeyan’.120 At this point the ability of the evidence to 
establish guilt to the requisite standard unraveled. As a result, his Honour retained a reasonable doubt 
about Mr Whyms’ guilt and so returned a verdict of not guilty. In doing so his Honour stated, 
The clear evidence was that the DNA, notwithstanding the likelihood ratio, was such that in the 
ACT and Queanbeyan population it was not unexpected, a real possibility that there would be a 
person whose DNA profile would match the DNA profile from the blood at and near the window of 
the premises and who is not Mr Whyms. The evidence was not further explained or circumscribed 
in any way. As a result, I could not exclude that another person left the blood found at and near 
the laundry window of the premises.121 
In the course of discussing the statistical expression of the DNA evidence, Refshauge J described it as 
becoming 
problematic and, I have to say, for me, quite murky. I am aware that in a recent study, about 10% 
of judicial respondents reported statistics as being a most difficult area of expert evidence122… I 
suspect that I fall within that 10% category.123 
His Honour was critical of the lack of explanation that was provided to him even though there was, as 
he said, ample opportunity for this to be done. He held, 
I find it difficult to rationalise the acceptance of the probability of 1 in 23 billion with the fact that 
an adventitious match in the ACT and Queanbeyan area is not unexpected. That, however, was the 
expert evidence. 
It may be that it could have been further explained. It may have referred to relatedness. It may 
have referred not to “unexpected” in the ordinary sense but simply that a possibility, even a 
remote possibility, denies the certainty of non-existence. These were, however, not explained and 
there was plenty of opportunity for such explanation. 
I find this result unsatisfactory for it does appear to me that there was much more explanation that 
I could have, perhaps should have, been offered. The fact is that, of course, I have to rely on and 
accept the evidence as presented to the court. 
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This case reveals how important a consideration the expression of DNA evidence and the intelligibility 
of that expression is for lawyers when adducing or challenging DNA evidence. When judges admit to 
being confused by the expression of DNA evidence, as Refshauge J did in Whyms, the duty of counsel 
to understand and explain accurately what the evidence means is made manifest. This case also 
reveals the importance of unpacking probability ratios to establish exactly what their import is, what 
level of adventitious matches they are consistent with and, therefore, what they prove.  
Lawyers have an unenviable task in ensuring the comprehensibility of DNA statistics in all their various 
forms of expression. Having a number of acceptable modes of expression of DNA evidence may 
present additional difficulty for lawyers trying to find an intelligible way to present DNA evidence to a 
jury and/or a judge in criminal trials. It is critical then to find out whether lawyers have difficulty 
understanding and/or dealing with DNA evidence presented as frequency ratios or exclusionary 
percentages or both. Accordingly, the research presented in this thesis explored these questions with 
lawyers in the ACT and Victoria to determine whether they struggle with the expression of DNA 
evidence in court. Lawyers were asked about their understanding of the various expressions of the 
strength of DNA evidence. Further, questions on any difficulties associated with DNA evidence were 
asked in an attempt to elicit information on its expression.  
2.3.2 Probability ratios and statistics 
The expression of probability ratios and statistics has been discussed in relation to Aytugrul and 
Whyms above. Probability ratios and statistics are considered here as constituting a theme in their 
own right because two judgments have specifically considered the wisdom of admitting probability 
ratios as evidence. The first case is that of Meyboom, which concerned samples with mixed DNA 
profiles, and the second is Forbes, where the court was invited to consider whether evidence of 
probability based on statistical considerations is admissible in the absence of other evidence.  
Meyboom 
Paul Meyboom124 was charged with a number of sexual offences in relation to two separate 
complainants and two separate incidents that took place in Canberra in 2005 and 2006. The case was 
heard by Higgins CJ in a judge alone trial in the ACT Supreme Court.  
Because of the lapse of time between the attacks and the lack of overwhelmingly similarity in their 
features, Higgins CJ did not allow evidence of one incident to be admissible in consideration of charges 
for the second incident. Meyboom was charged with two counts of unlawful assault with intent to 
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engage in sexual intercourse under s 53(1) under the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), three counts of sexual 
intercourse without consent under s 54(1) of the same Act, and two counts of theft under s 308 of the 
Criminal Code 2002 (ACT).  
The most significant and problematic evidence in this case was the DNA analysis.125 Higgins CJ noted 
that, 
In neither case, was there a direct deposit of any biological material by the perpetrator upon either 
victim so as to yield a complete biological sample as complete as the reference sample from the 
respective [victims].126 
All the DNA evidence was found to contain mixed profiles, meaning that there was more than one 
contributor to the biological material tested for DNA analysis. The mixed DNA profiles were separated 
into major and minor components. The major components were identical to the DNA profiles obtained 
from the victims. Three expert reports purported to include the accused in the minor components of 
the DNA profile obtained in respect of the first incident. All reports calculated in respect of both 
incidents contained likelihood ratios calculated using the ACT general population database. The first 
report calculated the likelihood ratio for the accused being a contributor on the assumption that were 
only two contributors to the minor component, and concluded it was 11 million times more likely that 
the accused was one of those contributors than a random individual.127 This is another example of the 
courts or specifically case law reporting a fallacious conclusion from the DNA evidence. The preceding 
table documenting the results of the testing presents the correct interpretation of this probability 
ratio.128 It did not address the possibility that there might be more than two contributors to the minor 
components. Lawyers, particularly defence lawyers, must be alert to and object to any evidence that 
perpetuates the prosecutor’s fallacy when they see it presented in court or in the unreported and 
reported judgments of courts. Lawyers must learn enough about the fallacy to object if and when they 
need to in order to ensure fair trials for defendants.  
The second report found another mixed profile from a minimum of two individuals. It identified the 
victim’s profile as the major contributor. Meyboom was not excluded as a contributor to the minor 
components. The likelihood ratio for the mixed profile to have come from the victim and Meyboom 
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was calculated as 127 times more likely than if it can come from the victim and a random member of 
the ACT population.  
The third report concerned another mixed profile with a minimum of two contributors, with neither 
the victim nor Meyboom able to be excluded as contributors. The likelihood ratio was calculated to 
be 290 million times more likely if the mixed DNA profile had originated from the victim and Meyboom 
than if it had originated from the victim and an unknown and unrelated individual randomly selected 
from the ACT population. Higgins CJ held that this probability did not take into the account the 
possibility that more than two people contributed to the mixed profile because the ratios that were 
presented to the court were formulated based on an assumption of two contributors only.  
In relation to the second incident only two samples tested positive for inclusion of the accused. The 
first gave a mixed DNA profile from a minimum of three individuals. The major components were 
identified as identical to the victim’s profile, and Meyboom could not be excluded as a contributor to 
the minor components. The probability ratios presented indicated that it was 600 million times more 
likely that the mixed DNA profiles were that of the victim, Meyboom and another unknown individual 
than if it had come from the victim and two unknown individuals randomly selected from the ACT 
population. 
The second sample was again found to contain a mixed profile with a minimum of two contributors. 
The major contributor was identical to the DNA profile of the victim and Meyboom could not be 
excluded as a contributor to the minor components. This evidence was rated as 1,900 million times 
more likely if the mixed profile originated from the victim and Meyboom, than the victim and an 
unrelated individual, randomly selected from the ACT population.  
For all samples, the non-exclusion of the accused was predicated on the assumption that all peaks 
consistent with his reference profile were contributed by him and no one else.129 
A third sample taken from the second victim was contaminated with DNA from a staff member and a 
statistical evaluation was not conducted.  
The Australian Federal Police forensic expert explained the process of testing and analysing mixed 
profiles and the procedures involved in comparing samples with low levels of material. It was stressed 
that if values are marginal, there cannot be certainty of identification, even as to the number of 
individuals contributing.130  
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Higgins CJ noted that it was surprising that no portion of the tape used to lift samples was kept to 
ensure the integrity of the extraction of DNA from it.131 Thus the possibility of an independent audit 
of the process was lost.132 
Concessions as to the possibility of a third individual contributing to most of the samples, coupled with 
the absence of some alleles that should have been present if the accused was a contributor, were 
found to mean that the expert’s opinion could go no further than saying that the accused could be a 
contributor but it was reasonably possible that he was not.133 It was: 
not possible, if the standard of evidence is proof beyond reasonable doubt, to exclude a reasonable 
hypothesis simply because that hypothesis is not established as a fact ... Where a third contributor 
can be identified then the extent of the contribution of that contributor, including a replication of 
alleles otherwise attributable to the accused, must be accounted for.134 
Meyboom could not be excluded as a minor contributor to the portion of DNA analysed. The presence 
of a mixed profile in the sample meant that the court could not rule, with any degree of probability 
that Meyboom was responsible for committing the offence with which he was charged. This supported 
the court’s view that mixed profiles are problematic because it is impossible to exclude or include any 
potential contributor with certainty if there are more than two people’s DNA present. Although the 
results were not invalidated, they could then be exposed to doubt. As Higgins CJ stated, 
To summarise, for mixed DNA where small amounts are present, it is impossible to, with certainty, 
exclude or include any particular person as a contributor. Nor was there any test to determine the 
time at which any DNA found was contributed or in what order.135 
His Honour then stated that this rendered the evidence of the expert who calculated the likelihood 
ratios in the reports by reference to the ACT population database, of no probative value in this case.136  
Meyboom demonstrates that although probability ratios attached to an identified DNA profile are 
generally of apparent high probative value,137 where the number of contributors is uncertain, they 
may be of little or no value at all. In this case, the nature of the mixed profiles led to a finding that 
although the DNA evidence did not exclude the accused, doubt remained and the criminal standard 
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of proof could not be met. There has been criticism of this judgment by Robertson, Vignaux and 
Buckleton who felt that the courtroom was not the place for individual judges, assisted by counsel 
who may not be equipped to explain these matters fully, to discuss how databases should be 
structured, how uncertainty in the number of contributors should be dealt with and how probabilistic 
evidence should be treated.138  
Forbes 
Benjamin Forbes139 was found guilty of engaging in sexual intercourse without consent with a 17-year-
old complainant in March 2005 in Canberra. He also pleaded guilty to a separate sexual offence at the 
same trial. Forbes appealed his conviction in relation to the March 2005 incident to the Court of Appeal 
in the ACT on the basis that the verdict was unjust or unsafe having regard to several factors.  
The first was the nature of the DNA evidence, as the only evidence that identified him. The verdict 
was, on the appellant’s arguments, wholly reliant upon statistical analysis that could not remove all 
reasonable doubt.  
The second factor was that the exculpatory material introduced at trial should have been sufficient to 
raise a reasonable doubt, provided the DNA evidence had been properly understood. The first of these 
arguments is considered here in relation to the theme of the presentation of probability ratios and 
statistics and the second is considered below when discussing the theme relating to the standard of 
proof that emerged from cases. The appellant’s final argument was that the DNA evidence and 
exculpatory material were such that in combination there was no possibility of removing a reasonable 
doubt for the jury. These matters were considered in the Court of Appeal by Higgins CJ, Penfold and 
Besanko JJ in 2009.140 
The samples taken in this case revealed a mixed partial profile from a minimum of three people, and 
provided strong evidence that the donor of the DNA reference sample (taken from the appellant) also 
contributed to another partial mixed profile.141 Another DNA sample revealed a partial mixed profile, 
but when considered in isolation of the other information, provided an ‘extremely strong link’142 to 
Forbes’ profile. A semen sample was detected on the victim and the DNA analysis provided ‘extremely 
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strong’ evidence to support the contention that the donor of the reference sample taken from the 
appellant was the source of the DNA profile found in the semen. The forensic biologists testified that 
the likelihood ratio for an ‘extremely strong’ correlation was greater than 1 million to one.143 
The defence argued that Forbes had an alibi and that the limitations of DNA evidence and the victim’s 
failure to identify the appellant on a photo board raised a reasonable doubt about Forbes’ guilt.144 
A forensic expert explained to the court how DNA samples are analysed and why statistical 
calculations are used to describe the probability of a random person in the population having the same 
DNA profile as the tested sample. Because DNA databases contain ‘samples’ of populations (rather 
than every person on the planet), forensic DNA specialists cannot give evidence that a DNA profile is 
an ‘exact match’ to a person — they can only use statistical probabilities to demonstrate the strength 
of the connection between samples.  
During the appeal hearing, the defence did not challenge the DNA testing that was conducted in the 
case, nor were there allegations of contamination or inadequate explanation of the evidence to the 
jury. Forbes’ first submission in the appeal was that where the only evidence incriminating an accused 
is DNA evidence and there is no other reliable supporting evidence such as identification evidence or 
evidence of motive or propensity, then an accused must be acquitted.145 This argument was based on 
the inability of forensic biologists to say that a crime scene DNA sample is an accused’s DNA and on 
that basis the probability ratio means there can never be 100% certainty in DNA evidence. 
In Forbes, their Honours found that evidence of a likelihood ratio produced by statistical calculations 
was clearly admissible and in many cases, may be significantly probative in a case with very little other 
evidence.146 There may be issues with admissibility and weight of DNA evidence,147 however this does 
not prevent the evidence from being highly probative and admissible in an appropriate case.148 
Meyboom provides a good example of when the courts might be unwilling to accept the reliability of 
probability or statistical DNA evidence. Mixed profiles are certainly less straightforward than single 
profile DNA results, and lawyers should adopt a cautious approach to using mixed profile results in 
criminal cases. Whether lawyers understand mixed profiles, and how they manage mixed profiles is 
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unknown. The Meyboom case therefore provides further justification for improved knowledge and 
understanding of how lawyers deal with DNA evidence and concomitantly how they should introduce, 
defend and challenge this type of evidence. There is a lacuna in our knowledge of lawyers’ use of non-
standard DNA evidence. In contrast, Forbes demonstrates that even in the absence of other evidence, 
or very little corroborating evidence, probability ratios and statistical DNA evidence can be considered 
reliable and probative depending on the facts of the case.149 Lawyers must be able to understand then 
how probability ratios might support or undermine their hypothesis in any given case. Because of the 
limited research in this area, lawyers’ opinions and management of probability ratios and statistical 
DNA evidence in criminal trials is unknown. This study attempts to address this gap. 
2.3.3 Standard of proof: beyond reasonable doubt 
The third theme that can be identified in the case law is discussion of whether DNA evidence alone 
can establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Inevitably, this occurs most prominently in cases where 
the only evidence implicating an accused is DNA evidence. The two cases considered here where the 
capacity of DNA evidence to establish guilt ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ was of central concern are 
Forbes and Hillier. 
Forbes 
The case of Forbes was introduced above. Regarding the limitations of DNA evidence, the Court of 
Appeal in Forbes was asked to consider whether DNA evidence, because of its probabilistic nature, is 
ever able to provide the certainty needed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt in cases where 
the DNA evidence is the only evidence supporting an inference of guilt.  
The Court of Appeal in Forbes dismissed the submission that ‘where the only evidence incriminating 
an accused is DNA evidence and there is no supporting evidence such as identification evidence or 
evidence of motive or propensity, then an accused must be acquitted.’150 The Court held that DNA 
evidence alone can be adequate to sustain a verdict in a criminal trial.151 Their Honours gave a number 
of reasons for dismissing the application — one of which was particularly relevant to DNA evidence 
and the standard of proof. The appellant’s proposition required the court to revisit the time-honoured 
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issue of defining the term ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ and the courts have warned against judges doing 
this.152 In addition, the courts have established that the term ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ does not 
reflect a calculation of percentage probability.153 Fingerprint evidence is routinely admitted without 
the proof that every person has a unique fingerprint. It is often decisive154 and it is therefore analogous 
to DNA evidence when considering whether it can prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  
Forbes sought leave to appeal to the High Court in May 2010 in what would have been a landmark 
case for DNA evidence in criminal trials. The High Court however refused the application, with French 
CJ upholding the argument of the ACT Court of Appeal that it was open for the jury to convict on DNA 
evidence alone.155 It was found that this case was ‘not a suitable case to consider the larger question 
which the applicant seeks to agitate’156 — whether DNA evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a 
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 
Hillier 
Steven Wayne Hillier157 was charged with the 2002 murder of Ana Louise Hardwick in Canberra. The 
case against the defendant was circumstantial. DNA evidence that connected a sample of DNA taken 
from the deceased’s pyjamas to the defendant was adduced. The possibility of contamination and/or 
indirect transfer from the couple’s children to the pyjamas was discussed in a number of the 
judgments in this case.  
Hillier exercised his right to elect trial by jury in the first trial.158 Later, when the case was retried, he 
elected trial by judge alone.159 The initial trial before Gray J and a jury in the Supreme Court of the ACT 
was heard in November 2004 and Hillier was found guilty of murder. Following a complex appeal 
process his conviction was quashed and he was retried.  
The second decision of the Court of Appeal found that: 
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The presiding judge, correctly in our view, directed the jury that they had to be satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that Mr Hillier’s DNA was found on the deceased’s pyjamas and was not there 
as a result of indirect transference via either of the children.160 
The defence submitted to the court that this approach should be endorsed in the final Supreme Court 
hearing. The prosecution submitted that the DNA evidence itself should not have to be proven beyond 
reasonable doubt because it was not an intermediate fact nor an indispensable link in the chain of 
reasoning for this case.161 Besanko J agreed that the DNA evidence might not be seen as an 
indispensable link in the chain of reasoning towards an inference of guilt.162 Nevertheless, if the DNA 
evidence is of great importance in establishing the presence of an accused at a crime scene, as in this 
case, then before it may be relied on it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt as belonging to the 
accused.163 
Besanko J concluded that the DNA evidence could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Samples 
containing DNA material were taken from the deceased and a few mixed profiles were found, 
including, at different points, a profile that could have come from the deceased, a profile that could 
have come from the accused and a profile from an unknown person. A repeated tape lift sample from 
the same site some years later in 2009 did not reveal a DNA profile that could have matched the 
accused. The defence raised the possibility of contamination and/or indirect transfer of the accused’s 
DNA from their children to the deceased. A forensic expert from the Australian Federal Police testified 
under cross examination that the detection of the DNA in the initial sample that ‘matched’ the accused 
may have occurred because of contamination.164 
Besanko J was concerned about the lack of proper procedure in handling items from the crime scene 
in a search room where other items relevant to the case were stored.165 These included items taken 
from the accused’s home that would have contained samples of his DNA. Contamination could not be 
excluded as a reasonable possibility for at least one of the samples of DNA evidence. The events in the 
search room and the irreplicability of the finding of a DNA profile that could include the accused, led 
Besanko J to rule that there was the possibility of contamination. Hillier was consequently found not 
guilty of murdering the deceased in his final trial. 
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The strength of the DNA evidence in this case was paramount and crucial in ascertaining whether the 
accused was present at the crime scene at the time of the deceased’s murder. Because the DNA 
evidence was crucial to the circumstantial case, the court ruled that the DNA evidence must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. A risk of contamination was raised by the defence, and together with the 
identification of a DNA profile of an unknown person, this led to the ruling that the DNA evidence 
could not be proved to the requisite standard.  
Hillier suggests that where the DNA evidence is of great importance, it may have to be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt. It may be done by demonstrating that there has not been contamination of the 
samples or indirect transfer of an innocent person’s DNA to a crime scene or evidence or where the 
DNA evidence does not contain mixed profiles or is otherwise weak evidence. Elimination of the 
possibility of contamination necessitates that lawyers develop an understanding of the evidence 
gathering process prior to receiving a case brief and investigate whether there was risk of 
contamination at the crime scene, in the laboratory or because of the handling of the evidence in the 
chain of custody. Lawyers should also consider whether there are any outliers in the DNA mixed profile 
that might suggest an unknown person’s DNA was present. This may suggest in some cases that 
contamination is a possibility. Hillier raises these questions as they must be addressed by prosecution 
and defence counsel, both in establishing the proof value of DNA evidence for the prosecution, and in 
raising a reasonable doubt for the defence.  
It is now well established that a jury may be left to decide on the guilt or innocence of an accused 
based on DNA evidence alone. This has implications for prosecutors when making decisions about 
whether to prosecute, and for defence lawyers where DNA evidence is the only circumstantial 
evidence against their clients. Given that miscarriages of justice can occur because of contaminated 
DNA evidence,166 and some cases where contamination has occurred have been DNA-only trials,167 the 
decisions in Forbes and Hillier reinforce the importance of lawyers understanding DNA evidence so 
that they accurately present and challenge the evidence in court. Again, this is an area that has not 
been adequately explored in the research. Questions about lawyers’ experiences with, and 
management of, DNA evidence in this regard are explored in this study. 
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 Reviews of forensic process 
This research has drawn on a number of recommendations directed at lawyers and the legal 
profession from two primary reviews of forensic process — the Vincent Report in Victoria, Australia168 
and the NAS Report in the United States.169 These two reports demonstrate disquiet about the use of 
forensic evidence in criminal prosecutions, with the Vincent Report in particular focusing on how DNA 
evidence led to a miscarriage of justice in the Victorian County Court.170 In addition to these reports, 
recommendations from Australian Royal Commissions over the past thirty years are briefly 
introduced, primarily to demonstrate that the concerns discussed in the Vincent and NAS reports are 
not new. The present research does acknowledge that there are a great number of committee and 
government reports into the use of forensic science in adversarial legal systems, but to explore these 
in detail is beyond the ambit of this research. This study needed to focus on only the most recent and 
relevant reports for the project jurisdictions and those focused on DNA evidence or with similar 
concerns or considerations for lawyers as in this study in other worldwide reports or commissions. 
More recently, the United States President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology released 
a report, (the PCAST Report), which investigates the scientific validity of the feature-comparison 
methods of forensic testing.171 Although DNA evidence is discussed, the report does not make 
recommendations relevant to the field of DNA evidence or analysis that would influence the behaviour 
of legal professionals in criminal trials. The focus of this thesis is on the Vincent and NAS Reports. The 
recommendations discussed in the reports below provide further justification for this research into 
the understanding and management of DNA evidence by Australian lawyers.  
2.4.1 Vincent Report (Victoria) 
the DNA evidence was, like Ozymandias’ broken statue in the poem by Shelley, found isolated in a 
vast desert.172 
On 21 July 2008, a sequence of events occurred that led to an innocent man, Mr Farah Abdulkadir 
Jama, being convicted of rape in the County Court in Victoria and imprisoned for six years with a non-
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parole period of four years.173 On 7 December 2009, prosecutor Brett Sonnet alerted the Victorian 
Court of Appeal that a ‘substantial miscarriage of justice’174 had occurred in the case, most likely due 
to a problem at the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine (VIFM) when Jama’s sample and another 
sample were collected. Jama was immediately acquitted; an apology was made and he was awarded 
an ex-gratia payment of $525,000 by the Victorian Government.175 
On 31 March 2010, former Supreme Court Justice the Hon Frank Vincent revealed the extraordinary 
case of contamination that had occurred in this Victorian case.176 The report is an important one for 
all Australian criminal lawyers, because the ease with which mistakes like those that occurred in this 
case can be made is real and relevant across jurisdictions. 
Jama was accused of raping a 48-year-old woman who was found semi-conscious in a nightclub toilet 
cubicle in Doncaster, Victoria.177 With no recollection of the evening, the victim was taken to a Crisis 
Care Unit (‘CCU’) for physical examination and further tests. Routine internal swabs found semen that 
was later matched via the Victorian DNA database to Jama. He was subsequently convicted of rape.  
More than fourteen months later Jama was encouraged to appeal the guilty verdict by newly engaged 
defence counsel. Brett Sonnet was appointed as prosecutor for the appeal. He investigated the case 
files and asked how Jama’s DNA came to be on the Victorian database. Sonnet discovered that the 
forensic medical officer who had taken a swab from the victim had also taken a swab from Jama’s 
mouth for a separate and unrelated matter on the previous day.178 His DNA had been placed on the 
database less than 48 hours before he was matched to the semen sample at the Victorian Police 
Forensic Science Department (VPFSD) in Macleod.  
The most likely explanation for Jama’s DNA sample being found on the swab taken from the victim 
was found to be contamination.179 In his report, Vincent found that the standard of cleaning of the 
examination rooms was inadequate for eliminating the presence of DNA. The cleaning that was 
routinely carried out at the CCU was directed at maintaining infection control, not avoiding the spread 
                                                             
173 Ibid. 
174 Kate Hagan, ‘DNA fiasco: rape conviction quashed’ The Age (online), 8 December 2009 
<http://www.theage.com.au/national/dna-fiasco-rape-conviction-quashed-20091207-kfc3.html>. 
175 Reid Sexton, ‘Man Paid $525,000 for wrong conviction’, The Age (online), 30 June 2010 
<http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/man-paid-525000-for-wrong-conviction-20100629-zjko.html>. 
176 Vincent Report, above n 2. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid 9–10. 
179 Ibid 48. 
 
  Justifications for the research 
   37
of DNA.180 The level of cleaning that would have been required of surfaces and equipment in the CCU 
to remove all traces of DNA was not routinely conducted.  
An investigation into the incident was requested by the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine (VIFM) 
and the Vincent Report was commissioned.181 In the report, Vincent acknowledges the assistance of 
the agencies and individuals involved in the initial case, all of whom were concerned about how their 
procedures and practices could allow for contamination to occur.182 All the agencies involved wanted 
to improve these procedures and practices so that further miscarriages of justice would be prevented. 
The Vincent Report discusses several important considerations for forensic scientists, investigating 
officers and the legal community when working on cases involving DNA evidence. The Vincent Report 
particularly criticised the police response; the interpretation and use of scientific opinion; the decision 
to proceed with a trial and the prosecution and defence approaches in this case. 
The DNA evidence 
the DNA evidence provided the only foundation for concluding that a crime had been committed 
at all, and then constituted the only means of identifying the perpetrator.183 
There were no fingerprints, witnesses, CCTV footage or any other physical or biological evidence that 
a rape had even been committed in this case.184 The decision to proceed on DNA evidence alone has 
been highly criticised.185 Throughout his investigation, Vincent found that the DNA evidence was 
perceived to possess ‘an almost mystical infallibility that enabled its surroundings to be 
disregarded.’186 Only a matter of weeks before the appeal case was heard did the parties begin to 
realise the potential errors in the investigation and interpretation of the DNA results.  
Further issue was taken with the prosecution’s decision to proceed with the case to trial.187 There was 
evidence that the police officer responsible for the case had enquired as to the likelihood of 
contamination188 but was reassured that it was not possible for this to have occurred in the laboratory. 
As a result, the officer prepared a brief of evidence with only DNA evidence to support an inference 
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of guilt.189 The Vincent investigation obtained advice from Dr James Robertson, a forensic scientist 
with the Australian Federal Police and now a member of staff at the University of Canberra.190 
Robertson maintains that like all other evidence, whether DNA evidence can be seen as ‘reliable and 
probative in the determination of disputed issues of fact involves consideration of a range of 
factors.’191 In this case, there was no consideration of the lack of other evidence surrounding the 
offence. 
Vincent stressed that because the DNA evidence was used both to allege that a crime had been 
committed, and to establish the identity of the perpetrator, care was required in this case. This was 
particularly the case given the lack of corroborating evidence. In response to the participants’ 
approach to the DNA evidence, Vincent stated, 
I have been left with the deep impression that at virtually every point, and by almost everyone 
involved, it was handled with so little insight into the issues which it presented that no need was 
seen to explore further or conduct research into them.192 
Jama’s case and the Vincent Report have profound implications for the legal profession and criminal 
cases involving DNA evidence. Recommendations from the report encompass scientific procedures 
for CCUs, cleaning procedures for the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine and reporting 
requirements for police investigators and lawyers.193 
Recommendation 9 of the report discusses police training on the use of DNA evidence for both 
intelligence and evidentiary purposes — particularly when there is minimal corroborative evidence.194 
It is important to ensure that police officers understand DNA evidence and the possibilities for 
contamination. However, the Vincent Report does not recommend how best to achieve this. 
Accordingly, this is followed by recommendation 10 for legal practitioners.  
Recommendation 10 is that the Judicial College of Victoria, the Law Institute of Victoria and the 
Victorian Bar Council conduct courses that assist legal practitioners and members of the judiciary in 
the appropriate use and nature of DNA evidence in the criminal justice system.195 These courses have 
the potential to ensure that lawyers have greater understanding of the forensic process, and that open 
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discussion of the potential for human error in DNA evidence occurs. How successful these courses are 
in achieving these objects remains to be seen. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) echoed these recommendations in their 2003 report 
‘Essentially Yours: The Protection of Human Genetic Information in Australia.’196 Chapter 44 of the 
criminal proceedings section of the report contains recommendation 44.1 which is that the ‘National 
Judicial College of Australia and the Law Council of Australia (through its constituent professional 
associations) should develop and promote continuing legal education programs for judges and legal 
practitioners, respectively, in relation to the use of genetic information in criminal proceedings.’197 The 
present study seeks the views of lawyers about their experience of legal education in this area and 
whether and how it is relevant to their legal practice. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
In his commentary on the Vincent Report, Gans suggests that the rules of evidence were partly 
implicated in causing this miscarriage of justice.198 He notes that Victorian courts, like those in other 
Uniform Evidence Act jurisdictions in Australia, assume that jurors, once they hear that an accused is 
linked to another similarly heinous crime, will be more inclined to convict regardless of the strength 
of the defence.199 In Jama, the jury was not made aware that his DNA had been taken in an unrelated 
matter, though no charges had been laid. This was because of the assumption described by Gans.200 
The Vincent Report does not engage with the fact that evidence law’s usual management of the risk 
of prejudice from unrelated events, may be dangerous when applied to evidence of the investigative 
origins of DNA evidence.201 Had that been understood in Jama then the origins of the first sample of 
DNA evidence may have been explored and it may have revealed that Jama had given a sample in the 
same room, to the same person less than 48 hours prior to the victim’s sample being taken.  
The Jama case led to questions about the safety of convictions based on DNA evidence alone and 
raised doubt about the use of DNA evidence in criminal trials generally, particularly those with little 
or no corroborative evidence of guilt.202 Vincent highlights how easily contamination can occur and be 
missed by those investigating, prosecuting and defending criminal matters. The report demonstrates 
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that legal bodies and staff have a responsibility to provide and partake in legal education that will 
teach them about the threats to the integrity of DNA evidence. Whether these recommendations are 
adopted will be extremely important in preventing further miscarriages of justice in Australia. By 
identifying the problems lawyers have with DNA evidence and exploring their experience of legal 
education in this area, this study aims to explore the extent to which the recommendations made in 
this report are being implemented and to assist both lawyers and those providing legal education 
courses to improve their practice in this area.  
2.4.2 NAS Report (United States) 
In 2009, the United States National Academy of Sciences released its report about forensic sciences. 
The NAS Report was commissioned after the Science, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2006203 came into force. The United States Congress directed the Academy to 
investigate the significant improvements needed in forensic science in the United States. The preface 
to this report recognised that both systemic and scientific advancements were needed in a number of 
forensic disciplines, to make sure they provide reliable results, establish enforceable standards and 
promote a best standard approach that is consistently applied.204 
In all testimony presented to the Committee responsible for the report, there was the overwhelming 
consistency of the following message: 
The forensic science system, encompassing both research and practice, has serious problems that 
can only be addressed by a national commitment to overhaul the current structure that supports 
the forensic science community in this country. This can only be done with effective leadership at 
the highest levels of both federal and state governments, pursuant to national standards, and with 
a significant infusion of federal funds.205 
The responsibility for investigating these issues, and making recommendations to achieve this critical 
goal were given to a committee formed under the auspices of the National Academies’ Committee on 
Science, Technology, and Law and Committee on Applied and Theoretical Statistics in 2006. The 
committee was made up of members of the forensic science and legal communities and a diverse 
range of scientists.  
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The NAS Report generated many recommendations for the various forensic disciplines and 
practitioners working within those disciplines. Legal practitioners were included in those disciplines, 
particularly with respect to further legal education. 
The NAS Report discussed the insufficient education and training of all parties involved in the forensic 
science system. Recommendation 10 stated: ‘NIFS should also support law school administrators and 
judicial education organisations in establishing continuing legal education programs for law students, 
practitioners and judges.’206 
The Committee recognised that although having a ‘checklist’ for the admissibility of forensic evidence 
is important,207 this is not always sufficient to ensure the integrity of the evidence and the approaches 
employed by different forensic science disciplines are not always understood by the judiciary or legal 
practitioners. Any advancement in the forensic sciences, the NAS Report argues, should be notified 
directly to legal scholars and practitioners. Legal education should enhance that connection by 
allowing students to take cross-institutional studies and by offering joint degrees or courses in the 
forensic science disciplines.208 
Prosecutors and defence lawyers in America have reported feeling as though they must make the 
presentation of forensic evidence as ‘visually interesting and appealing as such presentations appear 
to be on television’.209 Support for more interesting visual presentation of DNA evidence in the form 
of a tutorial was also discussed by Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson.210 
Forensic science has been described as the ‘handmaiden of the legal system’211 primarily because 
courts often place great emphasis on forensic science. Nevertheless, they often do so without fully 
understanding the limitations of the various disciplines. This means that there is always the risk of 
reliance on ‘junk science’ as evidence in court.212 Quite often judges and lawyers lack the scientific 
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expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence. This renders the criminal justice 
system inadequate to the task of curing the documented ills of the forensic science disciplines.213 
The third chapter of the NAS Report, ‘The Admission of Forensic Science Evidence in Litigation’ argues 
that the legal system is ill-equipped to correct the problems of the forensic science community. DNA 
evidence does not suffer from the lack of peer-review seen in many forensic disciplines because it has 
the capacity to ‘consistently and with a high degree of certainty support conclusions about 
individualization.’214 That is, it has scientific and peer-reviewed validation over a number of years 
proving that the scientific methods used are sound.215  
The NAS Report does however demonstrate the importance of lawyers’ questioning the scientific basis 
of any forensic evidence, including understanding the scientific principles behind DNA evidence. 
Underlying the admission of all forensic evidence should be a consideration of whether the discipline 
is founded on a reliable scientific methodology, and the extent to which a discipline relies on human 
interpretation that can be tainted by human error.216 Although DNA has a history of extensive and 
applied scientific research, publication and national standards for quality assurance and quality 
control, there are areas of DNA evidence that are not so widely researched, including low copy DNA217 
and mixed profiles.218 Lawyers may understand the scientific principles and research behind DNA 
evidence, but it may be that DNA evidence should be challenged on other grounds, for example with 
regard to the collection, processing, storage and handling of DNA samples. 
2.4.3 Australian Royal Commissions and overseas reports 
Although the Morling Royal Commission219 into the disappearance of Azaria Chamberlain did not 
directly report on DNA evidence, the case and the numerous appeals that followed helped to shape 
the legal and forensic environment for lawyers and expert witnesses in Australian courts today. The 
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lessons to be learnt from the Morling Commission’s enquiry are numerous, yet cases such as Jama 
demonstrate that they are difficult lessons to learn.  
The Lindy Chamberlain case involved the disappearance of 9-week-old Azaria Chamberlain from a 
camp ground in the Uluru-Kata Tjuta National Park (Ayers Rock) in 1980. Although her mother, Lindy 
Chamberlain, maintained that a dingo took her baby, the State charged her with murder and what 
ensued involved a Supreme Court of the Northern Territory trial, two appeals, including one to the 
High Court where the appeal was dismissed,220 three coronial inquests and finally a Royal Commission. 
After the fall of a climber at Uluru in 1988 led police to evidence that confirmed Lindy’s innocence, 
she was released from prison immediately, pending further investigation. After considering all 
evidence in considerable detail shortly afterwards, the Morling Commission recommended that the 
convictions be overturned and after a total of three years in prison, Lindy Chamberlain and Michael 
Chamberlain (who had been charged with being an accessory and given a suspended sentence) were 
pardoned of charges. The final inquest in 1995 allowed for the cause of death on Azaria’s death 
certificate to read ‘cause unknown’ rather than ‘murder’.  
Although the science used in Chamberlain could no longer be considered novel, science continues to 
improve and present new challenges to courts around the world. Some of the evidence in this case 
was given by experts who did not have the ‘experience, facilities or resources necessary to enable 
them to express reliable opinions on some of the novel and complex scientific issues which arose for 
consideration.’221 Also of concern for lawyers and experts presenting evidence in court was the fact 
that ‘some experts who gave evidence at the trial were over-confident of their ability to form reliable 
opinions on matters that lay on the outer margins of their fields of expertise.’222 This shows that 
lawyers need to be aware of the experience and knowledge of ‘experts’. It is both acceptable and wise 
to question experts about their qualifications and experience with the information they are presenting 
in court. If witnesses testify in court without the requisite knowledge or experience, and lawyers do 
not ensure this is made obvious, juries and judges may rely on their evidence and miscarriages of 
justice may ensue.  
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The importance of the lawyers’ questioning the credentials of experts was also noted in the Shannon 
Royal Commission into the 1978 conviction of Edward Splatt for murder in Adelaide, South Australia.223 
Shannon stressed that representatives of the legal system have a serious obligation to ask ‘such 
detailed and probing questions of the scientists as are likely to elicit the proper evidence.’224 Although 
the incompetence of forensic witnesses was particularly criticised by Morling and Shannon, lawyers 
were also said to fall prey to fallibility and error in using forensic evidence in court.225 
 Conclusion 
This chapter began by introducing Australian and New Zealand research on the use of DNA and 
forensic evidence by lawyers, jurors, forensic scientists and judges in criminal cases. The research 
conducted by ESR in New Zealand and by Findlay and Grix in Australia demonstrates that lawyers 
attribute a high level of certainty to DNA evidence, suggesting that they are less likely to test or 
challenge DNA evidence than other forms of circumstantial evidence in criminal cases. These studies 
pointed to the need for further research about lawyers’ understanding of DNA evidence. The present 
study seeks to fill this gap by exploring this matter with lawyers themselves and by obtaining 
observations from judges and forensic scientists.  
Forensic scientists and judges suggest that there are problems with lawyers’ presentation of DNA 
evidence and that lawyers lack a sound understanding of pre-trial forensic processes. These difficulties 
are addressed in the present study, with the research questions226 seeking to obtain information about 
what difficulties lawyers encounter with DNA evidence. The data and research findings on these 
difficulties are presented in Chapter 6. 
According to Briody,227 jurors place significant emphasis on DNA evidence in cases involving serious 
offences. This means that it is important that lawyers present DNA evidence accurately, particularly 
because research suggests that jurors harbour incorrect assumptions about the strength of DNA 
evidence and the meaning of probability ratios. 
The case law, primarily in the ACT Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia, demonstrates a 
number of contentious areas in relation to DNA evidence that must be considered by lawyers. The 
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way DNA evidence is expressed, through numbers and words was considered by the High Court in 
Aytugrul and discussed in Whyms; probability ratios and statistics were considered in Meyboom and 
Forbes and issues relating to reliance on DNA evidence as the only evidence of guilt and what that 
means for the criminal standard of proof were discussed in Forbes and Hillier. These cases provide the 
legal framework in relation to DNA evidence for practising lawyers Australia-wide. They also constitute 
the legal background to the first area of investigation for this research — lawyers’ every day 
understanding and use of DNA evidence in criminal trials. Research questions that explore these issues 
are outlined at 4.3 below and the results discussed in Chapter 5. Victorian lawyers have witnessed the 
influence of the miscarriage of justice in Jama and subsequent Vincent Report on criminal law practice 
in that state, where legal practice and use of DNA evidence was central to a substantial miscarriage of 
justice. Both the Vincent Report and the NAS Report call for lawyers to undertake further education 
in this area, to prevent future miscarriages of justice resulting from poorly handled DNA evidence. The 
research questions on DNA education investigated in this thesis are discussed at 4.4 with the data and 
findings presented in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 3 explains the socio-legal context in which this research took place. It introduces scientific 
principles associated with DNA evidence and identifies emerging and more contentious areas of DNA 
that lawyers will likely contend with in future criminal cases. The adversarial system of law is 
introduced and the procedural way lawyers must handle DNA evidence is also explained.  
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3 DNA in a legal context 
 Introduction  
The use of scientific evidence, such as DNA evidence, in an adversarial legal system requires an 
understanding of the basic tenets of two very different disciplines: science and law. This chapter 
introduces basic but important principles of DNA evidence, the forensic science system that DNA 
evidence forms part of and the legal system in which criminal trials take place in Australia. This 
provides the basic scientific and legal context of the present study. Exploring the philosophical 
underpinnings of the science/law relationship is beyond the ambit of this research. There is a large 
body of research in this area that looks at the similarities and differences in these two disciplines.1 The 
information provided in this chapter is not intended to be comprehensive and cover the field. It sets 
the context and foundation for detailed analysis in the later chapters. This research focuses on the use 
of DNA evidence in a legal context, which is why it is necessary to explain the legal and forensic context 
of the research. This chapter introduces definitions of forensic science and DNA evidence and explains 
some of the emerging areas of concern for lawyers in managing DNA evidence. It lays the foundation 
for the detailed discussion of the difficulties lawyers face in managing and using DNA evidence in 
Chapter 6. The nature of the adversarial system is introduced and the duties to disclose information 
about DNA evidence are explained. These topics are foundational to the discussion of the tensions 
created by the adversarial process for lawyers in gaining information about DNA evidence considered 
in detail in Chapter 5. The environment in which experts give evidence is also discussed, including 
evidentiary rules that allow for expert opinion evidence like DNA evidence to be adduced. This chapter 
explores relevant procedural rules (and lack thereof) governing criminal legal practice to understand 
the foundations upon which lawyers are required to build their criminal practice. How they practice 
every day is not only influenced by the limited guidance provided by these rules but also by the 
realities of the adversarial legal system discussed in Chapter 5. Finally, because it may be argued that 
lawyers have an obligation to understand the evidence they adduce or challenge in criminal trials as 
this helps to ensure a fair trial, relevant general principles relating to the right to a fair trial are 
introduced. Whether lawyers are meeting this obligation is also discussed in Chapter 5.  
                                                             
1 See, for example Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Serviceable Truths: Science for Action in Law and Policy’ (2015) 93 Texas 
Law Review 1723; Deborah M H Freeland, ‘Speaking Science to Law’ (2013) 25 The Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 289; Sheila Jasanoff, ‘Law’s Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings’ 
(2005) 95(S1) American Journal of Public Health S49; and Pauline Newman, ‘Law and Science: The Testing of 
Justice’ (2000) 57 New York University Annual Survey of American Law 419. 
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 Forensic science and DNA expert evidence 
Forensic science is science that is used for the purpose of the law, and so any science that may be 
called on in resolving legal disputes could be termed ‘forensic’ science.2 A more narrow definition from 
Cobb is the use of science in the ‘investigation of crime by police and by the courts as evidence in 
resolving the issue in any subsequent trial.’3 Crispino et al4 and Margot5 argue that forensic science is 
a scientific discipline in its own right, rather than a collection of scientific disciplines applied to criminal 
situations and define this ‘science’ as ‘identifying and associating traces for investigative and security 
purposes.’6 Whether forensic evidence is in fact a scientific discipline in its own right does not influence 
the way lawyers utilise DNA evidence in criminal cases. DNA evidence has its basis in forensic biology 
and this places it amongst the forensic science disciplines.  
3.2.1 Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 
DNA — deoxyribonucleic acid — is the blueprint for life, made up of genetic information found in 
almost every cell of every organism. Humans and animals are produced by combining a male 
reproductive cell (sperm) and female reproductive cell (ovum). These cells must combine to create a 
zygote with a full complement of DNA. Because all cells arise from the cell division that the zygote 
undergoes, all cells in a person’s body have identical DNA. Each of the 46 chromosomes in a human 
cell are formed from one piece of a double stranded DNA, where two strands are wound around each 
other to form the ‘double helix.’7 Inside these strands is a supporting structure of protein. Because the 
DNA is coiled, a large amount can be present within the nucleus of one cell.  
Although there are a few DNA analysis techniques used across the world, the most common approach 
is the use of short tandem repeat (STR) DNA sequences, because this is the recognised world standard 
used in DNA databases.8 The United Kingdom can be credited with having the first DNA database for 
                                                             
2 Peter Cobb, as cited in Peter White, Crime Scene to Court – the Essentials of Forensic Science (The Royal 
Society of Chemistry, 1998).  
3 Ibid 2. 
4 Frank Crispino et al, ‘Forensic Science – A True Science?’ (2011) 43(2–3) Australian Journal of Forensic 
Sciences 157. 
5 Pierre Margot, ‘Forensic Science on Trial – What is the Law of the Land?’ (2011) 43(2–3) Australian Journal 
of Forensic Sciences 89. 
6 Crispino et al, above n 4, 157. 
7 Peter White (ed), Crime Scene to Court – The Essentials of Forensic Science (Royal Society of Chemistry, 1998) 
305. 
8 Peter Gill and Tim Clayton, ‘The Current Status of DNA Profiling in the UK’ in Jim Fraser and Robin Williams 
(eds), Handbook of Forensic Science (Willan Publishing, 2009) 29. 
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use in criminal investigations and it still has, in the National DNA database (NDNAD), the largest DNA 
database in the world.9 
Extracting and ‘fingerprinting’ DNA was developed by Dr Alex Jeffreys, a geneticist at the University of 
Leicester in 1985. Jeffreys demonstrated that he could achieve discrimination between blood samples 
from different people by a process of analysis called restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP). 
This was done on the variable number of tandem repeat sections (VNTR) found in the non-coding part 
of a person’s DNA.10 The application of this profiling process to forensic science was described by Gill, 
Jeffreys and Werrett in the same year.11 At this early stage of profiling, the RFLP approach used a multi-
locus probe with a very high discriminating power in the millions, but low sensitivity, particularly 
regarding mixtures of DNA from more than one person. It also took a long time to process results — 
sometimes several weeks.12 This developed into single locus probe RFLP profiling in 1990,13 also 
achieving highly discriminatory results but slightly more sensitive and applicable to mixed profiles in a 
sample. It was however still a lengthy process. In 1991 a technique called polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) was introduced. This amplifies DNA sections of interest by copying them numerous times — 
making the test highly sensitive.14 This test could draw results in days rather than weeks, but match 
probability was low by comparison to RFLP profiling — according to Bramley15 a ratio of 1 in 40. This 
made it useful only as an elimination tool so it could only be used for exculpating individuals, rather 
than as inculpatory evidence. It remains exculpatory in its current form.16 
In 1994, a significant breakthrough in DNA analysis came in the form of DNA profiling for database 
purposes — analysis of STR loci17 or microsatellites.18 This method used the multiplex PCR technique 
for heightened sensitivity and greater speed of analysis and polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis 
                                                             
9 Bob Bramley, ‘DNA Databases’ in Jim Fraser and Robin Williams (eds), Handbook of Forensic Science (Willan 
Publishing, 2009) 309, 309. 
10 Alec Jeffreys, Victoria Wilson and Swee Lay Thein, ‘Hypervariable “Minisatellite” Regions in Human DNA’ 
(1985) 314 Nature 67; Alec Jeffreys, Victoria Wilson and Swee Lay Thein, ‘Individual-Specific Fingerprints of 
Human DNA’ (1985) 316 Nature 76. 
11 Peter Gill, Alec J Jeffreys and David J Werrett, ‘Forensic Application of DNA Fingerprints’ (1985) 318 Nature 
577. 




16 Though see the ‘reality’ that interviewees face when DNA evidence is found to be exclusionary evidence that 
rarely excludes at 5.4 below.  
17 Loci are locations on a chromosome and current DNA testing tests at ten loci — one is gender, with the 
remainder being unique to individuals, with exceptions of familial connections.  
18 Colin Kimpton et al, ‘Evaluation of an Automated DNA Profiling System Employing Multiplex Amplification at 
Four Tetrameric STR Loci’ (1994) 106(6) International Journal of Legal Medicine 302. 
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because it led to fewer errors in the measurement of DNA fragment sizes with more precise values of 
alleles.19 PCR amplifies STRs to levels that may be dated in age and the copies are separated according 
to size. The different sized STRs show up in a pattern of peaks on an electropherogram that is then 
compared against a database or against a suspect’s pattern.20 The small size of the STRs enables them 
to be taken from older and more degraded samples of biological material, as well as from fresh 
samples.21 At first these tests were carried out on four loci, so that the match probability was about 1 
in 40 000 for full profiles from unrelated individuals.22 This increased to six STR loci in early 1995 with 
a match probability of 1 in 50 million and later, in a system called SGM Plus (‘Second Generation 
Multiplex’ Plus) the Forensic Science Service (FSS) in the UK could test simultaneously for the original 
6 loci, a marker for gender and four new STR loci with a reported match probability of less than 1 in 1 
billion.23  
DNA profiling does not, and cannot, provide an absolute match between a sample and a particular 
person — it can only establish that it ‘could have’ or ‘did not’ come from that person.24 This is because 
without testing everyone on the planet, it is impossible to determine whether the statement that 
‘everyone has a unique DNA’ is true beyond a probability. For that reason, DNA evidence is always 
classified as circumstantial evidence by the courts and the legal system, in every case. 
3.2.2 Emerging areas of DNA Analysis 
Lawyers do not only use DNA evidence as it has traditionally been used, but may also use emerging 
areas of DNA analysis and testing. Two examples of the latter, for the purposes of introducing these 
issues for lawyers, are mitochondrial DNA and low copy analysis. Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) is a 
relatively new25 analysis technique. It is a less informative marker that can assist in detecting DNA 
from highly degraded samples of biological material such as bone.26 This technique is used for material 
                                                             
19 An allele is one member of a pair (or any of the series) of genes occupying a specific spot on a 
chromosome (called locus) that controls the same trait. 
20 Natasha Gilbert, ‘DNA’s Identity Crisis’ (2010) 464 Nature 347. 
21 Bramley, above n 9, 309. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid 310. 
24 Stephen Gutowski as cited in Ian Freckleton and Hugh Selby, Expert Evidence in Criminal Law (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 1999) 40. 
25 Mitochondrial DNA was discovered in the 1960s by electron microscopy as DNA-sensitive threads inside 
mitochondria, see Margit M K Nass and Sylvan Nass, ‘Intramitochondrial Fibers with DNA Characteristics: I. 
Fixation and Electron Staining Reactions’ (1963) 19(3) Journal of Cell Biology 593. It has only been used in 
court in more recent years however — see recent High Court case of Atygrul v The Queen [2012] HCA 15 for 
an example of its use in a criminal case.  
26 Gill and Clayton, above n 8, 37. 
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that is not suitable for RFLP or STR analysis27 and tests may be conducted on samples that are too 
small for nuclear-DNA testing because while there are hundreds or thousands of mitochondria in a 
single cell, there is only one nucleus.28 This then means that far fewer cells are needed for mtDNA 
testing, which makes it appropriate for use with degraded or limited samples of tissue. Mitochondria 
in all cells are copied from that of the zygote (fertilised egg) so all people in the maternal line of 
descent in a family have the same mtDNA sequence.29 
In conducting research with eligible jurors in a mock trial setting, Kaye, Hans, Dann, Farley and 
Albertson found that the jurors ‘generally recognized the limitations of mtDNA. The final probabilities 
of guilt supplied by the jurors suggest they were far from overwhelmed by the mtDNA match and 
statistics’ and during deliberations there was discussion that focused on the other evidence in the 
case.30 
Low copy number analysis is an area of DNA analysis that draws DNA profiles from very small amounts 
of genetic material. It is a contentious area of science,31 with some opposing its use because it doesn’t 
permit profiles to be reproduced, samples are prone to contamination and results are based on a lack 
of scientifically validated means for deciding their accuracy.32 Standard DNA tests require about 200 
picograms of DNA — around 33 cells, and double that for haploid sperm cells. Producing DNA profiles 
from very small samples (in some cases only a few microscopic cells) requires ways of increasing the 
sensitivity of the analysis, including by running more PCR cycles to create more samples of the DNA, 
                                                             
27 David H Kaye et al, ‘Statistics in the Jury Box: How Jurors Respond to Mitochondrial DNA Match Probabilities’ 
(2007) 4(4) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 797. 
28 Ibid 806.  
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid 825. 
31 See for example: Peter Gill et al, ‘An Investigation of the Rigor of Interpretation Rules for STRs Derived From 
Less than 100 pg of DNA’ (2000) 112(1) Forensic Science International 17; Bruce Bedowle, Arthur J Eisenburg 
and Angela van Daal, ‘Validity of Low Copy Number Typing and Applications to Forensic Science’ (2009) 50(3) 
Croatian Medical Journal 207; Peter Gill and John Buckleton, ‘A Universal Strategy to Interpret DNA Profiles 
That Does Not Require a Definition of Low Copy Number’ (2010) 4 Forensic Science International 221. In 2015, 
a New York judge, Justice Mark Dwyer, refused to admit evidence of low copy DNA testing results in a criminal 
trial in Brooklyn, because ‘to have a technique that is so controversial that the community of scientists who 
are experts in the field can’t agree on it and then to throw it in front of a lay jury and expect them to be able 
to make sense of it, is just the opposite of what the “Frye standard” is all about.’ See Shayna Jacobs, ‘Judge 
Tosses Out Two Types of DNA Evidence Used Regularly in Criminal Cases’ New York Daily News (online) 5 
January 2015, <http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/judge-tosses-types-dna-testing-article-
1.2065795>. 
32 Gilbert, above n 20, 347. This article uses the case of twin brothers Terence and David Reed who were 
accused and convicted of the murder of Peter Hoe in North Yorkshire, United Kingdom on 13 October 2006. 
The DNA profiles had been drawn from very small amounts of genetic material, and the appeal on the basis 
that a representative of the FSS in the UK overstepped her qualifications by speculating how the men’s DNA 
came to be on two pieces of plastic, failed in late 2009. 
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or by purifying the sample after PCR has occurred to remove reagents. Gilbert found that the PCR-
based quantitation methods may suggest that a sample does not contain DNA, yet technicians can still 
produce a partial sample.33 Upon analysis of this sort of sample, fluctuations may occur. STRs present 
in the original sample may not appear on subsequent testing, known as ‘allele drop out.’34 On the 
other hand, profiles may show STRs that are not actually present in samples — the ‘drop in effect’, 
which may be caused by contamination of a sample.35  
Generally, in low-copy profiling, scientists will split the limited DNA sample into three, running 
analyses on two samples with the third sample reserved for the defence. Peter Gill from the University 
of Strathclyde in Glasgow does not doubt the strength of the science used in low-copy profiling, and 
was involved in developing low-copy testing at the FSS in the UK.36 Although the amount of material 
available for profiling is much smaller than that in standard analysis and drop-in and drop-out effects 
are more pronounced, this may be avoided by ensuring cleanliness in testing environments and 
monitoring negative controls.37 Allan Jamieson, director of the Forensic Institute in Glasgow notes that 
the courtroom is not, however, the appropriate place to debate the validity and strength of low-copy 
DNA profiling.38 Until issues around reliability have been adequately dealt with by the scientific 
community, this debate should continue to occur in that arena rather than the courtroom.39 
A more recent development in DNA testing and profiling in the United States is that of Rapid DNA 
technology.40 Researchers in that country have taken ‘two sterile rooms, several instruments, and a 
highly-educated technician, and shrunken it to the size of a desktop printer’41 known as a RapidHIT 
machine. Fully automated Rapid DNA machines run multiple, single-source biological samples 
simultaneously and can produce DNA profiles in approximately 90 minutes.42 Developments like that 
                                                             
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid 348. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Peter Gill et al, above n 31. 
37 Ibid. 
38 As cited in Gilbert, above n 20, 348. 
39 An argument that Justice Mark Dwyer from the Supreme Court in New York agreed with in a recent case, 
discussed above n 31. 
40 For a discussion of legal implications of Rapid DNA testing see Erin R Steward, ‘Discussion and Evaluation: 
The Legality and Use of Rapid DNA Technologies’ (2016) 84(4) University of Missouri–Kansas City Law Review 
1133. 




42 For information on the machine, see Integenx, ‘RapidHIT®ID: Instant identification. Anywhere.’ (2015) 
<https://integenx.com/RapidHIT-id/>. 
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of Rapid HIT have the capacity to revolutionise legal investigations. The ramifications for the legal 
system were introduced and discussed by Steward.43 There are concerns for privacy as suspects can 
have DNA tested and results of profiles in under two hours, often without legal representations 
present.44 Steward also concludes that provided proper measures are followed and personnel are 
properly trained, Rapid HIT testing will improve search and seizure capabilities for investigations, and 
concerns of the constitutionality of these actions will be alleviated.45 Although it will be a number of 
years before testing with machines like Rapid HIT is commonly utilised in Australia, lawyers must be 
familiar with emerging technologies as they come onto the market.  
3.2.3 What is forensic science? 
Forensic science seeks to help clarify three major issues facing police officers investigating an incident: 
first, has a crime been committed; second, who is responsible; and finally, if a person is suspected as 
being responsible, is there enough evidence to charge him or her and support a prosecution?46 One of 
the basic tenets of forensic science is the Locard principle — that ‘every contact leaves a trace’.47 The 
‘trace’ is the domain of the forensic scientist,48 while it is the ‘evidence’ that the trace may become 
that is the domain of the police officer, investigator and finally, the lawyer.  
Forensic scientists are most commonly called by the prosecution, although defence counsel may also 
engage an alternative expert to scrutinise forensic reports and samples obtained by the prosecution.49 
There are several ways that forensic biologists may demonstrate to the court that DNA evidence is 
reliable:  
• The scientist giving the evidence may testify that he or she carried out the work personally or 
gave direct supervision to others who performed the work, or was under direct supervision by 
other qualified people. Witnesses may interpret factual evidence given by another witness 
under oath considering findings or outcomes. This might occur in situations where the defence 
calls alternative experts and the evidence of the prosecution is presented to the alternative 
expert for explanation. It may also occur if the alternative expert presents a different 
                                                             
43 Steward, above n 40. 
44 Ibid 1148. 
45 Ibid 1151–1152. 
46 Cobb, above n 2, 7. 
47 Emond Locard, L’enquête Criminelle et les Méthodes Scientifiques (Ernest Flammarion, 1920). 
48 Margot, above n 5. 
49 See discussion at 5.8.1 on lawyer’s hesitancy to do this and the realities associated with engaging experts for 
the defence.  
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recommendation or different evidence and the prosecution expert is asked to comment on that 
evidence and its interpretation in court. 
• The methods used must satisfy the requirements for the expert opinion evidence exception to 
the exclusionary opinion rule in evidence law.50 In Australia, in uniform Evidence Act 
jurisdictions51 like Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), the opinion rules in s 76 
and s 79 of the uniform Evidence Acts impose conditions, designed to ensure the reliability of 
the evidence, on the admissibility of scientific expert opinion evidence.52 Importantly, this 
requires that a person has specialised knowledge of the area on which they express an opinion 
based on their study, training or experience.53 
• Where the scientific findings require interpretation, the basis of the interpretation (basis rule) 
must be made available to the scientific community and to the court.54 This enables the basis of 
the interpretation to be tested scientifically and through the legal mechanism of cross-
examination.  
Forensic science aims to contribute to the finding of solutions to criminal problems and to assist the 
fact-finder by providing the most relevant and reliable evidence available. Margot sees forensic 
science as being a science that is distinctly applied to forensic problems, rather than being specific 
types of forensic chemistry or forensic biology.55 The work of forensic scientists is not yet universally 
viewed as a true profession.56 
3.2.4 The role of a forensic scientist  
The role that forensic scientists play in the adversarial criminal justice system is a matter of debate 
among forensic scientists. It is important to define this role both generally and specifically in relation 
                                                             
50 See discussion of the opinion rule at 3.5.1 below. 
51 Australian jurisdictions with uniform evidence legislation include: Victoria, the ACT, Norfolk Island, NSW, the 
Northern Territory (NT) and Tasmania. 
52 By comparison, the United States, a common law jurisdiction, has what are known as ‘Daubert rules’ that 
require that scientific evidence should be based on established scientific principles and methods, validated 
and, preferably, published so that they can be scrutinised by other members of the scientific community. 
53 See, for example, s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth):  
79. Exception: opinion based on specialised knowledge  
(1) If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience, the opinion 
rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that person that is wholly or substantially based on that 
knowledge. 
54 Cobb, above n 2, 9. 
55 Margot, above n 5, 101. 
56 James Robertson, ‘Forensic Science – a True Profession?’ (2011) 43(2–3) Australian Journal of Forensic 
Sciences 105. 
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to DNA evidence, because this may have implications for their relationship with lawyers, the 
difficulties lawyers encounter in identifying the weaknesses and/or limitations of DNA evidence, the 
barriers and challenges facing lawyers in obtaining information about DNA evidence and the 
investigations that defence counsel conduct in relation to DNA evidence both pre-trial and at trial. 
Margot argues that forensic scientists should become part of the investigative process — attending 
crime scenes and making decisions about the information collected based on investigative information 
and any other information that is relevant to the specific case.57 He suggests that forensic scientists 
operate within the legal investigation, not outside of it and that they can play an important role in 
aiding the selection of ‘traces’ at a crime scene, thus determining what may later become evidence in 
a court of law. Margot's view supports the proposition that forensic scientists can become involved in 
legal investigations, because their knowledge of traces assists in the collection of forensic evidence on 
a case-by-case basis. This conception of the role of forensic scientists accords them a significant 
involvement in the investigative process and treats forensic science as a science that necessarily 
applies in legal situations, rather than as an unaffiliated, independent scientific field. 
However, should forensic scientists become involved in the investigative process or work from a basis 
of knowledge about investigative facts, there may be a danger that bias will be introduced into their 
analyses and findings. Actual and perceived bias is one of the most significant concerns for forensic 
scientists.58 For this reason, Mnookin et al59 do not view the role of the forensic scientist as being that 
of a criminal investigator. Instead they believe that they need to know the basics of the scientifically 
relevant details, like the surface from which a fingerprint was lifted, but that they should not know 
about such things as a suspect’s confession or previous convictions for serious crimes.60  
Sequential unmasking is the process by which a forensic scientist interprets each item of evidence 
independently of other items of evidence or reference samples in a bid to reduce or eliminate 
contextual bias and other observer effects.61 Sequential unmasking creates protocols that aim to 
                                                             
57 Margot, above n 5, 92. 
58 For example, see Itiel E Dror and Simon A Cole, ‘The Vision in “Blind Justice”: Expert Perception, Judgment 
and Visual Cognition in Forensic Pattern Recognition’ (2010) 17(2) Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 161; Bryan 
Found, ‘Deciphering The Human Condition: The Rise of Cognitive Forensics’ (2015) 47(4) Australian Journal 
of Forensic Sciences 386. 
59 Jennifer L Mnookin et al, ‘The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences’ (2011) 58 University of 
California Los Angeles Law Review 725. 
60 Ibid 770. 
61 Dan E Krane et al, ‘Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic DNA 
Interpretation’ (2008) 53 Journal of Forensic Science 1006. For further and more recent discussion of 
contextual bias research in the forensic sciences, see Found, above n 58. 
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protect examiners from this sort of information, and potentially, from bias.62 Sequential unmasking 
may prevent bias in forensic scientists — both conscious and unconscious — but it limits the role of 
the forensic scientist to the scientific element of their work and excludes the possibility of their 
adopting an investigative role of the kind suggested by Margot. 
Forensic scientists and police officers63 are responsible for collecting and interpreting traces. Those 
traces often become the bases for evidence in legal trials and therefore having access to forensic 
scientists pre-trial, and an ability to communicate with them during a trial, is important as an expert 
witness. Lawyers may need to investigate the integrity of forensic reports and the veracity of forensic 
investigations in the period leading up to a trial in court. Both these propositions have implications for 
the examination-in-chief and cross examination of a forensic scientist as an expert witness. If lawyers 
do not communicate with expert witnesses or are tactical in how and when they communicate with 
them, a defendant may not be receiving the fairest trial in the circumstances presented.  
 The adversarial system  
The lawyer is active, the judge passive. The lawyer partisan, the judge neutral. The lawyer 
imaginative, the judge reflective.64 
Because the focus of this research is the experience of lawyers, the system within which lawyers 
introduce evidence to courts must be explored. As a common law country, Australia has an adversarial 
criminal trial system. Within this system, the judge’s role is that of an impartial, independent arbiter, 
who determines questions of law that govern the proceedings, including issues relating to the 
admissibility of evidence. Juries or, in cases involving less serious, generally non-indictable offences, 
judicial officers, determine the outcome of disputes based on information presented by the parties 
themselves, and/or their lawyers. Because the trial process is governed by rules of evidence and 
procedure, court procedure generally guarantees a role for lawyers in the adversarial process.65 To 
determine the fundamental role of lawyers in adversarial systems it is important to ask whose 
interests do lawyers serve and whose values do they represent?66 
                                                             
62 Krane et al, above n 61.  
63 Particularly for volume crimes. 
64 Justice Peck, describing a view with which he disagrees, cited in M Frankel, ‘The Search for Truth: An Umpireal 
View’ (1975) 123 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1031, 1035. 
65 Stephen Bottomley and Simon Bronitt, Law in Context (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2006). 
66 Roy Simon, Carol Needham and Burnele Powell, Lawyers and the Legal Profession: Cases and Materials 
(Matthew Bender and Company, 4th ed, 2009) 183. The role of lawyers in the adversarial system is discussed 
at 3.3.  
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Under an adversarial system, the parties (and their lawyers) are responsible for defining the issues in 
question and for initiating dispute resolution.67 The system presupposes two advocates representing 
their parties' cases before an impartial adjudicator — either a judicial officer of some form alone or 
combined with a jury of the parties’ peers. The adversarial system not only takes the fact of 
disagreement between parties into account, but relies on it, and any final judgment of a court will be 
informed by contrasting points of view. The role of lawyers in the adversarial system is to present 
these contrasting points of view in the interests of their clients. Accordingly, the adversarial system 
serves the public interest of achieving justice in a unique way while ensuring individuals can present 
their cases and be represented. 
This contrasts with the inquisitorial system, where the judge or a panel of judges is solely responsible 
for conducting legal enquiries. Lawyers play a more passive role — suggesting questions to the 
presiding judge and often following the judges’ questioning of the evidence and witnesses with 
questions of their own.68 
On the traditional role of the non-interventionist judge in the adversarial system, Lord Denning asserts 
that: 
In the system of trial which we have evolved in this country, the judge sits to hear and determine 
the issues raised by the parties, not to conduct an investigation or examination on behalf of society 
at large, as happens, we believe, in some foreign countries. Even in England, however, a judge is 
not a mere umpire to answer the question “How’s that?” His object, above all is to find out the 
truth, and to do justice according to law; and in the daily pursuit of it the advocate plays an 
honourable and necessary role.69 
Although Lord Denning saw the judge’s role as ‘finding out the truth’, the High Court of Australia in 
Whitehorn v The Queen stated: 
A trial does not involve the pursuit of truth by any means. The adversary system is the means 
adopted and the judge’s role in that system is to hold the balance between the contending parties 
without himself taking part in their disputations. It is not an inquisitorial role in which he seeks to 
remedy the deficiencies in the case on either side. When a party’s case is deficient, the ordinary 
                                                             
67 Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Review of Adversarial System of Litigation, Issues Paper No 25, 
<https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/DP62.pdf> 27 [2.25]. 
68    For a comprehensive discussion of the role defense lawyers play in evaluating forensic DNA evidence in both 
the Swiss and American context, see Vuille, Joelle and W. C. Thompson, ‘An American Advantage? How 
American and Swiss Criminal Defense Attorneys Evaluate Forensic DNA Evidence’ (2016) 14 International 
Commentary on Evidence 142 
69 Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55, 63 (Denning L). 
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consequence is that it does not succeed. If a prosecution does succeed at trial when it ought not 
to and there is a miscarriage of justice as a result, that is a matter to be corrected on appeal. It is 
no part of the function of the trial judge to prevent it by donning the mantle of prosecution or 
defence counsel.70 
Lawyers play a pivotal role in adversarial criminal proceedings and while lawyers for both the defence 
and the prosecution owe their primary duty to the administration of justice, their respective roles 
thereafter differ slightly. Defence counsel must represent the interests of their clients to the best of 
their ability. Prosecution counsel, in contrast, must act as so-called ‘ministers of justice’ and be 
advocates for the truth. Lawyers have the onerous tasks of, on the one hand, adducing sufficient 
evidence to establish the case they allege to the requisite standard and, on the other, of challenging 
the cogency and sufficiency of opponents’ evidence to undermine their case.71 Reinhardt and de Fina 
argue that the lack of training in anything other than a traditional adversarial, court-based system of 
law encourages a ‘mindset or culture amongst practitioners’ that is not focusing solely on justice.72 
The adversarial system can create conventions and tensions that sit in opposition to the need for 
lawyers to gain information from expert sources and to communicate with experts. These are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5.73 
 The human rights framework 
The adversarial system can only conform to fair trial principles if the opposing adversaries are equally 
matched. This is problematic because one of the contestants, the prosecution, is funded and armed 
by the State. Therefore, prosecution counsel is likely, in most cases, to have a superior armoury of 
proof at their disposal when compared to that of the defence. This problem achieves recognition in 
fair trial principles relating to equality of arms and the role and duties of the prosecutor in criminal 
proceedings, which seek to ameliorate defendants’ unequal position.  
It is necessary to consider the human rights framework of criminal trials in this research because fair 
trial and equality before the law principles underpin both the investigative and adjudicative stages of 
the criminal justice system. Clearly, therefore, these rights must frame investigative, forensic and legal 
approaches to how DNA evidence is, and should be, dealt with. It is beyond the scope of the thesis to 
                                                             
70 R v Whitehorn (1983) 49 ALR 448, 467, cited with approval by the Full Bench of the High Court in R v 
Apostelides (1984) 53 ALR 445. 
71 Bottomley and Bronitt, above n 65, 119. 
72 G Reinhart and Y de Fina cited in Chapter 4 of Charles Sampford, Sophie Blencowe, Suzanne Condlln (eds), 
Educating Lawyers for a Less Adversarial System (Federation Press, 1999) 48. 
73 See discussion at 5.7 and 5.8 specifically. 
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consider fair trial principles in detail. The purpose of the discussion here is to indicate the significance 
of those principles for the way that lawyers manage DNA evidence in criminal trials.  
The two human rights of most relevance to the subject matter of this research are the right to a fair 
trial and the right to equality before the law. The right to a fair trial is a fundamental human right 
established at common law and in international and Australian human rights instruments. Although 
the common law recognises the right to a fair trial, it has never defined the elements of fair trials, 
whereas human rights instruments74 list the minimum requirements for a fair trial. In 1923 Isaac J 
referred to this right at common law as the ‘elementary right of every accused person to a fair and 
impartial’ hearing75 and Deane J in Dietrich v The Queen 76 echoed these sentiments in the High Court 
in 1992, reiterating that ‘Isaacs J.’s statement that the requirement that the trial of an accused person 
be “fair and impartial” is “deeply rooted in our system of law” was not the stuff of empty rhetoric. It 
remains an accurate statement of the common law of this country.’ Reference to this ‘right’ in the 
common law is often made with a focus on what is not acceptable, whereas human rights instruments 
tend to outline what must be done for an accused person to receive a fair trial. Mason CJ and McHugh 
J articulate the former approach in Dietrich v The Queen77 — ‘the accused’s right to a fair trial is more 
accurately expressed in negative terms as a right not to be tried unfairly.’ In contrast, human rights 
instruments78 list the minimum requirements for fair trials — a more prescriptive approach that a 
defendant may refer to as determinative of fair trial principles.79  
The right to a fair trial consists of a bundle of rights including that all persons are equal before courts 
and tribunals; the right to a fair and public hearing before a competent, independent and impartial 
court or tribunal established by law; the presumption of innocence and minimum guarantees in 
criminal proceedings, such as the right to counsel and not to be compelled to self-incriminate.80 
Additionally, the right to equality before the law in the context of criminal trials may operate 
concomitantly with the right to a fair trial and buttress and provide content to a number of the 
elements of the right to a fair trial. So, for example, the fair trial right to have adequate time and 
                                                             
74 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 
(entered into force 23 March 1976) art 14 (‘ICCPR’); Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), Charter of Human Rights 
and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).  
75 R v MacFarlane; Ex parte O’Flanaghan and O’Kelly (1923) 32 CLR 518, 541–542. 
76 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 326. 
77 Ibid [8]. 
78 The two Australian states with this legislation are currently Victoria and the ACT: see Human Rights Act 2004 
(ACT) and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). 
79 Jeremy Gans et al, Criminal Process and Human Rights (Federation Press, 2011). 
80 See ICCPR art 14. 
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facilities to prepare a defence81 is supplemented by equality of arms principles, including the right to 
disclosure, derived largely from the right to equality before the law.82  
When lawyers present prosecution and defence cases in criminal matters involving DNA evidence, 
they must ensure that an accused receives a fair trial. How they conduct trials and handle evidence in 
each matter is then relevant to whether an accused receives a fair trial in terms of both the common 
law and relevant human rights instruments. Lawyers’ management and use of any form of evidence, 
including DNA evidence, may arguably influence their ability to ensure a fair trial has been achieved.  
This research explores whether a lawyer’s level of knowledge or understanding of DNA evidence, 
influences the risk of an unfair trial for a defendant. Accordingly, the broader concept of a ‘fair trial’ 
as established by the common law and human rights instruments is explored and the role of counsel 
in achieving this goal is considered. It is not intended here to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
right to a fair trial but rather to explore those aspects of the right to a fair trial and the right to equality 
before the law that are of relevance to the research questions explored in this research.  
Although the fair trial principle is claimed to be fundamental and universal — a basic human right 
protected by international law — its scope and effect are legally limited in several ways.83 This is 
explored further in sections [3.4.1]–[3.4.4]. 
3.4.1 Human Rights Instruments 
Under the Australian legal system, international human right treaties have no direct application or 
legal effect until they are incorporated into domestic legislation.84 Although domestic incorporation 
of the ICCPR in its entirety is yet to occur in all Australian jurisdictions, the ACT has enacted the Human 
Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and Victoria has enacted the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 
2006 (Vic), which are both based on the ICCPR. For other Australian jurisdictions, the ICCPR is the 
starting point for universally articulated human rights outside the common law. Even though not 
incorporated in their entirety in other Australian jurisdictions, international human rights principles 
cannot be ignored because various statutory and common law interpretive principles require 
                                                             
81 Ibid art 14(3)(b); Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 25(2)(b); Human 
Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 22(2)(b). 
82 See Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 8; Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 8. 
83 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (Lawbook, 3rd ed, 2010) 116. 
84 Anthony Mason, ‘The Role of the Judiciary in the Development of Human Rights in Australian Law’ in D Kinley 
(ed), Human Rights in Australian Law (Federation Press, 1998). 
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reference to international human rights norms.85 Both the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) and the 
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) cover criminal proceedings and include 
the right to a fair hearing86 and the right to equality before the law.87 The model represented by this 
legislation places courts under a duty to interpret legislative provisions so far as it is possible to do so 
consistently with their purpose in a way that is compatible with human rights88 and if this is not 
possible, the court must make a declaration of incompatibility or inconsistent interpretation.89  
3.4.2 Case law 
Although the notion of a fair trial is covered by the ICCPR and now the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) 
and Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), Refshauge J highlights that case law 
references the elementary right of every accused person to a fair and impartial trial as far back as 
1923.90 International human rights jurisprudence tells us that the right to a fair trial extends beyond 
the trial itself. For example, the European Court of Human Rights in Teixeira de Castro v Portugal91 
found that evidence obtained by deliberate police entrapment violated the right to a fair trial under 
the European Convention on Human Rights art 6. The court affirmed that the guarantee of fairness is 
not limited to legal proceedings, but underpins the whole criminal justice process — including the 
investigative and evidence gathering processes.92 This mirrors the approach adopted by the High Court 
in Jago v District Court93 (in relation to delay). Jago considered whether a miscarriage of justice had 
occurred because of undue delay before a trial.94 The case demonstrates that although it is not the 
court’s responsibility to ensure fairness in criminal investigations, any unfairness (for example delay) 
in that aspect of the criminal justice process may be relevant to whether the court can ensure the 
                                                             
85 Note the principle of legality, the principle of consistency and the legitimate influence principle as discussed 
in Gans et al, above n 9, 24–35.  
86 Sections 21 and 22 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT); Sections 24 and 25 Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). Based on art 14(3) of the ICCPR. 
87 Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 8; Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 8. 
88 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 30; Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 32. 
89 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 32–34; Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) 
s 28. 
90 R v Macfarlane; Ex parte O’Flanagan (1923) 23 CLR 518. 
91 Teixeira de Castro v Portugal [1998] IV Eur Court HR 1451. 
92 Ibid 34, citing Van Mechlen v the Netherlands (23 April 1997), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III, 
711, s 50. This could potentially influence Australian law — see Simon Bronnitt, ‘The Law in Undercover 
Policing: A Comparative Study of Entrapment and Covert Interviewing in Australia, Canada and Europe’ 
(2004) 33(1) Common Law World Review 35. 
93 Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23. 
94 Ibid. 
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accused receives a fair trial. For this reason, Mason CJ in Jago envisioned the right to a fair trial as 
extending to the whole course of the criminal process.95  
This conception of the fair trial is clearly relevant beyond the precise matters in issue in those cases 
and extends to the capture and analysis of DNA evidence. Furthermore, it is clear from human rights 
instruments themselves that the right to a fair trial extends to both pre- and post-trial processes. This 
is because of a number of the ancillary rights listed in human rights instruments as guarantors of the 
fair trial relate to pre- and post-trial matters, such as the pre-trial right to adequate time and facilities 
to prepare a defence96 and the post-trial right to review/appeal.97 
3.4.3 Legal representation  
The operation of the fair trial principle may depend on the nature and seriousness of the offence. In 
Dietrich v The Queen98 the High Court acknowledged that the concept of a fair trial is an evolving one, 
incapable of exhaustive definition.99 So, for example, what is considered fair, Gaudron J observed, may 
depend on the circumstances of a case and the prevailing social values at the time a case is heard. 
What may be fair in one case may be unfair in another.100 In Dietrich it was held that lack of legal 
representation for accused persons when charged with serious offences may cause trials to be unfair.  
The right to a fair trial imposes duties and responsibilities on counsel to know and understand the law 
and the evidence relevant to the cases in which they act.101  
The competence of lawyers by standards set by the profession has implications for the right to legal 
representation.102 If the right is that legal representation must be competent, even at the very 
                                                             
95 Ibid 29. 
96 ICCPR art 14 (3)(b); Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 25(2)(b); Human 
Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 22(2)(b). 
97 ICCPR art 14(4); Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 25(4); Human Rights 
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98 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 11 CLR 292. 
99 Ibid 300, 353. 
100 Ibid 364. 
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misconduct in the Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 4.4.2; Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) s 387, whereby if 
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(WA) 182, 188 and Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 353 (Toohey J): ‘I assume, of course, that 
representation is competent.’ See also Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 345 (Dawson J), 310 (Mason 
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minimum of standards, this should mean that if lawyers are presented with a case where there is DNA 
evidence beyond their level of understanding then they should decline to take the case. Arguably, 
taking the case would mean that the client could not be ensured of receiving a ‘fair trial.’  
3.4.4 Prosecutorial duties arising from the right to a fair trial  
Although courts cannot always remedy the denial of human rights occurring outside the judicial 
system, they cannot tolerate it within that system.103 Those charged with criminal offences, faced with 
DNA evidence in the case against them must be assured of this protection. The prosecutor also has a 
special role to play in protecting accused persons’ human rights. 
This responsibility is reflected in the entire conception of the modern prosecutor and consequent 
duties imposed on prosecutors. For example, former DPP and current ACT Supreme Court judge 
Richard Refshauge SC has stated that the prosecutor has a duty not only to prosecute persons charged 
with crimes but also to balance this duty by ensuring that prosecutions are not conducted at any cost. 
This means that DPPs must develop policies and guidelines to achieve the requisite fair balance.104 
Where DNA evidence is concerned, such guidelines will have particular relevance in cases where the 
only, or most significant, inculpatory evidence is DNA evidence or where the DNA evidence involves a 
new or emerging area of analysis.105  
By seeking to ensure that the trial is not just a bare fisted knuckle fight where ‘anything goes’, the 
right to a fair trial effectively determines the nature of the prosecutor’s role within the adversarial 
criminal trial. It assigns to the prosecutor the role of a ‘Minister of Justice’ and imposes certain 
consequent duties upon the prosecution.106 One aim of these duties is to achieve equality of arms107 
between the prosecution and the defence. In this regard, perhaps the most important of these duties 
                                                             
restrictive interpretation in AG (NSW) v Milat (1995) 37 NSWLR 370. A more recent case is that of Cornelius 
Stevens v Emily Mccallum [2006] ACTCA 13 (Higgins CJ, Crispin P and North J). 
103 McInnis v The Queen (1979) 143 CLR 575, 593 (Murphy J).  
104 Richard Refshauge, ‘Victim’s Rights and the Role of the Prosecutor’ (Paper presented at International Society 
for Reform of Criminal Law Conference, Brisbane, July 2006) 19. Also seen by the High Court in Mallard v The 
Queen [2005] HCA 68, 82. 
105 See 5.5 for discussion on the decision to prosecute in cases where DNA is the only or the most significant 
part of the evidence brief.  
106 David Plater and Sangeetha Royan, ‘The Development and Application in Nineteenth Century Australia of the 
Prosecutor’s Role as a Minister of Justice: Rhetoric or Reality?’ (2012) 31 University of Tasmania Law 
Review 78; David Plater, ‘The Development of the Prosecutor’s Role in England and Australia with Respect to 
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107 Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 8; Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 8. 
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(and for this research) is the duty of disclosure.108 The right to a fair trial imports the equality of arms 
principle into criminal trials and provides the basis of the prosecutors’ duty to disclose certain 
information to the defence. 
The equality of arms principle is founded on the inherent and unbalanced allocation of resources 
between an accused and the State. In many cases this may create an unequal playing field regarding 
forensic experts and DNA reports because the prosecution has access to State forensic laboratories. 
In the Australian adversarial system where the provision of forensic science for solving crime is 
provided almost exclusively by the State (unlike the private system in the United Kingdom),109 the 
courts cannot take sole responsibility for addressing the resource implications of the fair trial principle 
— like those created by the availability and allocation of resources involved in acquiring and 
presenting DNA evidence. This makes the designated role of the prosecutor and the duty of disclosure 
crucial elements in achieving fair trials in this regard. 
A prosecutor must act as a ‘Minister of Justice’ and must not embrace notions of ‘winning’ or 
‘losing.’110 This means that although prosecutors have at their disposal the resources of the State as 
State government agencies, this is balanced somewhat by their onerous duty of disclosure.111 The 
                                                             
108 See for example, Prosecution Policy of the Australian Capital Territory, Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (ACT), 12 <http://www.dpp.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/715506/PROSECUTION-
POLICY-OF-THE-AUSTRALIAN-CAPITAL-TERRITORY.pdf>:  
Disclosure 4.1: The prosecution is under a continuing obligation to make full disclosure to the accused in 
a timely manner of all material known to the prosecution which can be seen on a sensible appraisal by 
the prosecution:  
• to be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case; 
• to raise or possibly raise a new issue whose existence is not apparent from the evidence the 
prosecution proposes to use; or 
• to hold out a real as opposed to fanciful prospect of providing a lead to evidence which goes to 
either of the previous two matters. 
4.2: The prosecution is also under a duty to disclose to the defence information in its possession which is 
relevant to the credibility or reliability of a prosecution witness, for example: 
• a relevant previous conviction or finding of guilt; 
• a statement made by a witness which is inconsistent with any prior statement of the witness; 
• a relevant adverse finding in other criminal proceedings or in non-criminal proceedings; 
• evidence before a court, tribunal or Royal Commission which reflects adversely on the witness; 
• any physical or mental condition which may affect reliability; 
• any concession which has been granted to the witness in order to secure the witness’s testimony 
for the prosecution. 
109 Since the closure of the FSS (UK).  
110 See for example Plater and Royan, above n 106. 
111 In the ACT this legislation is governed by a number of statutes, including the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 
2008 (ACT) r 23.5-23.7. In Victoria, it may be found in the Victorian Bar Inc Practice Rules 2009 Rules 141-
142. 
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obligation of disclosure is only one aspect of the prosecutor’s broader obligation of a ‘Minister of 
Justice.’112 Rand J in the Canadian case of Boucher v The Queen113 aptly describes the role of the 
prosecutor as being:  
not to obtain a conviction, it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible 
evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available 
legal proof of the facts is presented: it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength 
but it must also be done fairly. The role of prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his 
function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be none charged with greater 
personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the 
seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings.114  
In fulfilling their duty to ensure that a trial is fair,115 the prosecution must disclose to the defence pre-
trial any material pointing to the innocence or guilt of the accused. This includes DNA evidence that 
either excludes or fails to exclude a defendant in matching a DNA sample to a crime scene or victim. 
The case of R v Drummond (No 2)116 demonstrates the importance of defence counsel being notified 
in a timely manner about the DNA evidence that the prosecution counsel will adduce. In this case, it 
was a point that was entirely germane to the conduct of the defence case as the DNA evidence in 
question had been mentioned in reports but defence counsel did not believe it would be adduced by 
the prosecution nor did they realise the significance of the evidence for this case.117 
Examples of the duty to disclose may be found in several statutes, rules of procedure and prosecutorial 
policy in Australian jurisdictions. Some examples include the Australian Capital Territory Barristers’ 
Rules,118 the Victorian Bar Incorporated Practice Rules119 and the Crimes (Criminal Trials) Act 1999 
(Vic).120 These provisions mirror the UK’s Crown Prosecutor’s Disclosure Manual.121 Also of relevance 
                                                             
112 See further discussion of the role of the prosecutor as a minister for justice in David Plater and Lucy De 
Vreeze, ‘Is the Golden Rule of Full Prosecution Disclosure a Modern Mission Impossible?’ (2012) 14 Flinders 
Law Journal 133. 
113 Boucher v The Queen (1955) SCR 16. 
114 Ibid 24. 
115 Mallard v The Queen [2005] 224 CLR 125, 155.  
116 R v Drummond (No 2) [2015] SASCFC 82.  
117 Though in this case the evidence in question was mentioned in forensic reports and counsel did not realise 
it would be adduced, nor the significance of the evidence if it were produced in court.  
118 See rr 66–72. 
119 See rr 141–142. 
120 See ss 6–7. 
121 Keir Starmer and Jim Barker-McCardle, Disclosure Manual, Crown Prosecutors Service, 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/disclosure_manual/disclosure_manual_foreword/>.  
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to the present study is the Prosecution Policy of the Australian Capital Territory122 and the DPP 
Prosecutions Policy, ‘Disclosure’ in Victoria.123 The prosecution duty of disclosure at common law is 
also extensive.124 
The Crimes (Criminal Trials) Act 1999 (Vic), introduced several disclosure requirements for both 
prosecution and defence. The prosecutor must provide the defence with a summary of its opening 
and notice of pre-trial admissions 28 days before the trial date.125 The defence must, within 14 days 
of the trial date, file a response to the prosecution opening. This response must ‘identify the acts, 
facts, matters and circumstances with which issue is taken and the basis on which issues is taken.’126 
This displaces the common law defence right to remain silent in relation to the nature of its case. The 
rationales for imposing disclosure obligations on the defence relate primarily to case management 
and efficiency considerations.127 The most common criticisms of these provisions are that they may 
result in an accused being compelled to facilitate his or her own conviction and that they displace the 
accused’s right to silence.128 Flatman and Bagaric contend however, that these provisions do not 
require an accused to disclose any more than was previously the case; they simply ‘hasten’ 
disclosure.129 Also defending the defence disclosure provisions, Refshauge J argues that if they help to 
ensure that genuine issues in a trial are litigated, and that only genuine issues are litigated, then there 
                                                             
122 This Policy was created after the formation of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1990 (Vic). Office of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT), above n 8, 12 (see quoted text).  
123 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic), Director’s Policy: Disclosure (24 November 2014) Office of Public 
Prosecutions Victoria, <http://www.opp.vic.gov.au/getattachment/bf6aca19-dbf7-4044-a4f7-
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PART 3 – Summary 
3. Subject to any claim of public interest immunity or legal professional privilege, or any statutory provisions 
to the contrary, the prosecution must fulfil its disclosure obligations under the Criminal Procedure Act 
2009 and disclose to the accused any other material which: 
(a) is relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case; or 
(b) raises or possibly raises a new issue whose existence is not apparent from the evidence the 
prosecution proposes to use; or 
(c) holds out a real as opposed to fanciful prospect of providing a lead to evidence which goes to (a) or 
(b) above. 
4. When in doubt about whether material should be disclosed, the matter should be discussed with a Crown 
Prosecutor or the DPP. 
124 See, for example, R v Stinchcombe (1991) 68 CC (3d) 1; R v Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619; R v Keane [1994] 2 All ER 
478; R v Gray (2001) 184 ALR 593 and R v Mallard (2005) 224 CLR 125. 
125 Crimes (Criminal Trials) Act 1999 (Vic) s 6(1)(a).  
126 Ibid s 7(2). 
127 Geoff Flatman and Mirko Bagaric, ‘Accused Disclosure – Measured Response or Abrogation of the 
Presumption of Innocence?’ (1999) 23 Criminal Law Journal 327, 328. 
128 Geoff Flatman and Mirko Bagaric, ‘Accused Disclosure – Measured Response or Abrogation of the 
Presumption of Innocence?’ (1999) 23 Criminal Law Journal 327. 
129 Ibid 330. 
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is no doubt that they will reduce trial times and increase certainty for those involved in the criminal 
process.130  
The prosecution duty of disclosure is extensive, because in the past, failures of disclosure have led to 
miscarriages of justice. In Mallard v The Queen,131 a principal authority on the matter, the High Court 
discussed the scope of this duty.132 This case also considered the role and responsibility of police in 
ensuring that the evidence given to the DPP is accurate and that no evidence has been withheld. One 
of the successful arguments in the High Court appeal was that the prosecution failed to disclose to the 
defence at the trial material which was relevant or potentially relevant to issues in the case, or which 
raised or possibly raised new issues not otherwise apparent, or which could have led to such matters 
being discovered.133 
The difficulty for the DPP was that they were reliant on the police to handle the investigation and 
consequently hand over a brief of evidence that was representative of what was found during the 
investigation. Evidence that was contrary to the defendant’s apparent ‘confession’ and did not place 
him near the crime scene was omitted from police statements and reports. This would have prevented 
the prosecution from presenting a fair and impartial case from the outset of the trial. In the second 
‘appeal’ in this case to the West Australian Court of Criminal Appeal, the prosecution conceded that, 
in several respects, material evidence should have been disclosed to the defence at trial but had 
instead been withheld.134 This concession arguably established the existence of an unreasonable or 
unsustainable verdict. Kirby J found that a miscarriage of justice had occurred in Mallard, because of 
the culmination, variety, number and importance of material evidence that was not disclosed or that 
was suppressed during the investigation and initial trial.135 
                                                             
130 Richard Refshauge QC, ‘Creating a Criminal Justice System for the 21st Century’ (2000) 9 Journal of Judicial 
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131 Mallard v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 125. 
132 This was also considered in detail in Lawless v The Queen (1979) 142 CLR 659, where the majority found that 
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Although it is difficult to define exhaustively the material that must be disclosed by the prosecution 
to the defence and to the court, the list would certainly include several obligations. These are: 
• To provide statements of witnesses proposed to be called; 
• To provide notice of discrepancies between a statement and the evidence proposed to be led; 
• To provide statements of witnesses not proposed to be called; 
• To provide prior convictions of prosecution witnesses and other material relevant to credit; 
• To provide other material which could reasonably assist the defence case; and 
• To provide all material relevant to mitigation of sentence. 
In relation to DNA evidence, the duty of disclosure clearly requires all expert reports to be provided 
to the defence. If a prosecutor is given a forensic biology report on DNA evidence and that report 
excludes or does not exclude the accused, this information is likely to fall under the category of 
information that must be presented to the defence. The English Court of Appeal case R v Maguire136 
held that in the forensic context, a forensic scientist who is an expert for the prosecution is under a 
duty to disclose material which he or she is aware may have some bearing on the offence alleged, or 
the more general circumstances of the case: 
The disclosure will be to the authority which retains him and which must in turn (subject to 
sensitivity) disclose the information to the defence. We hold that there is such a duty because we 
can see no cause to distinguish between members of the prosecuting authority and those advising 
it in the capacity of a forensic scientist. Such a distinction could involve difficult and contested 
inquiries as to where knowledge stopped but, most importantly, would be entirely counter to the 
desirability of ameliorating the disparity of resources as between the Crown and the subject.137 
Beyond the provision of a DNA profile and the statistical evaluation of a match between a sample and 
a random member of the population however, is the importance of providing further information, as 
demonstrated by the case of Jama. This arguably includes information beyond the forensic report and 
could extend to the forensic file compiled during the investigative phase by police officers and by 
forensic biologists collecting, testing, analysing and presenting DNA evidence in criminal trials. The 
duty of disclosure may even extend to enabling the defence to have access to prosecution experts 
who wrote the reports and compiled the evidence to facilitate their understanding of the contents of 
the reports and their implications. The extent of the prosecution duty of disclosure vis à vis DNA 
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evidence is yet to be tested and/or fully defined. This means that current professional practices 
derived from the adversarial criminal justice culture are likely to fill this void not necessarily to the 
advantage of the defence or in ways that advance the defence ability to understand or challenge DNA 
evidence either in general or in particular cases.  
In any event, the duty of disclosure must be adhered to in a timely manner. If information is presented 
only shortly before trial, the defence team has a much more limited ability to understand and 
challenge that evidence. If the prosecutor fails to fulfil these duties, then a fundamental tenet of the 
adversarial system, and indeed the right to a fair trial, are undermined and the consequences, as in 
Mallard, may be a miscarriage of justice.  
 Expert evidence and the opinion rule 
Your Honour, I swore to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, but every time I 
try that barrister over there complains.138 
Both Victoria139 and the ACT140 have enacted the uniform evidence legislation.141 This legislation 
governs the admissibility of expert opinion in both Victoria and the ACT and overrides any previously 
applied common law rules. Accordingly, the common law rules were not considered in this research.  
3.5.1 The opinion rule 
An opinion is ‘an inference drawn from observed and communicable data.’142 When it comes to 
opinions about facts relevant to legal proceedings, ultimately the only determinative opinion is that 
of the fact-finder — the judge (when the judge has jurisdiction over both the law and the facts) or the 
jury. Generally, witnesses may only testify about facts. Their opinions about facts in issue or facts 
relevant to facts in issue are regarded as irrelevant. Gans and Palmer argue that by allowing witnesses 
to express opinions about relevant facts, the court duplicates the role of the fact-finder in assessing 
                                                             
138 Peter Goldsmith, John Bolton Memorial Lecture: The Role of Expert Evidence and its Regulation, Academy of 
Expert Witnesses, quoted in Networked Knowledge, Experts (25 January 2007) 
<http://netk.net.au/Experts/Expert1.asp>. 
139 Evidence Act 2008 (Vic). 
140 Evidence Act 2011 (ACT). 
141 Those Acts included in the uniform evidence schedule are the following: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Evidence 
Act 2004 (Norfolk Island); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT); 
Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic). The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) applies in the ACT. 
142 Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australasia & New Zealand Banking Group (No 32) (1996) 136 ALR 627, 629 
(Lindgren J). 
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the evidence and facts.143 If you were to allow this duplication, there is the potential for trials to be 
longer. Additionally, there is a risk that the fact-finder will abrogate his or her role to an opinion-holder 
by deferring unduly to the opinion-holder’s assessment of the facts. Examples of this might be jurors 
giving weight to some witnesses’ opinions for extraneous and inappropriate reasons such as their 
authority as in the case of police officers.144 
Nevertheless, on occasion the opinions of some people may have evidentiary value and be justifiably 
influential, particularly if those people have knowledge that is beyond the knowledge of the fact 
finder, or if their views could legitimately ‘carry weight with the fact-finder.’145  
To help differentiate relevant from irrelevant opinion evidence, and to guard against the admission of 
the latter whilst permitting the admission of the former, the uniform evidence legislation contains a 
raft of rules relating to opinion evidence. They begin with a general exclusionary rule whose operation 
is curtailed by several exceptions to that rule, the most relevant for this research being the exception 
for expert opinion evidence. The general exclusionary rule is set down in s 76 of the uniform evidence 
legislation: ‘Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the 
existence of which the opinion was expressed.’  
3.5.2 Exceptions to the opinion rule 
As noted above, there is an exception to the opinion rule for opinions based on specialist knowledge. 
This is because the judge and/or jury often require expert information to make informed decisions on 
what evidence or relevant facts might mean. In that sense, not all opinions are equal and if a person 
has ‘specialised’ knowledge in an area, their opinions may assist the fact-finder in making more 
informed decisions about the case. Judges and especially jurors are selected on the basis that they are 
impartial and unbiased observers, able to make decisions using common sense and general 
knowledge. Courts appreciate the assistance of experts in areas that require more than common sense 
and general knowledge: 
If matters arise in our laws which concern other sciences and faculties we commonly call for the 
aid of that science or faculty which it concerns, which is an honourable and commendable thing 
for thereby it appears that we do not despite all other sciences but our own, but we approve of 
them and encourage them.146  
                                                             
143 Jeremy Gans and Andrew Palmer, Uniform Evidence (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2014). 
144 Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650, [9] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
145 Gans and Palmer, above n 3. 
146 Buckley v Rice Thomas (1554) 75 ER 182, 191 cited in Gans and Palmer, above n 3, 138. 
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The exception of most relevance to lawyers in relation to DNA evidence is contained in s 79 of the 
uniform evidence legislation, which reads: 
If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience, the 
opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that person that is wholly or substantially 
based on that knowledge. 
The terms of this provision are particularly broad. The NSW Court of Appeal in Adler v ASIC147 stressed 
that ‘specialised knowledge’ is ‘not restrictive; its scope is informed by the available bases of training, 
study or experience.’148  
Gans and Palmer distinguish ‘specialised knowledge’ from skills, belief and exposure.149 A person does 
not have specialised knowledge if he or she is simply good at drawing factual inferences but does not 
have knowledge beyond that of the fact-finder. To qualify as an expert under s 79, a person cannot 
simply have feelings or beliefs about the world — he or she must have knowledge because of 
observation and reasoning.150 Finally, it is not enough, as was held in Idaport Pty Ltd v National 
Australia Bank Ltd151 that someone has passively acquired knowledge in an area, he or she must have 
actively engaged in the topic to satisfy the ‘specialised knowledge’ exception.  
In Honeysett v The Queen152 a professor of anatomy gave evidence in an armed robbery case that there 
were similarities between an accused person and closed circuit television video footage of the 
perpetrator entering a hotel and committing the robbery. It was held in this case that the opinion of 
the witness, Professor Henneberg, was based on visually comparing images, rather than 
anthropometric measurement or statistical analysis. The opinion was not found to be based on his 
knowledge of anatomy, nor wholly or substantially based on his specialised knowledge within s 79(1). 
The area of ‘body mapping’ gave an ‘unwarranted appearance of science to the prosecution case that 
the appellant and another offender in the robbery shared a number of physical characteristics.’153 
Accordingly, the court held that the evidence should not have been admitted and ordered that the 
conviction be set aside and a new trial ordered.154  
                                                             
147 Adler v ASIC [2003] NSWCA 131. 
148 Ibid [629]. 
149 Gans and Palmer, above n 3. 
150 R v Tang [2006] NSWCCA 167. 
151 Idaport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 123, 153. 
152 Honeysett v The Queen [2014] HCA 29, 14. 
153 Ibid 32. 
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  DNA in a legal context 
   71
Similarly, in the case of R v Tang155 the appellant had been ‘identified’ by an expert as being a person 
involved in a robbery, based on facial recognition and mapping processes. The appellant argued that 
the person giving the evidence of facial recognition was not an expert as she did not have ‘specialised 
knowledge’ and therefore her opinions could not satisfy the s 79 exception to the opinion rule. The 
NSW Court of Criminal Appeal approved a definition of ‘knowledge’ from the US case Daubert v Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc156 as the following: 
the word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The term 
applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as 
truths on good grounds.157 
The requirement that the opinion must be ‘wholly or substantially based’ on an expert’s specialised 
knowledge prevents experts from making statements that are not based on their area of expertise 
and then having the court place authority on them. This issue was raised in HG v The Queen158 by 
Gleeson CJ: 
Experts who venture ‘opinions’ (sometimes merely their own inference of fact), outside their field 
of specialised knowledge may invest those opinions with a spurious appearance of authority 
[emphasis added], and legitimate processes of fact-finding may be subverted.159 
To avoid this situation, paragraph 1.3 of the Expert Code of Conduct contained in the Court Procedure 
Rules 2006 (ACT)160 specifies the form that expert reports should take. The body of the report, or an 
annexure to that report should state the following: 
(a) the expert’s qualifications; 
(b) all material facts and assumptions on which the report is based (a letter of instructions may 
be annexed); 
(c) the reasons for each opinion expressed; 
(d) if applicable, that a particular question or issue falls outside the expert's area of expertise; 
                                                             
155 R v Tang [2006] NSWCCA 167. 
156 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc, 509 US 579 (1993). 
157 R v Tang [2006] NSWCCA 167, [138] approving Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc, 509 US 579, 590 
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158 HG v The Queen (1999) CLR 414. 
159 Ibid 416. 
160 Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT), Expert Witness Code of Conduct, Schedule 1. See below for discussion in 
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(e) references to any literature or other materials relied on by the expert to support the expert’s 
opinions; 
(f) any examinations, tests or other investigations that the expert has relied on, and details of 
the qualifications of the person who carried them out.161 
These requirements largely reproduce those set down for civil cases by Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v 
Sprowles.162 
For the purposes of this research, this would mean an expert presenting DNA evidence would state 
their forensic biology qualifications in every report produced for the court and outline all the 
assumptions or material facts relied on in the preparation of that report. Compliance with these and 
the remaining requirements may not necessarily expose flaws in DNA evidence, however, particularly 
if there have been flaws in the collection of the evidence as was the case in Jama.  
Unlike other areas of evidence that are relatively new to the courts,163 DNA evidence is a widely-
accepted form of scientific expert evidence, and those giving DNA evidence usually fall within the 
scope of expert forensic biologists who have experience in testing, analysing and presenting the 
evidence in criminal trials. There is no harm in specifying the above information, however, presenting 
this information in forensic reports will not alone prevent miscarriages of justice.  
Edmond has expressed concern about the courts’ lack of emphasis on ascertaining whether experts 
have ‘specialised knowledge’ in the areas on which they give evidence, predominantly because of his 
concern with issues around the reliability of expert evidence.164 He argues that the ‘reluctance of 
lawyers and judges to engage with the validity and reliability of the techniques or the methods and 
bases’ that opinions may be based on, may have serious implications for criminal proceedings.165 
Edmond et al published a ‘guide for lawyers’166 on how to cross-examine forensic experts on the 
                                                             
161 Ibid Schedule 1.3. 
162 (2001) 52 NSWLR 705, [62]–[69], [84]–[87] (Heydon J).  
163 For example, body mapping, shoe imprints and facial recognition/facial mapping.  
164 Gary Edmond, ‘The admissibility of forensic science and medicine evidence under the Uniform Evidence Law’ 
(2014) 38 Criminal Law Journal 136; Gary Edmond, ‘Impartiality, Efficiency or Reliability? A Critical Response 
to Expert Evidence Law and Procedure in Australia’ (2010) 42(2) Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 83; 
Also see Gary Edmond, ‘Actual Innocents? Legal Limitations and their Implications for Forensic Science and 
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validity and reliability of the various fields of ‘forensic’ evidence, focusing mostly on comparison 
evidence. This article is, however, useful for lawyers cross-examining forensic biologists on DNA 
evidence in court. The concern over challenging forensic evidence is also reflected in the 2009 report 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (NAS Report), which emphasises 
that lawyers do not sufficiently challenge the basis of an expert opinion — although DNA evidence is 
viewed as having moved past criticisms of ‘junk science’ and is seen as generally inherently reliable as 
a form of evidence.167 Because DNA is an ‘accepted’ area of science, the evidence is more likely to be 
admitted without any exploration of its reliability.168 The science of DNA however is expanding 
exponentially and there are new areas of research finding DNA in smaller samples, with greater 
magnification.169 This makes it even more important that lawyers remain astute about new 
developments in this area and accept the responsibility of challenging DNA evidence through cross-
examination if need be.170 It is also particularly important that lawyers’ competence extend to ensuring 
that only competent experts give evidence and that their evidence is within their areas of specialised 
knowledge.171 It also means that lawyers must be alert to the possible flaws or limitations in the 
evidence that may be a source of unreliability, if they are to be able to expose them.172  
3.5.3 Managing and communicating expert evidence 
To ensure expert evidence is regulated in some form, the court relies in part on regulatory bodies that 
accredit experts. Part of the responsibility in this regard however, lies with the courts and court rules 
may govern an expert’s duty to the court, enforce requirements of full disclosure, pre-trial 
conferences and govern what form expert reports must take.173 Part of the responsibility for ensuring 
expert evidence is regulated in the courtroom also lies with legal practitioners, who elicit expert 
evidence in anticipation of relying on its results, or challenge expert evidence tendered by the 
opposing party. If that is the case, then lawyers must ensure that experts expose for court scrutiny, 
                                                             
167 National Research Council Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, 
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the factual basis for their decision-making — widely referred to in evidence law parlance as the ‘basis 
– rule’.174 Heydon JA explained this requirement as follows: 
the opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other 
intellectual basis of the conclusions reached: that is, the expert’s evidence must explain how the 
field of “See” in which the witness is expert by reason of “training, study or experience”, and on 
which the opinion is “wholly or substantially based”, applies to the facts assumed or observed so 
as to produce the opinion propounded.175 
Gans and Palmer point out, however, that this cannot be a general rule of admissibility because 
opinions derived from experience rather than study would never be able to satisfy that requirement.176 
Freckelton and Selby nevertheless note that most cases are argued by generalist lawyers and decided 
by the ‘average man’ on a jury. This places even more emphasis on experts to present information 
intelligibly and persuasively to laypeople and lawyers — otherwise ‘expertise has no point.’177 Lawyers 
should always be alert to the possibility that experts may express opinions that fall outside their area 
of expertise. They should also scrutinise, and, if necessary, challenge the connections between the 
basis for an opinion and the opinion offered.  
As a result of commissions of enquiry into the Splatt, Chamberlain and Thomas convictions, counsel 
should be aware of problems that arise in the chain of custody of evidence and poor scientific 
method.178 This is even more important given the conclusions and recommendations in the Inquiry 
into the Circumstances that Led to the Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama (Vincent Report).179 
Edmond argues that the reports imply that lawyers and judges have not appreciated the magnitude 
or prevalence of the issues that arise when forensic evidence is introduced in criminal trials and so 
have been ‘correspondingly ineffective in their practice.’180 
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It is vital that experts themselves and the lawyers calling experts and relying on their reports clearly 
understand the role of the expert in the courtroom.181 The Crown Prosecutors Service (CPS) in the UK 
has published a ‘Guidance for Experts’ booklet, introduced by the former Attorney-General Lord 
Goldsmith.182 In this booklet, Goldsmith refers to the three ‘Rs’ — retain, record and reveal. In 
summary, this means that UK experts must retain everything pertinent to their enquiries and findings 
unless otherwise instructed, begin making records at the time of receipt of instructions from a party 
and reveal everything they have recorded.183 This ideally enables the prosecution team to be aware of 
all the material in an expert’s possession and to decide what is relevant to their case and what they 
must do to satisfy disclosure requirements.  
The role of expert witnesses as persons whose opinions may be admissible is defined by the rules of 
evidence in each jurisdiction184 and by the behaviour of the parties.185 An expert can only answer those 
questions asked by lawyers and may only give evidence in response to those questions.186 If an expert 
feels that his or her evidence has been portrayed incorrectly and the strengths and weaknesses of the 
evidence have not been given due consideration, there is little the expert might do to rectify that 
impression. It is largely the role of the parties under the adversarial system to introduce evidence and 
thus decide what is relevant, and in Australia, if the evidence of an expert requires clarification, it is 
primarily the lawyers, parties or judicial officers who may make this decision and act on it. This is not 
the role of witnesses. The Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin in Canada187 
recognised the problems that this may create for expert witnesses. It considered the possibility that 
at the completion of experts’ evidence, judges may exercise their traditional right to address witnesses 
directly and enquire as to whether the true nature of their evidence has been frustrated by 
questioning during the course of trial.188 This measure may ensure that experts are able to 
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communicate additional and important corrections to incorrect interpretations or presentation of 
their evidence in court.  
 Rules governing criminal procedure 
This section aims to explore the current legal rules governing criminal procedure in cases involving 
DNA evidence. It considers both statute and practice directions relevant to the handling and adducing 
this form of evidence. The duty to disclose certain information (including DNA results that exclude or 
do not exclude an accused) is also a relevant rule to both defence and prosecution barristers and 
solicitors. Where there are also practice directions or legislation relevant to forensic biologists or 
statisticians giving DNA evidence, these too are briefly introduced. Only provisions and practice 
directions that govern criminal procedure are considered here — the civil rules are outside this scope 
of enquiry but are footnoted below.189 There are no specific legislative provisions or practice directions 
                                                             
189 See Practice Note 4 of 2004, Commercial List of the Supreme Court of Victoria and the Supreme Court 
(General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) – Order 44 and Form 44A ‘Expert Witness Code of Conduct’ for an 
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and appropriate, and that no matters of significance which the expert regards as relevant have, to 
the knowledge of the expert, been withheld from the Court; 
(i) any qualification of an opinion expressed in the report without which the report is or may be 
incomplete or inaccurate; and 
(j) whether any opinion expressed in the report is not a concluded opinion because of insufficient 
research or insufficient data or for any other reason. 
4. Where an expert witness has provided to a party (or that party’s legal representative) a report for the 
use of the Court, and the expert thereafter changes his or her opinion on a material matter, the expert 
shall forthwith provide to the party (or that party’s legal representative) a supplementary report which 
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that govern or inform lawyers’ treatment of DNA evidence in either Victoria or the ACT. General rules 
or directions may, however, be relevant.  
3.6.1 Victoria 
The Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) and Supreme Court (Criminal Procedure) Rules 2008 (Vic) govern 
criminal procedure in the Supreme Court of Victoria. Of note in the former piece of legislation are 
ss 50 and 189. These provisions govern different stages of pre-trial disclosure by the defence of their 
intention to call an expert and how soon before trial this must be disclosed. They also require 
disclosure of the ‘substance of the evidence it is proposed to adduce from the witness as an expert, 
including the opinion of the witness and the acts, facts, matters and circumstances on which the 
opinion is formed.’190 This Act applies in all criminal courts in Victoria. 
All barristers must also adhere to the Victorian Bar Inc Practice Rules and Rules of Conduct191 and the 
Compulsory Continuing Legal Education Rules 2008,192 as established by the Victorian Bar.193 These 
rules specify the number of hours of continuing education that lawyers must complete to obtain the 
requisite 10 Continuing Professional Legal Education (CPLE) points in each year. How these points are 
allocated is discussed in the Rules. Education about DNA evidence for lawyers is discussed in 
Chapter 7.  
Since the miscarriage of justice that occurred in Jama, the Victorian DPP has inserted the following 
proviso into the DPP guidelines on prosecutorial discretion: 
                                                             
shall state, specify or provide the information referred to in paragraphs (a), (d), (e), (g), (h), (i) and’ (j) 
of clause 3 of this code and, if applicable, paragraph (f) of that clause. 
5. If directed to do so by the Court, an expert witness shall— 
(a) confer with any other expert witness; and 
(b) provide the Court with a joint report specifying (as the case requires) matters agreed and matters 
not agreed and the reasons for the experts not agreeing. 
6. Each expert witness shall exercise his or her independent judgment in relation to every conference in 
which the expert participates pursuant to a direction of the Court and in relation to each report 
thereafter provided, and shall not act on any instruction or request to withhold or avoid agreement. 
190 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 50(2)(c), 189. 
191 Victorian Bar Council, Practice Rules (23 September 1997) Victorian Bar 
<http://www.vicbar.com.au/uploads//publications/The_Victorian_Bar_Incorporated_Practice_Rules_2209
10.pdf>.  
192 Victorian Bar Council, Compulsory Continuing Legal Education Rules (1 April 2008) Victorian Bar 
<https://www.vicbar.com.au/GetFile.ashx?file=pdf/VicBarCPDRules2008with18Feb08editsandnewattenda
nceform_000.pdf>.  
193 See website at <www.vicbar.com.au>. 
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In any matter in which the prosecution case is wholly or substantially reliant upon DNA evidence, 
the prosecution should not be instituted or continued until specific instructions have been sought 
from the Director or in his absence, the Chief Crown Prosecutor.194 
This proviso aims to limit the cases that are prosecuted in reliance on DNA evidence alone and to give 
lawyers guidance in assessing DNA evidence-only cases, by enlisting the advice and imprimatur for 
prosecution of the Director or Chief Crown Prosecutor in such cases. The purpose is to ensure that 
prosecutors are not beguiled by DNA evidence into assigning it undue weight when applying the 
reasonable prospects of conviction test to their determinations of whether to proceed to trial. The 
research findings discussed in Chapter 3 reveal that lawyers can overestimate the probative value and 
infallibility of DNA evidence.195 This may induce them to unwisely institute prosecutions relying on 
DNA evidence. The requirement for disclosure and consideration of all evidence, including DNA, by 
Victorian legislation196 and DPP guidelines197 gives tacit recognition to this problem and seeks to 
overcome it in this jurisdiction.  
3.6.2 ACT 
In the ACT, the Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rules 2007198 and Legal Profession (Barristers) Rules 2008199 
broadly govern the conduct of ACT lawyers. Neither of these sets of Rules outlines any set procedure 
informing lawyers how to deal with DNA evidence, nor specifically with experts presenting DNA 
evidence. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court ‘Criminal Proceedings’ provisions in the Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT) 
do not give insight into how lawyers should deal with expert evidence or more particularly with DNA 
evidence. Part 2.12 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) governs expert evidence and includes 
definitions of relevant terms, eg expert, expert report and code of conduct,200 and outlines the proper 
procedure for lawyers intending to adduce expert evidence. These Rules also provide an ‘Expert 
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Witness Code of Conduct’ in Schedule 1 and lawyers wishing to engage an expert must give this Code 
of Conduct to all experts, prior to their giving oral evidence.201 The Code of Conduct outlines the 
general duty owed by the expert to the Court, rather than one of the parties, what form expert reports 
must take and the procedure for expert conferences if they are requested by the Court.202  
The various courts in the ACT give lawyers information on practice and procedure via practice notes 
published on the court websites. The Supreme Court of the ACT no longer has a practice direction 
regarding expert evidence, as two previous practice directions on the topic — PD 2/03 and PD 2/04 — 
were repealed by PD 1/06 entitled, Court Procedures Rules revocation of Practice Directions and 
Notices to Practitioners.203 Nothing has replaced them to date. The Magistrates Court also does not 
have any practice directions relevant to lawyers’ role in using and dealing with DNA evidence or expert 
evidence more broadly.  
These rules obviously fail to cover how lawyers should deal with DNA evidence as a specific form of 
expert evidence. They cannot cover all elements of a lawyer’s practice and in most cases, practice 
directions and court procedure statutes and rules are administrative in nature, detailing information 
on court forms and practice in specific court environments. Only the Victorian DPP Guidelines enacted 
since Jama show recognition of any dangers involved in dealing with DNA evidence and so lawyers 
must go elsewhere, particularly to decisional law, for guidance on how to use and manage this 
evidence in criminal trials.  
 Conclusion 
Lawyers are guided in their criminal practice by legislation, case law, evidentiary rules and practice 
directions. There is very little guidance, however, for lawyers specifically using DNA evidence in 
criminal trials in either the ACT or Victoria. But this reflects the reality of using evidence that is 
common but rarely contentious, discussed in Chapter 5 below.204 This chapter has outlined some of 
the forensic and legal considerations that must be considered when research into lawyers and DNA 
evidence is conducted. It also outlines and considers the implications of key human rights principles, 
including the right to a fair trial and the equality of arms principle, for the prosecution duty of 
                                                             
201 Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), r 1202.  
202 See Unisearch Expert Opinion Services, Expert Codes of Conduct and Court Guidelines, Resources, 
<http://www.expertopinion.com.au/documents/ACT-Code-of-Conduct.pdf>.  
203 Supreme Court of the ACT, Practice Direction, (26 June 2006), Justice Department, Australian Capital Territory 
Government, 
<http://cdn.justice.act.gov.au/resources/uploads/Supreme/Practice_Direction_Court_Procedures.pdf>.  
204 Specifically see 5.2. 
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disclosure of forensic reports about DNA evidence. The behaviour of lawyers in their everyday criminal 
practice, as discussed in Chapter 5 generally, does not meet the standards of international human 
rights law instruments as ratified by Australia. Many tactical and cultural decisions are made based on 
the adversarial system in place,205 rather than human rights obligations placed on those in the legal 
profession to uphold the right to a fair trial. Evidentiary rules are introduced and the lack of practice 
directions in both Victoria and the ACT for using DNA evidence is noted. The notion that lawyers’ 
knowledge about DNA evidence and their level of competence in dealing with this evidence may have 
a bearing on the right to a fair trial is introduced. 
Chapter 4 will now introduce the methodology used in this research project, complete with a 
discussion on the interpretive paradigm used, the use of qualitative research methods and how 
computer assisted qualitative data analysis software assisted with the analysis. The ways in which the 
validity and reliability of the qualitative interviews and focus groups was guaranteed will also be 
explained. 
 
                                                             
205 Specifically see 5.7 and 5.8. 
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4 Methodology 
 Introduction 
The practice of law cannot be separated from theory, interpretation and argument. This chapter 
therefore contains not only a discussion of the qualitative methodology that was used in this research, 
but also briefly describes the ontological, epistemological and methodological considerations that 
were relevant to the research design and analysis.1 
The chapter will explore four main areas. The interpretive paradigm used and the philosophical 
underpinnings of the methodology and research design will be explored and the research questions 
are introduced. The chapter also explains the qualitative research methods used and provides details 
about the interviews and focus groups conducted for the research, the participants involved and the 
interview and focus group questions. Then there is a focus on the analysis of the data obtained from 
interviews and focus groups and the chapter finishes by discussing how this research satisfies 
requirements for quality and rigour in qualitative research. 
 Interpretive paradigm 
One of the key aims of this research is to provide information that will assist in improving lawyers’ 
understanding of DNA evidence and advance their capacity to deal effectively with DNA evidence in 
criminal trials. This aim fits with the overall paradigm accepted for social science research — to 
improve our understanding of the world and the experiences of those who live in it.2 It is an applied 
study,3 aiming to ameliorate the problems lawyers face in using DNA evidence and to assist those who 
develop policy in this area. To gain understanding of the day-to-day practice of criminal lawyers, the 
research was framed within an interpretivist research framework or paradigm.4 This gave the study a 
clear rationale and an underlying research philosophy. Legal research is at risk of being dysfunctional 
                                                             
1 Gibson Burrell and Gareth Morgan, Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis (Heinemann, 1979) 
1–2. 
2 Earl Babbie, The Basics of Social Research (Wadsworth, 6th ed, 2014). 
3 David E Gray, Doing Research in the Real World (Sage, 2nd ed, 2009); W Lawrence Neuman, Social Research 
Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (Pearson Education, 7th ed, 2009) 26. 
4 This paradigm assumes that humans cannot be studied using the same models as for scientific research. The 
interpretive paradigm sees reality as constructed by the subjective perception and experiences of individual 
people. Research using an interpretive paradigm aims to discover how research participants understand and 
construct their social reality. For more information on underlying premises of an interpretive paradigm see 
Burrell and Morgan, above n 1, 28–32. 
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if it is not designed with a clear research philosophy in mind.5 The ontological, epistemological and 
methodological premises adopted in this research are discussed below. All three have implications for 
the intellectual authority of this research. 
Legal research, as a branch of social science, lends itself to interpretive enquiry. This paradigm 
approaches reality in a certain way — it acknowledges that there are multiple interpretations of 
‘reality,’ all of which are of interest to the researcher.6 In the context of this research, this means that 
‘truth’, as espoused in this research, is that which is defined by the day-to-day experience of criminal 
lawyers, judges and forensic scientists rather than there being one universal ‘truth’ of the kind pursued 
in positivist research.7 
Epistemological considerations are essentially assumptions about knowledge8 and how one might 
begin to understand the world in which research is conducted. This research employs an inductive and 
empirical epistemological position — it does not test a research theory or hypothesis, but aims to 
establish patterns and uncover meaning as experienced by the participants.9 Applied research10 fits 
within these epistemological and ontological frameworks, because it insists on a research design that 
captures the insights and ‘realities’ — the attitudes, behaviours, value systems and beliefs — of 
participants, in this case, lawyers, judges and forensic scientists.11 
 Rationale for research design 
This research aims not only to contribute to knowledge in the disciplines of law and forensic science, 
but also, as applied research, to be of use to criminal justice professionals by providing reform-
oriented recommendations for improved practice in criminal cases involving DNA evidence.12 More 
specifically, the study used action research to seek ‘information on the attitudes and perspectives of 
practitioners in the field.’13 
                                                             
5 Margaret McKerchar, Design and Conduct of Research in Tax, Law and Accounting (Thompson Reuters, 2010). 
6 John W Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among the Five Traditions (Sage, 1998). 
7 McKerchar, above n 5. 
8 Burrell and Morgan, above n 1, 1. 
9 Gray, above n 3. 
10 See 4.3 below for further discussion of applied research categorised as ‘action research’. See also ibid.  
11 The epistemological view of knowledge being the product of a mixture of experiences and viewpoints. 
12 See Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations. 
13 Gray, above n 3, 30. See Chapter 12 of that text for more information on action research. K Lewin, ‘Action 
Research and Minority Problems’ (1946) 2(4) Journal of Social Issues 34, defines action research as ‘a process 
of combining theory and research to solve practical problems’ (at 34). 
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Previous research has found that some forensic scientists, jury members and judges in various 
jurisdictions feel that lawyers struggle to understand and use DNA evidence.14 The research method 
employed in this research was designed to uncover and explore15 the difficulties that lawyers 
experience in dealing with DNA evidence so that possible mechanisms for achieving improved practice 
might be identified. It was important that participants were not constrained in their provision of 
information by a data gathering process that might limit them, for example, to answering predefined 
questions with predetermined possible answers.16 It was also important that the research design 
ensured that lawyers and those working with lawyers would feel comfortable and were not inhibited 
in talking about areas of their own criminal practice in which they might lack confidence. A qualitative 
methodology was chosen as the most appropriate for creating an environment for gathering and 
exploring information of this nature.  
Interviews and focus groups were selected as the two methods for data collection as they were most 
likely to elicit information on participants’ potentially rich and varied experiences with DNA evidence.17 
If the responses to questions in interviews or focus groups referenced specific cases or interactions 
with forensic scientists, then the semi-structured nature of the interview also allowed for further 
exploration of the lawyer’s experience. The process of selecting participants for interviews and focus 
groups is discussed below.18 
 Research questions 
Research questions were developed regarding gaps in lawyers’ knowledge and competency in dealing 
with DNA evidence suggested by the previous research in this area and the reviews of process 
discussed in Chapter 3. These reviews were driven by policy investigations like the Strengthening 
Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward report (NAS Report)19 and individual cases of 
incompetence or wrongful conviction like that in the Inquiry into the Circumstances that Led to the 
                                                             
14 See 2.2.2-2.2.5: Previous research for further discussion.  
15 Babbie, above n 2, gives three purposes for research — exploration, description and explanation (at 94–96). 
16 Pertti Alasuutari, Researching Culture, Qualitative Method and Cultural Studies (Sage, 1995) 42. 
17 See detailed discussion at 4.5.2–4.5.3: Interviews – Focus groups. 
18 See detailed discussion at 4.5.2 for discussion on the selection of participants. 
19 National Research Council Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009) National Academy of Sciences, 
12–13, 85–110 <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf> (‘NAS Report’). 
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Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama (Vincent Report) 20 and many interview questions were 
written to address the gaps in knowledge suggested in these reviews.  
This research investigates two primary research questions: 
Research question 1 – What are lawyers’ understandings of DNA evidence and what difficulties do 
they have in dealing with this type of evidence in criminal trials?  
Research question 2 – What training opportunities and resources are available to lawyers on DNA 
evidence and what are lawyers’ views about the value of those opportunities and resources? 
4.4.1 Key areas explored in the research 
The primary research questions embrace and necessitate investigation of three key areas — how 
lawyers use DNA evidence in criminal trials; the difficulties lawyers then have with DNA evidence; and 
the education and training opportunities available for lawyers on DNA evidence.21 Investigation of 
each of these three areas required secondary research questions to be answered in order to explore 
the primary research questions posed above. Each area focuses on information about how criminal 
lawyers understand and use DNA evidence and not how they are supposed to understand and use 
DNA.22 The secondary research questions in each of these three areas are discussed below.  
Area A: Lawyers’ use of DNA evidence in criminal trials 
It is important to understand the practical experiences of lawyers in using and managing DNA evidence 
in criminal trials. Implicit in this use is their understanding or knowledge of the major threats to the 
reliability and accuracy of the DNA evidence that they adduce or challenge in these trials, as well as  
how they seek information from forensic scientists and police investigators regarding DNA evidence 
in individual cases. This study sought to gain insight into lawyers’ experience in managing DNA 
evidence by engaging them, and those who work closely with them, in critical reflection on the role of 
lawyers in questioning police and forensic scientists both before and at trial. Four secondary research 
questions were posed to explore lawyers’ management of DNA evidence in criminal cases.  
                                                             
20 See Frank Vincent, Inquiry into the Circumstances that Led to the Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama 
(2010) Parliament of Victoria <http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/papers/govpub/VPARL2006-
10No301.pdf> (‘Vincent Report’) and R v Jama [2008] VCC 0886.  
21 These three areas form the basis for the data and analysis chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
22 It is not enough to understand the rules and conventions that govern a community or system, to fully 
understand meaning one must also understand the objectives of the community or system being considered. 
See Martin Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction (Cambridge, 1994) Chapter 7: 
Understanding Social Action, 166. 
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RQ 1A. What do lawyers understand DNA evidence to mean for their criminal practice?  
This secondary research question relates to the first primary research question — how lawyers 
understand the fundamental concepts associated with DNA evidence. This question enquires into the 
day-to-day use and realities of using DNA evidence in criminal trials. It does not focus on whether 
lawyers’ understandings are accurate; rather it specifically aims to explore how their understanding 
influences how they deal with DNA evidence in their criminal practice. 
RQ 2A. What do criminal lawyers see as the limitations of DNA evidence? 
This question also explores lawyers’ understanding of DNA evidence, but focuses on what lawyers see 
as the limitations, if any, of DNA evidence. This understanding will influence their approach to DNA 
evidence and the degree to which they implicitly trust, and therefore challenge, the evidence in 
criminal trials.  
RQ 3A. How can lawyers be more effective with DNA evidence in criminal cases?  
This secondary research question assists in creating a benchmark for how lawyers might best 
understand and use DNA evidence. By determining how they can be most effective, recommendations 
for improved understanding and use can be made. This question, therefore, aims to explore lawyers’ 
effectiveness in managing DNA evidence not only with lawyers, but also with those who work closely 
with them in their criminal practice — forensic scientists and judges.  
RQ 4A. What is the process involved when criminal lawyers are given a case involving DNA evidence? 
This question relates to how lawyers investigate and prepare for cases involving DNA evidence. This 
includes the preparatory steps they take after receiving a brief with DNA evidence, the information 
gathering they engage in with those involved the investigation phases of the case and with expert 
witnesses and later, the procedural steps adopted in adducing DNA evidence in court. This process, 
and lawyers’ experiences of it, will give insight into lawyers’ understanding of DNA evidence. 
Accordingly, it relates primarily to the first of the primary research questions.  
Area B: Difficulties encountered by lawyers in using DNA evidence in criminal trials  
The second area of investigation for this research explores the difficulties lawyers have in using DNA 
evidence in criminal trials. Research and reports on this subject23 suggest that lawyers have some 
difficulty with understanding and/or adducing DNA evidence as expert opinion in criminal trials. 
Chapter 2 explores these criticisms in more detail. It is important for this research to learn what 
                                                             
23 See Chapter 2: Justifications for the research. 
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difficulties lawyers experience in dealing with DNA evidence, so that recommendations can be made 
that may assist in their amelioration and thus the secondary research question RQ 1B below was 
explored.  
RQ 1B. What do criminal lawyers find most difficult to understand about DNA evidence? 
Asking lawyers what they find most difficult about DNA evidence assists in gaining an understanding 
of how and why they deal with DNA evidence in the way that they do. Part of ascertaining how lawyers 
understand DNA evidence is determining what it is that leads to misunderstanding, or what constrains 
them in learning about DNA evidence. Limitations in lawyers’ understanding of DNA evidence might 
in fact impede them in identifying both their own problems and how best to remedy them. 
Area C: Where to find information: education and training for lawyers on DNA evidence 
The third area of investigation is the sources of lawyers’ information about DNA evidence, and what 
education and training initiatives are available for lawyers in this area. Each of the secondary research 
questions in this area specifically addresses the second primary research question. Investigation of 
these matters began by ascertaining whether there are any statutory provisions and/or practice 
directions that provide legal direction for lawyers in how to present DNA evidence in criminal trials. It 
then established what educational programs are available to lawyers both prior to their admission as 
practitioners and to practising lawyers.  
Once in practice, lawyers are required to attend CPD to retain their practising certificates.24 This study 
gathered information on external provider-led courses for continuing education in this area and any 
other measures that lawyers said that they utilised to educate themselves about DNA evidence. 
Lawyers’ opinions of these sources of knowledge are important, because they will influence their 
participation in the educational programs on offer and their use of other sources of information and 
thus any improvement in their knowledge in this area. 
RQ 1C. What form of continuous legal education is available to criminal lawyers in Victoria and the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) on the use of DNA evidence, and how does this compare nationally 
and internationally? 
Lawyers’ understanding of DNA evidence may be influenced by training or continuing professional 
development in this area. Asking lawyers about their experience of training will help in analysing how 
successful these programs are in improving their knowledge in this area.  
                                                             
24 Continuing Professional Development Rules 2008 (Vic) rr 6–7; Mandatory Continuing Professional 
Development Scheme 2007 (ACT), r 2.4. 
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RQ 2C. What is the lawyer experience of education or training on DNA evidence?  
This secondary research question goes further than RQ 1C by gathering lawyer’s opinions of formal 
educative initiatives with the view of discussing the adequacy of programs offered and their likelihood 
of improving lawyers’ knowledge and practice in this area. Answers to this question directly relate to 
the recommendations made in Chapter 8 of this thesis.  
RQ 3C. Where do criminal lawyers get information to help them with briefs in criminal trials 
involving DNA evidence? 
Having data on the sources of information on DNA evidence for lawyers is important when assessing 
whether lawyers talk to the most qualified professionals about the science and whether they access 
the best and most accurate sources of information on DNA evidence. Whether or not they do so has 
implications for their understanding of the evidence. This issue relates to the first primary research 
question because it seeks information on how lawyers develop their knowledge of DNA evidence.  
 Qualitative research methods 
Qualitative research offers a naturalistic approach to understanding how individuals in certain 
environments experience reality in their day-to-day lives.25 The research questions above focus on 
lawyers’ day-to-day experiences with DNA evidence. As noted above, the aim of the study is to expose, 
with participants’ co-operation, lacunae in their knowledge and possible concerns they have about 
their own competence or confidence in dealing with this evidence. Accordingly, by its very nature, this 
investigation required an environment in which participants could speak freely and reflectively on 
their experience. One-on-one interviews were considered to provide the best means for enabling 
participants in this research to give genuine, unguarded explanations and feedback in their own words 
about what they understand DNA evidence to mean for their criminal practice. The interviews 
themselves were designed with a view to gaining penetrative insights into the subtleties of individual 
experiences in using DNA evidence. The role of the researcher in this research was to develop a ‘deep, 
intense and ‘holistic’ overview of the context under study.’26 
                                                             
25 See Gray, above n 3; Creswell, above n 6. 
26 Gray, above n 3, 164. 
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4.5.1 Ethics approval 
Full ethics approval was granted for the study by the University of Tasmania’s Social Science Human 
Research Ethics Committee.27 This ethics approval was accepted by the Australian Federal Police’s 
Ethics Committee for focus groups with employees. The focus groups with Victoria Police forensic 
biologists were approved by the Victoria Police Human Research Ethics Committee. All interviewees 
gave consent28 for the interviews to be audio-recorded and this was done using an Olympus digital 
voice recorder. In accordance with ethics requirements, names of criminal lawyers and cases they 
used as examples were de-identified during the transcription of those interviews to text. These 
documents then formed the basis of analysis for this research.  
4.5.2 Interviews 
One-on-one interviews were conducted with practising criminal lawyers in two Australian 
jurisdictions, Victoria and the ACT.29 These jurisdictions were selected for two main reasons — first, 
because they are relevant to the ARC funded ‘Effectiveness Project’ of which this research was a part,30 
and, second, because both have seen cases at the local court level (and in the ACT, at the High Court 
level) in recent years where DNA evidence has comprised either the central point of an appeal31 or 
been subject to formal investigations for alleged contamination.32 Accordingly, criminal lawyers in 
both these jurisdictions are well placed to provide information relevant to the research questions set 
out above.  
Selection of participants 
Forty practising criminal lawyers were interviewed for the study. The lawyers were drawn from several 
sources including criminal justice organisations funded by government — Legal Aid (Victoria and the 
ACT), the Office of Public Prosecutions (Victoria) and the Department of Public Prosecutions (ACT) — 
                                                             
27 Full ethics approval was granted by the University of Tasmania’s Social Science Human Research Ethics 
Committee, project number H0011621. 
28 Via a signed consent form that was administered with an information sheet outlining the study. 
29 Steinar Kvale, Doing Interviews (Sage, 2007). The qualitative research interview is defined by Kvale as ‘an 
interview with the purpose of obtaining descriptions of the lifeworld of the interviewee with respect to 
interpreting the meaning of the described phenomena’ (at 8).  
30 Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies, Effectiveness of Forensic Science in the Criminal Justice 
System (13 April 2016) University of Tasmania <http://www.utas.edu.au/tiles/research/current-
projects2/the-effectiveness-of-forensic-science-in-the-criminal-justice-system>. 
31 See Forbes v The Queen [2009] ACTCA 10. 
32 See R v Jama [2008] VCC 0886. 
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and lawyers working outside of these organisations in law firms or at the Private Bar in both 
jurisdictions.  
Directors or Senior Managers of the government justice agencies were the initial liaison point for 
contact with government criminal lawyers. When senior management or Directors of these 
organisations gave consent for employees to take part in the project, consent was obtained from each 
lawyer who expressed an interest in participating. This was done by email communication and using 
individual consent and information forms.33 Managers and Directors of the government agencies were 
sent the invitation to participate and were encouraged to circulate these to criminal lawyers of varying 
levels of experience within their organisation. The only requirement was that the lawyers have some 
experience in criminal cases where DNA evidence was involved in some way — contentious or 
otherwise. Many of the lawyers who participated were experienced criminal law practitioners with a 
wide variety of trial involvement over more than 20 years. However, many were also at an earlier 
point in their legal career. Experience in the law was not determinative of participation or selection as 
an interviewee. In fact, it was desirable that participants included both inexperienced and experienced 
practitioners to reflect the landscape of practising criminal lawyers in each jurisdiction. Eighteen 
prosecutors working for the State Department (ACT) or Office of Public Prosecutions (Victoria), 
including Crown Counsel in Victoria were interviewed and twenty-two independent or government 
defence solicitors or barristers from Legal Aid and the Private Bar also took part. 
Lawyers working for law firms and the Private Bar were selected using a purposive or judgemental 
sampling approach and lawyers who had experience managing trials with DNA evidence were ideal 
interviewees.34 Both barristers and solicitors were contacted by email using the addresses given on 
their own or their Chambers’ or legal firms’ websites. These lawyers had distinguished themselves as 
specialising in criminal law and were identified using a general internet search.35 Five barristers 
practising at the Private Bar responded to the invitation to participate and all five were interviewed.36 
Lawyers are referred to in this thesis as research participants beginning with the letter ‘L’, for example, 
L33. 
                                                             
33 Ethics forms containing Information Sheets and Consent Forms (see Appendix C and Appendices D and E) 
were sent to participants. 
34 Earl Babbie, The Practice of Social Research (Wadsworth, 13th ed, 2013) 190–191; Colin Robson, Real World 
Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers (Blackwell, 2nd ed, 2002). 
35 Search terms included ‘criminal lawyer’, criminal, lawyer, Melbourne, Victoria, Canberra, ‘Australian Capital 
Territory’ and DNA. 
36 This number did not include the barristers working as Counsel for Legal Aid in Victoria or Victorian Crown 
Counsel working mostly for the Office of Public Prosecutions.  
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Interview and focus group participants — lawyers, judges and forensic scientists — are known in 
criminological research to fall into the category of ‘elites’,37 — those in higher socio-economic circles 
than the average member of society, or the researcher.38 This requires particularly specific preparation 
and organisation of interviews and focus groups with the acknowledgment that ‘elites’ usually have 
limited availability due to busy schedules and there is therefore less time available for ‘getting to 
know’ interviewees. Lawyers were extremely generous with their time. Most one-on-one interviews 
lasted between forty minutes and one hour. They took place during business hours and at the 
participants’ workplaces.  
Interview questions 
The interviews were semi-structured or ‘guided’, so that although the interview schedule was devised 
by reference to pre-determined research questions, the interview questions themselves were 
flexible.39 Interviewees were very much part of the interview process, actively shaping the course of 
the interview rather than passively responding to the interview schedule.40 
The research questions investigated in the study dictated that the interview questions focus on the 
gaps in lawyers’ knowledge revealed by existing research, reviews and investigations following cases 
of incompetence or wrongful conviction. 
All the interviews contained, in some way, the subject matter discussed below.41 They were not 
necessarily discussed in this order and were couched differently depending on the subject matter 
being considered at the time. In the discussion below explanations are provides as to which research 
question the interview questions relate to and how they elicit information relevant to the research 
questions. Other interview questions are listed at 10.6 in Appendix F below. 
                                                             
37 See Sotirios Sarantakos, Social Research (Macmillan, 4th ed, 2013). See also Kelly Richards, ‘Interviewing Elites 
in Criminological Research: Negotiating Power and Access and Being Called “Kid”’ in Lorana Bartels and Kelly 
Richards (eds), Qualitative Criminology: Stories From the Field (Hawkins Press, 2011). This is contrasted with 
much of the criminological research with a focus on interviewing ‘down’ (talking to people in lower-
socioeconomic circumstances or career positions than themselves) rather than interviewing ‘up’. Also see 
Rosanna Hertz and Jonathan B Imber (eds), Studying Elites Using Qualitative Methods (Sage, 1995); Teresa 
Odendahl and Aileen M Shaw, ‘Interviewing Elites’ in Jaber F Gubrium and James A Holstein (eds), Handbook 
of Interview Research: Context and Method (Sage, 2001) 299–316. 
38 Richards, above n 37. 
39 Steinar Kvale, InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing (Sage, 1996). 
40 Nigel King and Christina Horrocks, Interviews in Qualitative Research (Sage, 2010). 
41 These are directly related to the research questions discussed above. The full interview schedule is contained 
in Appendix F. 
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IQ 1. Where do criminal lawyers get information to help them with briefs containing DNA evidence 
in criminal trials?  
This question was addressed by asking criminal lawyers how they had learnt about DNA evidence. 
They were asked whether they had found the learning process useful and how they could have 
approached learning about DNA evidence more productively if they had the time to do so. Questions 
about where criminal lawyers go for guidance on DNA evidence — other criminal lawyers, experts, 
texts, and the internet for example — were discussed with criminal lawyers if they indicated that this 
had been their experience.  
Criminal lawyers were asked if they felt there was a gap in their knowledge of DNA evidence and how 
best they felt those gaps could be filled and their knowledge improved. These questions then led to 
interview questions associated with the following research question.  
IQ 2. What level of understanding do criminal lawyers have of DNA evidence in criminal trials?  
Criminal lawyers were asked about their experience with cases involving DNA evidence and what they 
understood the evidence to mean in relation to both non-contentious cases with routine briefs, and/or 
contentious cases involving DNA evidence that may have been unusual in their experience. Many 
criminal lawyers discussed cases in detail while others focused on the problematic areas of DNA 
evidence. They were asked how often their briefs involved DNA evidence and how confident they felt 
in handling this evidence.  
The level of importance each lawyer attached to DNA evidence was explored by asking about the 
extent to which it might be determinative of case outcomes. Prosecutors were asked if it influenced 
their decision to prosecute and defence lawyers were asked whether it influenced their decision about 
how to advise a client in relation to plea.  
IQ 3. What do criminal lawyers see as the limitations of DNA evidence? 
This research question was replicated exactly by the researcher as one of the key interview questions. 
In addition to asking about the limitations of DNA evidence, lawyers were asked a more theoretical 
question about their views on reconciling the science of DNA match probabilities in a legal 
environment with a legal standard of proof of beyond reasonable doubt. This was added after the first 
interviewee expressed an opinion about how complicated the relationship between probability 
evidence and the burden of proof in serious criminal cases was and that this is a limitation of DNA 
evidence. This sheds light on the primary research question about how lawyers use DNA evidence and 
what they understand the import of such evidence to be in criminal trials in that their understanding 
of the limitations of DNA evidence guides their practical experience in using it in their criminal practice.  
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IQ 4. What is the process involved when criminal lawyers are given a case involving DNA evidence? 
Criminal lawyers were asked a series of questions about the process they follow in cases with DNA 
evidence. This included consideration of whether it was their role to investigate the evidence in detail 
and ask probing questions of forensic scientists, or whether they considered that this encroached on 
the role of the forensic expert.  
IQ. 5 What do criminal lawyers find most difficult to understand about DNA evidence? 
IQ. 6 What makes an effective criminal lawyer in cases involving DNA evidence? 
Similarly, to research question four, these two secondary research questions were delivered as 
interview questions in these or similar words to all participants.42 
IQ 7. What form of continuous legal education is provided to criminal lawyers in Victoria and the 
ACT on DNA evidence in criminal trials, and how does this compare nationally and internationally?  
The first half of this question was addressed by asking criminal lawyers whether they had taken part 
in formal training courses or CPD sessions on DNA evidence. For those that had, the researcher asked 
about their experiences — whether the courses were useful for their practice and why. Linked to the 
previous research question was the investigation of what would be most useful for criminal lawyers 
by way of formal education on DNA evidence. An analysis of the courses available both in Australia 
and overseas was undertaken with comparisons made between the course content and the responses 
from lawyers as to the usefulness of continuing professional education and their previous experiences 
learning about DNA evidence.43  
4.5.3 Focus groups 
Selection of participants 
In addition to criminal lawyers’ subjective experiences with DNA evidence and their knowledge of that 
evidence, the perspectives of those observing or interacting with criminal lawyers using DNA evidence 
in criminal cases was sought. This meant that the analysis did not rely solely on lawyers’ observations 
of themselves. It therefore avoided, to some degree, the possibility that the data were skewed by 
participants’ inadequate representation of their own abilities.  
As senior members of the legal profession, judges overseeing criminal cases were an obvious choice 
for inclusion in the study. Forensic scientists who presented evidence in court and had been involved 
                                                             
42 See justification for these as research questions above.  
43 See Chapter 7: Educating lawyers about DNA evidence. 
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in questioning from and conversations with criminal lawyers were also seen as appropriately qualified 
to reflect on how criminal lawyers understand and deal with DNA evidence. Because the questions 
directed to these two groups of professionals were about their opinions of others (rather than their 
own practice), focus groups rather than interviews were considered to provide the appropriate 
method of data collection. At times the ‘interviewer’ acted as a chair, attempting to allow for multiple 
responses to each question at the same time from the various professionals taking part. Gathering 
information from more than one person at a time meant that focus group participants ‘bounced’ ideas 
off one another and were prompted to recall various experiences that they had forgotten to discuss.44 
Often the response of one participant would prompt others to reflect on experiences that were 
relevant to the practice of lawyers with DNA evidence. Other advantages of conducting focus groups 
with judges and forensic scientists were the access to greater numbers of participants, the low cost, 
ease of organisation and limited interruption both to court business and to the laboratory work of the 
forensic scientists. 
Two types of focus groups were held — those with forensic scientists and those with judges. 
Participants had homogeneity in their professions and were thus able to answer questions about 
lawyers, depending on their experience but the responses themselves were not homogenous, instead 
presenting a variety of opinions on how lawyers manage and use DNA evidence. An invitation to take 
part in the focus groups was extended to all the Supreme Court judges in Victoria and the ACT. All four 
members of the ACT Supreme Court Bench took part in a focus group in Canberra and three of the 
possible thirty Victorian Supreme Court judges elected to take part based on their interest in the 
project and their experiences on the bench with DNA evidence.45 These groups were not intended to 
be representative samples. Valid research, as espoused by an interpretive research paradigm and 
qualitative research does not require a certain number of participants, nor do participants need to 
represent a broad spectrum of relevant people.46 The experience of any number of the professionals 
in this area is valid, and provides potentially rich data and insight into how lawyers understand and 
deal with DNA evidence in criminal practice. The judges had varying experience on the Bench but had 
all been legal practitioners for over 25 years prior to their judicial appointment. Supreme Court judges 
were, as expected, very busy,47 but in each jurisdiction, could dedicate time to these focus groups.  
                                                             
44 Richard A Krueger, Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research (Sage, 4th ed, 2008). 
45 This number (32) includes the Chief Justice and judges from the Trial Division, but not judges from the Court 
of Appeal. 
46 See discussion of validity below at 4.7.1–4.7.3.  
47 See earlier discussion of elites, above n 37. 
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The head of the Australian Federal Police and Victorian Police forensic science laboratories sent out 
invitations to forensic biologists in their organisations inviting DNA specialists who had been involved 
with criminal lawyers to talk about their experiences as part of a focus group. Five Australian Federal 
Police forensic biologists took part in one focus group.48 Three focus groups were held in Victoria, with 
a total of 14 Victorian DNA specialists involved. The forensic scientists had varying levels of experience. 
In Victoria, forensic biologists may reach court reporting positions after one or two years’ experience.49 
In the ACT, forensic scientists may have to wait until they have five years’ experience — but whether 
a forensic scientist presents evidence in court depends on their experience and ability to prove 
specialised knowledge in forensic biology50 and therefore meet the requirements of s 79 of the 
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) and Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Each focus group with the Supreme Court judges 
and forensic biologist groups lasted for approximately one hour. Judges are referred to in this thesis 
with the letter ‘P’, for example P2, and forensic scientists that took part in focus groups are referred 
to by ‘FS’, for example FS10. 
All participants gave their consent for the focus groups to be audio-recorded. 
Focus group questions 
Like the interview questions, the focus group questions were semi-structured and explored the 
research questions but were also flexible in their approach, content and order. The same questions 
were directed to each of the forensic scientist groups. Because many of the focus group questions 
were the same as the interview questions, they are summarised in dot point form below and the full 
Schedule of focus group questions may be found in Appendix B.  
Forensic scientists  
FGQ1. What experiences have you had with criminal lawyers on cases where you have provided the 
case with DNA evidence? 
FGQ2. How do criminal lawyers understand the DNA evidence you present? 
o How do you find they explain it for judges/juries? 
                                                             
48 There are fewer forensic scientists practising in the ACT’s Australian Federal Police Laboratory than that of 
the Victorian laboratories.  
49 Email communication from Dr Bryan Found, Victoria Police Forensic Laboratory answering on behalf of 
Steven Fowler, Branch Manager to Kate Cashman, 17 October 2013. 
50 Email communication from Dr Simon Walsh, Coordinator, Biometrics Forensic and Data Centres, Australian 
Federal Police Forensic Laboratory to Kate Cashman, 22 October 2013. 
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FGQ3. How much should criminal lawyers understand about DNA evidence in criminal trials? 
o What can they do better? 
FGQ4. In your opinion, how should we endeavour to teach criminal lawyers about DNA evidence? 
FGQ5. From your experience, how does a competent lawyer deal with DNA evidence?  
Judges  
FGQ1. How often do the cases you oversee involve DNA evidence? 
FGQ2. How important is DNA evidence in criminal trials (to what extent is it determinative)? 
FGQ3. How do criminal lawyers explain DNA evidence for juries? 
FGQ4. Have you done any training courses in forensic and DNA evidence as a lawyer and/or a judge?  
o If yes, what was useful and why?  
FGQ5. How best could criminal lawyers’ knowledge be improved? 
FGQ6. Should criminal lawyers have an in depth understanding of DNA evidence, or is this the role 
of experts? 
FGQ7. What does an effective lawyer do when using and presenting cases involving DNA evidence?  
Discussion of the data collected in these focus groups and the interviews with lawyers is presented in 
chapters 5 (The realities of legal practice for Australian criminal lawyers), 6 (Difficulties with DNA 
evidence) and 7 (Educating lawyers about DNA evidence).  
 Analysis 
Data analysis in qualitative research incorporates data reduction, data display and the drawing and 
verification of conclusions from those data.51 The analysis for this research was conducted in several 
phases. The first constituted preliminary data analysis undertaken during the interview and focus 
group data collection process. The second phase of data reduction involved transcribing the interview 
and focus group data verbatim52 into large numbers of Word files that were managed and displayed 
using the computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software, NVivo. NVivo was used both to 
                                                             
51 Matthew B Miles and A Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook (Sage, 2nd 
ed, 1994). 
52 See below 4.6.2–4.6.3.  
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organise the data and assist in coding and conducting a thematic analysis of the data to answer the 
primary and secondary research questions discussed above.  
4.6.1 Preliminary analysis 
The purpose of preliminary data analysis is to keep track of data during the collection process and to 
follow up on issues that emerge from interviews as they take place.53 In this research, preliminary data 
analysis was undertaken by creating research memos (these also assisted in coding and analysis) 
where emerging themes and ideas were recorded by the researcher during the interview process. 
Ideas and notes taken in earlier interviews contributed to the development of more specific and 
targeted questions in later interviews and focus groups. An excerpt of such a memo is provided below. 
This was prompted after the transcription of an interview conducted on 22 June 2011. 
lawyers discuss the possibility of learning about DNA from other lawyers — but what about the 
issues of passing on incorrect information?54 
In an interview conducted on 23 June 2011, an interviewee was critical of an introductory DNA course 
that the interviewee had attended — the third of this form of course in as many years. That interview 
prompted the following thought by the researcher — written as a research memo: 
DNA 101 is not the answer — if we keep providing education in this way, lawyers will continue to 
be criticised for not engaging with the evidence enough. What we need is an acknowledgment that 
the adversarial system will always have that ‘senior/junior, master/clerk situation’ and that lawyers 
will approach others for information: maybe having access to the information is enough? Where 
to find the information is a skill that could assist if and when lawyers get a case?55 
These memos (and others) assisted in the development of a number of the recommendations and 
proposals for reform generated by the data described in Chapter 5 and the analysis in chapters 6 and 7.  
4.6.2 Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS): NVivo 
The process of data display and drawing conclusions from the data was assisted using the qualitative 
data analysis (QDA) software program, NVivo.56 QDA programs create an audit trail of processes 
undertaken and analysis as they develop through coding.57 This program was chosen for several 
                                                             
53 See Carol Grbich, Qualitative Data Analysis – An Introduction (Sage, 2007). 
54 Kate Cashman, Research Memo Entry, 23 June 2011. 
55 Kate Cashman, Research Memo Entry, 22 June 2011.  
56 Further information about NVivo can be found from the QSR website at <http://qsrinternational.com/>. 
57 Marilyn Tallerico, ‘Computer Technology for Qualitative Research: Hope and Humbug’ (1992) 30 Journal of 
Educational Administration 32.  
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reasons. First, NVivo provides the capability to transcribe data directly into the program to create 
projects or files, or import text files in various formats.58 Second, it is easy to use — the Microsoft user 
interface is easy to understand and instruction on its use is clear and concise. Third, it enables large 
quantities of unstructured qualitative data to be stored, searched, organised, retrieved and analysed 
in a systematic, consistent and logical manner. The forty interviews and six focus groups conducted 
for this research generated large quantities of initially unstructured text that required storage and 
effective management of the coding process. Fourth, it contains many useful functions including the 
ability to create ‘memos’ and annotations, so that notes can be added to a coded document to ensure 
more thorough reflective practice during the coding process. Some of the memos created in this 
research were done in this way in addition to those written directly into Word files during preliminary 
data analysis. Finally, NVivo enhances coding reliability by enabling descriptions to be added to the 
codes created, allowing the researcher and those checking the coding system to understand how and 
why codes were named in a particular way. NVivo allows for each code to be given a ‘description’ so 
that further information about the data stored at that code can be given, which helps to ensure that 
the coding process is reliable, consistent and transparent. This ensures that codes may be verified by 
others reviewing the nodes created. 
Figure 1 – Node properties: descriptions of the ‘from lawyers’ code 
 
The use of NVivo 
                                                             
58 Version 10 of the software also allows for audio, video, social media, pictorial and internet information to be 
uploaded for analysis.  
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NVivo refers to categories created for data as ‘nodes’. Each transcript of data is coded into several 
‘nodes’, and as each new node is developed, a description of why it is named or ‘coded’ in a particular 
way can be added. These descriptions, and indeed the nodes allocated to text within a transcription 
may be changed over time as the examination of the data and transcripts progresses — some nodes 
may be found to overlap and collapsed into a single node; certain themes may be subsumed into 
primary nodes; the meaning of certain words may change over the course of coding and descriptions 
of nodes may change. All this occurred at some point throughout the coding process in this research.  
Nodes are divided into two categories — free nodes and tree nodes. Coding begins with the creation 
of free nodes, which designate loose, often initially unrelated themes identified in the data that may 
later be revisited and retained or further categorised into tree nodes. Tree nodes are clusters of 
related themes that are kept with ‘branches’ of relevant sub-themes beneath free nodes. An example 
from the present study is the following excerpt from an interview with one Crown Counsel on the 
relationship between science and law in the courtroom: 
Yeah but also different ways of thinking about things. I just think scientists and DNA evidence is a 
bit like that — you’ve got something where they do this statistical analysis and it says 28 billion to 
1 sort of thing, but can you get a scientist or will a scientist ever be prepared to say that means 
that that was his blood? And the answer is no they won’t. They’ll say it provides extremely strong 
support for it which most of us would consider to be a substantial understatement if the science is 
right. 
So I think it’s that sort of tension between science and the legal process because in the criminal 
courts you have to make decisions. In the end the jury will have to make a decision that they are 
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of guilt? And in reality, even though no one ever says it, they 
really need to be certain. That’s not what the standard of proof is — it’s not certainty, but in reality, 
it is. And scientists would never be certain about anything it [the DNA result] says.59 
This selection of text was coded into several nodes — ‘science and law’; ‘language and terminology 
difficulties’ and ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. It was initially categorised into free nodes of ‘difficulties 
with DNA’ and ‘communication’ before being restructured into the relevant research question tree 
nodes and the tree nodes listed above. NVivo understands that the context of coded data is important 
and thus allows navigation between a display of the coded data and original data source. This function 
allowed information to be considered in context in the original interview or focus group transcripts 
and therefore helped to ensure rigour and reliability in the analysis.60 
                                                             
59 Interview with L3 (22 June 2011). 
60 See 4.7 below. 
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Each interview or focus group transcript represented a single data source. These were continually 
sorted, labelled, coded and re-organised. Over time, various nuances were exposed as categories and 
labels were refined and relationships between various themes were discovered.61 
Every ‘difficulty’ lawyers were said to have with DNA evidence was recorded. This enabled the 
frequency with which problems arose to be measured and the most common difficulties to be 
identified. In accordance with the aims of reform-oriented applied research this enabled target areas 
for reform and the development of education programs to be identified.62 
4.6.3 Development of codes and thematic analysis 
The coding approached the classification of data in two ways. The first was ‘a priori’ coding — based 
on themes pre-determined by the literature and the research questions, and ‘emergent’ coding for 
the themes identified throughout the transcription and NVivo coding process. This coding process is 
inherently inductive. Codes were determined and dictated by themes found in the content of the 
transcripts rather than per any broad legal or criminological theories. There were three stages to the 
emergent coding process: open coding, axial coding and selective coding. This process is like that 
supported by a grounded theory methodology63 even though this research did not follow a grounded 
theory approach to the research questions. Codes were first developed in NVivo by reading the data 
line by line, a procedure known as ‘open’ coding.64 In the present study it generated several 
uncategorised codes. For example, each difficulty that a lawyer was said to have with DNA evidence 
was listed as one code, or a ‘free node’ in NVivo. These codes were then reorganised into similar 
themes to generate tree nodes. The process of organising codes in this way, which involves rigorously 
specifying and organising codes to reflect theoretical core categories, is a form of coding known as 
‘axial coding’.65 This is the second stage of inductive coding and results in codes being consolidated, 
renamed, collapsed and more systematically organised. An example of the axial coding process is 
represented by the figure of the tree nodes below.  
                                                             
61 A criticism of QDA software programs is that technology carries with it certain meanings and divisions of 
labour. Caution with computer aided coding must be taken because of the influence it has on the way we 
interpret and apply our own meaning to that information, see Grbich, above n 53, 230. 
62 See Chapter 7 on educating lawyers about DNA evidence below.  
63 For the most recent work on grounded theory, see Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss, Basics of Qualitative 
Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory (Sage, 3rd ed, 2008). 
64 Ibid; Neuman, above n 3; Maggie Walter (ed), Social Research Methods: An Australian Perspective (Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
65 Corbin and Strauss, above n 63; Walter, above n 64. 
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Figure 2 – Axial coding: an example of some of the tree node classification in NVivo 
 
Selective coding66 is the final stage of coding and involves selecting cases that illustrate or contrast 
with the themes clarified during axial coding.67 
The development of codes in this way meant the data were analysed thematically by identifying, 
examining and recording patterns in the research data from open coding through to selective coding.68 
The codes and themes discovered are described in chapters 5 to 7 below.  
 Validity and reliability of qualitative interviews and focus groups  
One of the common criticisms of qualitative research is that it is ‘unscientific’69 and that the 
conclusions of one researcher may completely differ from those of another with the same 
information.70 Some commentators71 argue that there is no need to address matters of quality (such 
as validity and reliability) for qualitative research in the same way as for quantitative research because 
                                                             
66 McKerchar, above n 5; Neuman, above n 3. 
67 Codes and themes are discussed in detail chapters 5, 6 and 7 in more detail.  
68 Known as ‘thematic analysis’, see Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ 
(2006) 3 Qualitative Research in Psychology 77, 83. 
69 Gray, above n 3, 189. 
70 Nicholas Mays and Catherine Pope, ‘Rigour and Qualitative Research’ (1995) British Journal of Medicine 109. 
71 See Nahid Golofshani, ‘Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research’ (2003) 8(4) The 
Qualitative Report 597; Alan Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research (Taylor and Francis, 2007). 
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quantitative research pursues a positivist paradigm that seeks only one truth.72 Reliable and valid 
research in a positivist paradigm will find that truth. Qualitative research acknowledges numerous 
truths, that of each of the participants. Golofshani argues that if reliability, validity and triangulation 
are relevant to qualitative research, they must be redefined to reflect the multiple ways of establishing 
truth.73 Having acknowledged this school of thought, however, Gray,74 and indeed this research, see 
the value in demonstrating internal validity, reliability and external validity and generalisability to 
some extent in qualitative research.75 These matters are discussed below.  
4.7.1 Internal validity 
Ensuring that the research was internally valid required checking for congruence between the data 
and interpretations of those data.76 It is important to note however, that this process occurred within 
an interpretivist paradigm, acknowledging multiple perspectives of reality and truth for interviewees, 
focus group participants and the researcher.77 
Internal validity was achieved in this research by employing several qualitative design measures. The 
first is in acknowledging the researcher’s influence on the research, or as referred to by Goffman, the 
researcher’s ‘frame’.78 The second was keeping a research diary to reflect on the research process. 
The third was ensuring triangulation of the data and the fourth was checking for consistency in the 
coding of the data.  
                                                             
72 Positivism is a paradigm that sees reality as a single, fixed and measurable phenomenon, an assumption that 
underlies quantitative research, see Sharan B Merriam, ‘Introduction to Qualitative Research’ in Sharan B 
Merriam (ed), Qualitative Research in Practice: Examples for Discussion and Analysis (Jossey-Bass, 2002). 
73 Golofshani, above n 71. 
74 Gray, above n 3, 189-190. 
75 In addition to the above approaches to quality and rigour are the checks of transferability, dependability, 
confirmability and credibility suggested by Thomas M Skrtic, ‘Doing naturalistic research into educational 
organizations’ in Yvonna S Lincoln (ed) Organizational Theory and Inquiry (Sage, 1985); and see also 
authenticity as a measure of reliability in ibid.  
76 Merriam, above n 72, 25. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Frames have been defined by Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience 
(Harvard University Press, 1974) 10, as the ‘principles of organisation which govern social events and the 
actor’s subjective involvement in them.’ Extra textual frames are those describing what you’ve learnt and 
the knowledge you bring as a researcher; intra textual are internal framing devices such as gender, and 
culture — who you are; inter textual are those that come from the discipline you are a part of and circum-
textual relies on contextual interpretation — the environment in which information or in this case, research, 
is presented. 
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Reflexivity 
Reflexivity by the researcher is important so that the results, project design and analysis of the data 
may be defended. Reflexivity refers to the process of challenging a researcher to explicitly examine 
how their research agenda and assumptions, location, previous experience and personal beliefs might 
influence the research.79 The practice of conducting and writing up qualitative research in a self-aware 
and self-critical way is important for ensuring internal validity in qualitative research. If a researcher 
understands and projects how his or her own background might influence the interpretation of 
information, then limitations of a qualitative methodology are reduced. One mechanism for 
identifying and exploring these assumptions is using a research diary. The research diary kept during 
this research contained memos on sampling, data collection methods, operationalisation of the 
research process and analysis strategies.80 These are typically the areas of research validity that are 
challengeable.81 The research diary and memos were used to evaluate and interrogate the approach 
taken to the interviews and focus groups in this research.82 
Research diary 
Except for the focus groups with forensic scientists and a small number of lawyer interviews, data 
collection took place over a six-month period during the first and into the second year of research. At 
the end of each day of empirical data collection, an audio research diary was recorded. Reflections 
were predominantly about research methods used, research questions, interview questions and how 
the collection process might shape the overall analysis.83 There is no single correct method for keeping 
a research diary84 and the purpose is to keep a record of the researcher’s thoughts and experiences 
and to develop a reflexive stance.85 
The use of a digital voice recorder meant that feedback and reflection could be recorded immediately. 
The sincerity and overall tone of an interview is not obvious in the transcripts of recorded interviews 
and focus groups. The research diary was often used to provide the researcher’s reflections on 
lawyers’ mannerisms or the apparent sincerity or guardedness with which they gave information.  
                                                             
79 Ping-Chun Hsiung, ‘Teaching Reflexivity in Qualitative Interviewing’ (2008) 36 Teaching Sociology 211, 211. 
80 See 4.6.1 for further discussion of research memos.  
81 Walter, above n 64. 
82 Hsiung, above n 79, 214. 
83 Deemed an important aspect of reflexivity by Cynthia Hardy, Nelson Phillips and Stewart Clegg, ‘Reflexivity 
in organization and management theory’ (2001) 54(5) Human Relations 531. 
84 David Silverman, Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook (Sage, 2000). 
85 Miles and Huberman, above n 51. 
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The research diary was also used to process information from the interviews. Changes to the probing 
questions asked in association with research questions were made in response to the realisations 
recorded in the research diary. An example of how the research diary influenced later interviews is 
seen in the transcript of a diary entry:  
Research Journal – 23rd June 2011 
So this is my research journal for the 23rd of June, 2011 and it’s actually for yesterday. Yesterday I 
interviewed two people from X. I was supposed to interview X at 10:00 but I’m now interviewing 
him tomorrow and/or later today depending on how he goes. 
First of all, I spoke to X at one o’clock. Now I’ve realised quite a big difference between talking to 
solicitors and talking to barristers. So obviously, solicitors take care of matters in Magistrates’ Court 
a lot of the time or they instruct barristers in the Supreme Court. Their involvement in the actual 
presentation of evidence is quite limited and that meant that some of the questions weren’t 
particularly relevant. For example, how do you explain DNA in front of a jury and the influence that 
their knowledge has of limitations or of the process on presentation or explanations. It wasn’t 
relevant at all. So, in later interviews I suppose I need to be aware to tailor the questions to the 
interviewee. 
X came into the interview fairly flustered and said “I don’t know how long this is going to be. I don’t 
know much about it. I haven’t been in a case where the DNA is contentious.” It was still interesting 
to have a chat to him and I think he, and probably others, have more experience than they realise. 
Not every lawyer is going to have a major and high profile case involving DNA evidence to fall back 
on. And we ended up still talking for almost an hour about, first, about X and the connections that 
he has there but also about DNA more generally. And as a criminal lawyer, he has had experience 
in criminal matters and does a lot of burglaries and other trials and spoke from his experience of 
being at X where he did murder trials. So, he started off the interview a little bit out of context. It 
wasn’t particularly relevant but then moved into what he thought of DNA, what confused him, 
where he thinks the issues are and how best to learn about it. 
Now communication has been a huge thing through these interviews so far. So, the communication 
of the evidence itself and how problematic it is when an expert is quite hard to understand. He had 
had a lot of experience in forensics and said that “you know that has influenced his tendency to 
talk to the experts”. He still talks to the experts and he would also talk to people in the process as 
well.86 
                                                             
86 Kate Cashman, Research Journal, 23 June 2011. 
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Questions to barristers and solicitors were adapted because of the research diary reflections on these 
interviews. 
Triangulation and code consistency 
The use of different research methods to test the same information is often referred to as 
triangulation.87 Methodological rigour was ensured by the use of the four triangulation techniques 
identified by Denzin.88 Methodology triangulation is the use of more than one data-gathering 
technique.89 This was achieved in this research by collecting data by interviews, focus groups and 
thematic analysis90 of secondary data sources, including current legal and scientific education 
programs, case law and the reviews of process discussed in Chapter 2. Data triangulation was achieved 
by gathering the same type of data across two jurisdictions (Victoria and the ACT) and with some 
overlap in the questions directed to those participating in interviews and focus groups.91 Investigator 
triangulation was achieved by having final codes checked by a third party92 to ensure understanding 
of description and consistency in the information attributed to those codes. This was also achieved 
during the development of codes with the assistance of supervisors, one of whom was also present 
during the ACT Supreme Court judges’ focus group. Finally, theory triangulation involves the use of 
more than one theoretical scheme in the interpretation of the data, and in this research, that was 
achieved by the interdisciplinary overlap between the legal and forensic science disciplines. 
4.7.2 Reliability 
In contrast to quantitative research, reliability in qualitative research does not focus on the 
consistency of the results obtained or whether the same research process would produce the same 
conclusions in subsequent studies.93 Following the interpretivist paradigm, qualitative research is 
‘reliable’ if the analysis reported is consistent with the data collected.94 This outcome is inextricably 
linked to internal and external validity, as triangulation, code checking, and a clear description of the 
research context and purposive sampling of participants also ensure reliability. Issues with reliability 
                                                             
87 Babbie, above n 2. 
88 Norman K Denzin (ed), Sociological Methods: A Sourcebook (McGraw-Hill, 2nd ed, 1978). 
89 Adela McMurray, R Wayne Pace and Don Scott, Research: A Common Sense Approach (Thompson, 2004) 
263. 
90 Jennifer Fereday and Eimear Muir-Cochrane, ‘Demonstrating Rigour Using Thematic Analysis: A Hybrid 
Approach of Inductive and Deductive Coding and Theme Development’ (2006) 5(1) International Journal of 
Qualitative Methods 2. 
91 See 4.4 above. 
92 This person performed a checking role only and did not engage in data analysis in any form.  
93 Babbie, above n 2, 431–432. 
94 Merriam, above n 72. 
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will always arise because people do not always say what they feel and because an interviewee or focus 
group participant may respond to questions differently on different occasions.95 Another way in which 
this research achieved reliability in the results was by ensuring that the research design only allowed 
for participants to be asked questions that they were in a position to give a response to that might 
help answer the research questions.96 For example, given that the lawyers working for government 
organisations were selected for the study by their managers or directors based on their having 
experience with DNA evidence, asking questions about that experience was likely to be within the 
realm of answers that they could realistically provide to the researcher. Because not all interview 
questions were relevant to all of the participants, interviews could be tailored to the interviewees 
experiences and they were still able to garner data that were relevant to the research questions. 
4.7.3 External validity and generalisability 
External validity is achieved, in part, by the extent to which it is possible to ‘generalize from the  to 
other cases or situations.’97 Generalisations are, by definition, assertions of enduring value that may 
be applied regardless of context.98 Because qualitative research is essentially contextual — that is 
sampling is purposive (rather than random) and data are gathered from a small cross section of 
practitioners — the question remains as to whether results of qualitative research can ever really be 
generalised.99 The common concept of generalisability follows on from the positivist paradigm 
whereby one can generalise statistically from a specific sample to a population.100 This is almost 
impossible to do in most qualitative research where there is an in-depth focus and a small number of 
participants, compared with the entire population from which a research cohort is drawn. The 
interpretivist paradigm focuses on different interpretations of reality, and thus the concept of 
widespread generalisations is problematic. If it is essential that research be ‘generalised’ then the 
results of one piece of research may be used to build a working hypothesis in later studies,101 or 
ultimate conclusions in qualitative research are held to be suggestive rather than conclusive.102 
Merriam suggests that working hypotheses that take research context into account can assist others 
                                                             
95 Babbie, above n 2, 152–153. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Gray, above n 3, 190. 
98 Merriam, above n 72. 
99 Gray, above n 3, 191. 
100 Merriam, above n 72, 26. 
101 See Gray, above n 3. 
102 Ian Dey, Qualitative Data Analysis: A User-Friendly Guide for Social Scientists (Routledge, 1994). 
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in similar contexts in their decision-making, the ‘results of which can be monitored and evaluated in 
order to make better decisions in the future.’103 
Considering this definition of generalisability, this research achieves external validity by explaining the 
legal environment and research context for Victoria and the ACT104 so that lawyers outside these 
jurisdictions can still draw insight from the recommendations made in Chapter 7 if similar contexts 
apply to their own criminal practice. 
Validity through participant selection 
Although representative sampling was not the aim of this research, internal validity was achieved by 
ensuring that research participants reflected a broad range of legal and scientific professionals 
currently working in their respective fields. Interviewees and focus group participants varied in their 
experience — from lawyers who had been in practice for two to three years with experience of DNA 
evidence in lower courts to barristers with forty years of practice at the criminal bar running cases in 
which DNA evidence was the sole and/or most contentious evidence. This ensured that the 
participants were likely to provide an adequate representation of those either using or interacting 
with lawyers dealing with DNA evidence in criminal cases. 
 Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the research paradigm that underpinned the study and the philosophical 
framework that guided its research methodology. The rationale for a qualitative research method was 
given, followed by a discussion of the research questions and general themes considered by those 
questions. The qualitative research methods were introduced and the process of analysis — 
preliminary analysis, thematic analysis and coding using QDA software — was presented. The 
following three chapters discuss the research findings organised around themes identified in the data. 
The first of these, Chapter 5, sets the scene for chapters 6 and 7. It introduces some common concerns 
and considerations lawyers identified in relation to dealing with DNA evidence in criminal trials, and 
that influence whether they experience difficulties with the evidence and their involvement with DNA 
education.  
 
                                                             
103 Merriam, above n 72, 29. 
104 See Chapter 3: DNA in a legal context. 
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5 The realities of legal practice for Australian criminal lawyers  
 Introduction 
This chapter explores data on the practical experiences of lawyers in managing DNA evidence. It uses 
the ethnographic approach applied by Wyatt and also Williams and Weetman1 to explore and uncover 
the micro-dimensions of criminal law practice in relation to DNA evidence. To understand the 
difficulties that lawyers experience in managing DNA evidence (Chapter 6) and the way in which they 
learn about DNA evidence (Chapter 7) it is important to recognise that there are several experiential 
and systemic factors that influence lawyers’ views about and approaches to using and learning about 
DNA evidence. Many of these factors are experienced as tensions in lawyers’ practice. 
Recommendations in the Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward2 report 
(NAS Report) are based on the assumption that lawyers lack knowledge about scientific evidence like 
DNA evidence. What that report does not discuss is how lawyers approach DNA evidence in every day 
practice — the decisions they make, the reasons for those decisions and if, indeed, lawyers do lack 
knowledge or whether there are other considerations in play which explain why they use DNA 
evidence in the way that they do. This chapter identifies and discusses six themes that emerged from 
analysis of the data. These themes focus on the tensions inherent in managing and learning about 
DNA evidence in everyday criminal law practice. Many of these tensions arise from and are embedded 
in the adversarial criminal justice process. For this reason, they cannot necessarily be resolved.  
                                                             
1 Robin Williams and Jason Weetman, ‘Enacting forensics in homicide investigations’ (2013) 23(3) Policing in 
Society 376. David Wyatt, ‘Practising Crime Scene Investigation: Trace and Contamination in Routine Work’ 
(2004) 24(4) Policing and Society 443. Williams and Weetman’s research viewed daily activities of crime 
scene examiners and forensic scientists through an ethnographic lens, which is the importance of 
understanding the ‘nature and consequences of organisationally produced and socially consequential 
decision-making by specific actors’ in the context of the use made of forensic science: Williams and 
Weetman, above n 1, 380. Wyatt refers to this as a ‘conceptual reminder’ of the need to view forensic science 
as a whole system, one where forensic science is ‘enacted’ at specific sites (see Wyatt, above n 1, 443) 
including the courtroom. Wyatt’s research refers to ‘micro-dimensions of practice’ in analysing the practical 
experiences of participants. His research studied experiences of crime scene examiners in the United 
Kingdom and Wales using ethnographic data obtained from fieldwork at one of the country’s biggest forensic 
CSI training providers. Wyatt argues that such research is essential if an understanding is to be gained of how 
abstract processes are enacted at a grassroots level (at 447).  
2 National Research Council Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009) National Academy of Sciences 
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf>. 
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The chapter begins with a discussion of what lawyers do and do not know about DNA evidence and 
ends by considering the impact of the realities of legal practice upon lawyers’ approach to that 
evidence.  
The six themes that emerged from the data are: 
• DNA evidence is common but rarely contentious;  
• Contentious DNA evidence: is it the science or the procedure?  
• Is DNA evidence exclusionary evidence that rarely excludes? 
• Is DNA evidence really ‘just another piece of circumstantial evidence’? 
• Working on a case-by-case basis; 
• Does your ‘side’ (prosecution or defence) count?  
In interviews for this study, lawyers spoke at length about their practical experiences of cases involving 
DNA evidence. Case types were varied and included the full spectrum of criminal offences from 
property and drug offences, crimes of personal violence including minor and serious assaults, to sexual 
offences and murder. Although there was variety in practice, and indeed in the level of experience of 
the lawyers interviewed, it became apparent that the themes listed above and discussed below 
applied to most, if not all, lawyers to some degree when working with DNA evidence. For many, the 
use of DNA evidence requires them to balance notions of ‘ideal practice’ and systemic or cultural 
considerations inherent to criminal law practice. Acknowledging that such tensions exist enables an 
understanding to be gained of the intricacies of daily criminal law practice, particularly in relation to 
DNA evidence. 
The analysis in chapters 6 and 7 is informed by an understanding of the tensions considered here, as 
they provide information and perspective on lawyers’ practical experiences with DNA evidence and 
their understanding of that evidence.  
 DNA evidence is common, but is it contentious? 
This issue has implications for the extent to which lawyers may seek to become knowledgeable about 
DNA evidence and/or investigate or challenge the validity of DNA evidence in cases in which they act. 
The data obtained for this study reveal that DNA evidence is a common form of evidence in criminal 
law cases. That finding alone might suggest that lawyers need to have an excellent understanding of 
this evidence and should therefore engage widely with forensic biologists. What the data also suggest, 
however, is that DNA evidence is rarely contentious so that although lawyers understand the 
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importance of having knowledge about DNA evidence, the reality is that the outcome of cases rarely 
depends on how DNA evidence is collected, analysed and presented.  
Several of the lawyers interviewed had over twenty years of practical legal experience and only two 
of those lawyers had ever experienced more than one case involving contentious DNA evidence. That 
finding poses a significant challenge to legal educators who aim to involve lawyers in formal DNA 
education programs that they will view as relevant to their criminal law practice.  
At the same time, there is widespread awareness of the serious criticism levelled at lawyers in those 
rare cases where they have either failed to identify contentious DNA evidence or not handled it well 
and where it forms the basis of an appeal.3 Such criticism is exemplified by that contained in the Inquiry 
into the Circumstances that Led to the Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama (Vincent Report)4 into 
the Jama case. Although Jama is viewed as an exceptional case, the criticisms of lawyers (and others) 
involved in that case were so profound that interviewees were aware of the report’s 
recommendations.  
DNA evidence is very common in criminal cases. For example, L33 noted that the criminal cases in 
which he has acted have involved DNA ‘more than 50% of the time.’5 Similarly, L35 characterised it as 
‘a very common form of evidence.’6 Nevertheless, areas of criminal practice and specialisation often 
influence the extent to which lawyers encounter DNA evidence. For example, in sexual assault cases 
DNA evidence often forms a significant part of the brief. This is because evidence of the presence of 
semen may be adduced to establish one of the physical elements of the charge — that sexual 
intercourse occurred. Nevertheless, in such cases the DNA evidence may not be contentious. For 
example, it will not be contentious if the central fact in issue is the presence or absence of consent, 
rather than the occurrence of sexual activity.7  
                                                             
3 See 2.2 for discussions of case law where DNA evidence was contentious or was the basis for an appeal in 
criminal cases.  
4 Frank Vincent, Inquiry into the Circumstances that Led to the Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama 
(2010) Parliament of Victoria <http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/papers/govpub/VPARL2006-
10No301.pdf> (‘Vincent Report’). 
5 Interview with L33 (25 July 2011).  
6 Interview with L35 (28 July 2011). See also interview with L24 (24 June 2011) who found DNA evidence ‘fairly 
regular no matter what you’re doing’; and interview with L23 (8 September 2011) who qualified that 
‘contentious or otherwise, it’s very common.’ 
7 Interview with L33 (25 July 2011). 
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Even in non-sexual assault cases DNA evidence is seen as rarely contentious or disputed.8 Only those 
interviewees with many years’ experience of criminal practice9 referred to taking part in more than 
two contentious DNA evidence cases in their time practising law. Many of the interviewees had never 
had an experience of proving or defending a case involving contentious DNA evidence, or where DNA 
evidence was the contentious element of a case. This is illustrated by the following two quotes. The 
first is from a lawyer (L3) who has been practising in criminal law for 28 years, with the previous five 
being in a prosecutorial role. The second (L10) is from a defence lawyer who has been practising solely 
in criminal law for 29 years. L3 stated, 
I had a trial once, and this was one of the very few times that there’s ever been strongly contested 
DNA evidence in a trial that I've had ... I was a junior in this trial and it’s probably 15 years ago.10 
To the same effect L10 said, 
personally I haven’t had any cases where it’s been the turning point or [where] the sole issue has 
been DNA or the main issue has been turning on DNA. [So] my experience to date has been looking 
at DNA reports [and] trying to understand them ... I haven’t had any cases where we had a DNA 
expert, or where the Crown had a DNA expert. I haven’t had any Supreme Court matters where 
DNA has been that critical.11  
Statements like those of L3 above demonstrate the importance of being realistic in discussing or 
making recommendations for ‘ideal practice’ with respect to DNA evidence. 
The fact that lawyers have little experience of contentious or problematic DNA evidence raises 
questions about whether and to what extent they will be willing or able to invest time in investigating 
or challenging the reliability of DNA evidence. Their lack of experience contesting DNA evidence is 
partly due to the fact that DNA evidence is not contentious in the majority of cases. This may be the 
                                                             
8 See interview with L35 (28 July 2011) who felt that ‘there’s always DNA coming here and there, and most of 
the time it’s fairly uncontested.’ 
9 This number is used because L11 had 17 years criminal practice and has been involved with two contentious 
DNA evidence trials as he states, ‘sure, well broadly, I’ve been in criminal law since [19]97, but my experience 
with DNA trials is the two we’ve mentioned; Forbes and Meyboom. I’ve come across DNA plenty of times 
otherwise in matters and they’ve folded, they haven’t proceeded to trial, they’ve folded by way of pleas of 
guilty, where we’ve thought the evidence is overwhelming’: interview with L11 (24 June 2011). 
10 Interview with L3 (6 September 2011). This is echoed in the sentiments of L14 (28 July 2011): ‘Well I've only 
had one case where I’ve challenged DNA, it was a rape trial, we were unsuccessful, we had an expert, one of 
the leading experts. The challenge part of it ran for about a week. I struggled with it greatly.’ This is also seen 
in the interview with lawyer L8 (28 July 2011) who ‘is a solicitor and [has] been a solicitor for about 10 years 
and I don’t think I’ve had a case where there’s been — oh no I’ve had ... one — I've had one case where there 
was a lot hinged on a mixed sample and so the evidence wasn’t challenged.’  
11 Interview with L10 (23 June 2011). 
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case in  f sexual assault cases where consent is the disputed fact not identity, or if DNA evidence is not 
found at the scene, or if a defendant pleads guilty. This does not excuse lawyers from having the 
knowledge required to challenge DNA evidence when it is required and they must know enough so 
that they may discharge this duty correctly. This issue is underscored by the following quote from L18 
who is recognised within the profession as having considerable knowledge of DNA evidence. When 
asked about the prevalence of DNA evidence in her own cases, L18 said:  
I’m just trying to think … none that have gone to trial where I was involved personally. I’ve had 
some inquests where DNA was an issue. I occasionally get briefed to be a DNA advisor on trials 
where I’m not running the trial myself but I get briefed on a sort of consultant basis.12 
While L18 has considerable knowledge of DNA evidence based on self-tuition, she has very little case 
experience involving contentious DNA evidence. 
Identifying DNA evidence as a common item of evidence in criminal cases, but one that is rarely 
contentious is a significant finding because it may provide insight into lawyers’ lack of engagement in 
formal training programs on DNA evidence.13  
For case management reasons, it is important that trial lawyers devote most of their time to issues 
that are deemed contentious. From an efficiency perspective, this saves both lawyers’ and courts’ time 
and, therefore, also money for all parties involved. For these reasons the prosecution may rely on the 
defence to give them notice of whether they will object to any DNA evidence. This allows both parties 
to focus on what is in issue prior to trial; it prevents trial by ambush and the court’s time is then 
focused on matters that are genuinely in dispute.  
Defence lawyer L33 said that determining whether or not the DNA evidence is contentious is an 
important first step for lawyers in criminal cases. If it is not contentious, then lawyers are able to avoid 
wasting the court’s time. Moreover, early identification of the fact that it is in contention enables 
lawyers to consider and devise a tactical approach to dealing with the evidence:  
I think the first step is ... the ability to identify what is contentious DNA evidence. [This] is a 
distinctive non-trivial step. So, can you identify cases where DNA is contentious or critical and can 
you identify ones where it isn’t? That’s really important. And we shouldn’t be having fights about 
stuff that’s not important because it makes us look like idiots and it’s just a waste of time. I think 
that the next step is, is there any way that the force of DNA evidence can be sidestepped? Can we 
                                                             
12 Interview with L18 (26 October 2011). 
13 See Chapter 7: Educating lawyers about DNA evidence. 
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find alternative scenarios consistent with innocence, that don’t require us to go head-to-head with 
the statistics?14 
If lawyers commonly use DNA evidence but rarely find it contentious then they will make decisions on 
how much time to spend managing and understanding the evidence, based on this fact. Analysis of 
the data collected must take this into account, as do conclusions based on those data. The 
recommendations made in Chapter 8 of this thesis take this practical reality for criminal lawyers into 
account. 
 Identifying contentious DNA: is it the science or the investigative procedure?  
Lawyers interviewed for the study expressed divergent views both about the desirability of acquiring 
knowledge about DNA evidence and about the type of knowledge that should be obtained. Although 
lawyers acknowledge that DNA evidence is rarely contentious or controversial, many feel that they 
should know more about it to deal with those situations where it may be contentious and to help 
prevent the occurrence of miscarriages of justice. However, there is no consensus about what it is that 
lawyers need to know about DNA evidence — whether to spend time learning about the scientific 
principles involved in DNA testing, or whether to gain an understanding of the procedures involved in 
collecting, testing and analysing DNA sample. A minority of lawyers said that lawyers should avoid 
learning about any of these matters and should instead adopt a minimalist approach to acquiring 
knowledge about DNA evidence to avoid trespassing on the perceived domain of the DNA expert 
witness. These different viewpoints are discussed in the next section.  
5.3.1 Scientific understanding 
Many interviewees emphasised the necessity for lawyers to understand both the science of DNA 
evidence and the scientific principles involved in DNA testing and analysis. The discussion of this 
matter begins with a group of lawyers who reflected on their lack of scientific understanding of DNA 
evidence and the implications of this for the cases in which they act. A typical acknowledgment of lack 
of such understanding was made by L3: 
it is complex so in the end you’re dealing with evidence that as a prosecutor you might find very 
difficult to understand yourself. … I've got a science degree, so some of the things are less foreign 
                                                             
14 Interview with L33 (25 July 2011). L33 went on to add, ‘the next thing you need to do would be aware of is 
how does the DNA evidence interact with other evidence in the case. It’s unusual if not unheard of for it to 
be just a stand-alone bit of evidence that has no more context. Does the existence of the DNA evidence 
render other facts more or less likely? Are there other facts that are not necessarily contentious which might 
fit into the way that we look at the DNA evidence?’ 
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to me than they would be to others ... but still I can’t pretend to understand how it all works 
scientifically.15 
Similarly, L14 also questioned his own understanding of DNA evidence:  
I’ve never really understood what I could really do with it in defence, I don’t understand the science 
well enough, and every time I get [a case with DNA evidence] I have to read [up on it] again because 
I don’t really get it, and I forget it ... my brain’s only big enough to hold a certain amount of 
information at one time I think.16 
The lawyers who gave this not uncommon response perceived their lack of scientific understanding to 
be problematic for a number of reasons. Some lawyers reasoned that if they did not understand the 
science, then neither would the jury:  
but I tell you if I don’t have an understanding of the science, and I don't really understand it, [then] 
the jury don’t really understand it either.17 
Other lawyers said that if a lawyer does not have adequate knowledge of DNA evidence, there is the 
possibility that the jury will misunderstand it or misapprehend its probative value because lawyers will 
not be able to question experts meaningfully or elicit accurate and informative evidence to present to 
the jury. This concern is exemplified by the following quote:  
Unless you know about the science you’re not going to get why that’s the right question or whether 
you’re getting the right answer.18 
Despite the prevalent view about the desirability for lawyers to understand the science of DNA 
evidence, some lawyers expressed a contrary view and advocated for an avoidance strategy. That is, 
to avoid acquiring an understanding of both the science of DNA and the procedural or scientific 
method involved in collecting, storing and analysing DNA evidence. 
                                                             
15 Interview with L3 (6 September 2011).  
16 Interview with L14 (28 July 2011). 
17 Interview with L24 (24 June 2011).  
18 Interview with L30 (20 June 2011). Also see interview with L32 (22 June 2011): ‘the only way you can ask 
somebody about what they’ve done is to have some understanding as to how and why’ and ‘if you’ve got no 
idea about DNA it’s just here’s a sample and here’s a number and you don’t know how you get from sample 
to number or what it means then you’ve got no — you can’t just stand up and say it must be wrong because 
that’s like saying the sky’s falling down. You just do a “climate deny” or whatever, what you’re working ... So 
a lot of lawyers just don’t understand why the number and how the number. I think a lot of people have 
dabbled in dealing with those cases do have the knowledge because you [would] be too scared to get into it 
at all if you didn’t know what you were doing then you would be being a bit negligent running that sort of 
case without any idea as to what you’re going to say.’ 
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As seen in the quotations in the paragraph below, lawyers gave different reasons why having the most 
basic information on both the science of DNA evidence and the forensic, investigative procedures 
employed for DNA evidence is the ‘safest’ way to deal with experts and their evidence. The reasons 
for avoiding an acquisition of more than just the basic knowledge of DNA evidence included avoiding 
becoming confused, and that it may lead to a failure to ask the more basic questions of experts in 
front of the jury: 
So what I do is, I try not to understand the science because then I get confused by my knowledge 
of the science.19 
I think it’s a two-edge sword ... I mean I’ve done enough DNA cases that I know the science behind 
it, although I don’t know all the terms and I can’t conceive of extraction processes and things like 
that ... Sometimes you’re better off just not understanding it ... Because then when they say, this 
matches that, the next question [to the expert is] how do you know that?20 
Another lawyer who eschewed an understanding of the science felt that the more he understood 
about DNA evidence the more he realised he should remain ignorant of the science:  
I don’t try and understand scientific background. I suppose I have a basic understanding of [the 
science], but [the more I know the] more it convinces me that [the experts] know what they are 
talking about ... I really do not try to understand the science of it.21  
L3 felt that a fellow member of the Victorian Bar knew ‘too much’ about DNA evidence and was critical 
of her self-education in this area:  
She showed herself to have this amazing knowledge of DNA. She just seemed to have read 
everything and to understand all this stuff ... And what that meant was that she was trying to 
challenge the experts as though she was their equal and that wouldn’t have worked in the minds 
of the jury because she was just a barrister. What knowledge she had, which was quite impressive, 
was stuff she’d just read in [a] book. She wasn’t an expert. And I always thought I would have loved 
to have known what she knew, but the fact is, she wasn’t in a position to be able to use it effectively 
because she would have just come across as a smartass and someone challenging these PhDs and 
these geniuses.22 
                                                             
19 Interview with L29 (22 June 2011).  
20 Interview with L29 (22 June 2011).  
21 Interview with L25 (8 September 2011). See also interview with L30 (20 June 2011) who said that ‘[a]nd I 
don’t really understand — I mean I don’t understand how the DNA stuff works in the sense of the locis ... 
and I don’t understand how DNA itself works so I thought I don’t need to actually understand what DNA is I 
just need to try and understand the processes that give it significance.’ 
22 Interview with L3 (6 September 2011).  
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The implications of these views for improving lawyers’ competence in dealing with DNA evidence and 
the appeal of education programs for them, may be that some will continue to have difficulties with 
this evidence; some will be willing to participate in further education and some will see such programs 
as irrelevant or problematic. How they approach the latter will depend on their attitude toward what 
they perceive to be the possible consequences of gaining scientific and procedural understanding.  
5.3.2 Understanding investigative forensic procedures 
Important for many interviewees is an understanding of the forensic procedures used in the collection, 
analysis and storage of DNA evidence (the so-called chain of evidence). Contamination and procedural 
errors in cases like Forbes, Meyboom and Jama discussed in Chapter 223 demonstrate that it was not 
errors in scientific analysis per se that led to the contentious issues that arose in those cases (rather 
than the scientific principles alone).  
Some lawyers interviewed for this study did not feel that they were equipped to challenge potential 
errors in the chain of evidence or in the testing and analysis phase of DNA evidence in the laboratory:  
I think the other problem is [that] there are some problems with DNA [that] can’t be detected from 
a file, particularly cross contamination and transference and an expert won’t be able to read that 
in the subpoenaed notes. You have to think a bit creatively about whether that’s possible or not 
and it’s difficult and I don’t know how it is you’re supposed to raise the possibility of something 
which may or may not happen. Like what if Jama did want to say there was contamination, well he 
at least had the timing issue of the overlap, but timing won’t get you there, generally speaking I 
would have thought.24 
Although some lawyers (like L18 quoted above) mentioned the difficulties of uncovering 
contamination in cases like Jama,25 the data from lawyers and forensic scientists suggest that lawyers 
are actually very much aware of how contamination and transference might occur. For example, L6 
stated: 
I mean, they need to look at continuity; [they] need to look at … contamination. They need to look 
at how the analysis was conducted and understand that for themselves — how the experts … have 
analysed the piece of evidence and how they’ve arrived at their conclusion and be able to explain 
                                                             
23 Aytugrul v The Queen [2012] HCA 15; R v Whyms [2012] ACTSC 7; R v Meyboom [2011] ACTSC 13; R v Hillier 
[2010] ACTSC 33; R v Forbes [2009] ACTCA 10 and R v Jama [2008] VCC 0886. 
24 Interview with L18 (26 October 2011).  
25 R v Jama [2008] VCC 0886. 
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that to the jury, because obviously if it’s important then they need to understand … the whole 
process to make sure nothing has gone wrong.26 
Similarly, L 12 said:  
It was as simple as not bothering to wash their bench tops; it could not be more elementary ... it’s 
a simple lesson to us all that there is the potential for something so basic in any given case [to go 
wrong], and so the accused who looked so incredibly guilty almost exclusively because of the DNA 
profiling evidence [is innocent]. When they keep saying it wasn’t me, that’s possible. And the 
capacity for otherwise sensible and responsible people to make fundamental errors and do stupid 
things is remarkable and we all know that from our personal lives.27 
Transference is also understood by lawyers and they spoke to the importance of ensuring that 
secondary transfer has not occurred, as reflected in the comments of L33: 
The significant part of the evidence was the extent to which and the circumstances under which 
DNA could persist on an object and be transferred from object-to-object ... One of the limitations 
of DNA is the transferability and I’ve seen more and more examples of practitioners trying to attack 
the physical properties rather than the statistical properties. With some success.28 
Lawyers discussed both contamination and transference in many of the interviews and acknowledged 
that both of these events occur because of human error. Lawyers were aware that although the 
science is robust, humans play a role in the collection, testing and analysis of DNA evidence. 
Understanding ‘the capacity for humans to err’29 is a key competency for criminal lawyers. 
Another lawyer stated that the errors of contamination and transference are now more likely with the 
use of smaller samples detected using modern technology because the ‘more sensitive the sample, 
the more compromised it may potentially be.’30 Although the technological and scientific 
                                                             
26 Interview with L6 (7 September 2011).  
27 Interview with L12 (8 September 2011). Also see interview with L18 (26 October 2011) when asked about 
the limitations of DNA evidence ‘that DNA evidence is microscopic, that it can be transferred without people 
seeing it, that transference can happen very easily. You can’t tell a contaminated sample from a non-
contaminated sample, I could go on and on, there’s a whole lot of things which people accept. If I pick up 
this pen and I pass it to someone else and they pass it on — there’s all sorts of combinations that might 
appear on that pen. Some people might appear and some people won’t appear.’  
28 Interview with L33 (25 July 2011). Also see interview with L39 (7 September 2011): ‘the other thing ... is 
transference’; and interview with L8 (28 July 2011): ‘limitations in terms of ... continuity or any sort of 
innocent transfer.’ See also interview with L18 (26 October 2011). 
29 Interview with L4 (25 October 2011). See also interview with L12 (8 September 2011), ‘[w]ell there have been 
some extraordinary examples of human error, and mixing this up, and contamination of one sample with 
another and just poor work.’ 
30 Interview with L7 (28 July 2011).  
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breakthroughs have been considerable, these breakthroughs lead to smaller and more easily 
transferred DNA traces being collected, tested and later used as evidence in criminal trials. 
The statements quoted above and those footnoted demonstrate that lawyers understand the risks 
associated with human error including contamination and transference. They understand that both 
threats must be considered before the veracity of the DNA evidence can be assured. The problem in 
practice, therefore, is how to apply this understanding to individual cases. In Jama for example, 
lawyers may have had an understanding of contamination and transference in a general sense, but a 
miscarriage of justice still occurred because of the failure to uncover that this had happened.  
Accordingly, there is a gap between having an understanding of problematic forensic procedures and 
exposing their existence in individual cases. The Jama case is a good example of this. While, lawyers 
may not be able to remove this risk completely in every case, they can make decisions about acquiring 
relevant knowledge to help prevent the occurrence of future miscarriages of justice. 
The provision of biology files31 to lawyers in cases where DNA evidence is a significant component of 
the prosecution case may help to close this gap. This measure will not be effective, however, if lawyers 
do not understand those files. Further, there may be a tension between providing information that is 
comprehensible to non-scientists and legal professionals and presenting adequate scientific 
information to demonstrate the reliability and strength of a DNA evidence result. This tension may be 
one that is hard to resolve and that should not, in any event, be resolved in a way that undermines 
the integrity of scientific documentation. Ideally, at least, lawyers should to be able to subpoena 
biology files in cases where the DNA evidence might be more contentious. This would mean, at the 
very least, that they may have more information on the DNA evidence in their cases and that they may 
be better placed to identify potential problems with it. Having access to a report or biology file before 
talking to an expert or challenging the evidence in court would also facilitate case preparation and 
knowledge acquisition before trial.  
A number of lawyers commented on the importance of questioning how the DNA was deposited and 
how the evidence was collected and later how it moves through the chain of custody. For example, 
L25 said, 
I go back and have a look at the chain [of custody and make sure it] is not broken and is intact and 
that there is no prospect of the corruption of the samples. I like to be able to work that out from 
                                                             
31 Biology files comprise all testing and results information, notes from forensic biologists about samples and 
the analysis process and any information from statisticians or others involved in collection, storage, analysis 
and interpretation of DNA evidence results. 
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the material I’ve got ... [For example] this constable took it and then this one put it in the locker, 
or put it in a sealed bag and it went in a locker and the next person came ... so [try to trace] all the 
way back [un]til it is tested to show that the sample doesn’t get corrupted.32 
Such statements indicate that lawyers are clearly aware of the chain of custody and the importance 
of ensuring the integrity of DNA samples. Jama tells us that unless lawyers both have that awareness 
and exploit their knowledge of these matters, there remains the risk that miscarriages of justice may 
occur. The lawyers in Jama did not investigate how the DNA sample was taken nor uncover how Jama’s 
DNA came to be placed on the database. In contrast, lawyers like L25 and those footnoted above33 
investigate the chain of evidence and likelihood of transference. This approach may, of course, have 
been a result of what occurred in Jama. 
Overall, lawyers’ knowledge of DNA evidence appears to be relatively sound — most lawyers can 
explain what DNA is, how the testing takes place and what DNA evidence can be used for. The tension 
that exists for lawyers in criminal practice though is deciding whether they need to understand the 
science of DNA evidence in more detail or devote their time and continuing legal education to gaining 
a deeper understanding of the forensic procedures used and the chain of evidence. Interviewees had 
an understanding and awareness of contamination and transference. Nevertheless, Jama’s case 
demonstrates that the ability to uncover contamination and transference goes beyond merely 
knowing what contamination is or that transference can occur easily. It requires the right questions 
to be asked of forensic scientists and the forensic process.  
 Is DNA evidence exclusionary evidence that rarely excludes? 
The research explored the extent to which lawyers understand the nature of DNA evidence as 
exclusionary evidence. DNA evidence does not create ‘conclusive matches’ between DNA profiles of 
known samples to other samples on a database. All it can do is either exclude individuals, or not 
                                                             
32 Interview with L25 (8 September 2011). See also comments from interview with L31 (28 September 2011): ‘I 
basically, I follow the chain a lot, and I’ll physically write it out or follow the chain of statements. And we’ll 
put the statements side-by-side and go okay so SP1 that day goes from there, okay that goes there, puts it in 
the safe, gets it out of the safe, takes it to there. So it’s just by analysing the statements. And I’ve certainly 
had to do that at least two or three times in the past.’ Also see comments in interview from L35 (28 July 
2011) who has a degree in science combined with law, ‘[f]irstly look at the item that the DNA is allegedly 
found on, is it transferrable? Look at the amounts, whether it’s trace amounts, whether it’s copious amounts, 
look at the profile itself, whether it’s a straight profile or whether it’s a mixed profile. And if it’s a mixed 
profile look at the varying quantities on the electropharagram. So it could be that any DNA profile that’s 
attributable to your client may be the minor contributor and there maybe another person out there who is 
a major contributor. That could always be if that’s a victim. Then yeah that’s fine. So if it’s copious amounts 
of blood at the point of entry I think you can sort of quietly infer ... That’s a pretty good DNA profile there 
from whoever it may be.’ 
33 See above n 27. 
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exclude individuals based on the loci tested. If they are not excluded, the probability ratio can present 
how much more likely an observed DNA profile would be if it came from the defendant or someone 
on the database than if it came from a random person. The majority of lawyers interviewed 
understood this aspect of DNA evidence but queried whether it could still be referred to as 
exclusionary evidence. Their concern was, in part, due to advances in technology and more 
specifically, mixed profiles becoming more prevalent in the swabs of DNA taken from crime scenes. 
The sensitivity of the technology means that fewer people are able to be ‘excluded’ from being 
contributors in a DNA sample that is found at a crime scene. Mixed profiles allow for a greater number 
of possible combinations of the loci tested in samples being present — and, accordingly, more people 
fall into the mixture than if it were a single DNA profile. 
Defence lawyers referred to the exclusionary nature of DNA evidence more frequently than 
prosecutors. Prosecutors expressed frustration that defence lawyers rely on a proposition that with 
the increase in mixed profiles their clients may not have been responsible for crimes because of the 
chance that another member of the population could not be excluded from contributing to the DNA 
sample that was found at a crime scene. More often than not, defence counsel made, and stressed, 
the distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary results. Defence lawyers focus on exculpatory 
evidence as a matter of course and thus tend to concentrate on the use of DNA evidence to exculpate 
their clients by using the exclusionary nature of DNA evidence to eliminate or erode its significance as 
inculpatory evidence. This presents issues for some prosecutors who have difficulty accepting that 
DNA evidence never really excludes the possibility that the perpetrator might have been someone 
other than the accused.34 L23, for example, expressed frustration about this stating, ‘it’s exclusionary 
and not inclusionary ... [but you] can never really exclude that there was somebody else [involved].’35  
The increasing use of mixed profile DNA evidence in criminal trials has made the exclusionary concept 
of DNA evidence more problematic for lawyers because with so many ‘potential’ contributors, a 
defendant may never really be excluded. In this regard L30 noted, 
Well more and more it doesn’t [exclude people] because of the way that they interpret it ... more 
and more you’re getting multiple contributors. So they’ll say well it could be him and he’s 
contributed these [but] it could be somebody else who’s contributed those, so he’s not excluded. 
So the exclusions are happening less and less because of the way that almost always you’re doing 
the samples with multiple contributors not sole contributors.36  
                                                             
34 Interview with L23 (8 September 2011). 
35 Ibid.  
36 Interview with L30 (20 June 2011).  
Lawyers and DNA: Understanding and challenging the evidence 
 120 
Lawyers have come to understand that DNA evidence is exclusionary rather than inclusionary and they 
feel relatively comfortable using the evidence in this way. However, the changing technology used in 
DNA testing is undermining this confidence because in situations where a person may previously have 
been excluded from a DNA sample, they may not be excluded based on a mixed profile. This illustrates 
one of the difficulties of using and relying on scientific evidence like DNA in a legal setting — the 
technology will always be changing and lawyers find themselves trying to keep pace with that change. 
 Is DNA evidence really ‘just another piece of circumstantial evidence’? 
A tension arises from the fact that although DNA evidence no longer has the air of infallibility that it 
once had in criminal trials, it may still be treated differently to other types of circumstantial evidence. 
This section discusses a number of themes relevant to this tension. It begins with the argument that 
DNA evidence should be treated no differently to other circumstantial evidence. Second it considers 
lawyers’ views on the limitations of DNA evidence. The gaps in the information provided to lawyers 
about the chain of evidence and the details of the forensic processes used are then discussed and 
finally, the influence of DNA evidence on the decision to prosecute is examined.  
Lawyers spoke of a decline in the perception of DNA evidence as an extremely important and 
persuasive item of evidence, to ‘just another piece of evidence’, of similar weight to other 
circumstantial evidence in criminal trials. They attributed this shift to a recognition that there have 
been cases where miscarriages of justice have occurred as a result of too much trust being placed in 
DNA evidence. L1 illustrates this point: 
well that’s the problem with DNA, that it was the be all and end all, but now we can see there are 
cases in the United Kingdom and others that are unravelling because of all these issues about 
contamination, cross-contamination, how it was gathered, etcetera, etcetera.37  
One of the implications of the view expressed in this quote is that it is important to assess DNA 
evidence in combination with other evidence presented at trial. However, many lawyers interviewed 
suggested that the presence or absence of DNA evidence is still viewed as pivotal. For many, DNA 
evidence is seen as being more than ‘just another piece of circumstantial evidence.’ Evidently there is 
a tension between, on the one hand, DNA being viewed as just another piece of circumstantial 
evidence and on the other it being treated as more persuasive than other evidence. Of course, these 
perceptions may be influenced by the fact that if DNA is the only probative evidence available to the 
                                                             
37 Interview with L1 (23 June 2011).  
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prosecution in a particular case, great weight must be attached to it if it is to establish the defendant’s 
guilt:  
technically it might be the only evidence you’ve got. Yeah it can persuade you, of course, if you 
have a light-on circumstantial case and you’ve got that extra bit of evidence that’s confirmatory by 
way of DNA. It can certainly tip the difference between prosecuting or not ...38 
Lawyers understand that DNA evidence can be very persuasive in a courtroom. Because of this, many 
lawyers use DNA evidence to their advantage and tactically approach a trial with DNA evidence in 
mind:  
I think prosecutors treat it as powerful evidence, which it is and evidence that juries are attracted 
to and I know that prosecutors get frustrated with what they see as a CSI effect, which is jurors’ 
acquitting when there’s no DNA or when it’s not really likely that there would have been DNA. So 
they get frustrated with defence lawyers capitalising on the absence of something which is not that 
much of a big deal.39  
This quote acknowledges the unusual power of DNA evidence and the CSI effect, discussed in 
Chapter 3.40  
For defence counsel the presence of a strong DNA result that links their client to the crime or the crime 
scene can restrict the possibilities for defending the case:  
DNA often cuts off a lot of opportunity for creativity in defence. It really does, it knocks it stone 
dead. You often just can’t get around it. You’ve often just got to say, “well yes he bled on the 
carpet. It’s his blood on the carpet so other than the fact that if one of the inhabitants of the house 
has worked at the blood bank and had the person’s blood in their” … well it doesn’t work does it. 
So blood on the carpet means well, yes my client has been there and bled on the carpet. Then the 
focus becomes [wider] — was he there for a lawful reason? Was he there as an invitee? You know 
was he there for another reason other than the crime as charged?41  
As a defence lawyer, L19 argues, DNA evidence has significance in a number of ways:  
[it’s] crucial for both sides, because if they haven’t got it then it gives me much more, in defence. 
If the prosecution haven’t got it, it gives me in defence much more scope for creativity. If I’m 
                                                             
38 Interview with L15 (7 September 2011). Also see interview with L22 (20 June 2011) who stated, ‘without the 
DNA we’ve got next to nothing, with the DNA we’ve got a good case.’  
39 Interview with L18 (26 October 2011). 
40 See Chapter 2.2.2 for further discussion of juries, DNA evidence and the CSI effect. 
41 Interview with L19 (26 July 2011).  
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prosecuting and I have it, it means that I’ve cut off any lines of exploration and confusion that the 
enemy might try and use. If you haven’t got DNA you can bet your bottom dollar that the defence 
will say, well they haven’t got DNA, they haven’t got this and they haven’t got that, and their case 
is hopeless. You shouldn’t believe a word that is said by this witness and they’ve got no supporting 
evidence — acquit. That’s how it works.42 
These statements indicate that the presence or absence of DNA evidence can provide a tactical 
advantage to one side or the other in a way that may not apply to other circumstantial evidence. 
5.5.1 Limitations of DNA evidence as circumstantial evidence 
Whether lawyers view DNA evidence as essentially unproblematic and implicitly reliable will 
determine how they deal with it and the extent to which they may test its probative value and 
reliability. Participants in the study were asked to identify and explain what they perceive to be the 
limitations of DNA evidence. The aim was to uncover whether lawyers understand the accepted 
limitations of DNA evidence, or whether they see DNA evidence as 100% certain and trustworthy in 
every case.43  
One of the interview questions focused on whether lawyers believe DNA evidence to have any 
limitations. This aimed to explore the emphasis that lawyers place on DNA evidence and whether it is 
in fact, just another piece of circumstantial evidence.44 Many answers were insightful and suggest that 
lawyers, on the whole, are more discriminating than previous research would indicate.45 This suggests 
that although lawyers rarely challenge DNA evidence, or feel that they don’t understand it sufficiently, 
this is not necessarily because they don’t understand that it has limitations, or how it may be used or 
relied on.46  
Many lawyers made the point that DNA evidence can only explore questions of who may have 
committed an offence, not how an offence was committed or the chain of events thereafter. As L8 
said, ‘well DNA will only explain or attempt to explain the origin of the sample and it won’t explain 
how the sample got where it’s said to be.’47  
                                                             
42 Also see interview with L22 (20 June 2011) who stated ‘so there is no direct evidence that he’s [been] there 
[and] without the DNA we’ve got next to nothing. With the DNA, [however] we’ve got a good case.’ 
43 See discussion of Veth et al’s research in Chapter 2.2.1. 
44 Interview question 2C, Appendix F. 
45 See Chapter 2.2.1 for a discussion of the previous research on lawyers and DNA evidence. 
46 Possible explanations for lawyers’ failure to challenge DNA evidence is explored further in Chapter 6. 
47 Interview with L8 (28 July 2011). See also interview with L17 (27 July 2011): ‘well it can only tell us that that 
DNA material is that DNA material. There are assumptions around that and that’s probably where the danger 
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DNA evidence may assist in those enquiries, but it cannot prove all elements of a crime. Focus group 
participant FS2 pointed out that a DNA sample and result does not explain how the trace appeared at 
the location where it was found.48  
One lawyer expressed doubts about basing a prosecution solely on DNA evidence:  
There’s no doubt from a prosecution perspective DNA evidence is very helpful, but as I said the 
real issue with DNA evidence really comes about when you have little or no other evidence — what 
is the evidential implication? Because in the majority of cases DNA evidence is not used as the 
linchpin of a Crown case. It’s simply to buttress the case, the inferences that you seek to draw. So, 
it’s really kind of just one strand. But the real issue in my view comes from when you have no other 
strands or one very tenuous or weak strand. How can you rely on DNA evidence in that case to 
have a jury infer guilt from just that item only or that piece of evidence only?49 
This lawyer felt that DNA evidence can be of fairly limited use if it is the only item of evidence from 
which to infer the guilt of an accused. Further, this may potentially cause a miscarriage of justice. The 
Victorian Office of Public Prosecutions has recognised the danger of relying on DNA evidence alone 
and has introduced a requirement for prosecution counsel to obtain the approval of the Director to 
proceed in cases where the only evidence against the accused is DNA evidence.50 This demonstrates 
an understanding that DNA evidence is not treated like other circumstantial evidence. Generally, one 
item of circumstantial is insufficient to ground a reasonable prospect of conviction (the test applied 
to determine whether a case should proceed to trial). Unlike other circumstantial evidence, DNA 
evidence alone can be considered to satisfy this test, subject to the qualification in Victoria that the 
Victorian Director must give approval for the case to proceed.51 
                                                             
lies ... the limitation is what you do with that information’; interview with L2 (21 June 2011): ‘it can’t tell you 
when the DNA was put there’; interview with L16 (7 September 2011): ‘but it just says they’ve touched it ... 
the question may be what [the] intent was’; interview with L31 (28 September 2011): ‘all it can tell us is 
who’s been where and who’s been near and/or touched what, and who, etc. It doesn’t tell us any more than 
that’; interview with L32 (22 June 2011): ‘It may show the person’s DNA was in that location. It doesn’t now 
necessarily mean that person was in that location.’ Also see interview with L35 (28 July 2011): ‘you can’t put 
a time on it. So you don’t know when that DNA was deposited.’ 
48 Focus group with FS2 (4 June 2011).  
49 Interview with L6 (7 September 2011).  
50 Interview with L26 (8 September 2011).  
51 See Forbes v The Queen (2009) 167 ACTR 1. 
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5.5.2 DNA evidence as ‘conclusive’ 
DNA has been viewed by lawyers as ‘certain’ and conclusive,52 yet they are aware that they cannot use 
the word ‘conclusive’ to describe it. The lawyer quoted below admitted to using language that is 
almost conclusive, but acknowledged the tension here because he began by explaining that DNA 
cannot ever be explained by way of a ‘match’: 
Yes, you can’t talk in terms of a match and you are prohibited from talking in terms of a match in 
court. You will never ever, ever hear ‘match’ being talked about, “it’s his DNA”. All you can ever 
say is that the likelihood ratio is so high that it excludes, for all intents and purposes [all other 
people in the universe] … As a prosecutor, I think I’ve used “has to be him” and I don’t think I’ve 
got in trouble and the defence can’t materially argue against that. You can never say that it is his 
blood; you can never say that is …53 
Many prosecution lawyers and a smaller number of defence barristers interviewed had spent time 
with forensic experts in preparing cases and learnt that even a probability ratio that was greater than 
the population of the planet, for example 1 in 10 billion, did not necessarily mean that there could 
never be two people with the same DNA profiles on the same loci on the planet, or even in the same 
city: 
Yeah, I don’t like it as opposed to not understanding [it]. The figures I have doubts about ... You 
know the notion that, taking events at random, [the probability ratio might be] 1 in a billion or 
something. Even the statisticians tell you it doesn’t mean that there isn’t somebody else [with the 
same DNA profile] or that there aren’t 10 people within the range. That to me is an enduring 
weakness that you’ll never be able to fix.54 
The discussion above suggests that lawyers acknowledge the persuasiveness of ‘1 in 10 billion’ as a 
probability ratio, particularly if there is no further exploration, with forensic scientists, of what those 
                                                             
52 See Veth et al’s research in Chapter 2.2.1. 
53 Interview with L19 (26 July 2011). L16 (7 September 2011) also suggested that ‘the proper answer to that is, 
well a flying pig’s possible but I’ve never seen one, just because I haven’t seen one doesn’t mean it’s not 
possible. So it’s that sort of thing a proper person would say now look, all things are possible, Elvis Presley 
may still be living, but I haven’t seen it happen and I cannot understand how it would happen, this makes it 
very hard for them and you can’t dictate to the witness how they’re going to answer that.’ 
54 Interview with L34 (6 September 2011). Also see interview with L22 (20 June 2011) who also felt that this 
was a limitation: ‘well the biggest limitations are the sort of things, the fact that it’s not absolute evidence, 
in a sense that you know, it does not, it’s the probability that is them rather and I understand, and I haven’t 
really got to the bottom of it, but when you calculate the probabilities you are not necessarily talking about, 
there’s been some studies that talk about how many people are involved in getting to one in a million, how 
many cross matchings are referred to in one in a million and I think it’s not a very large number of people, 
it’s like eighteen thousand or something like that?’ 
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terms mean. Some defence lawyers do talk to forensic scientists so that they are able to expose what 
ratios like this mean, but this is unusual.  
Lawyers also felt that a limitation of DNA evidence is that experts may have to concede that certain 
propositions are ‘possible’ because nothing is ‘impossible’. This is the nature of probability evidence 
and so it applies to DNA evidence. Nevertheless, lawyers have expressed a desire for forensic scientists 
to ‘give in’ and say that a sample belonged to an accused person with 100% certainty.55  
5.5.3 Exposing deficiencies in investigative procedures 
One of the lawyers interviewed did not believe that lawyers should consult experts if they could 
understand the forensic reports themselves. L4 compared this skill to the skills required in reading a 
witness statement and evaluating any file in detail. In his view the skills involved in the latter task are 
no different in cases involving DNA evidence where the results of testing and analysis are routinely 
provided by forensic biologists in the form of a comprehensive forensic report:  
This [the DNA] is just evidence. It’s no different to a witness statement ... [T]hat means just going 
back, … sitting down and saying, right, give me the file. Look through it yourself. What’s missing? 
Have a basic understanding. Check the statements. Is the sample that was taken from my client, 
my client’s sample? Is the sample that was taken from the crime scene, well that was matched 
against my client, the sample that was taken from the crime scene? That’s just chain of evidence. 
It’s got nothing to do with DNA. What does the file say? How many times was it tested? Is there 
something scrawled on the file saying “contamination”, as there will be if they probably conducted 
re-testing. Was it re-tested?56 
Although this statement suggests that there should be no need for lawyers to speak to forensic 
scientists if they can understand forensic reports, forensic scientists take a different view and maintain 
that lawyers have much to gain from involving experts in the preparation of cases. It helps them to 
present the DNA evidence effectively in court and to question experts thoroughly. It is their view that 
unlike many other types of evidence, DNA evidence may take considerable time and effort to 
understand.57  
If lawyers wish to obtain information about the procedures involved in collecting, storing and 
analysing DNA evidence, then it is important that they understand that they may go beyond the 
forensic report that is provided and ask for disclosure of the forensic biology file. This typically contains 
                                                             
55 See the research of Victoria Grace et al, Forensic DNA Evidence on Trial: Science and Uncertainty in the 
Courtroom (ISCE Publishing, 2011). 
56 Interview with L4 (25 October 2011).  
57 Focus group with FS3 (25 October 2011); Focus group with FS7 (25 October 2011). 
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the notes that were taken by a forensic biologist from the moment the sample was collected or 
received at the laboratory, and includes information on decisions that were made during forensic 
analysis processes. The information a lawyer may need to challenge the investigative procedures 
applied to DNA evidence is not included in the forensic report, but may be contained in the forensic 
biology file. Only the report is routinely provided to lawyers. This means that often defence counsel 
will be required to subpoena the forensic file to gain access to this information. L17 stated that 
forensic reports themselves contain little information about investigative procedures:  
they need to know what counsel should be provided with to be made aware of the processes that 
were gone through to come to those results. I think that’s really what it comes down to for us and 
making sure if police don’t provide it, then it’s either requested or subpoenaed from forensic 
science and if there’s any question about those results, then getting an independent expert to have 
a look at it.58 
5.5.4 Decision to prosecute 
It is trite to say that the decision to prosecute is of critical significance. Accordingly, it is important to 
understand whether and to what extent that decision is influenced by the presence or absence of DNA 
evidence. This is underscored by the fact that the decision to prosecute Jama on the basis of DNA 
evidence alone was particularly criticised in the Vincent Report.59 The data reveal a variety of attitudes 
to the significance of DNA for the decision to prosecute. What is evident is that both the seriousness 
and nature of the offence and the strength of the DNA evidence in question60 influence this decision. 
In relation to less serious offences, a mixed profile generated from a small sample of DNA evidence 
found outside the area of a crime scene is unlikely to support a decision to prosecute. Similarly, a 
single DNA profile with a high likelihood ratio attributed to an accused as the most probable 
contributor in a serious rape trial, with a sample of semen taken from inside the victim’s body is more 
likely to support a decision to prosecute. These considerations are discussed below. 
                                                             
58 Interview with L17 (27 July 2011). L17 went on to add, ‘no that’s an absolute starting point and even though 
they take a while to come in, it’s really important to get the whole lab file because sometimes tests have 
been done over and over again and there’s correspondence between people saying I think this isn’t right, 
what happened here. It should all be provided, not just a sanitised version of this is what happened at the 
end after a bunch of emails from the informant and the lab and supervisors within the lab. You can see where 
processes haven’t been done correctly and they’ve had to be done again.’  
59 Vincent Report, above n 4. 
60 For example, the size of the sample collected at the crime scene, the strength of the likelihood ratio 
generated and whether the profile generated is mixed or a single profile will all dictate how ‘strong’ the DNA 
evidence is.  
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When there is only DNA evidence and no other circumstantial evidence, L25 felt that the inherent 
strength of DNA evidence is such as to warrant prosecution.  
I’m trying to think if I’ve prosecuted, I can think of two cases where I’ve agreed with the prosecution 
just on the basis of DNA. We didn’t have much else and so I have gone on the basis of DNA because 
it’s fairly strong. If the science is correct — and that [question] for me is just an article of faith. I 
accept that the science is correct, until such time as the courts turn around and say it’s not 
acceptable. I just proceed on the basis that it’s right.61 
Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that a case like Jama is very rare — where there was only DNA 
evidence at the scene and no other evidence to suggest the guilt of the accused. As noted above, in 
response to the Vincent Report, to prevent such a miscarriage of justice from happening again, the 
Office of Public Prosecutions in Victoria has instituted a process whereby the Director must approve 
any case proceeding to trial based on DNA evidence alone.62  
The lawyer quoted below (L9) believed that the presence of DNA evidence influenced the decision to 
plead more than the decision to prosecute, because DNA-only cases are rare:  
I think it would have more of an effect on the decisions to plead than decisions to prosecute. I 
mean it’s very rare that you would find a case that you’d only have DNA and you decide to 
prosecute. I mean it just wouldn’t happen. I mean Jama was Ethiopian or something… He was in a 
singles female middle-aged nightclub. Seven-foot-tall and with CCTV and there was not one black 
man [seen] in that place on that night, [by witnesses or on CCTV footage]. So, it was just a disaster, 
and it was a disaster [more so because of the lack of] sterilising procedures of the night before. 
The fact that he’d had a medical officer examine him the night before ... The odds of this happening 
is billions to one.63 
As might be expected, it may not be the presence or absence of DNA evidence per se that influences 
the decision to prosecute, but rather the perceived strength of that evidence, its probative impact on 
the case in question and the seriousness of the offence:  
                                                             
61 Interview with L25 (8 September 2011).  
62 Interview with L26 (8 September 2011).  
63 Interview with L9 (7 September 2011).  
 
Lawyers and DNA: Understanding and challenging the evidence 
 128 
Yes, it does come into it, it either strengthens the case or weakens the case. If the DNA is 
inconclusive and there is iffy evidence then I am probably less likely to authorise a prosecution. If 
the DNA is strong, that would influence me in making the decision to sign an indictment.64  
The presence of DNA evidence in addition to other evidence however, can certainly bolster a case and 
satisfy the reasonable prospect of conviction test that is applied.65 
In answer to the question whether the availability of DNA evidence influenced the decision to 
prosecute, L31 said: 
No, it doesn’t because it’s the lack of evidence that assists rather than the existence of evidence 
that doesn’t assist. So, it’s a different strategy when you analyse it as a prosecutor. So, there was 
no DNA found on the knife? It doesn’t mean anything. So, no [having DNA evidence] doesn’t affect 
the prosecutor’s decision [to prosecute] at all, unless it’s a rape case and you’ve got DNA and that’s 
all there is.66 
Regardless of whether DNA evidence has a greater influence because of its absence or presence, this 
quote demonstrates that there is an awareness amongst prosecution lawyers, as evidenced also by 
the Victorian protocol, that DNA evidence alone may not justify a prosecution. This is so even though 
some view DNA evidence as potentially inherently sufficiently strong, or of sufficient strength in the 
case at hand, to justify proceeding in the absence of other circumstantial evidence. 
 The nature of working on a case-by-case basis  
It is important to acknowledge the reality of working in a system where lawyers handle a high volume 
of criminal cases with a wide variety of evidence types relevant to the facts in issue. In order to practice 
criminal law, lawyers must acquire knowledge of various areas in relatively short periods of time. This 
                                                             
64 Interview with L25 (8 September 2011). Also see interview with L34 (6 September 2011) who agreed, ‘it 
without a doubt influences the decision to prosecute’; and interview with L39 (7 September 2011): ‘oh, 
undoubtedly it does. I mean leaving aside DNA only. Most definitely it does. I mean despite my own personal 
misgivings, it is a very strong prosecution cloak and it’s a good one to have in your armoury.’ 
65 For a discussion on the use of this test by the Office of Public Prosecutions in Victoria see John Champion, 
‘Plea Offers and Discontinuances DPP Speech’ (Paper presented to Law Institute of Victoria Annual Criminal 
Law Conference, Melbourne, 27 July 2012) [2]–[3] <http://www.opp.vic.gov.au/getattachment/4391b56c-
dfce-4569-ba7f-571999aa0388/DPP-speech-to-LIV-annual-criminal-law-conference.aspx>. 
66 Interview with L31 (28 September 2011). L32 (22 June 2011) felt that, ‘cops have really started to appreciate 
this or even prosecutors is that all the traditional methods of policing are still vitally important you’ve got to 
have witnesses that get the person to the crime scene you’ve got to get motive to get them to the crime 
scene. All the stuff that leads to a circumstantial case for them, which is a pretty good case, then the DNA 
becomes the icing rather than the cake.’ 
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leads to a tendency to deal with DNA evidence on a case-by-case basis, with lawyers refreshing their 
knowledge of that evidence when they are faced with a case that so requires.  
Undoubtedly, the most common reason given by interviewees for failing to engage more 
wholeheartedly with DNA evidence in general was that they work on a case-by-case basis and learn 
what is required for the case immediately at hand. If that case involves DNA evidence, then they learn 
about how the DNA evidence in that case was applied and tackle arguments concerning the use of the 
evidence in that specific context. One of the implications of this approach is that lawyers may engage 
in a repetitive relearning process as cases involving DNA evidence arise, possibly having to regain 
knowledge previously possessed but subsequently forgotten: ‘We are event focused as barristers and 
we get a brief, you prepare the brief. It’s a bit like being a surgeon. You go and do the job and put it 
away. Forget it. It’s gone and you move onto the next one.’67 
What this means for some lawyers is that they do not consider it important to learn everything they 
can about DNA evidence, or even more so, contentious DNA evidence, until they have a case before 
them that requires that very knowledge:  
I think issues don’t crystallise themselves until you have to look at them. I think one thing that 
lawyers do is you have to become kind of a bit of an expert in whatever it is for maybe a couple of 
weeks of your life and it could be anything. It could be something to do with debt derivative, 
equities or DNA evidence. I’ve done those kinds of cases and ask me two weeks later and I wouldn’t 
be able to tell you [anything about them] but I’ve got across that sufficiently for the couple of 
weeks I needed to and DNA is no different ... the finer details I leave to each case and to work out 
what the actual issue is. And then I speak to the experts.68 
To similar effect L39 said that nothing inspires a lawyer to learn about evidence like DNA more than 
an impending case with a judge asking questions to make sure you understand what you are 
presenting.69 
Lawyers commented on how they best learn about different types of evidence. This is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 7. However, it is important to understand how the exigencies of practice affect 
lawyers’ knowledge about different types of evidence. L9 helps to explain this: 
                                                             
67 Interview with L15 (7 September 2011). L15 also notes ‘[a] lot of this is reinventing, every time I do a DNA 
case, I’ve got to get back to it, because I’m not doing it all the time. So you’ve got to re-learn it ...’ 
68 Interview with L38 (7 September 2011). 
69 Interview with L39 (7 September 2011).  
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like most barristers I learn things as I do them and I don’t retain a hell of a lot of it. I mean you read 
Rumpole of the Bailey and you see how he does it. It’s perfectly real. I mean a barrister running a 
case is going to get on top of all sorts of technical material that he’s got no idea really about. And 
as soon as he’s finished the case it’s gone out of his head.70 
A key implication of this work/knowledge retention is that lawyers may be required to re-learn the 
basics of DNA evidence each time they have a case with potentially controversial DNA evidence. They 
assume they know nothing and go through a process of acquiring an understanding of how the DNA 
evidence has been used in each individual case they take:  
A lot of this is reinventing, every time I do a DNA case, I’ve got to get back to it, because I’m not 
doing it all the time. So you’ve got to re-learn it and go through a process, usually if you can with 
the expert witness, sitting down with them. So it’s time consuming …71 
In a slightly different vein, one of the judges noted that because DNA evidence is not ‘readily 
repeatable next time’ (referring to every case having different information and focusing on different 
aspects of DNA evidence), ‘you might learn a thing, but you can’t convey it to the next trial.’72 
It is important that those who work in the forensic science arena, and particularly with DNA evidence, 
understand the practical constraints on lawyers’ ability to gain and retain scientific knowledge. As 
noted in Chapter 6, forensic scientists are critical of lawyers’ failure to communicate with them and of 
their level of competence in managing DNA evidence. An understanding of the exigencies of legal 
practice may enable forensic scientists to apprehend why lawyers wait until close to trials to engage 
                                                             
70 Interview with L9 (7 September 2011). See also interview with L13 (27 July 2011) who supports this 
statement: ‘a lot of really good barristers, when challenging expert evidence will SWOT up on something to 
the point where, they’re not better than the expert, but they can have a really competent conversation with 
the expert and it’s just one of the skills of the lawyers. Just in the same way that you bone up on the facts of 
the case, until you know the facts of the case better than any witness there, because you know it from ten 
different perspectives, and some barristers will be able to do that better than others.’ Also see interview 
with L30 (22 June 2011): ‘Learning is by doing for me because [that is] the way that I learn. So it involves 
looking at it and trying to analyse what’s happened [in each case]. Or as L31 (28 September 2011) points out, 
learning is done ‘on the job.’  
71 Interview with L15 (7 September 2011). Also see interview with L7 (28 July 2011) who also has this view: ‘it's 
the sort of knowledge I find that I have to refresh myself on each time because I’m not dealing with it 
probably … If I were running a sex practice it would probably become more embedded, but I find that I’m 
almost going back to scratch each time if I’m thinking about how I might sort of understand it in terms of … 
like this case where it involved sort of washing of clothes and strengths of samples and that sort of stuff. I’d 
have to go back to the beginning and do all the research I did all over again, so in relation to that.’ Also see 
interview with L15 (17 September 2011): ‘A lot of this is reinventing, every time I do a DNA case, I’ve got to 
get back to it, because I’m not doing it all the time. So you’ve got to re-learn it ... With barristers, you have 
to understand that whatever you did yesterday gets forgotten, you can’t store it all and you let it go and if I 
did a DNA case tomorrow, I’d probably have to re-educate myself in three months’ time for DNA again.’ 
72 Focus group with P4 (3 May 2011). 
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with them. It may also encourage them to work with lawyers in ways that overcome potential 
problems arising from such delays. 
 Does your side count? 
It is important to recognise that lawyers do not use DNA evidence in a vacuum. They work within an 
adversarial system, which necessarily generates adversarial modus operandi for counsel. Often, 
significant systemic tensions are generated by the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system 
itself. Defence lawyers, for example, tend not to consider DNA evidence with the primary focus of 
proving the truth of what happened in the course of the alleged event. Instead, their aim is to cast 
doubt on the DNA evidence, even when there is nothing to suggest that that evidence is anything but 
robust. In order to do this, they have developed various tactics, including maximising or creating 
confusion about its interpretation and undermining its weight. Their overall aim is to wreck its 
probative force. Adversarialism also encourages defence lawyers to use the absence of DNA evidence 
tactically even where its absence is of little or no relevance. Further, for tactical reasons defence 
counsel may avoid communicating with prosecution experts in any way that might disclose their case 
or intended approach at trial. Rather they adopt a ‘trial by ambush’ approach, which discourages 
revealing information about their own case to the opposing party and that party’s witnesses. The 
tensions that these matters create arise because, either the tactical advantage they seek to achieve is 
of limited or questionable effectiveness, or they impose limitations on lawyers’ ability to gain detailed 
knowledge of DNA evidence generally and of the DNA evidence in particular cases — knowledge which 
might promote different strategic approaches or increase their overall effectiveness in managing DNA 
evidence. Further, although lawyers are officers of the court73 rather than solely prosecutors or 
defence lawyers who are bound exclusively to their clients, the data suggest that lawyers’ roles in the 
adversarial system heavily influence their access to information or perceived access to information 
and, therefore, their understanding of DNA evidence. 
5.7.1 Casting doubt 
A prominent component of a defence lawyer’s role is to cast doubt on the DNA evidence presented 
by the prosecution. In general terms, defence lawyers cast their role as finding ‘any hole in the case 
[where there is] reasonable doubt’,74 without necessarily focusing on the most likely version of events. 
                                                             
73 See Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s 2.3.9 and Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) s 28.  
74 Interview with L13 (27 July 2011).  
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DNA evidence can pose particular problems for them because of the high status generally ascribed to 
its probative value.75 The following statement made by L19 illustrates this problem: 
in defence where you want to have the capacity to run riot and cause confusion and mayhem to 
the enemy’s case, DNA has the salutary effect of cutting off all sorts of avenues of exploration for 
alternative hypotheses you can raise. That’s what you do in defence, you don’t care about guilt or 
innocence in the pure sense, but just see if we can wreck the other person’s case.76 
Nevertheless, defence lawyers participating in this study identified lines of attack for diminishing the 
probative force of DNA evidence. Prominent amongst these is the creation of confusion about the 
meaning of DNA evidence. For example, L19 pointed out that referring to the various databases77 
allows the defence to ‘create a bit of confusion, because that’s what it’s all about.’78 Using this tactic, 
defence lawyers may attempt to make DNA evidence as complicated and long-winded as possible in 
order to confuse juries and encourage them to attach little weight to it. L29 described this process: ‘A 
good defence lawyer will simply untangle every strand in the process and have it go for days.’79 
Another tactic is to concentrate on any perceived weakness in the evidence and play on it to 
undermine its weight. For example, L29 noted that, ‘a defence lawyer won’t talk about [the] strength 
of evidence, they’ll talk about the weakness. So they find the greatest weakness and then they just 
keep banging away at it.’80  
In contrast, according to L29 an effective prosecutor makes the DNA evidence as simple and as easy 
to understand as possible:  
Well an effective prosecutor will simplify it and an effective prosecutor will break it down to its 
bare bones. A sample taken, put in the machine, a DNA sample extracted [and] multiplied so that 
you can see it on a graph ... That’s what a good prosecutor would do ... [do it] simply like that.  
While defence counsels’ approach may be that of the wrecking ball, creating confusion and tapping 
any weakness in prosecution evidence rather than the vigilant crusader for truth and justice in the 
                                                             
75 See discussion of Meyboom at 2.3.2; and see for example, Johanna Veth, Annabel Ahuriri-Driscoll, Victoria 
Grace and Gerald Midgley, ‘Lay and Professional Understandings of Forensic DNA Evidence’ as cited in James 
Wallman, Claude Roux and Chris Lennard (2011) 7(1) Forensic Science, Medicine and Pathology 75-138; see 
also Grace et al, above n 55. 
76 Interview with L19 (26 July 2011).  
77 Databases used to store the various DNA profiles collected across Australia and the world of various groups 
of the population. 
78 Interview with L19 (26 July 2011).  
79 Interview with L29 (22 June 2011).  
80 Ibid.  
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sense that a layperson might expect, this is done in the best interests of the client and provided it 
complies with ethical standards, may not be improper. Nevertheless, this approach does raise 
questions about just how justice is achieved, and the extent to which it may cause juries to misjudge 
or misunderstand DNA evidence, so that their assessments of it are ultimately not soundly based. 
5.7.2 Lack of DNA evidence 
The data demonstrate that defence lawyers may emphasise the absence of DNA evidence at a crime 
scene.81 For example, if there is no DNA as part of a brief, L14 says ‘it’s one of the first things I point 
out to the jury, for sure.’82 If the prosecution does not have DNA evidence to present to the jury, this 
can provide defence lawyers with a tactical weapon to erode the persuasiveness of the prosecution 
case. L19, for instance, referred to being able to ‘go to town’83 if a prosecutor reveals the informant 
did not collect or provide DNA evidence.  
5.7.3 Timing 
Lawyers are responsible for introducing DNA evidence, and by doing so, they define DNA evidence as 
supporting or refuting the major issues in the case. They may also challenge DNA evidence, either 
seeking for it to be excluded or attempting to reduce the weight the fact finder may attach to it. Timing 
may be crucial in this regard.  
Because court time is limited and expensive, lawyers must present evidence and their cases quickly 
and efficiently and they cannot devote unlimited time to analysing all evidence presented in a case. 
McEwan argues that this means lawyers cannot apply the same level of investigative or forensic 
thoroughness that a scientist would employ before reaching a conclusion.84 They must determine 
matters in issue and present evidence to establish their parties’ cases within a fairly limited time 
frame.85 This is particularly relevant to DNA evidence because it can often take long periods of time 
for DNA results to become available and lawyers may receive results only shortly before a trial 
commences. A number of defence lawyers interviewed for this research noted the inefficiencies they 
faced in relying on a duty of disclosure by the prosecution for forensic reports in some cases.86 This 
                                                             
81 For further discussion of this in the thesis, see discussion above at 5.5 in its capacity to reveal how the 
absence of DNA evidence is used tactically by the defence and therefore the extent to which DNA evidence 
is ‘just another piece of evidence.’ 
82 Interview with L14 (28 July 2011).  
83 Interview with L19 (26 July 2011).  
84 Jenny McEwan, Evidence and the Adversarial Process: The Modern Law (Blackwell, 1992) 33. 
85 See discussion at 5.6 on the time constraints associated with dealing with cases on a case-by-case basis.  
86 See discussion of whether your side ‘counts’ at 5.7. 
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delay means that lawyers may prepare their cases without what is often a key category of evidence. 
It delays consultation with experts who may give further insight into the testing and the results from 
DNA evidence samples. These considerations affect how criminal trials are conducted and the fairness 
of the trial itself.87 
5.7.4 Avoiding experts and trial by ambush 
The data reflected hesitancy by many defence lawyers to engage with State forensic experts. For some 
this was a tactical decision. This decision was made despite knowing that these experts are available 
to them. Even judges suggested that talking to opposing parties’ experts might be inadvisable as 
potentially alerting the opponent to the defence approach to the case (although as the following 
quotation from the focus group with judges shows, there were conflicting judicial views in this regard):  
P3: I’m not sure that that will necessarily make it [DNA evidence] clearer; it will only telegraph 
your punches. 
P4: Very likely, but telegraphing your punches is not a reason for excluding that sort of approach. 
P2: In civil cases I agree with you but I don't think it would work in a criminal case.88 
The negative view of communicating with the opposing party’s expert witness was echoed in the 
following comment of L30: 
Well we generally don’t try because what’s the point in talking to the expert on the prosecution 
side because you’re going to flag the issues that you want to raise and you might not want to flag 
those in advance.89  
The hesitancy to provide information to the prosecution about the defence case is illustrated by the 
following statement of L35: ‘It is an adversary [system] and so ... I would be very careful, very, very 
careful about playing my hand.’90 
For lawyers, ‘displaying their hand’ is seen as undesirable because in the adversarial system, one side 
is pitted against the other. These quotes demonstrate how the adversarial system itself influences 
                                                             
87 For a discussion of the human rights framework (and ultimately the fairness of the trial itself): see 3.4. 
88 Focus group with P2, P3 and P4 (3 May 2011). 
89 Interview with L30 (20 June 2011). 
90 Interview with L35 (28 July 2011). This is echoed in the statement of L11 (24 June 2011): ‘it’s [a] practical 
reality. It takes a very long time to get to trial. Asking too many questions in the early stages can be tactically 
not in the interests of your client, if you tip off the other side, so to speak … So if you leave it to the end of 
the day, it’s too late to fix up mistakes ...’ 
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defence lawyers’ approach to obtaining information from probably the most prominent source of DNA 
expertise, state forensic analysists.  
Although many lawyers acknowledged that there is no property in an expert, very few defence lawyers 
approached forensic experts employed by the State. However, conflicting attitudes to this matter 
were evident. Some defence counsel signalled the need for care while recognising the benefit to be 
obtained from communicating with Crown experts. The following statement is from one such lawyer: 
Well, there’s no property in an expert. There’s no property in a witness but you have to be careful 
obviously, but with an expert witness far from it. A number of times I’ve had experts who have 
been helpful to me.91 
This interviewee further noted that not only does his understanding improve when he speaks to 
prosecution DNA experts, but that also he is often surprised with the level of assistance he might 
receive. 
Some participants, when discussing communication between expert witnesses and opposing counsel, 
pointed to a distinction between pathologists and forensic scientists. L12, for example, said that 
pathologists as a profession are open to having defence counsel contact them to ask about the 
evidence and any test results but that the same culture of accessibility and openness is not as 
prominent in forensic science laboratories.  
You can ring up a pathologist and say I read your report and what did you mean by this and couldn’t 
there be another explanation and they’ll generally talk and discuss. That culture of accessibility and 
openness isn’t as prominent at the forensic science laboratory, and it never has been, so that’s a 
difficulty.92 
This culture of lack of accessibility may make it more difficult for lawyers to ask the questions that 
competent lawyers need to ask of DNA experts. Moreover, these are the questions that forensic 
scientists say lawyers need to ask in order to present the evidence adequately.  
Clearly, it is not simply that lawyers have difficulty gaining access to experts or that they find it difficult 
to communicate with experts in their scientific language.93 Tactical considerations involved in defence 
counsels’ decisions not to communicate with prosecution experts pose significant challenges for those 
seeking to improve their knowledge of DNA evidence both generally and in specific cases with a view 
                                                             
91 Interview with L4 (25 October 2011).  
92 Interview with L12 (8 September 2011).  
93 The difficulty that some lawyers have with communicating DNA evidence and communicating with forensic 
scientists is discussed at Chapter 6.5. 
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to preventing further miscarriages of justice. Considerations arising from, and embedded in, the 
criminal justice system are particularly difficult to counter. 
 Prosecution and defence considerations 
While the adversarial system and fair trial principles are premised upon the equality of the adversaries, 
in reality that equality does not exist. The greatest force of arms lies firmly with the State. This has 
implications for defence lawyers’ ability to discharge their responsibilities with respect to both eliciting 
and challenging DNA evidence. It is important that this tension between prosecution and defence be 
understood because of its potential to inhibit defendants’ equal access to justice. In the context of 
DNA evidence, the unequal positions of defence and prosecution counsel emerges particularly in their 
differential access to DNA expert witnesses. It also has the potential to generate different levels of 
competence in dealing with DNA evidence between defence and prosecution counsel. However, 
counter-intuitively, the data suggest that defence counsel display greater competence in handling 
DNA evidence than prosecution counsel. Nevertheless, interviewees still felt that there was room for 
improvement by both prosecution and defence lawyers. The discussion here focuses on these matters. 
Availability of adequate time and funding also differs for defence and prosecution counsel. Both are 
matters likely to affect their ability to manage DNA evidence effectively.  
5.8.1 Lack of defence experts 
Although the forensic scientists who took part in this research were very open to both prosecution 
and defence lawyers asking them questions about individual cases, defence lawyers did not feel that 
they had the same level of access as prosecutors to the State experts. Additionally, there are few 
independent or defence DNA experts available for the defence to consult. In this regard L18 said, 
‘[t]here aren’t that many experts available to the defence anyway and they may or may not have the 
ability to understand enough about the case to know what it is they’re supposed to be looking for.’94  
Similarly L5 stated, 
the other thing in terms of calling your expert, there’s very few defence experts. I won’t say 
defence, there’s very few experts outside of DAL [Division of Analytical Laboratories] who are 
about to give that evidence.95 
However, these two lawyers were not greatly concerned about gaining access to forensic biologists in 
State laboratories and talking to them about the DNA evidence in their cases. In fact, L5 simply said 
                                                             
94 Interview with L18 (26 October 2011).  
95 Interview with L5 (26 October 2011).  
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that he ‘wouldn’t bother’ talking to forensic biologists from State laboratories. Their concern was 
instead with the lack of other experts available to the defence. They assumed that they either could 
not speak to the State experts or that they would not have been given the best information available 
for their case had they done so. None of the defence lawyers interviewed said that they routinely 
speak to ‘State’ forensic scientists about testing procedures or the analysis of DNA results.  
L13 noted that he did not speak to crime scene investigators or police officers involved in 
investigations, but had always assumed that as witnesses for the State, the forensic scientists would 
not speak to him. This is a non-tactical but, nevertheless, adversarial reason why defence counsel may 
not talk to prosecution experts. L13 acknowledged that he spoke to the prosecutor and the informant 
in some cases but that everyone else is seen as ‘off bounds’ within the adversarial system:  
my impression is that generally speaking, you get to talk to the prosecutor and to the informant 
and everyone else is seen as off bounds and if you want to speak to them, you speak to them 
through the committal process, which is a very cumbersome, long process. But I’ve never tried to 
speak to a crime scene examiner about something like this, but maybe they would. Maybe I’m 
incorrect in thinking that they wouldn’t want to speak to you.96 
It is important that defence counsel understand the chain of evidence. Their level of understanding in 
this regard may depend on the extent to which they communicate with State DNA experts pre-trial. 
Such understanding is, of course, necessary to help ensure that they are able to expose any 
weaknesses or possible flaws in the DNA evidence during cross-examination and alert juries to 
potential limitations of the evidence during closing addresses. These weaknesses and possible flaws 
rarely present themselves or come with explanatory labels in criminal cases. If defence counsel does 
not have access to experts then they may not recognise that there is a problem with or limitations to 
the casework. For example, without that access to independent experts, lawyers are limited in their 
understanding of how complex mixtures and incomplete DNA profiles can be particularly 
problematic.97 Cross examination can only be conducted in this way if counsel has engaged in effective 
pre-trial preparation and discussions with State experts about the procedures they employed. The 
quote below implies that this is one lawyer who is willing to talk to State experts as well.  
So I think it’s important to actually go through the process sometimes and have a witness identify 
the methodology [of how the collection of evidence and testing was conducted and explain these 
in court]. So identify the fact that what’s being looked for in the first instance is whether or not the 
                                                             
96 Interview with L13 (27 July 2011).  
97   See Peter Gill, Misleading DNA Evidence: Reasons for Miscarriages of Justice (Academic Press, 2014). See 
section 4.28 for a discussion of complex mixtures and incomplete DNA profiles. 
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sample can be excluded. And make sure that the jury understands the process. And not in any great 
detail but they need to understand the process. Then, you can then explain the limitations of that 
to the jury, in the course of the closing address.98 
This quote identifies the benefit that may be derived from talking to State experts in understanding 
how evidence was collected, tested and interpreted. This lawyer refers to a State forensic expert giving 
evidence in a trial against their client, the accused. It reveals that this defence lawyer is interested in 
the process of collection, storage and analysis of DNA evidence, such that the jury would also benefit 
from this explanation and be sure that contamination or transference, for example, have not taken 
place. 
5.8.2 Lawyer competence 
It is trite to say that lawyers who engage with the material and go beyond textbooks in learning about 
DNA analysis are likely to be best positioned to manage DNA evidence effectively. The question is to 
what extent such effort is reflected in lawyers’ competence in dealing with DNA evidence. What 
emerged from the data, is that defence counsel appear to be prepared to engage more thoroughly in 
gaining an understanding of DNA evidence and how to deal with it than prosecution counsel. This is 
despite their relative lack of access to expert assistance. This view is exemplified in the following 
statement made by P3, a judge who participated in a Focus Group: 
the defence counsel was seriously competent and obviously did understand all the ins and outs of 
the DNA, how it was analysed and what the results meant ... He’d taken the trouble to understand 
the whole thing and was able to cross-examine the expert into agreeing that her analysis was 
simply speculation and not anything more than a probability.99 
It is important to consider the above quote in the context of the defence lawyer’s role which is to 
challenge evidence adduced by the prosecution. This role may motivate defence lawyers to obtain 
knowledge about where the potential to challenge that evidence may lie in both the procedures and 
science involved in DNA collection, analysis and interpretation. P3 additionally said that the defence 
lawyer’s case appeared more persuasive because the prosecutor had not engaged with the expert or 
demonstrated any working knowledge of the DNA evidence.100 Generally, P3 felt that defence counsel 
                                                             
98 Interview with L33 (25 July 2011).  
99 Focus group with P3 (2 May 2011). 
100 Ibid. 
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engaged in a more significant manner with the evidence in order to challenge the prosecution case or 
argue for its limitations: 
But the overwhelming impression was that the prosecutor did not understand DNA ... the defence 
counsel that was briefed for the client that I was there for clearly had an incredible grasp of DNA 
and most importantly appeared to translate it, if you like, in a way that the jury might understand. 
And he absolutely destroyed it.101 
Prosecutors’ lack of understanding of DNA evidence was remarked upon by a number of interviewees,  
particularly in comparison to defence counsel who were perceived as having a better grasp of the 
evidence and accordingly greater competence in dealing with it, and in particular, in challenging it and 
cross-examining expert witnesses.102 If prosecutors cannot adequately introduce or explain DNA 
evidence, or ask effective questions of forensic scientists then the jury may be left with an incomplete 
picture of that evidence.103 
Effective communication between prosecution lawyers and forensic scientists is also important as 
demonstrated by the following quote from one of the judges interviewed. It speaks to prosecution 
counsels’ lack of preparation compared with that of defence counsel. This is important because the 
weight accorded the evidence of even the most competent expert witness will depend upon the skill 
with which it is adduced by counsel:  
You really need cooperation in the presentation between lawyers and forensic experts. Where you 
get an incompetent prosecutor ... even if the forensic expert is full bottle and very good, it won’t 
be presented properly because it’s up to counsel to make sure that the expert explains it to the 
judge or jury in terms that the judge or jury can understand. If they don’t do that, it’s a complete 
fog. Unfortunately, we find a lot of the prosecutors simply aren’t on top of it.104  
This statement suggests that the lack of communication and cooperation between expert witnesses 
and counsel is not limited to defence counsel, but also extends to prosecution counsel.  
                                                             
101 Interview with L28 (28 July 2011).  
102 Interview with L28 (28 July 2011). See also FS2 (4 June 2011) who found ‘prosecutors are the worst’ and FS1 
who ‘had one particular case when the defence lawyer was quite well known for his knowledge of DNA and 
the prosecutor was [not]. I was getting better worded questions [from the defence as a result], more 
technical questions and I was able to answer those better’ 4 June 2011).  
103 See Chapter 6 on the difficulties of communicating DNA evidence at 6.5. It was found that forensic scientists 
are particularly concerned that most lawyers do not understand their evidence, and that they cannot 
communicate the strength of their evidence adequately through lawyers in court.  
104 Focus group with P1 (3 May 2011).  
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A prosecutor also noted that it is important for an expert to explain to the jury what DNA evidence is, 
the techniques used in the testing process, what probabilities mean, the databases used and finally, 
the chain of evidence: 
if it is a jury trial it is important for them first of all to learn what DNA evidence is. So, I will have 
the forensic expert explain in general terms what DNA is and in general terms the kind of 
techniques that they use to extract DNA, the various processes, extraction and amplification and 
so on, and then what the probabilities mean and the database that they used for that, and that can 
be a source of some debate sometimes as well ... But certainly making sure that the jury is told the 
basics about DNA and so on and in as easily understandable terms as you can, what all of these 
various things mean before you actually go to the items themselves and then talk about what the 
results were in relation to those particular items and what were the probability ratios and what 
does that mean in lay person’s terms and that’s where it becomes difficult because your forensic 
experts will, of course, only use, as is appropriate, language that they consider to be technically 
correct but if that is not expressed in a way that makes it easy to understand, then that can be 
quite difficult in having a jury understand what that means.105 
To elicit this information, it is important for lawyers to communicate with experts to ensure their own 
understanding of the forensic biologist’s testimony and an understanding of DNA evidence itself.  
As P1 stated above,106 if the lawyer does not understand or is incompetent in their communication of 
the information in court, the jury will find it difficult to follow the examination in chief by prosecution 
counsel and the cross examination by defence counsel. A lawyer will only be able to ask a forensic 
biologist to explain DNA evidence — including probabilities and likelihood ratios — and the testing 
procedures employed, if the lawyer is competent and understands the evidence and has an 
understanding of how the expert will present the evidence. Accordingly, talking to a witness about 
what he or she will be asked at trial is important. This means that cooperative communication 
between experts and lawyers in this respect is paramount to the success of a criminal trial. 
The minutiae of accepted practice often depends on lawyers’ competence, access to experts and 
opportunities to communicate with forensic scientists. For example, while it might be accepted that 
lawyers should investigate the chain of evidence before trial,107 in practice the prosecution will only 
do this if alerted by the defence to the fact that it might be in issue.  
                                                             
105 Interview with L36 (20 June 2011).  
106 See quotation at p 139. 
107 See discussion at p 139 above.  
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L23 explained the conditions for further investigating the chain of evidence if the defence puts the 
prosecution on notice that it is in contention:  
L23: I don’t [look at the chain of evidence] unless I know it’s going to be an issue.  
R1: How would you know that? 
L23: The defence are required to put you on notice on that.108 
This approach is dependent upon the defence being able to identify that this might be in issue at an 
early stage — something that might be influenced by the lawyer’s competence, their access to experts 
and the opportunities to communicate with them. These are difficulties experienced by lawyers and 
explored further in Chapter 6.109  
These are challenges that go beyond simply understanding DNA evidence in a scientific or procedural 
sense. They comprise contextual challenges of practising in an adversarial system which necessarily 
generates a prosecution versus defence mentality.  
Although all lawyers are officers of the court, the data demonstrate that a lawyer’s position as either 
a prosecutor or defence lawyer does influence their management and use of DNA evidence in criminal 
trials. Forensic scientists and judges who participated in this research suggested that defence lawyers 
have a greater competence in dealing with DNA evidence than prosecution lawyers. They also 
indicated that it is beneficial for defence lawyers to talk to them, though this rarely occurs.  
 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored lawyers’ understanding of DNA evidence by uncovering and discussing the 
key practical realities they are subject to in using DNA evidence in their criminal practice. The themes 
that were identified began with an acknowledgement that although DNA evidence is common it is 
rarely contentious in criminal cases in Australia. For those cases that do have contentious DNA 
evidence, lawyers are torn between gaining knowledge of relevant scientific principles or of the 
applicable forensic procedures. Discussion in Chapter 2 of the case law in this area suggests that it has 
rarely been the science of DNA that has been the primary cause of the injustice.110 Rather it has been 
the procedure involved in either collecting or storing the evidence that has been problematic. This 
finding runs counter to the recommendations of the Vincent and NAS reports that suggest that lawyers 
                                                             
108 Interview with L23 (8 September 2011).  
109 See Chapter 6: Difficulties with DNA evidence. 
110 See 2.4. 
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should learn more about the science of DNA evidence. This chapter has also revealed that although 
DNA evidence may be just another piece of circumstantial evidence, lawyers and courts, nevertheless, 
tend to place more emphasis on this evidence than on other types of circumstantial evidence and that 
it is one of the few types of evidence that will influence the decision to prosecute where only one item 
of circumstantial evidence is present. Defence lawyers were seen by lawyers and forensic scientists as 
being more competent in using DNA evidence. This chapter noted that lawyers approach cases on a 
more ad hoc basis than might be expected, and thus deal with cases involving DNA evidence on a case-
by-case basis. The implications of this approach for their acquisition and retention of knowledge were 
explored. Finally, it explained some of the tactics lawyers (mostly defence lawyers) use in challenging 
DNA evidence — including how to cast doubt on the evidence, how to conduct a trial by ambush and 
how to make tactical use of a lack of DNA evidence. It also considered the effect of the perceived lack 
of experts available to the defence for their management of DNA evidence. The themes and the 
realities considered here cannot necessarily be resolved. Yet it is important that their existence is 
acknowledged and recognised as they give us a better understanding of the practicalities involved in 
the use of DNA evidence in the legal context. They are the realities that were not discussed in the 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 111 (NAS Report), and other reports 
into miscarriages of justice in this area.  
These themes will have an influence on the difficulties that lawyers experience in managing and using 
DNA evidence in the following chapter (Chapter 6) and the type of DNA evidence education that 
lawyers may find most useful (Chapter 7).  
 
                                                             
111 National Research Council Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009) National Academy of Sciences 
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf>. 
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6 Difficulties with DNA evidence  
I find all of it confusing! I find the mathematics, not being a mathematics guy, incredibly difficult. I 
find the law about it difficult, the law isn’t easy. I find understanding the processes involved in 
extracting it difficult and that’s a big issue if ever you want to challenge it one of these days, and 
the way they arrive at a profile I find that quite difficult as well. I find the whole thing difficult to 
understand, and when it’s simplified for me sometimes it just creates more questions in your mind, 
you can understand it in a very simplistic way.1 
 Introduction 
This chapter aims to assist in our understanding of how lawyers deal with and manage DNA evidence, 
and allow us to determine what difficulties, if any, they have in dealing with DNA evidence in criminal 
trials. The research and reports in this area have been critical of lawyers, and have suggested that they 
improve their knowledge of and skills in handling DNA evidence.2 The previous chapter (Chapter 5) 
provided an overview of the tensions that exist in practice for criminal lawyers when dealing with DNA 
evidence within an adversarial legal system.  
The quote that introduces this chapter is a cri du coeur about the difficulties lawyers experience with 
DNA evidence. This chapter explores these problems. Its analysis is guided by the practical experiences 
and realities of practising criminal law discussed in Chapter 5.  
It is important to assess and understand the difficulties lawyers experience when dealing with DNA 
evidence because these must be addressed, alongside the considerations posed by Chapter 5, before 
any improvement in criminal law practice can be achieved. This chapter begins by addressing the 
concerns of previous researchers and authors of the reports on forensic science in this area3 with 
emphasis on the difficulties lawyers experience with DNA evidence. The aim is to pinpoint how 
lawyers’ knowledge and engagement with DNA evidence can be advanced and improved.  
Three major areas of concern were identified in the analysis of difficulties experienced by lawyers 
when dealing with DNA evidence:  
• difficulties with the science;  
                                                             
1 Interview with L14 (28 July 2011). 
2 See Chapter 2: Justifications for the research. 
3 Ibid. 
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• procedural difficulties; and  
• difficulties in communicating DNA evidence.  
Excerpts taken from the interview transcripts are provided as exemplars of these themes and links are 
made between the themes identified, the research literature and case law. Finally, the implications 
for practice are discussed for each of the difficulties identified.  
The difficulties lawyers experience with the science of DNA evidence relate principally to the use of 
probability ratios and to the interpretation of mixed profiles. Lawyers’ misunderstanding of the 
science springs largely from the problems inherent in determining how (if at all) probability ratios can 
be married to the concept of ‘reasonable doubt.’ Those lawyers who had the opportunity and/or 
initiative to talk to experts on DNA evidence found that their understanding of the science and 
probability ratios improved considerably.  
Many of the problems occurring in pre-trial procedure are linked to lawyers’ inability to identify errors 
in forensic procedure, either from the criminal brief, in the case of prosecution lawyers or, in the case 
of defence lawyers, from the information disclosed by the prosecution. A lack of understanding of the 
forensic procedures used in collecting DNA evidence coupled with lawyers’ feelings of inadequacy in 
dealing with DNA evidence generally contributes to their failure to challenge the evidence adequately. 
For example, contamination, although reasonably well understood by lawyers, remains problematic 
because lawyers do not feel that they have the ability or information to be able to determine if 
contamination has occurred. Further, their understanding of contamination appears to have a 
significant element of ‘hindsight’. That is, it is based on previous miscarriages of justice, rather than 
on a strong alertness to, or awareness of, the potential weaknesses in practice in DNA collection 
procedures. During trial, two matters present as particularly problematic for lawyers — first, the 
examination and cross-examination of expert witnesses and, second, the blurring of the roles played 
by lawyers and experts in presenting and challenging this evidence.  
The major issues with communication are the lack of it and lawyers’ and forensic scientists’ divergent 
perceptions about the role of the forensic scientist when testifying. 
The failure to discuss DNA evidence with the expert witnesses contributes to lawyers’ 
misunderstanding of the science, their inability to uncover flaws in pre-trial investigative processes 
relevant to DNA evidence and to their lack of confidence in presenting and challenging DNA evidence 
at trial. Lawyers also find forensic reports on DNA evidence difficult to understand which contributes 
to their apparent unwillingness to communicate with forensic scientists pre-trial and to flaws in their 
eliciting information or challenging of DNA evidence at trial.  
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The role of the forensic expert in explaining DNA evidence in court is an area of contention. Some 
lawyers believe that it is not the lawyers’ role to understand the science but instead to understand 
how to introduce the expert and ask the ‘right’ questions. They devolve responsibility for 
communicating and explaining the evidence almost entirely to the forensic expert. The biggest 
concern with this approach is that forensic scientists do not believe that lawyers are asking the ‘right’ 
questions and so conclude that courts are being left with misinterpretations of the language and 
terminology used and varying interpretations of the strength of the probability ratios in individual 
cases. 
The three themes identified in the analysis of the difficulties experienced by lawyers when dealing 
with DNA evidence will now be explored in greater detail. 
 Difficulty with science  
The first theme identified during the analysis was a difficulty with DNA science itself — the scientific 
principles used in the detection, testing and analysis of biological material and the detection of DNA 
profiles using physical and/or trace evidence collected at crime scenes and from individuals. There 
were two areas that were of the greatest concern to lawyers. The first is the use of probability ratios, 
Bayesian statistics and numbers in DNA evidence interpretation and reporting. The second is the 
increasing detection and reporting of mixed profiles found in DNA evidence deposited at crime scenes. 
Interviews revealed that probability ratios and mixed profiles lead to confusion, misinterpretation and 
uncertainty in the use of that DNA evidence by lawyers in criminal trials.4 
6.2.1 Probability ratios and Bayesian statistics 
Understanding and managing probability ratios and statistics was a common cause of concern for a 
great many lawyers interviewed.5 This remains difficult even for more experienced lawyers, senior 
practitioners and judges. The following quote demonstrates this difficulty: 
But the area of forensic statistics is erupting as especially problematic, again in terms of lawyer 
performance because there are so few lawyers who are equipped to ask the right sorts of questions 
and evaluate claims, and of course statistics lie at the heart of the potency of DNA evidence. The 
                                                             
4 These difficulties were exposed by question 5 in the Interview Schedule for focus groups and questions 2A, 
B, C and D for interviews — see Appendix G and F. 
5 Interview with L15 (7 September 2011); interview with L28 (28 July 2011); interview with L9 (7 September 
2011). Revealed in response to question 5 in the Interview Schedule for focus groups and questions 2A, B, C 
and D for interviews — see Appendix G and F. 
 
Lawyers and DNA: Understanding and challenging the evidence 
 146 
numbers re-emerging these days are so extraordinarily high as they were in the very early stages 
and then are so high as to be almost meaningless ...6 
Statements like this reveal that lawyers may begin from a point of confusion and they see the Bayesian 
statistics used as virtually meaningless. This also accords with the view of some of the senior 
practitioners interviewed7 and that of Refshauge J in Whyms8 who admitted to finding statistics and 
DNA evidence ‘quite murky’9 and confusing.10 He placed himself in the 10% of judicial officers in 
Freckleton, Reddy and Selby’s research who find this to be the most difficult area of expert evidence.11 
The difficulties with probability ratios and statistics can be classified into four key areas. The first is 
difficulty with the numbers used in the calculations and presentation of DNA evidence. The second is 
the language and expression used by scientists in reporting probability ratios and statistics. The third 
is the inherent difficulty in reconciling the probabilistic nature of DNA evidence with the beyond 
reasonable doubt standard of proof in criminal cases. Finally, lawyers feel intimidated and even 
overwhelmed by evidence presented in this way and find the numbers ‘too hard’ or ‘too confusing’.  
These findings accord with those of Grace et al12 who found that lawyers have significant difficulty in 
understanding and tackling probability ratios.13 The case of Aytugrul v The Queen14 in the High Court 
confirms that the communication of probabilities and statistics remains a live issue in criminal trials.15  
The numbers 
The present study provides detail of the scientific aspects of DNA evidence that lawyers find most 
daunting — mathematics and numbers being identified as among the most unnerving. The most 
common response when lawyers were asked what they found most difficult about DNA evidence was 
probabilities.  
                                                             
6 Interview with L12 (8 September 2011).  
7 Interview with L14 (28 July 2011); L12 finds the numbers ‘deeply confusing and … deeply intimidating’ (8 
September 2011); interview with L2, talking specifically about statistics with mixed profiles (21 June 2011). 
8 R v Whyms [2012] ACTSC 7 (17 January 2012). 
9 Ibid [70]. 
10 Ibid [77]. 
11 Ian Freckelton, Prasuna Reddy and Hugh Selby, Australian Judicial Perspectives on Expert Evidence: An 
Empirical Study (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 1999) 66. 
12 Victoria Grace et al, Forensic DNA Evidence on Trial: Science and Uncertainty in the Courtroom (ISCE 
Publishing, 2011). See discussion in Chapter 2.2.1. 
13 Ibid 69–70.  
14 Aytugrul v The Queen [2012] HCA 15.  
15 Ibid. See [7]–[15] for discussion on the various probability ratios used in this case. 
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The arguments in court I reckon have changed from everyone trying to blind juries and judges with 
these Google plex numbers. Now how can you say 1 in 250 billion people? That’s ridiculous. [There 
are] only 5 billion people on the planet. It’s such a practically stupid number that people tend to 
say bloody scientists have no idea about the real world.16 
More specifically, one of the primary concerns expressed by lawyers was the mathematics involved in 
generating probability ratios and in DNA interpretation and reporting generally. This is illustrated in 
the following quotes from lawyers:  
Where I’ve got difficulty with it, and I suspect a lot of people do, is what these figures really mean 
because you have this expert saying 1 in 30,000 so therefore it’s a strong indication? What?17 
Yeah and they use a different language. If you don’t understand the language and you don’t 
understand what you’re looking for its meaningless and there’s a lot of different stages in the 
process, getting to that figure, and then a lot of it is plugging things into a computer so you’ve got 
to get to a point where they look at the data, how would they arrive at the data that they plug into 
the computer because you can’t really challenge the mathematics. It’s not done by a human 
being.18 
Lawyers therefore just ‘creep by in terms of understanding what is going on ... [one lawyer] is aware 
[their] level of knowledge of DNA would be 1% of the scientist expert.’19 On more than one occasion 
lawyers responded to a question with, ‘I did law because I can’t understand maths!’20 The interview 
with L14 also typifies this view, as this excerpt, also provided above in full at 6.1 demonstrates: ‘I find 
all of it confusing! I find the mathematics, not being a mathematics guy, incredibly difficult.’21 
                                                             
16 Interview with L32 (22 June 2011). Also see interview with L36 (20 June 2011): ‘I find the ways in which 
probability ratios and so on are expressed to be quite confusing.’  
17 Interview with L23 (8 September 2011). 
18 Interview with L14 (28 July 2011). See also interview with L24 (24 June 2011) who stated the following: ‘but 
maths, particularly that part of maths involving stats is very difficult for people to understand anyway. You 
know you might have done it in school and the probability of flicking 6 on a dice or something like that. 
Initially it’s 1 in 6 and then it becomes this exponentially and so forth the more you throw on it. The same 
with flicking two coins getting heads and tails. So it’s difficult concept unless you’re a pure mathematician.’ 
Also in an interview with L27 (21 June 2011), the following statement was made: ‘I go numbers and then — 
what does that mean?’ See also interview with L36 (20 June 2011): ‘the most difficult? The probability ratio.’  
19 Interview with L5 (26 October 2011). 
20 Interview with L22 (20 June 2011). This statement is echoed in part by the responses of other lawyers, see 
also interview with L16 (7 September 2011) who had a science background himself but knew of other lawyers 
who were afraid of the mathematics of DNA evidence and statistics and stated ‘some I know do law or used 
to do law because they couldn’t do algebra.’  
21 Interview with L14 (28 July 2011). 
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This view presents a barrier to change that must be overcome before lawyers can become more adept 
at managing and using DNA evidence in criminal trials. The resistance to tackling the mathematics or 
learning more may be inferred from cases like Jama.22 Accordingly, any further education in this area 
needs to acknowledge and overcome the difficulty that lawyers encounter with probabilistic and 
numerically based evidence. The ‘law versus mathematics’ mentality displayed by many participants 
suggests that a simple recommendation to ‘learn more about DNA evidence’ is not going to be 
achieved without putting measures in place to deal with barriers like an inherent fear of numbers and 
mathematics.  
The influence that the ‘it’s just too hard’ mentality has on practice is far reaching — lawyers use this 
as an excuse for their ignorance about scientific matters and it provides further justification for failing 
to learn more about DNA evidence. Avoiding the ‘mathematics’ and avoiding learning more about 
DNA evidence because it might involve consideration of ‘Google plex numbers’23 is a concern that may 
prevent lawyers from adequately and competently prosecuting accused or defending their clients in 
criminal trials.  
Language and expression  
Lawyers feel that there is ambiguity in the language and expression used to present probability ratios 
and Bayesian statistics in scientific reports and expert evidence in court. For example, one of the 
judges interviewed for this research believed an otherwise strong case against a defendant was 
weakened by the DNA evidence being expressed as ‘his [the defendant’s] DNA, [but] it could’ve been 
one of any of two other people in the area. That’s nuts, that’s got to be wrong but that’s the evidence 
I’ve got.’24 Similar confusion arising from the ambiguity of language used to present DNA evidence is 
seen in the response from L8: ‘their language is strange. … I’ve never understood the way they insist 
on phrasing that this is 1000 times more likely to be someone other than B or not someone other than 
B. It’s always in the negative!’25 
                                                             
22 R v Jama [2008] VCC 0886. 
23 Interview with L32 (22 June 2011). 
24 Focus group with P3 (3 May 2011). This was because of the argument run by defence counsel who was 
identified by other lawyers, and the judges in that State as being particularly interested in and competent in 
challenging DNA evidence. 
25 Interview with L8 (28 July 2011). See also interview with L9 (7 September 2011): ‘the bottom line is this is 
more likely or the probabilities are this is more unlikely to be someone else, or however they frame it. I mean 
their language is strange. I mean I studied probability at a high level and I’ve never understand the way they 
insist on phrasing that this is 1000 times more likely to be someone other than B or not someone other. It’s 
always in the negatives so it’s quite difficult.’ See also interview with L24 (24 June 2011): ‘well when you get 
1 in 20 billion what the hell does that mean out of 800 people? It’s highly quite strong, very strong, whatever 
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There is also confusion with the use of verbal descriptors like ‘extremely strong’ and ‘strong’ rather 
than the exclusive use of percentages. The combined use of numbers and words does not alleviate 
this confusion: 
Because what is provided on one level are completely meaningless statements about likelihood 
ratios. And these tables ... will say, for instance 72 billion times more likely [that] a mixed DNA 
profile originated from the accused. They would say in relation to 72 billion times probability that 
that provides extremely strong [emphasis in the recorded interview] support for the proposition 
that the item came from X. What does that mean?26  
This supports the research of Martire et al27 on the ambiguity created by using certain words, 
particularly those on the scale used to describe the strength of DNA evidence. Most lawyers in 
Martire’s research preferred the use of verbal descriptors like ‘quite strong’ or ‘very strong’ because 
this counteracts the overwhelming influence of numbers like 1 in 20 billion. Of additional note is the 
research from McQuiston-Surrett and Saks in America that found that the language used by experts 
clearly affects the inferences fact finders draw, often producing conclusions quite different to those 
intended by the expert.28 The participants in the study were 183 undergraduate students who were 
eligible for jury duty. The evidence was presented to them using terminology adopted by the American 
Board of Forensic Odontology (ABFO). Based on this terminology the participants were asked to 
determine how certain it was that crime scene evidence originated from a suspect. The strongest 
correlation expressed by the ABFO, ‘reasonable scientific certainty’ was viewed as expressing a lesser 
degree of certainty than two other expressions – ‘consistent with’ (intended by scientists to be a much 
weaker term used to describe similarity, but no degree of specificity) and ‘match’ (intended to mean 
some concordance, but no expression of specificity).29 This research suggests that jurors’ 
interpretation of experts’ expressions may well not match what experts intend to say. This is 
                                                             
the expressions are — they [the jury] go oh ok, fair enough yeah. But still, those words mean different things 
— what does quite strong mean for a juror? Different to what it might mean for me as a lawyer, and a forensic 
scientist too.’ 
26 Interview with L28 (28 July 2011).  
27 See Kristy A Martire et al, ‘On the Interpretation of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science Evidence: 
Presentation Formats and the Weak Evidence Effect’ (2014) 240 Forensic Science International 61; Kristy 
Martire et al, ‘The Expression and Interpretation of Uncertain Forensic Science Evidence: Verbal Equivalence, 
Evidence Strength and the Weak Evidence Effect’ (2013) 37(3) Law and Human Behaviour 197; Kristy A 
Martire, Richard I Kemp and Ben R Newell, ‘The Psychology of Interpreting Expert Evaluative Opinions’ (2013) 
45(3) Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 305. 
28 Dawn McQuiston-Surrett and Michael Saks, ‘Communicating Opinion Evidence in the Forensic Identification 
Sciences: Accuracy and Impact’ (2007-8) Hastings Law Journal 1159, 1189. 
29 Ibid 1162. 
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problematic — particularly if the strength given to evidence by a jury or judge as fact-finders is greater 
than that intended by the expert.  
Two quotes in particular from lawyers in the present study illustrate how they feel about the language 
and numbers used to express probabilities and the Bayesian statistics used: 
I think that there is a fundamental problem with the way the likelihood ratio is described. It is in a 
sense … bulletproof, but it talks in probabilities that are so difficult to comprehend.30 
when you get 1 in 20 billion what the hell does that mean out of 800 people? Whereas [if] it’s quite 
strong, very strong, whatever the expressions are — they go oh ok, fair enough yeah. But still, 
those words mean different things.31 
For one lawyer, this makes the words and numbers ‘essentially meaningless’.32  
This accords with Martire’s research, which suggests that the use of words like ‘strong’ and ‘very  
strong’ confuses juries.33 The confusion partly arises from incongruent use of particular words. For 
example, one report might state that 1 in a million is ‘extremely strong’ support for a proposition, 
while another might say that 1 in 20 billion is also ‘extremely strong’.34 
This finding sits uneasily with the High Court decision in Aytugrul.35 The Court was disinclined to accept 
the potentially unfairly prejudicial persuasiveness of the verbal descriptors in contention and the risk 
that jurors’ might misinterpret the strength of DNA evidence relying on these terms.  
While at least one lawyer interviewed for this research (L36) was aware of these studies,36 surprisingly 
none of the defence lawyers interviewed mentioned it. L36 said: 
the ways in which probability ratios and so on are expressed [are] quite confusing and I have read 
some research about different ways of presenting the information and [how] some ways can make 
it more easily understandable but also can leave quite different impressions depending how you 
express the probability ratios.37 
                                                             
30 Interview with L28 (28 July 2011). 
31 Interview with L24 (24 June 2011). 
32 Interview with L28 (28 July 2011). 
33 Martire et al, ‘The Psychology of Interpreting Expert Evaluative Opinions’, above n 27, 309. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Atygrul v The Queen [2012] HCA 15.  
36 Interview with L36 (20 June 2011). 
37 Ibid. 
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Despite lawyers’ preference for verbal descriptors over probability ratios, they are left confused by 
how verbal descriptors match with the numbers that reflect the same strength of result. If lawyers are 
unable to reconcile the numerical and verbal expressions of the strength of DNA evidence they will 
not know what strength and weight should actually be ascribed to it. This will be particularly 
problematic in situations where the same terms are used to describe a very broad range of numerical 
representations. The words used to describe probability ratios are applied differently in every case 
and in some matters, verbal descriptors are not used at all. Notwithstanding the broad scale of 
numerical representations of strength attributed to the verbal descriptors used, lawyers still prefer 
the use of the words to numbers.  
The current approach to presenting statistics in court is a combination of both numerical and verbal 
descriptors, with no consistency between cases or jurisdictions. Lawyers must then present expert 
evidence by examining and cross-examining experts using both the verbal and numerical descriptors 
of the strength of DNA matches. This is clearly a very difficult task when the use of terminology is 
slippery or inconsistent. This raises the question of how this problem might be tackled. One 
mechanism might be for lawyers to find out, prior to trial, how particular descriptors will be used by 
expert witnesses, so that they can prepare their examination and cross-examination accordingly. 
Certainly, finding out pre-trial exactly what those verbal descriptors mean is important.   
‘Beyond reasonable doubt’ and statistical analyses 
Individuals from all research groups — lawyers, judges and forensic scientists — had problems 
reconciling probabilistic DNA evidence with the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of proof applied 
in criminal cases. Many research participants tried to give ‘reasonable doubt’ a numerical value. For 
example, one lawyer compared it with a 99.9% probability ratio.38 Another compared it to the words 
‘extremely likely’ on the verbal indicator scale.39 This inherent scientific and legal balancing act was a 
consistent theme in the interview and focus group data in both jurisdictions.  
Most interviewees commented on the use of DNA evidence as scientific evidence in legal settings. The 
concern with the standard of proof was evident in those discussions and demonstrates that this area 
of concern for practitioners mirrors the concerns in the case law discussed above in Chapter 2.40 In 
Forbes41 it was held that DNA evidence alone could provide proof beyond reasonable doubt but there 
                                                             
38 Interview with L38 (7 September 2011). 
39 Interview with L2 (21 June 2011).  
40 See 2.3. 
41 Forbes v The Queen (2009) 167 ACTR 1. 
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was no discussion of how that proof is to be reasoned or explained from the evidence — only that it 
can meet this standard. In Hillier42 the court held that if the State wishes to prosecute on DNA evidence 
alone, then logically that evidence itself must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. There was no 
discussion of what reasonable doubt means and the case law generally prohibits the judge from 
defining it.43 Neither of these cases goes into any detail about how reasonable doubt is to be 
interpreted. However, R v Cavkic44 is authority for the proposition that beyond reasonable doubt is 
not to be determined on a statistical basis. DNA evidence thus sits uneasily in this environment and 
lawyers find it difficult to reconcile decisional law principles with the way this evidence is presented 
as statistical probabilities.  
An illustration of this difficulty is seen in an argument from lawyer L38, who suggests that the inability 
to say definitively that a DNA sample is that of an accused supports the proposition that a reasonable 
doubt can also be determined on a statistical basis. If faced with a statistical probability of 1 in a billion 
he believes that lawyers:  
then try to fit that in to the 99.9 repeating kind of model … And so, it’s that interface between the 
way in which the conclusion is expressed which is really nothing to do with conclusion. It’s just the 
underlining statistical science behind the conclusion.45 
Further illustrating the connection lawyers make between probability ratios and the existence of a 
reasonable doubt is the following: ‘I mean ... ultimately it comes down to a probability and the 
question is whether that can ever be beyond reasonable doubt when what you’ve got is just a 
probability.’46 
One of the judges who took part in a focus group referred to an expert called by the defence in criminal 
matters who expressed very strong views about DNA evidence and its statistical basis. When this 
judge, P5, asked the expert why he had such strong views, the scientist responded he was worried 
about the reasonable doubt standard.47  
The data discussed above suggest that lawyers, judges and forensic scientists make assessments about 
the weight of DNA evidence in relation to criminal standard of proof when it is presented as a 
probability ratio or statistical representation. It is legitimate for them to do so, because even though 
                                                             
42 Hillier v The Queen (2008) 1 ACTLR 235, 245. 
43 Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584; Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28. 
44 R v Cavkic (2005) 12 VR 136.  
45 Interview with L38 (7 September 2011). 
46 Interview with L36 (20 June 2011). 
47 Focus group with P5 (26 July 2011). 
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the weight of evidence is ultimately an issue for the jury, lawyers and judges may address the jury on 
that matter, encouraging them to take a particular view of its weight. The difficulty is that lawyers and 
forensic scientists have different perceptions about the weight of DNA evidence and its relationship 
to the beyond reasonable doubt standard. This is particularly problematic when the language used 
around probability ratios is inconsistent, apparently flexible and open to wide interpretation. The 
problem is compounded by the fact that courts have resisted defining ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ 
because that too is a question for the jury to determine. Although scientists have allegedly expressed 
concern about the standard of proof to the judges who participated in this research,48 predominantly 
it was lawyers who had difficulty in this area.49  
The decisional law50 precluding judicial attempts to define the beyond reasonable doubt standard 
necessarily prevents judges and lawyers from couching it in statistical terms. So perhaps the best way 
to address at least some of the concerns about applying this standard of proof to statistical analyses 
might be to ensure consistency in the wording and expression used to present the strength of DNA 
results. Clearly, introducing a statistical interpretation of what proof beyond reasonable doubt might 
mean is not an option.  
Intimidation 
The data revealed that many lawyers are intimidated by or feel overwhelmed by DNA evidence. This 
is particularly the case where the numbers presented in forensic reports are higher than the current 
world population or where probabilities are expressed in billions. The intimidating nature of such 
statistical analyses leads many lawyers to view DNA evidence as unchallengeable. This obviously 
diminishes their confidence in their ability to challenge it. For some lawyers, there is a sense of 
hopelessness in challenging DNA evidence and the intimidation factor makes many lawyers feel that 
‘calling this evidence is a nightmare.’51 
These views are illustrated by L12, who said that the numbers are ‘deeply confusing when they are 
utilised and deeply intimidating. The intimidation factor is huge.’52  
                                                             
48 Ibid.  
49 See interview with L36 (20 June 2011); interview with L38 (7 September 2011). 
50 Thomas v The Queen (1960) 102 CLR 584; Green v The Queen (1971) 126 CLR 28. 
51 Interview with L29 (22 June 2011).  
52 Interview with L12 (8 September 2011). 
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L31 expressed a similar view: ‘I can’t go beyond the fact that’s saying that’s bigger than the population 
of the world so that’s got to be bad.’53 Similarly, L12 referred to the numbers being so high that they 
were ‘meaningless’, with the result that, ‘there’s a high incidence of defence counsel just capitulating 
and facing those numbers.’54 The tendency for numbers to be so large led some lawyers to express 
frustration with scientists with, for example, one participant viewing them as having ‘no idea about 
the real world.’55 L32 believed the numbers to be ‘Google plex’56 and considered scientists’ reporting 
of statistics as, for example, 1 in 250 billion people to be ‘ridiculous.’57 
The intimidating nature of DNA evidence could result in differing responses to it. In some cases, 
lawyers regard it as determinative58 and in others they treat it as highly suspicious.59 Lawyers were 
also aware of the influence DNA evidence can have on criminal trial outcomes and their feelings of 
intimidation appeared to stem, in part, from this realisation.60 The following statement by defence 
lawyer, L28, demonstrates these views: ‘Well, the numbers are very intimidating and sometimes I 
know those numbers are in the millions or something rather than in the billions. They’re terrifying.’61  
The Vincent Report is critical of lawyers’ failure to engage with DNA evidence more meaningfully.62 
This finding provides some explanation as to why lawyers have failed to challenge DNA evidence in 
the past, including in miscarriages of justice cases like Jama.63 Lawyers are intimidated by what they 
refer to as ‘ridiculous’ numbers. This viewpoint may also provide insight into why they fail to engage 
more meaningfully in education initiatives64 and discussions with experts on DNA evidence. If they are 
intimidated by the numbers they are less likely to actively engage with others to use the numbers and 
DNA evidence for the purposes of improving their criminal law practice.  
There are potentially serious consequences for both defendants and the criminal justice system if 
lawyers avoid challenging DNA evidence because they are intimidated by probability ratios that 
                                                             
53 Interview with L31 (28 September 2011). 
54 Interview with L12 (8 September 2011) referring to the statistics and probability ratios used in DNA evidence. 
55 Interview with L32 (22 June 2011). 
56 Referring to the high numbers being generated by DNA evidence results. 
57 Interview with L32 (22 June 2011). 
58 Interview with L28 (28 July 2011); interview with L27 (21 June 2011); interview with L17 (27 July 2011); 
interview with L1 (23 June 2011). 
59 Interview with L28 (28 July 2011); interview with L20 (25 July 2011); interview with L4 (25 October 2011). 
60 See interview with L12 (8 September 2011) and interview with L3 (6 September 2011). 
61 Interview with L7 (28 July 2011). See also interview with L12 (8 September 2011) and interview with L3 (6 
September 2011). 
62 Vincent Report, above n 4, 32–39. 
63 R v Jama [2008] VCC 0886. 
64 See Chapter 7: Educating lawyers about DNA evidence. 
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generate large numbers. There are scientific explanations for the expression of probability ratios in 
the words that are used. Lawyers need to understand what the terms are, what they mean and 
elucidate these explanations for juries so that they, too, accurately understand the strength of the 
DNA evidence. If lawyers do not engage with DNA evidence because the numbers ‘are just too big’, 
there is the risk of wrongful convictions in cases where DNA evidence may have been deposited in 
some manner other than that alleged by the prosecution if this possibility is not exposed effectively 
to fact finders. 
6.2.2 Mixed profiles 
As DNA technology becomes more discriminating, smaller and smaller traces are collected from crime 
scenes and the testing measures used can pick up more than one person’s DNA profile at a time. Mixed 
profiles are increasingly being found in samples of DNA taken from crime scenes. As noted by one of 
the lawyers interviewed, mixed profiles are often classified as ‘prejudicial evidence’.65 This is because 
the assumptions made about the number of contributors and those contributors’ profiles as compared 
to the general population are problematic and the statistics and mathematics involved are very 
complicated.66 One of the judges interviewed questioned how far mixed profiles could be taken, 
because the results may allow you to ‘come up with almost anybody if you want to construct a 
theoretical DNA profile.’67 Lawyers find mixed profiles hard to question and hard to challenge. The 
increasing use of mixed DNA profiles in criminal trials has escalated lawyers’ levels of confusion and 
their difficulties in dealing with DNA evidence. This confusion is evidenced in the quotes below: 
But mixed samples will continue to create difficulties, particularly about what comes out of the 
statistical analysis.68 
once you get mixes into the mix then it becomes very difficult, but it can be very persuasive.69 
But there’s always this sense of alarm bells when you get mixed samples. Generally, lawyers are 
never really going to understand the actual testing technique.70 
                                                             
65 Interview with L29 (22 June 2011). 
66   For further discussion of the problems arising from the interpretation of complex mixtures and incomplete 
profiles see Peter Gill, Misleading DNA Evidence: Reasons for Miscarriages of Justice (Academic Press, 2014) 
4.28 and lawyers’ role in pushing for the testing of smaller samples in Erin Murphy, Inside the Cell: The Dark 
Side of Forensic DNA (Nations Book, 2015). 
67 Focus group with P4 (3 May 2011). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Interview with L11 (24 June 2011). 
70 Interview with L20 (25 July 2011). 
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The issue taken with mixed profiles is further described by L18 who says that ‘mixtures are 
complicated: how they are calculated, how they’re worked out; it’s all hard.’71  
L20, a defence lawyer, expressed distrust of mixed profiles. He said that he hears ‘alarm bells when 
you get mixed samples’ and believes that, ‘it’s suspicious that the numbers can be so high but not 
100%, and lawyers are never really going to understand the actual testing technique, let alone with 
two profiles.’72  
The difficulties that lawyers in this research have had with mixed DNA profiles are echoed in 
statements of Higgins CJ in the 2011 ACT Supreme Court case, Meyboom.73 With constantly improving 
technology it is likely that there will be trace evidence found in increasingly smaller biological samples 
with increasing discrimination of DNA profiles found for multiple contributors. Mixed profiles are likely 
to become ever more complicated escalating lawyers’ difficulties in coping with such evidence.  
 Difficulty with pre-trial procedure  
The second area where lawyers noticeably have difficulty with DNA evidence is in respect of both pre-
trial and trial procedure. Pre-trial, the major difficulties encountered fell into three main categories: 
first, the difficulty of identifying errors in the forensic process; second, a failure to investigate or 
challenge the evidence prior to the trial because of a lack of knowledge and confidence with DNA 
evidence; and, third, difficulties in detecting possible contamination of DNA evidence.  
During criminal trials lawyers struggle in different areas, including in effectively examining and cross-
examining experts and coping with an apparent blurring of the boundaries between the roles of the 
expert witness and the lawyer. These concerns will be addressed and explained below at 6.4, with the 
words of lawyers, judges and forensic scientists used to illustrate these themes.  
6.3.1 Identifying errors 
Although many lawyers claimed to understand the basic science behind DNA evidence, very few knew 
how to identify errors in laboratory testing or the collection of DNA evidence at a crime scene or police 
station. Lawyers had a common difficulty in finding out how to ensure DNA evidence is reliable.  
                                                             
71 Interview with L18 (26 October 2011). 
72 Interview with L20 (25 July 2011). 
73 R v Meyboom [2011] ACTSC 13. A discussion of this case and the legal implications of Higgins CJ’s judgment 
may be found in Chapter 2.3 at 27-28, but Higgins CJ essentially found that if there are a number of mixed 
profiles taken from a sample and few people can be excluded because of that, then the probative value of 
the evidence decreases. 
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Many compared their practices in dealing with these difficulties to a ‘fishing exercise’, sometimes 
undertaken ‘in the forlorn hope that something odd might emerge ... potentially days of exploration 
in this forlorn hope.'74 Some felt defeated by these difficulties. So, for example, even a fishing exercise 
was not something that L12 felt capable of performing. He stated that it was hopeless to expect 
lawyers to uncover forensic errors given that in Chamberlain75 there were very senior lawyers, some 
of whom were QCs who, despite their forensic endeavours did not uncover the failures to supervise 
the scientific ‘experts’ or maintain proper records. The failure to uncover errors in Chamberlain 
occurred from the first trial all the way through to the High Court appeal. This led L12 to conclude that 
‘the trial process has not been very successful in unmasking these sorts of problems, in Australia at 
least, or in England.’76  
Difficulties in detecting deficiencies in the evidence from scientific reports 
Inevitably, an element of trust is extended to experts — their qualifications and the tests that they 
conduct on DNA evidence. The lawyers interviewed felt that it is too difficult, if not impossible for 
lawyers to detect issues from a forensic report:  
Particularly cross contamination and transference, and a lawyer won’t be able to read that in the 
subpoenaed notes. You have to think a little bit creatively about whether that’s possible or not and 
it’s difficult and I don’t know how it is you’re supposed to raise the possibility of something which 
may or may not happen.77 
Lawyers were open to analysing the forensic reports but if there were errors at the crime scene or in 
the laboratory then the information presented in the reports is unlikely to indicate those possibilities.78 
The following statement by L32 illustrates lawyers’ difficulties in probing into or questioning the 
results given in forensic reports: 
For lawyers, there’s a report that says X and they’ve got no idea [about] the process by which X is 
achieved. So, you can’t do anything except say okay then. It’s like, maybe a lot of this electronic 
stuff, I have no idea how or why, so all I can do is just say ‘Oh okay’.79 
The NAS and Vincent reports recommend ongoing legal and scientific education to improve lawyers’ 
knowledge of DNA evidence with the aim of improving their ability to detect errors in this evidence. 
                                                             
74 Interview with L12 (8 September 2011). 
75 Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521. 
76 Interview with L12 (8 September 2011). 
77 Interview with L18 (26 October 2011). 
78 Interview with L30 (20 June 2011).  
79 Interview with L32 (22 June 2011).  
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If, however, the information needed to make an adequate assessment of the evidence or the scientific 
procedure involved is not provided in forensic reports, then a lawyer’s task in this regard may be 
insurmountable or, at least, appear to be so.  
If lawyers feel uneasy about, or incompetent in, uncovering errors then they are less likely to challenge 
DNA evidence or even investigate its authenticity. This is clearly problematic when there is a risk of 
wrongful conviction because of reliance on flawed DNA evidence. It may not be possible for lawyers 
to detect potential weaknesses in DNA evidence from the information provided in forensic reports 
alone. This difficulty may partly be overcome by increasing the communication between lawyers and 
experts. Lawyers do not need to rely solely on forensic reports to interpret or understand the 
evidence. They can obtain assistance from scientific experts. However, self-imposed barriers may 
prevent lawyers from seeking such assistance as, for example, where they choose not to engage with 
scientists for tactical reasons (discussed above in Chapter 580). This approach will deprive lawyers of a 
potential source of information that they may need in order to uncover possible sources of error in 
the collection and analysis of DNA evidence.  
Crime scene investigators constitute another possible source of relevant information. Lawyers might 
question the experts and/or investigating officers to determine whether there is the risk of error. To 
do so effectively, of course, they must have a sound working knowledge of the best practices that 
apply to the collection, storage and analysis of DNA evidence. This will ensure that they can ask 
appropriate questions about what has occurred in individual cases and then usefully assess the 
implications for the reliability of DNA evidence of the answers they receive. The possibility for lawyers 
to gain access to files compiled during the course of investigation and analysis is considered at 5.3.2.81  
6.3.2 Investigating and challenging DNA evidence pre-trial 
The difficulty associated with investigating and managing DNA evidence pre-trial was a concern raised 
predominantly by defence lawyers. If defendants categorically deny involvement in the crime with 
which they have been charged, lawyers are required to question the evidence more closely. It is a 
truism that it is in the interests of the defence to find errors or weaknesses in evidence adduced by 
the prosecution. However, this can be a peculiarly difficult task where DNA evidence is concerned 
because of its apparent unassailability. Several lawyers commented on how difficult it is to investigate, 
with a view to later challenging, a seemingly ‘unchallengeable’ type of scientific evidence, particularly 
                                                             
80 See above at 5.7.4 but also p 111, 121, 131 and 133. 
81 See above at p 115. 
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one that has been accepted by the courts as credible evidence for over 30 years.82 The degree and 
types of challenge have changed in recent times. As one of the judges who participated in one of the 
focus groups explained: 
I think what’s happened is that DNA was so abstruse that initially everyone just accepted what the 
experts said; then it became accepted and now it’s being challenged much more. We’ve got over 
the early challenges, and now it’s being more forensically challenged.83 
There are varying degrees and sources of ambivalence about challenging DNA evidence. One defence 
barrister (L19) expressed the view that lawyers should not ‘out-science the scientist’84 by appearing to 
have knowledge about the more complex aspects of DNA evidence. L19 also said that the greatest 
question is whether to challenge the evidence at all.85 Another interviewee, L22, felt that there would 
only be ‘one, two or three lawyers [who] would ...even try to question DNA evidence, [rather] they 
would all more or less accept it.’86 
Lawyers identified the length of time the sample has been at the crime scene and whether external 
factors such as rain, temperature and the other elements may have affected the evidence as 
potentially offering areas for questioning at trial. However, uncovering and exploiting any possible 
negative impact of even such mundane factors, entails a degree of scientific understanding and 
engagement with pre-trial investigators and forensic experts. 
To challenge DNA evidence effectively, a lawyer must understand the processes and procedures 
utilised in the collection and analysis of it. In this regard one prosecutor noted,  
a lot of being able to present DNA evidence in a succinct and a comprehensible way effectively, 
usually kind of requires all the parties to be on the same base as to the process of collecting and 
testing for DNA evidence and knowing the procedures that are followed and so on.87  
                                                             
82 Interview with L5 (26 October 2011); interview with L6 (7 September 2011); interview with L19 (26 July 2011); 
interview with L12 (8 September 2011), interview with L3 (6 September 2011); interview with L32 (22 June 
2011); interview with L35 (28 July 2011); interview with L37 (24 June 2011).  
83 Focus group with P2 (3 May 2011). 
84 Interview with L19 (26 July 2011) who said that lawyers who read textbooks about DNA evidence and then 
proceeded to ask obscure questions of forensic scientists were trying to ‘outsmart’ those actually qualified 
in this area to make them look poor on the stand. 
85 Interview with L19 (26 July 2011). 
86 Interview with L22 (20 June 2011).  
87 Interview with L36 (20 June 2011).  
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Defence lawyers88 suggested that it is increasingly difficult to challenge any aspect of DNA evidence 
because of the difficulty in finding alternative experts from whom to obtain advice. For example, L12 
believes there to be a ‘dearth of people who can really inform defence counsel about what they should 
look at and what they should ask about’.89 Because of the principle that there is no property in 
witnesses,90 defence lawyers may, subject to certain conditions, properly seek information from any 
potential witness. Accordingly, defence lawyers do not need to engage a ‘defence’ expert to 
understand DNA evidence in more detail, or to investigate it with a view subsequently to challenging 
the evidence in any given case. Yet, only two defence lawyers stated that they can and do talk to State 
organisation or police-based forensic scientists.91 However, they also noted that there are systemic 
and tactical decision-making considerations that affect whether they do so or whether, instead, they 
actively avoid talking to State experts.92 Such tactical considerations primarily involve not disclosing 
defence arguments to prosecutors and ‘State’ witnesses before trial.93 Some were just too intimidated 
by or scared of the evidence to investigate or question it pre-trial, for fear of looking ignorant or 
because they lack understanding of how to do so.94  
This finding supports the research discussed in Chapter 3 as it demonstrates that lawyers acknowledge 
their lack of understanding and lack of confidence in challenging DNA evidence. It goes further by 
providing an additional explanation as to why defence lawyers avoid challenging DNA evidence and 
talking to experts. As detailed in Chapter 5, sometimes this is because they do not want to ‘give away’ 
their case to the prosecution or to forensic scientists whom they consider to be essentially the 
‘property’ of the State. Sometimes, it is because they do not feel that they have the same level of 
access to those experts.95 For some lawyers, as the data in this section show, it is because they do not 
                                                             
88 See interview with L17 (27 July 2011); interview with L1 (23 June 2011).  
89 Interview with L12 (8 September 2011). 
90 Harmony Shipping Co SA v Saudi Europe Line Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 1380, 1384. 
91 Interview with L7 (28 July 2011); interview with L27 (21 June 2011).  
92 Interview with L27 (21 June 2011). Also see 5.7.4: avoiding experts and trial by ambush. 
93 See for example interview with L30 (20 June 2011) who stated ‘we generally don’t try [to talk to state DNA 
experts] because what’s the point in talking to the expert on the prosecution side because you’re going to 
flag the issues that you want to raise and you might not want to flag those in advance.’ See also interview 
with L35 (28 July 2011): ‘it is an adversarial [system] ... I would be very careful, very, very careful about 
playing my hand.’ 
94 For example, interview with L3 (6 September 2011): ‘A lot of people are just a bit too scared to do anything 
other than just let it go through.’ Also, see interview with L32 (22 June 2011) and interview with L6 (7 
September 2011). 
95 See interview with L31 (28 September 2011): ‘I would not feel I would have the right to that sort of access. I 
feel I’d have to go through the prosecutor and the informant with any questions I had and they’re not my 
witness.’  
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have sufficient confidence in their ability to do so. The lawyers in Jama96 failed to challenge the DNA 
evidence that placed Jama at the scene of the crime and this resulted in a guilty verdict for the charge 
of rape. The defence lawyer did not actively seek to challenge the DNA evidence and instead explored 
other explanations of why Jama’s DNA may have been on the victim.97  
Challenges facing lawyers during the trial are discussed in more detail further below.98  
Focus groups with forensic scientists revealed that experts are surprised about lawyers’ failure to 
communicate with them pre-trial. They expressed this surprise both in relation to prosecution and 
defence lawyers. Some forensic scientists revealed that they had only ever had one or two pre-trial 
conferences with lawyers in over 80 cases: 
I've done it I think once in maybe 82 something court trials. Well actually I’ll clarify that. I’ve had it 
once where it has been properly organised, informally in an office, days before the actual court 
trial. 
The other pre-trial conferences I have had are where the Prosecutor will rush out the door two 
minutes before you’re due on the stand and do a conference. As far as a formal conference [goes], 
[I have had] one and it was a complex BPA job and it was excellent and it was really good to just 
explain what I will be able to say and what I won’t be able to say. You can see how it had a really 
positive impact on the lines of questioning when I got on the stand. It actually made life significantly 
easier for me because I wasn’t going in cold … I had sort of a good platform to start from … but I 
think fundamentally I was able to construct better answers. So, I think from that perspective it 
would have been better for the jury because I had a better grip on what was in contention. But 
that’s once.99 
The ideal thing is just for them to want to meet to go through it thoroughly and then to give you a 
heads up if anything changes in the meantime. [Also it is important] to keep in contact with you 
particularly if it’s a big case. Then in the actual witness box go through very methodically [and] 
logically [your evidence, asking short] questions or questions with [short] answers. Very, very few 
lawyers do this though — I really don’t understand why.100 
                                                             
96 R v Jama [2008] VCC 0886. 
97 The cross examination of the DNA expert Ms Pamela Scott was conducted by defence barrister Ian Crisp on 
16 July 2008, 37 (line 2) — 96 (line 9) of the transcript. 
98 See 6.4 at 163 below. 
99 Focus group with FS12 (25 October 2011). 
100 Focus group with FS2 (4 June 2011). See also focus group with FS6 (25 October 2011): ‘but then they still 
have enough time to bother you for your notes and for methods and all that crap that they don’t half the 
time end up using but then they don’t have time to talk to you.’ 
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6.3.3 Contamination 
Most of the lawyers interviewed for the study had a good understanding of contamination in general 
terms and how to be satisfied that there was continuity of samples in the laboratory.101 Nevertheless, 
lawyers stated that they did not know how best to expose contamination of the kind that occurred in 
Jama, even though the cause of the contamination in that case was uncomplicated. Accordingly, while 
lawyers are aware of the potential for contamination in their cases, they find it difficult to envisage 
how they might identify whether this has occurred in practice. One of the defence lawyers explained 
this difficulty as follows: 
How are you going to find that anomaly, what sorts of questions do you ask to get somebody to 
admit, “yeah we don’t always wash our bench tops”. I mean who would have thought to say tell us 
what your protocol for cleaning the laboratory desktops is, and did you do it on that occasion, can 
you absolutely swear to the fact that you or Fred did it?102  
Their capacity to do what is discussed in this quote is, moreover, restricted by the fact that they do 
not fully understand where in the process of the collection and analysis of trace evidence 
contamination may occur. This is illustrated by the following quote:  
also, just in terms of how to go about that, well, I’m aware that there can be potential for 
contamination or things like that. It’s not necessarily obvious which points of the process are 
contentious points and where it is that we should be focusing our attention and, often, there have 
to be a lot of forensic decisions made in a matter before it gets to trial. Like you need to turn your 
mind to that at an early stage and you don’t normally have counsel engaged till later in the process 
and while counsel might have a lot of the experience you need in relation to DNA, you really need 
that experience closer to the start of the proceeding, rather than the end of the proceeding.103 
Another restraint on their ability to distinguish a real prospect for contamination is the dearth of 
information provided to them about the processes utilised in the collection and analysis of the DNA 
samples. Consequently, lawyers questioned why it is difficult to obtain information about the practices 
employed to ensure the continuity of samples and, indeed, about all the procedures utilised 
throughout the DNA collection and analysis processes in the cases on which they work:  
                                                             
101 Continuity of samples means ensuring that a sample goes from a crime scene to a laboratory and then into 
and out of storage as it is tested. This is important for ensuring that contamination does not occur, either by 
those testing the sample or between other exhibits in the laboratory. Also see 5.3.2 at 115 for further 
discussion of continuity, transference and contamination issues. 
102 Interview with L12 (8 September 2011). 
103 Interview with L13 (27 July 2011). 
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It can sometimes be very difficult to actually establish continuity if there are a number of different 
samples and a number of different tests being made. So, the first thing I’d raise is this kind of simple 
issue of why is it so difficult? Why is it so difficult for a defence lawyer to be able to trace continuity; 
continuity should be a given. Police can either establish it or not. You would expect it to have 
proper decisions and they should be able to establish it. There should be the whole exercise of 
confirming continuity of an exhibit that is relied upon for DNA testing. It shouldn’t be as difficult as 
it is, in my view.104 
It is also important to acknowledge at this point that the problems in Jama could not have been 
uncovered simply by looking at the forensic file in his case. Defence counsel and defence experts 
would have been highly unlikely to identify the possibility of cross contamination and transference 
simply by examining the subpoenaed notes. Detailed information about the agency’s cleaning 
procedures was needed. Also, the lawyers involved in this case needed to be alive to the dangers of 
cross-contamination from the earlier sample taken from Jama. Their concerns in relation to this 
sample lay elsewhere — in preventing the jury from learning about its existence and becoming aware 
of his involvement in another criminal investigation. 
The findings discussed here accord with comments made in the Vincent Report about lawyers’ inability 
to identify contamination and challenge DNA evidence in a way that ensures that there has been no 
contamination of the sample in their case. Contamination has been identified by lawyers as an area 
of perceived difficulty. In practice lawyers find it hard to gain access to all the information they might 
need to detect possible contamination. If lawyers find contamination easy to understand but difficult 
to uncover, there remains the risk of contamination in criminal trials leading to wrongful convictions.  
 Procedural difficulties during trial 
Lawyers participating in the study spoke of their difficulty in managing DNA evidence during the 
criminal trial. This discussion will focus on two of the most common areas of concern. The first is the 
process of examining and cross-examining DNA experts. The second relates to the problem 
encountered by a few lawyers of delineating with some degree of certainty the roles and 
responsibilities of counsel and expert witnesses in the presentation of this evidence. Many lawyers in 
the study spoke of there being a blurring of the boundaries in this regard. The issue here is to what 
extent do and should lawyers assign responsibility to expert witnesses for ensuring that the evidence 
they give is complete and comprehensible.  
                                                             
104 Interview with L28 (28 July 2011). 
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6.4.1 Examining and cross-examining experts in court 
It is at this stage of the process that we see all the deficiencies in lawyers’ knowledge and the 
difficulties experienced in the pre-trial stage coalesce. Those deficiencies and those difficulties largely 
cause the problems that occur at this stage of the process. The problems arise in both examination 
and cross-examination of expert witnesses. This means that the party calling the witness does not 
elicit that evidence satisfactorily and the opposing party does not challenge it adequately. 
These problems are exemplified in expressions of frustration made by forensic biologists who believe 
that they have been hampered in giving clear, complete and cogent evidence because lawyers do not 
ask them the right questions.  
These problems also manifest themselves in the ways that lawyers approach the questioning of expert 
witnesses on DNA evidence. Lawyers calling the expert witnesses largely abrogate responsibility for 
adducing their evidence clearly, cogently and completely to the witnesses themselves. Opposing 
counsel may simply abandon the field. They have not previously felt able to identify any potential 
areas of weakness in the evidence and, at trial, they do not feel adequately equipped in terms of 
knowledge or information to test the evidence before the fact finder. So, it remains in no small 
measure untested.  
Expert witnesses’ frustration and their view that lawyers do not understand what questions to ask to 
elicit their evidence in examination-in-chief in a manner that enables fact finders to assess its weight 
accurately, is exemplified by the following quote from one forensic scientist:  
when you’re being led through your evidence and you’re being asked questions that don’t make 
sense technically … you feel like you’re scanning around and or rephrasing it and ... your evidence 
becomes more ineffective.105 
                                                             
105 Focus group with FS2 (4 June 2011). FS2 also said: ‘We that’s right and what was really frustrating on the 
stand is when you get a prosecutor or the defence, it doesn’t matter. … when they’re asking you questions 
they obviously don’t understand, they’re asking you in way where you come across as obstructive or 
whatever it is because you have to keep saying, look, I can’t answer it that way or rephrasing their questions.’ 
See also focus group with FS1: ‘Yeah, and even in the cross [she] was sort of trying dig her way [out of it], I 
guess and it came across that way and the judge in that instance actually stepped in and sort of helped me 
because I was struggling to answer her questions in a way that was actually clarifying anything, we were just 
getting further and further down this whoa, don’t want to go there track’ (4 June 2011); focus group with 
FS9 (25 October 2011): ‘Some of them seem to have a lot of knowledge though. I have had ones who get up 
there and ask all kinds of things about procedures, some of them are really good … that walk you all the way 
through … and then you get to the opposite end where I’ve had lawyers who’ve got you on stand and 
immediately said what were the DNA results and the judge has interjected and said you think we can ask her 
what DNA is first and the judge has actually led me through my evidence rather than the prosecutor, because 
the prosecutor was a bit hopeless. And then you get the opposite where they ask you all the right questions 
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Forensic scientists and judges in both jurisdictions included in the study expressed the view that 
prosecution counsel have less understanding of DNA evidence than defence counsel. This is illustrated 
by the following discussion by one of the groups of forensic scientists that took part in this research:  
FS2: and I think it takes away a lot from our evidence when we’re battling with the lawyers and 
usually … 
FS4: Particularly the prosecutors. 
FS2: usually it’s prosecutors. 
FS1: Yeah 
FS4: Particularly. 
FS2: I find that prosecutors are the worst.106 
The consequences identified by forensic scientists are that prosecutors concede to defence challenges 
too readily and fail to ask pertinent questions or to remediate defence challenges in re-examination, 
which then leaves a level of uncertainty about their testimony. This is illustrated by the following 
statement: 
I think that’s where some prosecutors let themselves and their cases down because by not 
understanding it enough they concede sometimes too easily and they don’t ask questions; they 
don’t re-examine or they don’t use tools that they have got where they can use it in the courtroom 
to their advantage …107 
                                                             
and almost get too technical and start saying, well what is DNA type and allele and introducing too many 
terms all at once. It can be quite frustrating and you get the full range of questions, both poor and too 
technical.’ 
106 Focus group with FS2 (4 June 2011). Focus group with FS10 (25 October 2011) also contained the following: 
‘a lot of prosecutors that I’ve found have just thought oh well, you know, we’ll take care of it. In the end they 
don’t have to understand the science and the stats so much and with the defence lawyers they’re really on 
top of what’s going on, which I found, I guess, frustrating sometimes because the defence will put up some 
ridiculous arguments or you know start badgering us and the prosecutors are just, get switched off, sitting 
back.’ Also see focus group with FS5 (25 October 2014): ‘to tell you the truth, I’ve had a lot more defence 
lawyers that are on top of everything than when I had prosecutors.’ 
107 Focus group with FS2 (4 June 2011). See also FS6, FS8, FS9 and FS10 (25 October 2011) with the exchange 
below: 
FS6: Because you’re depending on them to ask you the right type of questions to get the right information 
out, so they need to know to guide you to the jury, does that make sense? 
FS10: I guess that’s the frustrating [part], especially if the defence are on top of what’s going on and the 
prosecutor isn’t and the defence are trying to imply certain things by asking certain questions and 
then the prosecutor just sits there and … 
FS9: Isn’t saying anything. 
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In relation to the approach lawyers adopt to questioning DNA experts in court — in eliciting evidence 
in examination-in-chief, a number of lawyers stated that they viewed their responsibility to be leading 
the witness competently through their evidence. This view essentially devalues the desirability of 
understanding that evidence themselves. So, for example, L9 said ‘it probably doesn’t matter at the 
end of the day whether you understand precisely how they’re getting to the bottom line if you can 
lead them through the evidence.’108 
The problem with this approach is that the lawyers may then not be alive to any deficiencies, 
anomalies or inaccuracies in the evidence that has been presented. It means that they may fail to 
identify features of the evidence that may warrant clarification, further explanation or even re-
expression in, perhaps, more readily available terms for the jury. The problems associated with how 
lawyers’ view their own and expert witnesses’ roles in communicating the evidence to fact finders, is 
explored in greater detail in the next section, because it is an issue of individuated significance. 
An important aspect of the failure to ask appropriate questions is lawyers’ lack of understanding about 
the limits of the expert witnesses’ knowledge, which may define what propositions they can or cannot 
agree to, what explanations they can provide and how far they can go in assisting the determination 
of facts in issue. So, in focus groups, forensic scientists expressed the view that lawyers did not have,  
[a]n understanding of the boundaries of our knowledge and so therefore what extent we can go 
to with answering questions. And I know we always can say that’s beyond my area of expertise but 
I guess if they had an understanding of that, perhaps you wouldn’t get those questions that then 
start to make you feel like you’re not the expert you’re there to be because once you start saying 
that’s beyond my area of expertise, how many times can you say that before they go well, what 
are you an expert in?109 
Notwithstanding the view that defence lawyers are more knowledgeable about DNA evidence than 
prosecution lawyers, forensic scientists were also of the view that the failure to ask ‘the right 
questions’ was also evident in cross-examination (usually the defence is the cross-examining party). 
                                                             
FS10: yes, and doesn’t respond or doesn’t follow up on it. I think they are the most frustrating court [trials] 
that I’ve ever had is where the defence are implying something [and they] can ask you all these 
questions going down a certain line and what they’re asking you, you have to say it’s a possibility but 
it’s not the most likely explanation for the DNA evidence. But the prosecutor never asks you [the right] 
questions … 
FS6: And you can’t just say it without being asked.’  
108 Interview with L9 (7 September 2011).  
109 Focus group with FS11 (25 October 2011).  
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The following statement from L12 compares the role of the defence in challenging DNA evidence with 
the relative ease of the prosecution role in adducing it: 
It’s easy enough prosecuting. You simply adduce the evidence. The experts are on top of their area. 
We all know what they can and can’t say. They mustn’t engage in the prosecutors’ fallacy and they 
know in general terms how to communicate that which can be communicated. So, in adducing it 
as a prosecutor it’s fine.110 
A recurring theme in relation to the difficulties facing cross-examining counsel is the unequal positions 
of the defence and the prosecution, with the prosecution having expert advice available to it and the 
defence often having to cope with a dearth of available, alternative expert assistance in challenging 
the evidence appropriately and effectively. In the words of L12, when describing the difficulties 
counsel experience in discharging their responsibilities, ‘to sniff out where there might have been 
some anomaly or technical deficiency’ in the evidence111 ‘[i]t’s almost wholly dependent upon an 
expert providing some guidance and as I’ve said there’s very few of them.’112  
In the absence of alternative experts available to defence counsel to help them improve their 
understanding of DNA evidence, defence lawyers feel ill-prepared to cross-examine prosecution or 
State forensic scientists. As a result, they find it ‘deeply intimidating’.113  
Another example comes from L37 who said, ‘how do you cross-examine something you don’t 
understand?’114 Quite clearly what is being lamented here is a lack of adequate knowledge about DNA 
evidence. 
Cross examination in these circumstances can leave counsel perplexed about how to elicit 
comprehensible information for the jury: ‘How to ask the right questions and how to also put yourself 
in the shoes of the jury and work out what’s going to be going over their head and what’s not is the 
most difficult thing.’115  
Some lawyers, like L19, therefore, view the task of whether to cross-examine DNA experts at all as 
being one of the ‘greatest questions ... of all.’116 
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What is manifest from the analysis here is that the tasks of eliciting evidence in examination-in-chief 
and challenging it in cross-examination are hobbled by lawyers’ lack of understanding of that evidence 
and by what they don’t do or consider that they can’t do pre-trial to learn about the evidence in their 
case. These tasks are also hampered by their perceptions of the impenetrability of the evidence and 
the degree to which it is ‘bullet-proof’.117  
The role of the defence lawyer was often interpreted by defence lawyers in a tactical way — some felt 
that their role was to confuse the jury and make the DNA evidence ‘bamboozling, baffling science that 
is impenetrable, that’s what the defence lawyer has got to do.’118 Similar tactics in presenting the 
evidence were also espoused by another defence barrister, who does not like to go through ‘DNA 
evidence 101’ with the jury, and in fact prefers to make the evidence seem as complicated as possible 
so that the jury does not take the evidence into account.119 The objective of these lawyers in relation 
to DNA evidence that linked the accused to the crime, is to reduce the impact of that evidence by 
making it seem incomprehensible or so confusing that the jury may simply disregard it.  
Defence lawyers’ hesitancy to cross-examine forensic biologists has implications for practice as the 
process of cross examination is heralded as being one of the ‘greatest legal engines ever invented for 
the discovery of truth.’120 A lack of knowledge on how to find the anomalies or technical deficiencies 
then becomes an inability to cross-examine in a competent manner, and the expert evidence is not 
tested thoroughly and challenged adequately. Cross-examination is arguably the best method of 
uncovering the truth, as Wigmore argues,121 but not if lawyers dread the process, feel intimidated by 
cross-examining DNA evidence and avoid having to challenge the evidence in their criminal trials.  
6.4.2 The roles and responsibilities of lawyers and experts — blurred boundaries? 
One of the predominant themes to emerge from the data was confusion about the roles of lawyers 
and experts in presenting DNA evidence during examination-in-chief and re-examination. The 
confusion arises from the divergent views lawyers have about their own and experts’ roles in these 
questioning sessions. As discussed below, forensic scientists see their role as responding to the 
questions of lawyers about the evidence they have collected, analysed and/or interpreted — not 
explaining how their evidence applies to the trial at hand.  
                                                             
117 DNA evidence was seen as ‘bullet proof’ by L28 (28 July 2011). 
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Judges, forensic scientists and some lawyers interviewed consider that lawyers have a responsibility 
to bring a sound knowledge of DNA evidence to bear on the task of adducing evidence from DNA 
experts. In contrast, some lawyers expressed the view that lawyers need to know only enough to ask 
simple questions of experts who then have the responsibility to make this evidence intelligible to a 
jury. The concern is that, in the absence of a consensus about who has responsibility for what in the 
presentation of DNA evidence in court, that evidence may not be provided in the most lucid form for 
fact finders.  
The approach of lawyers who take a minimalist approach to their own role was encapsulated by L3: 
‘But really, it’s a matter of the experts, they’re the experts. I think lawyers sometimes try to be experts 
and I don’t think they can be.’122 
To similar effect L25 expressed the view that it is the role of the expert to explain DNA evidence and 
that the role of the lawyer is to ask questions that elicit the most important information: 
All you’ve got to do is make sure that everybody understands. So, what, why, how, when questions, 
will explain that. Well that’s all an advocate really needs to do. The expert should be able to do the 
rest.123  
Lawyers have a great responsibility to ask questions that will elicit the expert’s evidence in the best 
possible form to maximise fact finders’ understanding and appreciation of it, and to ask the right 
questions lawyers need to have the right information and level of understanding about the evidence. 
L36 sees this as a two-way process: 
I think there’s a fair bit of responsibility on the lawyer because an expert, like any witness, can only 
answer the questions that are put to them ... They do scientific analysis fulltime. They’re scientific 
experts ... it’s up to the lawyer to ask questions and to delve further so, if the experts are talking 
about things in a way that isn’t easy to understand, the lawyer does have the responsibility to bring 
them back and break those concepts down into a way that can be easily understood.124  
The overall view was that lawyers need not have an understanding of DNA evidence that rivals that of 
forensic biology experts, but that they should have enough understanding of the evidence to address 
informative and appropriate questions to the expert before trial and during both examination-in-chief 
and cross-examination. Freckleton, Reddy and Selby’s research supports this finding in suggesting 
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that, although many judges are content with the quality of the advocacy in their courtrooms, where 
expert evidence is concerned, there are many who are dissatisfied both with the advocacy of the 
lawyers and with the role played by the experts.125  
The risk of asking questions without understanding either the question or the answer may also result 
in evidence that does not advance the State’s or the defendant’s case, or that complicates the case to 
the point where it no longer assists the trier of fact in their decision making.  
DNA evidence that is confused by ineffective questioning of an expert by either the prosecution or the 
defence in a criminal trial does not contribute to a case as strongly as it might have if presented 
competently. Ineffective questions prevent the trier of fact from fully understanding the issues and 
evidence in the case. If there have been any problems in the collection or processing of the DNA 
evidence and this has not been detected before it gets to the courtroom, then it is the role of the 
lawyer to prevent a miscarriage of justice from occurring. If they cannot competently interrogate the 
evidence, the DNA results may be given more weight than they deserve, or in the alternative, they 
may be undervalued by the court because they have not been used to their full potential. Both these 
outcomes are not ideal for the criminal justice system.  
Lawyers of course understand that experts necessarily have a greater knowledge about DNA evidence 
than they.126 However, DNA evidence appears to be an area of expertise where there are particularly 
disparate knowledge levels between lawyers and experts.127 Inevitably, the nature of the role lawyers 
assume in eliciting DNA evidence will be determined by the amount of time they can devote to 
preparation of the case. In reality, as seen in Chapter 5, more often than not lawyers have limited time 
to prepare evidence for criminal cases.128 As noted there, cases are always changing and as L3 noted 
it might be ‘DNA one day and ... other evidence on another.’129 So while lawyers may have a desire to 
understand the evidence fully, limitations of time may confine the role of the lawyer (specifically the 
prosecutor) merely to providing the expert witness with the opportunity to present and explain the 
DNA evidence to the jury. 
The prosecutor’s role is to adduce DNA evidence from expert witnesses during examination-in-chief 
and later to re-examine these witnesses after they have been cross-examined by the defence. 
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However, forensic scientists participating in the study complained that many prosecutors failed to re-
examine them on contentious points and conceded defence points too readily.  
L19 drew a distinction between their responsibilities in relation to DNA evidence at the pre-trial stage 
of proceedings and subsequently at trial: 
I think it is very important for a lawyer to know a lot about DNA pre-trial, I don’t think it is 
necessarily important for the lawyer to know much about DNA in the courtroom, because I’m 
assuming that if the lawyer has done his or her work properly and there’s been a problem with the 
DNA in the pre-trial process then it will be excluded either by agreement or by order. … so, I’m 
assuming that if you get to a point where the DNA is being admitted into evidence it’s been through 
that process of scrutiny beforehand. You shouldn’t necessarily get into a criminal trial and then 
start to, ‘oh shit DNA what are we going to do about it now?’ It’s too late. Should a lawyer have a 
scientist’s understanding? No.130 
Such views have implications for lawyers’ approach to the acquisition of knowledge about DNA 
evidence. They indicate that there is a lack of consensus about how much lawyers should know about 
DNA evidence. Many lawyers and forensic scientists believe that lawyers should know about more 
than just the basics of DNA evidence and that this is required if they are to ask experts the most 
appropriate questions in court. In practice, if lawyers do not feel it is their role to understand DNA 
evidence beyond being able to ask basic relevant who/what/when/where/why questions of experts, 
then they may not attempt to improve their knowledge beyond elementary procedural requirements 
of proofing an expert. Experts can only answer the questions lawyers put to them in court and the 
concern is that if a lawyer does not have the knowledge that allows them to ask the right questions of 
experts, then the court may be left without the most robust and accurate account of the DNA evidence 
in any given criminal trial.  
 Difficulty with communication 
The third most common area of difficulty has been categorised into the theme of ‘communication’. 
This covers the difficulties that lawyers have both in communicating DNA evidence to fact finders and 
their difficulties in communicating with expert witnesses. The most common themes that are 
discussed in this chapter include the use of forensic reports, explaining DNA evidence in court, the 
language and terminology used by those communicating DNA evidence and the notion of lawyers 
‘asking the right questions’ and the ramifications of their failure to do so.  
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6.5.1 Forensic reports  
The communication of DNA evidence to lawyers, to fact finders and the court generally occurs in the 
form of a written forensic report. This is prepared by forensic biologists in the laboratory where the 
testing and analysis has taken place and is often given to lawyers in a truncated and summarised 
form.131 Lawyers participating in the study expressed difficulty with forensic reports for two main 
reasons — the language and expression used and the level of detail in the information provided.  
 
Language and expression 
They use a different language, if you don’t understand the language and you don’t understand 
what you’re looking for its meaningless.132 
Lawyers’ difficulties with the scientific expression of DNA results is explored in detail at 6.2 above.133  
The language used by forensic biologists in their written reports received mixed reviews from the 
lawyers interviewed. There have been concerted attempts to simplify the scientific language used so 
that the results of DNA tests are delivered in the most comprehensible manner possible.134 Lawyers 
gave different reasons for the difficulties they experience with the language and expression used in 
forensic reports. One lawyer said that the last DNA report he had seen contained over 10 pages of 
dense scientific material. This had the effect of both lawyers and jurors having their ‘eyes glaze over 
one tenth of the way into the report.’135 Other lawyers said that the reports have improved in their 
use of plain English and because they now include an Appendix, which further explains their findings 
and the terms used.136 Nevertheless, as noted above at 6.2, there are many lawyers who struggle with 
the presentation of the probability ratio, in terms of both the use of large numbers and the language 
used to present the results. 
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Level of detail 
To make the reports easier to understand many laboratories have reduced their level of detail, 
simplified the language used and summarise their findings for ease of use by lawyers and the courts.137 
While this has made it easier to find the final probability ratio for that report, it has meant that lawyers 
still have little information available to them on the procedures and analysis techniques utilised and 
the limitations of the results themselves. One lawyer compared DNA forensic reports with those used 
in civil trials and argued that if reports like the forensic biology DNA results were used in civil trials 
‘judges would laugh at them because they don’t have any of the findings and all the background work. 
It just says “a hit was made” and that’s the probability.’138 The data from the present study show 
apparently contradictory responses from lawyers to forensic DNA reports, with some lawyers having 
trouble with the length and detail of the reports, and others criticising the lack of detail and 
information in them. There was no single accepted view of the desirable level of detail and language 
that should be used by forensic scientists in their reports.  
The lack of detail in the reports — or the absence of detail that would enable a lawyer to discern 
possible contamination issues, is best illustrated by the comment of a prosecutor: 
The reports are useful enough for the purpose of presenting the evidence in court and there’s not 
much more than that. But what I’m suggesting is what’s behind the report is not transparent — it’s 
just not there. How can I possibly spot contamination if it’s present then?139 
The opinions expressed by lawyers in the present study concerning their difficulty in understanding 
the language, expression and presentation of information in forensic reports accords with the 
research of Howes et al.140 These researchers recommended that information contained in forensic 
reports be simplified to make it more comprehensible to end users of the reports, namely the 
courts.141 This recommendation draws on principles of content and sequence and on language 
principles.142 Adoption of this recommendation would go some way to ameliorating the concerns of 
lawyers presented in this thesis. In recognition of this problem Victoria Police have considered the 
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Victorian Supreme Court Practice Direction on the presentation of expert evidence143 and, as 
requested by the courts, have recently produced standardised reporting practices across all 
disciplines.144  
Alternative methods of presenting DNA evidence have been discussed by Goodman-Delahunty, 
Hewson145 and Freckleton and Selby.146 Their work, and the confusion generated by written forensic 
reports revealed by the present study, suggest that investigation is warranted into a more regular use 
of non-verbal communication of this information. Non-verbal means of communication including 
audio and visual PowerPoint presentations were recommended by Goodman-Delahunty and 
Hewson147 and by the courts in the cases of Pantoja148 and Green.149  
6.5.2 Explaining DNA evidence in court 
The role of the forensic scientist as seen by lawyers, judges and forensic scientists themselves can be 
explored through several key themes — cooperation, communication, preparation and education. 
Enhanced communication and cooperation between forensic scientists and members of the criminal 
justice system was acknowledged by many interviewees to be extremely important. For example, it 
can prevent the kind of problems alluded to by Judge P3 in the following quotation: 
I think [the issue] was poor presentation by the forensic scientist, but the prosecution lawyer 
clearly hadn’t discussed it with him and didn’t have a clue about how to resurrect the error that 
the defence lawyer had created.150 
This statement, though brief, identifies a number of shortcomings in what occurred in the case in 
question, which can all be attributed to a lack of communication between prosecution counsel and 
the expert witness. As a result of this failure to communicate, the prosecution adduced the evidence 
poorly and defence counsel exploited these inadequacies to create the appearance that the 
prosecution evidence was erroneous. Further, the prosecution was unable to rehabilitate the evidence 
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by correcting the assertions made by defence counsel. The result may have been that the fact finder 
was left with a misrepresented view of the evidence. 
There is a divergence in views between forensic scientists and lawyers on the way that forensic 
scientists should give evidence. The possible implication of this for lawyers is the miscommunication 
of DNA evidence in certain trials. If scientists expect lawyers to ask questions and explore evidence in 
a scientifically informed and educated way, and lawyers have an expectation that scientists will 
present DNA evidence in legal language, the DNA evidence may never have the authority or 
explanation that it might otherwise deserve or require. Lawyers and forensic scientists expressed a 
degree of frustration with regard to their disparate expectations of each other. Their failure to 
reconcile these differences endangers the accurate presentation of the evidence and creates a risk 
that it will be misinterpreted and miscommunicated to the fact-finder. This problem might be 
mitigated with improved communication about the evidence pre-trial. Pre-trial communication 
between lawyers and forensic scientists might expose some of the tensions highlighted in this section 
and the role of both forensic scientist and lawyer might be better understood by the other party. 
Lawyers believe that scientists should tailor their evidence to suit the justice system. This view is 
incompatible in some ways with the limitations inherent to the forensic science disciplines. Lawyers’ 
perceptions are illustrated by L24, a prosecutor responsible for introducing forensic biology experts in 
court, who commented that forensic scientists will not ‘concede, they will not go past what they 
believe to be scientific or the way they’re supposed to give their evidence in a scientific manner.’151 
The same lawyer suggested that forensic scientists avoid speculation because they want to maintain 
‘rigidity ... in how they give their evidence.’152 Accordingly, there is clearly a divergence of views about 
whether scientists should be less ‘scientific’, as L24 appears to argue. 
Nevertheless, because forensic biologists are professional witnesses there is an expectation that 
regardless of the content, they should communicate complicated scientific evidence clearly and 
comprehensibly to lay people. One lawyer explained, by analogy, the necessity to achieve a balance 
between maintaining scientific integrity and clearly communicating DNA evidence: 
From my view if you’re a biologist who just deals with DNA that’s fine. You can be an expert just in 
DNA, but if you’re a biologist [who is] a professional witness, half of the skill set you’re required [to 
have] is the ability to explain your science to a lay person. It’s kind of a difference between a 
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biologist and a biology teacher and they really need more teacher skills [like] the ability to break it 
down and submit a form and analogy and those sorts of things.153 
This divergence in expectations about the ‘performance’ of the forensic scientists may indicate lack of 
cooperation, communication and understanding by both lawyers and forensic scientists about the role 
of the expert witness in relation to DNA evidence. Judges like P3, quoted above, acknowledge this 
tension. Lawyers’ frustration about forensic scientists’ reluctance to ‘tailor’ their evidence to a lay 
audience is a tension that may be overcome with improved pre-trial communication about the DNA 
evidence in particular cases. Blaming scientists does not help lawyers to fulfil their duty to make sure 
the evidence adduced can be understood by all in the courtroom. This cannot be done if they fail to 
communicate with forensic scientists or to obtain a level of understanding about the evidence that 
would enable them to see a way forward that preserves the integrity of the evidence and yet increases 
its comprehensibility.  
Standard presentation 
Many of the interviewees suggested that standard presentations for universally-accepted and non-
contentious areas of DNA evidence should be introduced into criminal trials. This may assist in greater 
understanding not for only jurors, but also for lawyers and judges. Judicial participant P5, suggested 
that a chart be drawn up of accepted DNA evidence to avoid the situation where the jury is considering 
‘big numbers ... when it’s not a real issue in the case.’154  
In Victoria, L16 referred to a standard PowerPoint presentation used by forensic biologists at the 
Victoria Police forensic laboratory to explain their expert opinions in court and introductory films were 
also referenced by interviewees.155 Both these measures were particularly useful for presenting non-
contentious DNA evidence in criminal trials. 
Simplifying complex evidence 
Lawyers and expert witnesses, when dealing with DNA evidence, are faced with the unenviable task 
of simplifying very complex, scientific evidence for lay people. Essentially, what is required is for the 
evidence to be comprehensible, which means that scientists must be able to communicate 
information about DNA evidence in a ‘way which enables them to be questioned about it and for the 
observers to understand their answers and again process what those answers mean.’156 
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It is, of course, not an easy task to present complex scientific evidence in a form that is comprehensible 
to lay people. One of the interviewees, L34, referred to a medical practitioner who gives evidence in 
Victorian courts as being an example of someone who can do this, but noted that there is no 
comparable DNA expert:  
[he is able to] explain to a jury in the simplest of terms that this is, what it’s about ... He can 
translate his medical concept of the cause of death or the injury or whatever into simple terms 
that the jury can understand. I’m yet to find anyone giving evidence of DNA that’s got the capacity 
to do that.157  
Words like ‘match’, ‘consistent with’ and ‘more probable than’ are interpreted very differently by 
different people. Judges acknowledge the research in this area:  
P4: Especially when there are studies as well aren’t there, on the interpretation of words. You 
can say to someone, what’s stronger, highly probable or consistent with, and they’ll interpret 
it completing differently. They might say consistent with is much stronger than highly 
probable when, in fact, ... 
P3: It’s the other way around.158 
The word ‘possible’ is not one favoured by most lawyers, particularly prosecutors who feel that the 
use of the word ‘possible’ means that defence lawyers can ‘make hay [with DNA evidence] while the 
sun shines.’159  
Lawyers participating in the study commonly referred to forensic scientists using ‘jargon’, but some 
lawyers and judges acknowledged that the evidence given by forensic biologists about DNA can never 
really be jargon free because there are words and expressions that come from within the discipline. 
This also applies to the jargon used by lawyers that forensic scientists say they find difficult to 
understand.160 Many lawyers used words like ‘gibberish’161 and ‘gobbledy-gook’162 to describe the 
language of experts presenting DNA evidence. L5 agreed that lawyers need to know about the 
processes used and concepts involved in DNA testing and the results but found that when he 
challenged experts for the prosecution they reverted to using more complicated terminology and this 
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was difficult to follow.163 Time is then spent trying to understand what is said, rather than seeking to 
address issues with the evidence itself.  
The importance of language and the ramifications of using words was explored in Martire et al's 
research164 which focused on the use of verbal descriptors of strength as compared with numerically 
presented probability ratios. This research supports the proposition that people interpret the same 
words, for example ‘match’ in very different ways, assigning it varying degrees of strength. In contrast, 
in Aytugrul v the Queen165 the High Court failed to acknowledge the significance ‘… research like that 
of Martire et al166 by finding that the jury was likely to ‘contain at least one juror capable of realising, 
and demonstrating to the other jurors, that the frequency estimate [used in the case] was the same 
as the exclusion percentage.’167 This assumption, given Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson’s work168 in 
this area, is dangerous with respect to the communication of DNA evidence in serious criminal trials. 
A good forensic expert must be able to communicate and explain DNA evidence in simple terms 
without losing scientific authority. Some lawyers believe that scientists should not use jargon and that 
‘they’ve got to simplify it, but give a proper explanation without all the ... caveats.’169 However, 
scientists may fear losing accuracy if they abandon scientific terminology, in the same way that lawyers 
may fear losing legal authority if they abandon legal language in liaising with scientists. It is unrealistic 
to expect scientists to present their evidence without using any of the scientific language of their 
discipline. Equally, they are unlikely to desist from applying caveats to their evidence; their concern is 
to convey an accurate indication of its strength and correct interpretation. Nevertheless, a form of 
expression needs to be devised to maintain the integrity of the evidence and yet achieve its effective 
communication in court. The dilemma was expressed by L34 as follows:  
Well our job [is to be] more a communications expert than anything else, being able to convey [the 
evidence] to a jury in a way that the jury can understand. And to me that’s the gulf that you have 
                                                             
163 Interview with L5 (26 October 2011). 
164 See Martire et al, ‘On the Interpretation of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science Evidence: Presentation 
Formats and the Weak Evidence Effect’, above n 27; Martire et al, ‘The Expression and Interpretation of 
Uncertain Forensic Science Evidence: Verbal Equivalence, Evidence Strength and the Weak Evidence Effect’, 
above n 27; Martire, Kemp and Newell, above n 27. 
165 Atygrul v The Queen [2012] HCA 15.  
166 Martire et al, ‘On the Interpretation of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science Evidence: Presentation Formats 
and the Weak Evidence Effect’, above n 27; Martire et al, ‘The Expression and Interpretation of Uncertain 
Forensic Science Evidence: Verbal Equivalence, Evidence Strength and the Weak Evidence Effect’ above n 27; 
Martire, Kemp and Newell, above n 27. 
167 Atygrul v The Queen [2012] HCA 15, 75. 
168 Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson, above n 145, 1. 
169 Interview with L22 (20 June 2011).  
 
  Difficulties with DNA evidence 
179 
with DNA evidence and the communication of it. So, you’ve got this fear that you can’t say anything 
that’s not absolutely 100% right. So, you can’t simplify it for the jury, but for the jury to understand 
it requires simplification.170 
Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson’s work suggests that jurors have limited knowledge of DNA 
evidence and that conviction rates are high among mock jurors with low levels of knowledge of DNA 
evidence.171 If these convictions are based on an unjustifiable faith in, and lack of a sound 
understanding of, DNA evidence, it is clearly critical that lawyers and experts ensure that their 
expression of this complex evidence is simple and comprehensible. Wheate’s 2010 research suggests 
that forensic experts cannot simplify their evidence to a point where it loses meaning, so a delicate 
balance must be struck between explaining DNA evidence adequately so that it has the requisite 
authority and ensuring jurors understand the evidence.  
Communicating complex scientific evidence like DNA is not an impossible task. Although the 
profession needs to acknowledge that complex scientific evidence cannot be ‘dumbed down’, there is 
the possibility that it can be explained in more simple terms, perhaps using analogies as lawyers find 
these helpful or using visual aids like those found useful by L16. It is important that lawyers, judges 
and juries understand DNA evidence as presented by forensic experts both pre-trial and in court. 
Similarly, forensic experts must understand the legal framework in which they are communicating 
their evidence. Neither party should have to present ‘over-simplified’ evidence purely so that others 
may understand it. Rather, they should present evidence as their discipline requires, with lawyers then 
responsible, as L34 suggests, for being the ‘communications expert[s]’.172  
The implications for practice in this area are profound. The research suggests that when experts say 
one thing, lawyers and jurors may hear something entirely different. There needs to be a balance 
between communicating the appropriate terminology for the scientific and legal disciplines in criminal 
practice, and simplification of each discipline such that DNA evidence is understandable by lay people 
and non-scientists. If lawyers continue to expect scientists to change their language, and, in 
consequence, fail to communicate with them about what the terminology of DNA means, both science 
and justice professionals will lose an opportunity to maximise the ability of DNA evidence to assist in 
solving legal problems. Lawyers may use the wrong terms to describe the strength of probability ratios 
and jurors may interpret those words in an entirely different way to that intended by both scientists 
and lawyers.  
                                                             
170 Interview with L34 (6 September 2011). 
171 Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson, above n 145, 1. 
172 Interview with L34 (6 September 2011). 
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 Conclusion 
Lawyers have been dealing with DNA evidence in criminal cases for over two decades and yet, as the 
present research demonstrates, they still struggle with this evidence in several key areas. This chapter 
has answered the secondary research question of ‘what do criminal lawyers find most difficult to 
understand about DNA evidence?’ The predominant themes identified in the data have been 
discussed above, with illustrative quotations from the interview transcripts provided. Links between 
the themes identified in the data and the literature or case law in this area were established and the 
implications for criminal law practice were explained.  
Lawyers have difficulty with the scientific principles associated with DNA evidence. The probability 
ratios and statistics being used in today’s forensic biology laboratories are complicated and confusing 
for most lawyers working in the criminal law area. The mixed profiles that are now being found in 
traces left at crime scenes have proved to be problematic not only for criminal lawyers, but also for 
judges in both jurisdictions included in this research.  
Procedural difficulties were divided between those occurring pre-trial and those encountered during 
the criminal trial. Pre-trial concerns were primarily about how to identify errors in DNA evidence and 
how to challenge the process used to generate the results in any given case. What contamination is 
and the importance of asking about contamination was well understood by lawyers, but they 
nevertheless experience problems in detecting possible cases of contamination from the information 
that is routinely provided. During trial, lawyers experience problems with how to examine and cross-
examine experts meaningfully on DNA evidence. They have difficulty defining the nature of their and 
the forensic expert’s role in presenting the evidence to the court. If it is indeed the forensic scientist 
who bears primary responsibility for ensuring that the evidence presented is comprehended and 
complete, this begs the question of what the role of the lawyer should be and how much do lawyers 
need to understand about the evidence.  
The communication of DNA evidence is problematic, with lawyers critical of the information provided 
in forensic reports by biologists and confused about the role forensic experts and lawyers should each 
play in explaining DNA to the court. The language and terminology of DNA evidence and forensic 
experts in court was criticised by lawyers, with many having unclear expectations of what forensic 
scientists can and cannot say and the terminology they should and should not use. The theme of 
‘asking the right questions’ was an important one for communicating DNA evidence to lay people 
during criminal trials. Forensic scientists interviewed were overwhelmingly of the view that lawyers 
are not asking the right questions of them and that the evidence is, therefore, not being given the 
correct weight in individual cases. 
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With an understanding of the practical realities of legal practice and the difficulties that lawyers face 
with the scientific, procedural and communication aspects of DNA evidence, it is possible to evaluate 
what DNA education programs might be most useful to lawyers and as well as being most likely to be 
utilised by them. The various methods available to lawyers to learn about DNA both formally and 
informally are discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 7). 
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7 Educating lawyers about DNA evidence 
 Introduction 
This chapter explores how lawyers learn about DNA evidence. It is the key analysis chapter for the 
second research question which pertains to the opportunities and resources available to lawyers in 
this area. The focus is on identifying the various ways that lawyers have learned from others or taught 
themselves about the evidence. It presents the interviewees’ views on whether the various methods 
of education currently available are considered ‘useful’ and which options they might use in the future. 
Lawyers’ opinions of these measures are important because of their potential influence on their 
attendance at education programs and any improvement in their knowledge in this area. If the options 
available are not useful but continue to be offered, then lawyers may avoid engaging with DNA 
evidence education and their knowledge will not improve. Criticisms of lawyers in handling DNA 
evidence, as highlighted by the discussions of DNA evidence and its use in the courtroom in earlier 
chapters, warrants the investigation of the issues associated with further education for lawyers on 
DNA evidence. 
Education and training program design is important. As early as 1982, education academics wrote 
about accommodating learning styles in designing education programs for professionals.1 Dixon, a 
noted adult education expert, highlighted several factors that must be considered when designing 
educative programs for professionals. These include content, external constraints, the skill and 
preferences of the profession and the learning styles of participants.2 This chapter focuses on the 
learning styles and preferences of lawyers, and to some extent judges, in relation to complex scientific 
evidence like DNA. There is research which indicates that programs that are designed with participant 
learning styles in mind are evaluated more highly by participants.3 Accordingly, the present study 
investigates whether the education programs available to lawyers on DNA evidence are designed 
taking into account lawyers’ learning styles.  
This chapter looks firstly at formal DNA education programs in Victoria and the Australia Capital 
Territory (ACT) and then discusses several examples from overseas jurisdictions. The discussion next 
                                                             
1 Nancy Dixon, ‘Incorporating Learning Style into Training Design’ (1982) 36(7) Training and Development 
Journal 62. 
2 Ibid. 
3 H A Witkin, ‘Field-Dependent and Field-Independent Cognitive Styles and Their Educational Implications’ 
(1977) 47(1) Review of Educational Research 1. 
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moves to more informal measures of self-education including learning from scientists, learning from 
peers and undertaking personal reading and research with available materials online and in text. 
 Formal sources of DNA education 
Lawyers were asked about the options available to them in accordance with research and interview 
question 1C.4  
There are many formal DNA education programs and initiatives in Australia and overseas run by 
registered and certified education bodies, law societies, legal organisations and institutes and forensic 
science providers. They vary from one hour seminars and three or four day workshops to professional 
certification programs tailored to lawyers’ availability. It is outside the ambit of this thesis to discuss 
all these initiatives. What this thesis does is introduce some of the available options for lawyers in 
Victoria and the ACT for education in this area. It also considers other courses and workshops in 
Australia and overseas for comparison and discussion purposes. They provide examples of the variety 
of information and courses available to Australian lawyers. Examples of programs organised by legal 
accreditation bodies — both face-to-face and online — are discussed, as well as those offered by 
private providers in Australia, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Europe.  
7.2.1 Law Institutes and Societies 
In Australia, lawyers must attend continuing professional development (CPD) courses to retain their 
practising certificates as barristers and solicitors in their respective jurisdictions.5 In the two primary 
research jurisdictions of Victoria and the ACT these courses are primarily, though not exclusively, run 
by the Law Institute of Victoria6 and the ACT Law Society.7 
Law Institute of Victoria  
The Law Institute of Victoria conducts CPD courses on DNA evidence on an irregular basis. Following 
the 2009 release of the Inquiry into the Circumstances that Led to the Conviction of Mr Farah 
                                                             
4 Research question 1C: What form of continuous legal education is available to criminal lawyers in Victoria 
and the ACT on the use of DNA evidence, and how does this compare nationally and internationally? See 
4.4.1 above for discussion of this question. 
5 Legal Profession Continuing Professional Development (Solicitors) Rules 2015 (Vic) r 8; Legal Profession 
Uniform Continuing Professional Development (Barristers) Rules 2015 (Vic) r 8; ACT Law Society, CPD 
Guidelines: A Continuing Professional Development Scheme for Canberra’s Legal Practitioners (1 April 2015) 
ACT Law Society <https://www.actlawsociety.asn.au/documents/item/1124>. 
6 For more information about the Law Institute of Victoria, see <http://www.liv.asn.au/>.  
7 For more information about the Law Institute of the ACT, see <https://www.actlawsociety.asn.au/>. 
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Abdulkadir Jama8 (Vincent Report), in 2010 the Institute hosted professional development initiatives 
on DNA evidence for practising criminal lawyers. These were on a once only basis, though they may 
repeat the courses in future. One of the first events of the 2010 program was a one-hour seminar 
presented by forensic scientist Jane Taupin, called ‘Forensic Science Evidence in Criminal Trials.’9 The 
aim of the seminar was to highlight some of the contentious issues that lawyers should explore in 
cases involving forensic science evidence. DNA evidence was the primary focus of the presentation. 
The seminar was available both in person and via teleconference and the author of this thesis was in 
attendance by distance. The material presented was introductory in nature, though it did cover some 
information on contamination and miscarriage of justice cases. Although the agenda promised further 
discussion of these areas, and of issues relating to the use of DNA evidence specifically, the allocated 
time expired before the presenter had the chance to discuss them. Lawyers in attendance received 
their CPD points, but did not gain the in-depth view of current issues with DNA evidence that they may 
have otherwise had if the seminar had been fully completed.  
Just over one month later, the Institute held their Criminal Law Conference on the 30th of July where 
former Supreme Court Judge and author of the Vincent Report, Frank Vincent gave a presentation 
about his report and DNA evidence.10 He presented the findings of the Vincent enquiry and the 
circumstances that led to Jama’s conviction and later acquittal. There was a clear focus on how the 
DNA evidence was adduced in the Jama case and on the lack of challenge and communication by all 
those involved in the forensic and legal processes. No further courses on DNA evidence have been 
publicly advertised on the Institute’s website since 2010, although they may have been conducted on 
a more ad hoc and informal basis since that time.11 
ACT Law Society and Bar Association 
The ACT Law Society is the body responsible for many CPD programs run for lawyers in the ACT. It has 
not held any DNA evidence-specific training programs in recent years. However, in July 2015 barrister 
                                                             
8 Frank Vincent, Inquiry into the Circumstances that Led to the Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama 
(2010) Parliament of Victoria <http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/papers/govpub/VPARL2006-
10No301.pdf>. 
9 Law Institute of Victoria, Forensic Science Evidence in Criminal Trials (2 June 2010) 
<http://www.liv.asn.au/whatsoncalendar?evpage=CPDDetail&function_code=CPD10S0206/CPD10S0206&
eventid=CPD10S0206>. 
10 Frank Vincent, LIV Criminal Law Conference (30 July 2010) Law Institute of Victoria 
<http://www.vicbar.com.au/GetFile.ashx?file=pdf/LIV_Criminal_Law_Conference.pdf>. 
11 Many organisations hold in-house presentations that are not documented online, and that are open only to 
staff within those organisations. These might occur at the request of lawyers or scientists or may be 
conducted on a case-by-case basis as the need arises.  
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Hugh Selby delivered a CPD course on preparing and presenting expert witness evidence,12 which 
targeted criminal lawyers who prepare and present forensic biology evidence, among other kinds of 
expert evidence in court.  
The ACT Bar Association runs annual conferences on topics relevant to barristers in that jurisdiction. 
Former barrister Shane Gill delivered an information session on the use of statistics in DNA evidence 
at the CPD conference for the ACT Bar Association in 2011. During the 90-minute workshop, Gill, the 
2014/15 President of the ACT Bar Association, addressed his concerns about the ‘deceptive 
characteristics of the numbers typically used in prosecution evidence to give the evidence of potential 
match strength.’13  
7.2.2 Private CPD course providers 
Private organisations and educators in Australia and overseas provide education and training that may 
be relevant for Australian criminal lawyers. The discussion here does not provide an exhaustive list of 
the options available, but it does demonstrate the breadth of courses, seminars and workshops 
currently available to practising lawyers in the various countries and jurisdictions discussed. Many are 
available online.  
One Australian private organisation that offers short courses on DNA evidence for lawyers is Forensic 
Foundations in Melbourne.14 Many of these are certified by law institutes or societies for CPD points, 
and others are used by governmental organisations for their practising lawyers. The courses listed 
below are run as three-day workshops spread over three weekends that may be taken as an entire 
course or as individual units. The first day focuses on ‘DNA Profiling: Theory and Practice.’ This covers 
the more fundamental basics of DNA evidence — what it is, the information it can provide and the 
systems used for DNA evidence typing. The second day of the course gives a more hands-on 
experience of testing for DNA evidence (using participants own buccal swabs) and the amplification 
and information gathering processes. Lawyers are then invited to interpret and present their analysis 
with guidance from forensic practitioners. Day three is titled, ‘DNA Profiling: Analysis and 
Interpretation’ and focuses on the use of statistics and probabilities, Bayes theorem, the prosecutors 
                                                             
12 Hugh Selby, Preparing and Presenting Expert Witnesses (22 July 2015) ACT Law Society 
<https://www.actlawsociety.asn.au/events/event/preparing-and-presenting-expert-witnesses>. 
13 Shane Gill, The Use of Numbers in DNA Evidence (June 2011) <http://shanegill.com.au/ethics-dna/>. 
14 See Anna Davey, About Us (2016) Forensic Foundations <http://www.forensicfoundations.com.au/who-we-
are/about-us/>. 
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and defence lawyers’ fallacy and the use of DNA databases.15 The focus of all these courses is more on 
the scientific principles used in DNA evidence collection and analysis than on legal procedure. 
Information on a ‘DNA for Legal Practitioners’ course offered by Forensic Foundations is presented in 
Table 1 below. This course is run by Anna Davey, Director of Forensic Foundations. The Table provides 
a snapshot from 2012–2014 of the clients who requested this course and of the attendance rates for 
different client groups on different dates. We see that on some occasions the course was well 
attended16 as when the client was Victorian Legal Aid in July of 2012. On other occasions the course 
was run with the minimum number needed for it to go ahead and was offered by Forensic Foundations 
and advertised generally to the profession.17 
Table 1 – Forensic Foundations ‘DNA for Legal Practitioners’ Course Summary 2012–2014 
 Date No of Attendees Location Client 
1 March 2012 6 Melbourne General 
2 July 2012 20 Melbourne Victorian Legal Aid 
3 June 2013 5 Melbourne General 
4 Feb/March 2014 9 Sydney General 
5 Dec 2014 8 Sydney Commonwealth DPP and NSW DPP 
This Australian example is one of very few privately provided courses that offers training on the 
forensic sciences for those in the legal profession. Attendance rates for those courses run by 
organisations that employ lawyers, always had higher attendance than general sessions. This may 
have been due to greater advertising within those organisations or practitioners choosing not to utilise 
the course and the content.  
DNA education is also offered by private providers in the United States who are certified to award CPD 
points to Australian practising criminal lawyers. One such course is the ‘DNA Identification for Lawyers’ 
course by Cybergenetics,18 a company that runs DNA workshops using real life case examples and 
presentations on a wide range of DNA topics. Cybergenetics are the founders of the TrueAllele DNA 
testing system that is used by investigative organisations and laboratories around the world. Topics in 
the ‘DNA Identification for Lawyers’ self-paced training course include ‘biology and information’, 
                                                             
15 Personal communication, Anna Davey, April 2015.  
16 Personal communication, Anna Davey, April 2015. 
17 The March 2012 and June 2013 courses fell into this category. 
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‘mixture and interpretation’ and ‘True Allele Testimony’. The material is presented as a video, handout 
and PowerPoint that participants may keep.19 
Private providers in the United Kingdom run CPD programs both on site at various locations around 
the United Kingdom and in legal firms and government organisations that request their services. 
Anglia DNA Services Ltd is one such provider and is accredited by the Solicitors Regulation Authority 
to offer a regular CPD course, ‘The Use of DNA Testing in Legal Practice.’20 The course covers the 
following modules: 
• an introduction to DNA testing; 
• an overview of the use of DNA testing for legal purposes; 
• an explanation of paternity and family relationship (for example, sibling) testing in relation to 
legal practice; 
• an understanding of the wording used in reports generated from DNA testing; 
• an overview of some of the problems and limitations of DNA testing;  
• an overview of the consent and ethical issues related to DNA testing; 
• a guide to some of the current and most useful DNA information resources available to legal 
professionals; and 
• a forum to ask questions and discuss related topics. 
This course is run as a face to face offering rather than as an online, self-paced course.  
In the United States, there is a large variety of online materials for DNA evidence education. A 
prominent provider of online courses on DNA evidence is the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), which 
is a registered training organisation that provides courses aimed at officers of the court. These are 
either run directly by the NIJ or by organisations deemed ‘grantees’ (including, for example, West 
Virginia University or RTI International).21 The NIJ makes recorded webinars and seminars through 
partners like West Virginia University and RTI International. 
                                                             
19 Ibid. 
20 Anglia DNA Services Ltd, The Use of DNA Testing in Legal Practice <http://www.angliadna.co.uk/Continuing-
Professional-Development>. 
21 See RTI International, About Us (2016) <http://www.rti.org/page.cfm/About_RTI>. 
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Courses are fully delivered online and many are free to ‘public safety employees’22 and members of 
the public. Many of the courses are deemed to be ‘on demand’ and thus lawyers can utilise a self-
paced learning model.23 An example of these self-paced courses is ‘DNA – A Prosecutor’s Practice 
Notebook’, with lessons that include the following: 
• Investigating Cases Involving DNA; 
• Preparing Cases Involving DNA; 
• Presenting Cases Involving DNA; 
• Special Case Circumstances; and 
• Lab Report Analysis.24 
Another is ‘Principles of Forensic DNA for Officers of the Court’25 with fifteen modules and lessons 
covering: 
• The biology of DNA, including statistics and population genetics; 
• DNA laboratories, quality assurance in testing, and understanding a laboratory report; 
• Forensic databases; 
• Victim issues; 
• The presentation of DNA evidence at trial; and 
• Post-conviction DNA cases. 
This particular course involves a case study analysis of a rape and murder trial that focused heavily on 
DNA evidence.  
Canadian organisations run self-paced and online education initiatives for lawyers on DNA evidence. 
For example, from 2010 the Canadian Police Knowledge Network has run an online course for police 
officers and other ‘law enforcement officers’ (which arguably includes lawyers) that is 3.5 hours in 
                                                             
22 For example, police officers and court officers, see National Institute of Justice, Training: Courts and 
Courtroom (16 April 2013) Office of Justice Programs <http://nij.gov/training/Pages/courts.aspx>. 
23 See discussion in Jackie Dobrovolny, ‘How Adults Learn from Self-Paced, Technology-Based Corporate 
Training: New Focus for Learnings, New Focus for Designers’ (2006) 27(2) Distance Education 155, 7.4. 
24 National Institute of Justice, NIJ-Sponsored Course or Event: DNA – A Prosecutor’s Practice Notebook, Office 
of Justice Programs <http://nij.gov/training/pages/training-detail.aspx?itemid=71>. 
25 National Institute of Justice, NIJ-Sponsored Course or Event: Principles of Forensic DNA for Officers of the 
Court, Office of Justice Programs <http://nij.gov/training/pages/training-detail.aspx?itemid=70>. 
 
  Educating lawyers about DNA evidence 
189 
duration and is coordinated by the Justice Institute of British Columbia.26 Upon completion of the 
course participants should arguably be able to:  
• Recall the basics of DNA science and its uses in law enforcement investigations; 
• Identify biological substances and other unusual exhibits that may be used for DNA analysis; 
• Recall DNA evidence collection issues; 
• Recall the definition of ‘accountable contamination’; 
• Recall the ways that DNA evidence results may be reported and interpreted; 
• Recall the procedure for obtaining and executing a DNA warrant; 
• Recall legal issues related to forensic DNA evidence; and 
• Recall the federal DNA database legislation and how it affects forensic DNA evidence. 
Canadian lawyers also have access to online resources in the United States, examples of which have 
been discussed above.27 In addition to online courses, law conferences that focus exclusively on DNA 
evidence are advertised by the Nova Scotia Law Society. They are accessible both online and in 
person.28 On 28 April 2012, the last of the thirteen Annual Canadian Symposiums on DNA Forensic 
Evidence was held in Toronto. It was run by the Osgoode Professional Development Centre through 
Osgoode University.29 Topics included: 
• The latest on the science of DNA; 
• Understanding the difference between viral DNA and molecular DNA; 
• Pitfalls and practical tips when presenting DNA evidence at trial; 
• DNA data banking – current update, emerging issues and the future of the DNA data bank; 
• The role of Interpol and international DNA data bank blunders; 
• Impact of the National Research Council Report in Canada; 
                                                             
26 Justice Institute of BC, Forensic DNA Evidence (11 February 2010) Canadian Police Knowledge Network 
<http://www.cpkn.ca/course_dna>. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ricardo G Federico and David S Rose, 12th Annual Canadian Symposium on DNA Forensic Evidence (28 April 
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• Legislative and case law updates in DNA search and seizure; and 
• Admissibility of scientific evidence. 
The Faculty of Law and Criminal Sciences at Lausanne at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland, 
alongside the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, offers a Certificate of Advanced Studies 
‘Statistics and Evaluation of Forensic Evidence.’30 This course targets not only chief scientists but also 
other scientists involved in the testing and analysis of samples, the police and lawyers. It runs for 18 
months and confers university credit on participants. The weekly, online commitment is 
approximately four hours with an additional four hours per week of personal work required outside 
the online platform. Shorter courses with a 150-hour commitment are also available on the ‘Essentials 
of DNA Interpretation’; ‘Essentials of Forensic Interpretation’ and ‘Essentials of Bayesian Networks in 
Forensic Science.’31  
The Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) ran courses for lawyers, prosecutors and judges to help 
improve their ability to read and interpret the findings of forensic experts. One of these courses, which 
was available online, was titled ‘Forensic DNA Analysis – Lawyers.’ It is no longer available online.32 
This course concentrated on imparting scientific knowledge and had very little focus on the use of 
forensic evidence in a legal setting. It began with an introduction to forensic science and continued 
with sessions on quality assurance, ‘ideal’ forensic laboratories and expertise more generally.  
Conferences run by universities and industry specific societies 
Many conferences that are run by universities and industry specific societies are available to lawyers 
and forensic biologists. They may be eligible for CPD points for both professions. The Australian and 
New Zealand Forensic Science Society (ANZFSS)33 runs bi-annual conferences in Australia and New 
Zealand and these can be attended by any interested lawyers34 and forensic scientists. Such 
conferences would provide opportunities for communication to occur and informal relationships to 
                                                             
30 European Network of Forensic Science Institutes, Statistics and the Evaluation of Forensic Evidence Certificate 
of Advanced Studies (CAS) (1 February 2014) <http://www.enfsi.eu/agenda/statistics-and-evaluation-
forensic-evidence-certificate-advanced-studies-cas-online-course-18>. 
31 University of Lausanne, Statistics and the Evaluation of Forensic Evidence – CAS (March 2007) Formation 
Continue <http://www.formation-continue-unil-epfl.ch/statistics-evaluation-forensic-evidence-cas>. 
32 The Institute also ran two day ‘Forensic Expertise – Lawyers’ and two day ‘Forensic Expertise – Prosecutors 
and Judges’ courses as well as short course, ‘Introduction to the value of Forensic Expertise in Criminal 
Justice Systems. None of these are currently available to lawyers online.  
33 See <www.anzfss.org> for further information.  
34 Like that of L36 who was a member of a state branch of this national body. 
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be developed between scientists and lawyers. The Expert Evidence Conference in Canberra35 is 
another example of an industry-specific conference that gives lawyers the opportunity to interrogate 
and understand forensic biology evidence like DNA.  
 Lawyers experiences of CPD  
The data reveal that interviewees had mixed experiences of formal DNA education programs they had 
undertaken. They were asked about these experiences in accordance with research and interview 
question 2C.36 Interviewees’ attendance rates were disparate and lawyers’ attendance rates at 
education programs varied widely. Some had never attended formal DNA evidence training. L31, for 
example had ‘never been to a single workshop or seminar in relation to DNA.’37 L17 could not 
remember ‘the last time DNA was covered’ in his legal training or workplace.38 Others had attended 
just one or two hour-long seminars in their careers.39 In contrast, L14 said that he had attended so 
many workshop-style courses that he couldn’t remember them all. His experiences were varied: 
we visited the McLeod forensic science centre in a conference situation. We attended lectures 
there with a scientist and viewed the lab and how they do it and the machinery used, the process. 
It was all very interesting but I didn’t really understand it. I’ve been to numerous lectures put on 
by lawyers about the law in relation to it. I’ve been to numerous lectures put on by Victorian 
Forensic Science, other lectures put through the Victorian bar — the continuing legal education 
program — through other scientists independent of Victorian Forensic Science ... Heaps and heaps 
of lectures like that, they all seem a bit ‘same same’ after a while and in fact I’ve seen one lecture 
about three or four times. 
L14 remembered having attended lectures ‘put on by lawyers about the law in relation to it [DNA 
evidence] ... and lectures put on by the Victorian Bar.’40 Similarly, L7 remembered attending hour long 
sessions organised by the Bar Association41 and L28 noted that Legal Aid provide access to professional 
                                                             
35 Last run in 2010 by the Australian National University College of Law. See 
<https://law.anu.edu.au/sites/all/files/conferences/files/expert-evidence/expertevidence.pdf> for 
presentation guide. 
36 Research question 2C: What is the lawyer experience of education or training on DNA evidence? See 4.4.1 
above. 
37 L31 preferred talking to colleagues over formal sessions. Interview with L31 (28 September 2011). 
38 Interview with L17 (27 July 2011). 
39 Interview with L9 (7 September 2011); interview with L8 (7 September 2011) who also felt that it ‘doesn’t 
seem to be available.’ Interview with L25: ‘I have been to one session’ (8 September 2011). 
40 Interview with L14 (28 July 2011).  
41 Interview with L7 (28 July 2011).  
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learning on DNA evidence.42 As stated earlier, accredited courses are provided by organisations like 
Forensic Foundations in Victoria43 and more informal sessions and lectures are run fairly regularly by 
forensic experts from State laboratories. These informal and ad hoc sessions are generally provided 
by private organisations and law societies upon request to government organisations or Chambers. L2 
has attended sessions run by the Australian Federal Police44 and L26 has asked experts from the 
Melbourne forensic laboratory at Macleod to coordinate regular sessions with lawyers as part of an 
ongoing education program.45 Only one lawyer interviewed, L32, had personally attended a forensic 
science conference run by the ANZFSS.46 He noted that the connections with forensic professionals 
forged as a result of attending this conference has proved to be invaluable in his work as a barrister: 
I know a lot of these people now, which is of course always useful when you’re in an adversarial 
environment. If you’ve got a relationship with somebody they don’t just see you as the enemy, 
they say, ‘hang on, he’s not a bad bloke and he understands his science a bit and that we’re just 
doing our job.’ Again that [means they’re] less likely to want to bullshit because people don’t want 
to be seen as potentially compromising their integrity to somebody who might be able to pick it 
up.47  
L32 joined ANZFSS as a young lawyer and found the conference run by this organisation on forensic 
evidence to be invaluable, including the sessions on DNA evidence.48 This is because of the connections 
he made there with the forensic science community, the communication that occurred between 
members of the legal and scientific professions and the familiarity he gained with terms and scientific 
procedures used by forensic biologists in testing and analysing DNA evidence.  
The lectures, seminars, workshops and courses with modules or content published online that are 
discussed in this chapter all varied along a spectrum from purely scientific information and information 
on contentious issues or errors in forensic testing, to the use of DNA evidence in very specific legal 
contexts. L8 remembers a DNA evidence seminar that focused exclusively on the scientific principles 
of DNA testing and analysis, with no focus on the use of DNA evidence in legal settings.49  
                                                             
42 Interview with L28 (8 September 2011).  
43 See p 185-186 above.  
44 Alongside Hugh Selby, barrister and author. Interview with L2 (21 June 2011). L24 (24 June 2011) has also 
attended AFP run sessions with forensic scientist Dr Simon Walsh.  
45 Interview with L26 (8 September 2011).  
46 See the Australian and New Zealand Forensic Science Society website at <www.anzfss.org>. 
47 Interview with L32 (22 June 2011).  
48 Ibid. 
49 Interview with L8 (28 July 2011). 
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L3 similarly found that most of the DNA education programs he had undertaken had focused on 
scientific issues. He used the issue of cross-contamination as an example, noting that discussion of this 
matter had concentrated on how cross contamination occurred, and how one laboratory where it had 
occurred had improved its practice to ensure it did not happen in the future.50 This is useful 
information for lawyers to know for the purposes of pursuing particular lines of enquiry in preparing 
for trial or eliciting information from witnesses. However, L3 stressed that little information had been 
provided about how lawyers might expose the fact that cross-contamination had occurred or might 
possibly have occurred.  
L33 had had the opposite experience:  
most of the CLEs, certainly that I’ve seen in relation to DNA [focus on] the way in which it has arisen 
in court rather than [the science]. There have been a couple that have … given more about the 
scientific underpinnings of it.51 
Twenty of the forty lawyers interviewed commented on the usefulness (or otherwise) of the various 
education programs on DNA evidence on offer. The consensus about formal education programs 
provided by way of seminars or lectures was that they were not particularly relevant to lawyers’ daily 
criminal practice. For example, L35 said, 
[w]e had a DNA expert give a lecture here sometime late last year. … I wasn’t too impressed with 
that one. I think it was too focused on the historical aspects of DNA like how it came about. Alec 
Jefferies and all of that jazz as opposed to actually how we can use DNA. I think we need something 
a bit more nitty-gritty where it’s focused on how to interpret DNA profiles [in specific cases].52 
L18 similarly complained about a mismatch between what lawyers hope to learn and what is actually 
covered in education programs provided: 
[The question lawyers have is] can I win my case? [T]his is the problem with these lectures. What 
you’ll find is someone will turn up and say, ‘we have these repeating base pairs’ and then someone 
puts up their hand and says, ‘I’ve got a case with a sperm sample and I want to know if I can get it 
excluded’, and off you go. So, I think with lawyers you need to start with that.53 
                                                             
50 Interview with L3 (6 September 2011).  
51 Interview with L33 (25 July 2011). 
52 Interview with L35 (28 July 2011). 
53 Interview with L18 (26 October 2011). 
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L29 felt that offering DNA evidence education at set times throughout the year had the effect of 
reducing its practical relevance: ‘I go to a seminar and listen to it ... absorb 50% and not apply it for a 
year and then forget it.’54  
L3 simply described organised DNA education as ‘not useful’ and a ‘waste of time’ because the systems 
being used by the laboratories change over time.55 The reason why L30 felt that formal DNA education 
was not useful was because learning is by doing for him as a lawyer,56 but for L8 it was also because 
of a lack of time: ‘I mean lawyers are busy, as you know, and I don’t think there’d be much uptake for 
a day long or two-day workshop, seminar, or whatever.’57 
Some interviewees found formal seminars, workshops and courses ‘very useful’,58 and L20 felt they 
could ‘get a lot from them’.59 For example, L35 left his course with ‘PowerPoint presentations that I 
kept with me for quite a while.’60 
Although lawyers like L23 felt that formal DNA education was not particularly useful, they 
acknowledged that learning comes from a variety of sources, and that many people learn in different 
ways:  
I learn more when I’m under pressure for a particular case and I need to learn about it and I’ve got 
direct face-to-face interaction with my expert. I’m going to get a lot more out of that than I would 
at a seminar. But in some ways, I have to accept that’s a personal thing. I wouldn’t criticise seminars 
... [and] I wouldn’t dismiss that as a valuable source. Just from my point of view it’s not the most 
valuable and I’m more likely to learn on a case-by-case basis. But I suppose it begs the question 
that we’ve had mistakes with DNA in the past and obviously there needs to be a system in place 
where people don’t misunderstand DNA evidence. Now how did that misunderstanding arise — 
maybe that misunderstanding wouldn’t have arisen had there been more education. So, I wouldn’t 
dismiss education.61 
                                                             
54 Interview with L23 (8 September 2011).  
55 Interview with L3 (6 September 2011). L29 felt that ‘formal seminars on DNA evidence suffer the same 
problems they suffer in the courtrooms; it’s still scientists talking science’, interview with L29 (22 June 2011). 
56 Interview with L30 (22 June 2011). 
57 Interview with L8 (28 July 2011).  
58 Interview with L19 (26 July 2011). L28 found them useful when used in combination with other learning tools 
(28 July 2011); interview with L20 (25 July 2011); interview with L19 (26 July 2011); interview with L16 (7 
September 2011). 
59 Interview with L20 (25 July 2011). 
60 Interview with L35 (28 July 2011). 
61 Interview with L23 (8 September 2011). 
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Although the formal reports on the use of DNA and forensic evidence62 recommend that more 
education on DNA evidence be provided for lawyers, it is important that there is a combination of 
approaches available to suit various learning styles. Most lawyers who commented on formal DNA 
education workshops and seminars did not find them useful, but many63 saw that they had a place in 
assisting lawyers to become more knowledgeable and competent with DNA evidence in some way. 
This feedback may go some way to explaining why more lawyers do not engage with formalised 
programs and why there remains a knowledge gap in this area. 
A great many interviewees saw a high value in more informal measures for improving their knowledge 
of DNA evidence and how to apply it in their criminal trials. The data indicate that lawyers learn about 
DNA evidence from a variety of sources, including talking to other professionals, from texts, articles 
and books and online resources available worldwide.  
7.3.1 Talking to other professionals 
The use of DNA evidence in criminal trials necessarily requires some manner of cooperation and 
communication between the forensic science and legal professions. For some interviewees,64 the 
forensic biologists analysing and interpreting DNA evidence in their cases were their primary source 
of information about questions on DNA evidence. One of the judges taking part in the focus groups 
went so far as to say that ‘everything I know about it; I’ve learnt from listening to [expert] witnesses.’65 
One of the benefits of learning informally from forensic biologists is the accessibility this gives to 
information at the point in time when lawyers have a case involving DNA evidence. It is important to 
note here, however, that this proposition tends to only apply to prosecutors.66  
Better communication between lawyers and experts was recommended by the Vincent Report as a 
possible solution to the problems that arose in Jama67 such an approach can lead to informal 
education about DNA evidence. Because he views ‘professional development courses as being 
                                                             
62 See Chapter 2 on justifications for the research.  
63 See, for example, interview with L28 (28 July 2011); interview with L12 (8 September 2011); interview with 
L17 (27 July 2011); interview with L22 (20 June 2011). 
64 See interview with L38 (7 September 2011); focus group with P4 (3 May 2011); focus group with P1 (3 May 
2011). 
65 Focus group with P4 (3 May 2011). Also see interview with L38 (7 September 2011): ‘it’s mostly the experts.’ 
66 See 5.7 at 131 for a discussion of how your ‘side’ counts. 
67 Where each of the professionals involved in collecting, testing, analysing and then forming a criminal case 
around the evidence did not communicate and operated in silos, see Frank Vincent, above n 8.  
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something too hit and miss’,68 judge P1 falls back on the interaction between experts and lawyers as 
an ideal education tool. 
One prosecutor stated that if prosecutors are given a criminal brief that involves DNA evidence, they 
often just ‘get the ... experts from FSL in and go through it and get them to teach [them] for that 
case.’69 This accessibility leads to more open communication about the most relevant aspects of DNA 
evidence to particular cases and allows further conversation about what is and is not contentious 
about the evidence. Many lawyers ask that scientists begin their explanations from first scientific 
principles each time and apply them to each case specifically.  
Your ability to listen and accept that you don’t know anything is really beneficial. And part of what 
I’ve found in my experience of law and having to quite often understand areas that I’ve never had 
any experience with is [the benefit of] actually sitting with the person and going ‘take me through, 
like lead me by the hands through the woods and point out the trees as we go.’70 
However as detailed in chapters 571 and 6,72 defence counsel feel that experts are not as accessible to 
them as they are to ‘State’ lawyers.73 One of the defence lawyers interviewed for this study (L12) said 
that while he learns a lot from scientific experts he does not feel that there is a ‘culture of accessibility 
and openness prominent at the forensic science laboratory’ to promote and further his education 
from this source.74  
Although this same lawyer finds it generally useful, in learning about most areas of expert evidence, 
to build a strong and positive rapport with experts who regularly present evidence in court, this is not 
as often the case where DNA evidence is concerned: 
What I find really useful is in areas where we use experts all the time, for instance psychiatrists or 
psychologists. Once you’ve established a rapport with [that] expert over time, you can just call that 
person and informally speak to them and get a lot of useful information. But you’re unlikely to use 
DNA experts often enough that you would build up that rapport.75 
                                                             
68 Focus group with P1 (3 May 2011). 
69 Interview with L15 (7 September 2011). 
70 Interview with L27 (21 June 2011). 
71 See 5.7: does your side count at 131 above. 
72 See 6.3.2: investigating and challenging DNA evidence pre-trial at 158. 
73 See 5.7: does your side count at 131 above. 
74 Interview with L12 (8 September 2011). 
75 Ibid. 
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Learning from forensic biologists who will be expert witnesses in court, not only allows lawyers to 
become better educated about the issues involved in specific cases, but also allows prosecutors to 
prepare for examination in chief: 
your preparation would be to talk to your expert first. Talk to your expert and find out where this 
all travels to, so that you can spend some time thinking about the questions you might need to ask 
so that your expert can let everyone know [in court] what we don’t know and the[y] do know.76  
Forensic scientists felt that they could be better utilised if lawyers understood the limitations of their 
knowledge and were better educated about their evidence and what questions to ask of them in court. 
What I think would benefit both sides would be an understanding of what’s allowed and not 
allowed [to be asked of experts], what our boundaries are as expert witnesses and also what their 
boundaries are as lawyers.77 
Learning from forensic biologists requires skilled communication,78 though as L24 noted, ‘as far as 
science is concerned it’s a two-way street ... we have got to learn to communicate with them [and] 
they’ve also got to learn to communicate with us.’79 This two-way street is often difficult to navigate 
because, as L30 explained, ‘lawyers ask legal questions and biologists give scientific answers’.80 
However, if lawyers learn from forensic biologists informally, the disjunction between what is asked 
by lawyers and answered by experts may be reduced.   
The problem with relying on informal education from scientists is that the tensions identified in 
Chapter 5 — time, access and the adversarial system more broadly — all have an influence on the 
degree to which this source of knowledge can be relied upon. As the quote above from defence 
counsel, L12, demonstrates, there is not a culture of accessibility to forensic biologists by defence 
counsel. L15, a prosecutor, agreed with this proposition: 
in an ideal world you have the time to keep up with recent developments in DNA in an effective 
way and are able to talk to witnesses easily and as much as you like; to be able to re-brief you at 
every stage, you need that done. But those things are all available at a place like this. It’s easy to 
                                                             
76 Interview with L27 (21 June 2011).  
77 Focus group with FS1 (4 June 2011). 
78 As suggested by the National Research Council Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences 
Community, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009) National Academy 
of Sciences <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf> (‘NAS Report’) and Vincent Report, 
above n 67. 
79 Interview with L24 (24 June 2011).  
80 As noted in an interview with L30 (22 June 2011).  
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click your fingers [and] say, ‘I want the witness here’ and they’ll come. For the defence it’s not so 
easy for them to do that, they have to be more proactive and be prepared to go out and see them.81  
As the discussion in this section has shown, many of the lawyers interviewed have found that talking 
to experts and learning from forensic biologists is the most useful form of education on DNA evidence. 
Issues of access aside, language difficulties and communication of the evidence both prior to and 
during trials can only be improved if conversations occur between scientific and legal professionals. 
However, the tensions created by working in an adversarial system identified in Chapter 5 and the 
unequal access that lawyers have to DNA experts make it inappropriate for this kind of informal 
education to be the only form of education lawyers receive on DNA evidence. Nevertheless, it clearly 
plays an important role in bridging the gap between lawyers and scientists in communicating DNA 
evidence.  
Lawyers also learn informally about DNA evidence from their peers in the legal profession. One of the 
benefits that lawyers associated with learning in this way is the ability to communicate in similar 
terms, using a common language. L30 feels that you ‘need to get lawyers to teach lawyers’ in some 
capacity.82 The use of legal language in describing how DNA evidence is presented and to be used in 
criminal trials progresses lawyers’ understanding, as explained by L13:  
Ideally it would be another lawyer because you don’t necessarily speak in the same language that 
[experts] do and you’re not used to describing things in the way that they want you to describe 
things. You’re unlikely to have any rapport with an expert in the field.83 
Additionally, lawyers favour learning from peers because, as L14 explained, they feel more 
comfortable about ‘asking stupid questions’,84 which enables them to learn more about DNA than they 
otherwise might. It has also meant, particularly for defence lawyers in government agencies and at 
the Bar, but also in some cases for prosecution lawyers, that accessibility issues with forensic biologists 
are ameliorated. Lawyers in the same organisation, or barristers in the same chambers, may provide 
more informal and conversational-style direction and advice on where to find information.85 They may 
also help determine whether there are issues with the evidence that need to be explored further: 
                                                             
81 Interview with L15 (7 September 2011).  
82 Interview with L30 (22 June 2011). 
83 Interview with L13 (27 July 2011). 
84 Interview with L14 (28 July 2011). 
85 Many of the participants found lawyers to be their first point of information — see Interview with L14 (28 
July 2011): ‘chats with friends in Chambers who have done similar cases’; interview with L29 (22 June 2011): 
‘you’ll find small pockets of lawyers out there with enormous experience’; interview with L17 (27 July 2011): 
‘I would ask a barrister who I knew had some knowledge of it’; interview with L35 (28 July 2011): ‘any sort of 
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If I know that there’s a senior lawyer at Legal Aid with this experience, I can just quickly just run a 
scenario by them and quickly get a response that, yes there’s a problem, no there’s not, maybe 
there is and if it’s maybe or yes, they’ll tell me what to do next.86  
Assisting fellow lawyers in relation to DNA evidence is an approach that L18 adopts. She is known in 
her Chambers as a lawyer who has knowledge in this area: 
I’ve got a whole bunch of resources and people are always coming to see me and asking to borrow 
them because they want to educate themselves. [Y]ou’d expect that from a group of people who 
are good at what they do ... I do [know] my own cases and the[re are] people who ask me for help.87 
It is not only the language used by, and accessibility of, lawyers that make them an appealing source 
of information for other lawyers, but also their understanding of the adversarial system. L4 points out 
that lawyers learn their craft as a ‘guild’ or in an ‘apprenticeship’ system, and thus learning about 
scientific evidence like DNA should be no different.88 Moreover, fellow lawyers understand what kind 
of information is likely to be most useful to other lawyers who seek their help: 
[This lawyer] wasn’t explaining it to us from a scientific approach. He was explaining it to us from 
the perspective of how you go about damaging this evidence to get your client acquitted. That was 
his approach and that’s what lawyers are interested in. Lawyers are particularly interested in [the] 
manner in which you can complete the magnification or extraction process. They’re interested in 
how this is going to help my case or hurt my case.89 
As a source of knowledge, a lawyer with scientific training or education is viewed as even better than 
a lawyer with understanding of the adversarial system. In 1994, Wilson argued that there was an acute 
need for interdisciplinary postgraduate courses, which incorporate studies across several areas, 
including law and forensic science, science more generally, criminology and ethics.90 There are a 
growing number of university courses that specifically combine these disciplines, including the 
                                                             
DNA matters that come up that happen to be around me sort of happen to come my way. So I’m having to 
help colleagues in terms of understanding the basics, what it all means.’ 
86 Interview with L13 (27 July 2011).  
87 There are others who are also in this position — see L26: ‘I suppose my other role is like I said I’m sort of a 
— one of the things I do in terms of assisting our lawyers is like if they’ve got a question about a DNA 
statement, I’m a person that they can come to and if I can answer their question I’ll say, I’ll answer it. If they 
need more than me then I can say, ‘this is the person I need to speak to.’ 
88 Interview with L4 (25 October 2011).  
89 Interview with L29 (22 June 2011). 
90 Paul Wilson, ‘Lessons from the AntiPodes: Successes and Failures of Forensic Science’ (1994) 67 Forensic 
Science International 79, 86. 
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University of Canberra,91 the University of Tasmania,92 Griffith University,93 and the University of New 
England94 and it is possible for students to study individual units from these different disciplines and 
incorporate them into their degrees. 
Seven of the lawyers interviewed for this research had undergraduate science degrees in addition to 
their law degrees and one had a Bachelor of Forensic Studies combined with a law degree. The 
qualifications of those lawyers with a scientific education included a Bachelor of Applied Science 
majoring in forensic biology (the only forensic science background),95 Science graduates,96 
undergraduate Genetics,97 an Associate Degree in Science (majoring in winemaking)98 and research 
honours in Genetics after a combined Science and Law degree.99 Although having a science degree 
was seen to be advantageous in some ways, because it is not the subject matter of day-to-day work 
for a lawyer, those with the such qualifications still find it necessary to refresh their knowledge of DNA 
science when working on cases involving DNA evidence.100 
The sociological research of Albers101 supports the proposition that fellow professionals — in this case, 
lawyers — have a role to play in educating others within their profession. Albers argues that so-called 
‘action learning’ is consistent with three sociological notions: 
1. That the whole is greater than the sum of the parts; 
                                                             
91 The University of Canberra, for example, runs Bachelor of Forensic Studies/Bachelor of Laws degrees at the 
undergraduate level, see <http://www.canberra.edu.au/coursesandunits/course?course_cd=194JA>. 
92 The University of Tasmania does not have undergraduate or postgraduate offerings in this area, but offers 
two forensic studies units: ‘Forensic Investigation’ <http://www.utas.edu.au/courses/art/units/hga213-
forensic-investigation> at the undergraduate elective level and ‘Foundations of Forensic Studies’ at 
postgraduate level <http://www.utas.edu.au/courses/art/units/hsp503-foundations-of-forensic-studies>. 
The University of Tasmania subjects are not specifically for law students, although law students may take the 
undergraduate unit as an elective within their degree.  
93 Griffith University offers a Bachelor of Forensic Science degree combined with a Bachelor of Criminology and 
Criminal Justice, see <https://degrees.griffith.edu.au/Program/1433>. 
94 The University of New England offers the unit ‘Fundamentals in Forensic Science’ as a unit within the 
Criminology degree or combined Bachelor of Criminology/Bachelor of Laws course, see 
<https://my.une.edu.au/courses/units/FSC102>. 
95 Interview with L21 (24 June 2011).  
96 Interview with L3 (6 September 2011); interview with L30 (22 June 2011) — neither of these lawyers specified 
their majors. Interview with L32 (22 June 2011) who had a Bachelor of Science majoring in Chemistry.  
97 Interview with L33 (25 July 2011). 
98 Interview with L34 (6 September 2011). 
99 Interview with L35 (28 July 2011). 
100 Interview with L21 (24 June 2011).  
101 Cheryl Albers, ‘Improving Pedagogy through Action Learning and Scholarship of Teaching and Learning’ 
(2008) 36 Teaching Sociology 79. 
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2. All social reality is human constructed;102 and 
3. Knowledge is therefore collaboratively constructed. 
Together, Albers argues, these three ideas suggest that the work experience of groups of individuals 
in similar contexts is an untapped resource for improving practice. Peers in similar circumstances, and 
with similar levels of experience, act as resources for one another to develop strategies for change.103 
This supports earlier work on adult learning theory from key commentators in this area, Marquardt 
and Waddill.104 Colleagues’ experience results in valuable practical knowledge that helps guide 
personal practice — a practice that in law inherently involves unique events and where action involves 
judgment about what ought to be done in a particular case.105 This accords with the views of the 
majority of lawyers interviewed who preferred these more informal methods of learning about DNA 
education. 
Real life problems and situations provide fertile ground for genuine learning. The potential 
improvement of the work context also provides strong motivation for change. The focus is on actively 
effecting change by understanding the impact of behaviour on outcomes.106 For lawyers, a program of 
education that involves DNA evidence may include the perspectives of others within the profession in 
order to enrich the reflective and overall learning process.107 Again, and similarly to learning from 
scientists, this is not ideal as the only source of education about DNA evidence, particularly in the 
event that a lawyer’s interpretation of DNA evidence for their own criminal cases is misguided. It is, 
therefore, important that this form of learning be combined with either self-education from other 
sources, as discussed here at 7.3 or the more formal education options considered at 7.2. 
7.3.2 Reading and online research 
Lawyers also utilise the academic resources of peer reviewed journal articles and reports, and non-
peer reviewed resources that appear online both through Australian and overseas sources. The data, 
in fact, demonstrate that lawyers need to be able to refer to written resources to support informal 
communication they have with scientists and other lawyers. Significantly, such resources were 
                                                             
102 Also see Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Anchor Books, 1966). 
103 Albers, above n 101. 
104 Michael Marquardt and Deborah Waddill, ‘The Power of Learning in Action Learning: A Conceptual Analysis 
of How Five Schools of Adult Learning Theories are Incorporated Within the Practice of Action Research’ 
(2004) 1(2) Action Learning: Research and Practice 185. 
105 John Olson, ‘Making Sense of Teaching: Cognition vs Culture’ (1988) 20(2) Journal of Curriculum Studies 167. 
106 Albers, above n 101, 81. 
107 Ibid 82. 
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deemed to be more important than formal courses. Lawyers consider this source of knowledge to be 
useful, particularly if it is in a format that is regularly updated and known to contain authoritative and 
accurate information.108 
Texts  
None of the lawyers interviewed could recall a particularly helpful textbook on DNA evidence, though 
L34 did say that lawyers will begin the process of reading about DNA evidence when they have a case 
that requires it. When that occurs, L34 argues that lawyers will ‘rush out and buy the latest books on 
DNA and start reading them.’109 A number of lawyers were of the view that a simple textbook on the 
subject at the level of ‘DNA for dummies’ would be particularly useful and potentially more useful 
than lectures or seminars on the topic. Both L9 and L7 refer to a book of this nature being ideal, with 
L7 saying, ‘it would be far more useful than convening a lecturer and having 100 people sit there and 
listen to some scientist prattle on.’110 They see these lectures — often based on specific cases and their 
use of DNA evidence — as being too hard to apply to other cases with different case information, 
whereas simple texts about the basic science are easy to refer to for introductory information.  
L9 pointed out that ‘there are books in the library on DNA, and they’re thick and they’re written by 
scientists. So, there is certainly room for a simple book on DNA.’111 Other lawyers do not ‘believe in 
reading books’ because they express the views and training of the authors and not necessarily that of 
the entire profession.112 The lawyers that participated in this research were not overwhelmed by the 
availability of textbooks that could assist them in understanding DNA evidence.  
Articles 
The data reveal that peer reviewed and more widely available non-peer reviewed research articles are 
of great utility to lawyers. Many research participants noted they read articles about DNA evidence.113 
                                                             
108 Interview with L12 (8 September 2011). 
109 Interview with L34 (6 September 2011).  
110 Interview with L7 (28 July 2011). 
111 Interview with L9 (7 September 2011). 
112 Interview with L6 (7 September 2011). L15 has also stated that they would ‘never have looked at a text book 
on DNA’ (interview with L15, 7 September 2011) and preferred to go straight to the experts for information. 
113 Interview with L14 (28 July 2011); interview with L30 (20 June 2011); interview with L4 (25 October 2011); 
interview with L12 (8 September 2011); interview with L38 (7 September 2011); interview with L17 (27 July 
2011); interview with L36 (20 June 2011); interview with L9 (7 September 2011); interview with L11 (24 June 
2011). 
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Although there are numerous articles available online and in paper publication, the articles of most 
use to lawyers are those that explain the science and how it is applied in legal settings.  
One of the articles identified as being particularly valuable by L11114 is that of Edwards,115 discussed in 
Chapter 2.116 As noted there, Edwards gives a detailed checklist of issues for lawyers to consider when 
they work with DNA evidence to ensure it is free of contamination.117 The article does not question 
the scientific validity of DNA testing, but instead discusses when and how past contamination has 
occurred. L11 was most appreciative of this article, noting: 
Reading and research is useful ... one article I [find] useful … [is] ‘Ten things all lawyers should know 
about DNA evidence’ ... I think it is true, going to that effort to read at least something that’s 
pitched to one’s intellectual level and background, like [that article]. Getting on top of that 
literature, is part of preparation too. So really, if you come across her convey my thanks, because 
it’s pretty well known.118  
Defence lawyer L30 found an article by an American public defender, Edward Ungvarsky, to be 
valuable. Again, the author writes from a legal rather than a scientific perspective. The non-peer 
reviewed article, ‘What Does 1 in a Trillion Mean?’119 explains, from a legal and procedural perspective, 
how statistics are used and how persuasive they can be in a courtroom. 
Lawyers also regularly refer to material produced by Andrew Haesler, formerly a Senior Public 
Defender in New South Wales and now a Justice in the County Court of New South Wales. Haesler J 
has regularly published information on the use of DNA evidence in criminal trials on the Public 
Defender’s website,120 in journal articles121 and at academic conferences.122 Lawyers refer to his 
                                                             
114 Interview with L11 (24 June 2011). 
115 Kirsten Edwards, ‘Ten Things Lawyers Should Know About DNA Evidence’ (2005) 29 Criminal Law Journal 71. 
116 See 2.3. 
117 Edwards, above n 115. 
118 Interview with L11 (24 June 2011). Also see comments by L14 (28 July 2011): ‘I get some case and I have to 
read up about it, there’s a great article. … 10 things all lawyers [should know about DNA evidence].’ 
119 Edward Ungvarsky, ‘What Does 1 in a Trillion Mean?' (2007) 20(1) GeneWatch 10. 
120 See Andrew Haesler, DNA for Defence Lawyers (25 May 2011) NSW Public Defender’s Office 
<http://www.publicdefenders.nsw.gov.au/Documents/dnafordefencelawyers.pdf>; Andrew Haesler, DNA 
in the Local Court (February 2009) NSW Public Defender’s Office 
<http://www.publicdefenders.nsw.gov.au/Pages/public_defenders_research/Papers%20by%20Public%20D
efenders/public_defenders_dna_local_court.aspx>; and Andrew Haesler, DNA in the Local Court – the CSI 
Effect (September 2010) NSW Public Defender’s Office, 
<http://www.publicdefenders.nsw.gov.au/Pages/public_defenders_research/Papers%20by%20Public%20D
efenders/public_defenders_dna_local_court_csi_effect.aspx>.  
121 Andrew Haesler, ‘DNA in Court’ (2008) 8(1) Judicial Review 121. 
122 See for example, Andrew Haesler, ‘Issues in Gathering, Interpreting and Delivering DNA Evidence’ (Paper 
presented at Expert Evidence Conference, Canberra, February 2011) <http://njca.com.au/wp-
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articles because they are easy to understand and written in a way that they can apply directly to their 
cases with DNA evidence.123 Haesler’s publications on the NSW Public Defender’s website are used by 
lawyers, including prosecutors like L2, from jurisdictions outside NSW.124 
Flatman, a lawyer, writes about the probative value of DNA evidence and discusses some of the legal 
and scientific shortcomings and some of the current law on the acceptability of DNA as a form of 
scientific evidence in criminal trials in Australia. This is simply written and targeted to other lawyers 
looking to use and challenge this evidence.125  
Some articles are written specifically for an educative function. For example, Moriarty and Saks wrote 
an article for American judges about the possible issues associated with using DNA evidence.126 It 
begins by introducing the nature of the forensic sciences, which is of particular value in a time when 
there is more scientific information available than ever before. It then moves to the contemporary 
and historical fears about expert evidence and how the law attempts to resolve them. The analysis, of 
course, focuses on American case law rather than the Australian context; however, it does give judges 
a few options to observe if they wish to ‘develop workable filters’ to deploy in discharging their judicial 
gatekeeping role with regard to the use of DNA evidence specifically: 
• Limited admissibility and disallowing conclusions of a match;  
• Focusing on the task at hand — matching proposed expertise with the issue about which the 
expert is testifying in that specific case; 
• Disallowing overpowering or misleading testimony;  
• Proposal for use of court-appointed experts and panels of experts; 
• Appointment and allowance of competing expert opinions.127 
Benchbooks and other judicial officer-specific training 
                                                             
content/uploads/2013/07/Judge-Andrew-Haesler-SC-Issues-in-Gathering-Interpreting-and-Delivering-DNA-
Evidence-paper.pdf>.  
123 Interview with L18 (26 October 2011); interview with L27 (21 June 2011); interview with L22 (20 June 2011); 
interview with L2 (21 June 2011); interview with L11 (24 June 2011). 
124 Interview with L2 (21 June 2011).  
125 Geoffrey Flatman, DNA: A Trial Lawyers Perspective 
<http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/medicine/flatman.pdf>. 
126 Jane Campbell Moriarty and Michael J Saks, ‘Forensic Science: Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws, and Judicial 
Gatekeeping’ (2005) 44(5) American Bar Association Judges Journal 16. 
127 Ibid 29. 
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Australian judges undertake training in their role as judicial officers.128 One of the judges interviewed 
for this research felt that Benchbooks are a useful source of information on DNA evidence.129 The 
Judicial Commission of NSW has published material on its website about DNA evidence, including in 
the Sexual Assault Trials Handbook.130 This discussion of DNA evidence in these sources focuses on the 
scientific aspects of DNA evidence concentrating on its significance as corroborative evidence and as 
evidence of identification. The Supreme and District Courts of Queensland Benchbook contains three 
pages on the definitions of DNA evidence and short discussions of the more relevant case law.131 In 
2006, Thomas referred to seminars and conferences run by the Judicial Commission of New South 
Wales on DNA for judges,132 though there are no longer online records of these courses and judges 
(and lawyers) would not have access to them at this point in time. Benchbooks and handbooks are 
useful to both judges and practising lawyers. They inform judges about the fundamentals of DNA 
evidence, relevant case law and potentially contentious issues that might arise in relation to this 
evidence. They are useful to counsel in the same way that they are useful to judges, but, additionally, 
they alert counsel to the matters that may be in the forefront of judges’ minds in relation to this 
evidence. This arms them with useful information about judicial thinking and, therefore, about what 
they might need to do to meet judicial expectations in adducing or challenging DNA evidence.  
Online resources and reports 
Both judges and lawyers acknowledge the variety and wealth of information about DNA evidence 
available online.133 Victorian judges see the unedited internet as a powerful source of information and 
commentary about all areas of forensic science and utilise material produced particularly by the 
Americans in their own research on DNA evidence.134 Lawyers also regularly consult the internet as a 
first port of call about DNA evidence: ‘I’d Google it — there are a number of … forensic web sites.’135  
                                                             
128 See National Judicial College of Australia, Judicial Education <https://njca.com.au/>. 
129 Interview with P2 (3 May 2011). 
130 Judicial Commission of NSW, Sexual Assault Trials Handbook (August 2016) Judicial Commission of NSW, 
<http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/sexual_assault/index.html>. 
131 Queensland Courts, Supreme and District Courts of Queensland Benchbook DNA (May 2013) 
<http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/86056/sd-bb-53-dna.pdf>. 
132 See Cheryl Thomas, Review of Judicial Training and Education in Other Jurisdictions (2006) Judicial Studies 
Board <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-
institute/files/Judicial_Training_and_Education_in_other_Jurisdictions.pdf>. 
133 Interview with L11 (24 June 2011); interview with L15 (7 September 2011); interview with L3 (6 September 
2011); interview with L7 (28 July 2011); focus group with P5 (26 July 2011). 
134 Focus group with P5, P6 and P7 (26 July 2011).  
135 Interview with L7 (28 July 2011). See also, interview with L15 (7 September 2011): ‘I probably would at some 
stage, it sounds bad but in preparation [I’d] see what’s on the internet’; interview with L3 (6 September 
2011): ‘You know what you do nowadays — you’d go to the internet? I’d go Google, I’d go to Wikipedia right 
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In addition to a more general ‘Google’ search, lawyers also have access to online guides and resources. 
The no longer operating Forensic Science Service in the United Kingdom produced an online ‘Guide to 
DNA for Lawyers and Investigating Officers’ and the Crown Prosecution Service still provides this 
information on their website.136 The Guide contains the basic scientific principles for a number of DNA 
testing procedures and flags issues of contamination, describes issues with databases and includes an 
important section on how best to evaluate DNA analysis. It also provides advice about further reading 
material and gives an appendix defining terms.  
American Bar Associations and government justice agencies provide online resources that could 
potentially assist in educating Australian lawyers about DNA evidence. The American Bar Association 
published their most recent set of Criminal Justice Standards on DNA evidence in August 2006.137 
These standards pay particular attention to the scientific aspects of the evidence but also collate 
standards on the collection, preservation and use of DNA evidence; the testing of DNA evidence; pre-
trial procedures including disclosure and defence testing and retesting of the evidence; considerations 
at trial; charging based on DNA profiles and finally DNA databases. Similarly, North Carolina produces 
a webpage that focuses on DNA analysis,138 with links to other information about DNA evidence 
including reports, the American Bar Association Standards discussed above and other DNA-specific 
information. This page connects lawyers to a training manual for the defence Bar, written by the NIJ.139 
This publication was written by lawyers and forensic biologists. It begins by explaining the the science 
of, and testing techniques used, for DNA analysis, but then offers lawyers advice on the legal 
procedures associated with both adducing and challenging DNA evidence in cross-examination in 
                                                             
from the start and if you put in DNA into the Wikipedia it’s going to … send you off scampering to the relevant 
text or scientific papers.’ 




137 American Bar Association, Standards On DNA Evidence (2007) 
<http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_dnaevid
ence.html>.  
138 North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense Services, DNA Analysis (2014) Forensic Resources, 
<http://www.ncids.com/forensic/dna/dna.shtml>. 
139 Eric H Holder, Jr, Mary Lou Leary and John H Laub, DNA for the Defense Bar (June 2012) National Institute of 
Justice <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/237975.pdf>. 
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criminal trials.140 This includes advice on questioning law enforcement officers on evidence 
collection141 and effective cross-examination of DNA experts.142  
An English resource that is openly available to lawyers around the world is the guide developed by 
Puch-Solis, Roberts, Pope and Aitkin.143 This guide is intended for lawyers but still has a primary focus 
on the scientific aspects of DNA evidence, rather than the procedural aspects of how to investigate 
the collection and use of DNA evidence in criminal cases. The guide gives an overview of the following 
matters: 
• DNA evidence and criminal proceedings; 
• The DNA profile; 
• DNA profiles as evidence in criminal proceedings; 
• Assessing the probative value of single donor profiles; 
• Two Person (‘Mixed’) Questioned Profiles; 
• Low Template DNA (LTDNA); and 
• Presenting DNA Evidence in Courtroom. 
The publication suggests that there is an onus on trial counsel to maintain standards of clarity, to 
ensure that the evidence has indeed been presented accurately and clearly by forensic scientists for 
the benefit of the jury. The report supports a key finding of the present study that lawyers and judges 
are more capable of discharging their legal responsibilities — to the court, to society and to their 
clients — if they have a sound understanding of DNA evidence. The report also reinforces the 
importance of lawyers avoiding ‘fallacious reasoning.’144 
 Conclusion 
This chapter began by presenting an account of what education courses are currently offered to 
lawyers on an ad hoc basis by formal education providers. The discussion in this regard focused on 
Victorian and ACT offerings, but also gave examples of what is available elsewhere in Australia and 
                                                             
140 Ibid 91–123. 
141 Ibid 110. 
142 Ibid 95. 
143 Roberto Puch-Solis et al, Manual Assessing the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Guidance for Judges, 
Lawyers, Forensic Scientists and Expert Witnesses (2012) Working Group on Statistics and the Law, 
<http://www.maths.ed.ac.uk/~cgga/Guide-2-WEB.pdf>. 
144 Ibid 99 [7.18]. 
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overseas. This discussion does not cover the field of what is available worldwide, but provides an 
example of what is currently being offered by various organisations and institutions in various 
jurisdictions. Lawyers have had a broad range of experience with these courses and their views have 
been presented in this chapter to help facilitate recommendations presented in Chapter 8 on DNA 
education. The chapter then provided an analysis of more informal measures of both self-education 
and outside organisational-led training. Lawyers seek information from forensic biologists who 
analyse and present DNA evidence and from their peers in legal practice. Both sources were identified 
by several interviewees. Many of the opportunities for informal education about DNA evidence for 
lawyers go beyond the ad hoc case-by-case interaction with experts and fellow lawyers. Reading and 
research conducted online in a self-paced environment constitutes a significant source of information 
and knowledge acquisition for lawyers. This chapter raises important questions about the utility of 
offering formal DNA evidence education through service providers. Lawyers argued that the 
availability of accessible and up to date information when they most need it is arguably more valuable. 
These findings inform the conclusions and two recommendations made in Chapter 8 below. 
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8 Conclusions and recommendations 
 Introduction 
This thesis has presented research on two key areas — first, on lawyers’ understanding of DNA 
evidence and the difficulties they face in dealing with this evidence in criminal trials, and second, on 
the training opportunities and resources available to lawyers in this area. This chapter concludes the 
thesis by first summarising the findings in relation to the primary and secondary research questions 
as they have been analysed and discussed in previous chapters. Based on those findings, it then makes 
recommendations for legal practice and policy changes and further research in this area.  
 Original contribution 
This thesis makes an original contribution by exploring how lawyers manage DNA evidence in cases in 
which they act. In particular, it identifies influences upon the way that lawyers deal with DNA evidence 
in practice, including systemic factors integral to the adversarial criminal justice system. It discusses 
the difficulties they encounter with DNA evidence, their understanding of this evidence and their 
perceptions of their own role in relation to DNA evidence at trial. It also explores how they learn about 
DNA evidence in general and, more particularly, how they learn about how to contend with DNA 
evidence in a criminal trial context. The originality of this thesis also resides in the fact that the data 
analysed were obtained from those with the greatest experience and understanding of how lawyers 
manage DNA evidence, namely, lawyers themselves and the judges and forensic scientists with whom 
they work. This has enabled this thesis to provide original insights into the complexities of working 
with DNA evidence by drawing on the different perspectives of key actors in the legal system. 
Chapter 2 identified the dearth of research on how lawyers deal with DNA evidence in practice. The 
reports - Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (NAS Report) and the 
Inquiry into the Circumstances that Led to the Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama (Vincent 
Report) 1 and previous research discussed at 2.2 indicate that lawyers play an influential role in jurors’ 
perceptions of DNA evidence and suggest that how lawyers present DNA evidence has an impact on 
the outcome of trials. Most of the academic research outlined in Chapter 2 is consistent with the 
                                                             
1 National Research Council Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Sciences Community, 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009) National Academy of Sciences 
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf> (‘NAS Report’); Frank Vincent, Inquiry into the 
Circumstances that Led to the Conviction of Mr Farah Abdulkadir Jama (2010) Parliament of Victoria 
<http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/papers/govpub/VPARL2006-10No301.pdf> (‘Vincent Report’). 
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recommendations of the NAS and Vincent reports in suggesting that a lack of competence in dealing 
with DNA evidence by all involved, has been a source of serious error in criminal cases. These reports 
have not reflected upon the possibility that there may be barriers to lawyers’ acquisition of knowledge 
and communication with DNA experts, and that those barriers might be systemic and generated by 
the exigencies of lawyers’ real life practice and/or the cultural norms of their work environment.  
This thesis explores in depth the factors that may underpin lawyers’ perceived lack of competence in 
this area. Building on existing research that recognises the problematic nature of DNA evidence for 
lawyers, it identifies and explores in detail the problems that lawyers experience in dealing with DNA 
evidence including, their difficulties in understanding elements of the scientific procedures used in 
testing DNA evidence, problems derived from the inability of DNA evidence to constitute conclusive 
evidence of guilt and problems relating to its presentation in court. Furthermore, by adopting a 
qualitative social scientific research methodology it explores these difficulties in greater depth than 
any previous studies. These matters are explored in Chapters 5 and 6 with a particular emphasis on 
uncovering the underlying sources of these problems and examining whether and how lawyers 
recognise and tackle them. It was found that while lawyers generally have an understanding of their 
own difficulties with this evidence and of the problems it generates, they are perplexed about how to 
overcome them.2 
Because human involvement at all stages of the collection, analysis and presentation of DNA evidence 
introduces opportunities for mistakes to occur, effective oversight and scrutiny of investigative and 
analytical processes prior to the trial itself is of critical importance. Lawyers’ views about these stages 
of the criminal justice process have not previously been sought. This study has identified some of the 
sources of frustration for lawyers in gathering information on DNA evidence, some of which may be 
remedied — for example, the lack of adequate information available to them about the collection and 
analysis of DNA evidence and, for defence lawyers, their lack of access to expert advice about DNA in 
the cases in which they act. 
This study not only reveals the difficulties that lawyers experience in using, understanding and 
presenting DNA evidence in criminal trials, it also examines the source of those difficulties. For 
example, because the results of DNA profiling are never 100% certain they must be presented as 
probability ratios. Probability ratios, however, are problematic for lawyers. Both the work of other 
scholars3 and the present study reveal that lawyers and jurors find them confusing and open to 
                                                             
2 See 6.2–6.5 at 145-178. 
3 See 2.2.1–2.2.2 at 8–10. 
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misunderstanding and misinterpretation.4 In common with previous research and reports, the 
conclusions from this study demonstrate that lawyers cannot counteract these problems unless they 
are adequately armed with relevant knowledge and skills. This study goes beyond earlier research and 
uncovers lawyers’ perceptions of these difficulties in great detail.5 The data show that lawyers 
themselves are aware of their need for adequate and effective knowledge. The problem for them is, 
how to gain it and, specifically, how to gain access to optimum sources of knowledge in a timely 
manner.6 In this regard, one of the greatest challenges, as revealed by this thesis, is how to surmount 
systemic barriers arising from the adversarial process, which erect cultural hurdles to information 
sharing between the legal and forensic science communities.7 
The Australian legal system and the adversarial nature of court trials and pre-trial procedure often 
dictates how much information lawyers are willing to share with opposing parties and, therefore, with 
experts. Importantly they influence whether defence counsel communicate with experts at all.8 For 
prosecution lawyers, it appears that their perceptions of their own role in relation to DNA evidence 
may influence the degree to which they interact with DNA experts.9 For the most part, tactical and 
cultural influences on lawyers’ behaviour occur because lawyers work within an adversarial system in 
Australia,10 a system that is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Any recommendations for 
change aimed at improving lawyers’ knowledge of DNA evidence and their communication with DNA 
experts must, therefore, take systemic factors into account and acknowledge the influence of the 
Australian legal culture and the environment in which Australian lawyers operate on decisions they 
make about their work.  
 Research conclusions 
This section explains how each of the research questions was answered by the data collected and 
analysis conducted in chapters 5, 6 and 7. The first of the primary research questions asked about 
                                                             
4 See 6.2.1 at 145-154. 
5 In undertaking interviews with lawyers and judges and forensic scientists as professionals who work with 
lawyers in this area, the discussion and analysis of lawyers’ perceptions of these difficulties is found in 
Chapter 6, specifically 6.2–6.5 at 145-178. 
6 See analysis of the data in Chapter 5, exploring what the ‘realities’ of legal practice are for Australian criminal 
lawyers in this area. In particular, see also 6.5, the communicative difficulties lawyers face at 171. 
7 See 5.7 at 131 about how your position as prosecutor or defence counsel has a role to play in your 
understanding and use of DNA evidence in criminal trials in Australia.  
8 See 5.7.4 at 134. 
9 See discussion of pre-trial procedure at 6.3.2 at 158 and the expectations of experts by lawyers at 6.4.2 at 
168. 
10 See 3.3 at 55 for discussion of the adversarial system as it operates in Australia.  
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lawyers’ understandings of DNA evidence and the difficulties they have in dealing with this type of 
evidence in criminal trials. 
 Lawyers’ understanding of DNA evidence 
Lawyers’ understanding of DNA evidence was dealt with in many sections of this thesis.11 Despite the 
myriad of legal profession rules, guidelines and legislation governing criminal procedure for lawyers 
in Victoria and the ACT, overall this research found that it was not the rules in place but the adversarial 
nature of criminal trials that has the greatest impact on lawyers’ behaviour. Understanding of DNA 
evidence was varied. Many described the mathematics and/or presentation of DNA evidence as 
‘gobbledy gook’ or ‘meaningless’.12 Many expressed a lack of understanding about the science and 
mathematics. Many do have some understanding of some aspects of basic principles and procedure. 
They also understand where the problems in relation to DNA evidence can arise — flaws in its 
collection and analysis and problems arising from statistics and its limitations. However, they lack 
either an understanding of how to expose procedural flaws or the confidence to do so. Lawyers made 
the important point that while they know in theory how procedural errors might occur, they have 
difficulty in exposing their occurrence in practice. They also lack either the understanding and/or the 
skill to overcome misconceptions arising from the way that statistics are presented. Their ability to 
tackle these problems is not assisted by adversarialism because it erects barriers for defence lawyers 
to access forensic scientists working for State laboratories. Lawyers also typically lack access to 
requisite information (for example, the full biology file) that might alert them to procedural flaws. 
Further, restricted access to most relevant information and/or most relevant sources of information 
limits their ability to ensure presentation in court is accurate and comprehensible in lay terms and 
that there is not a mismatch between what forensic scientists say and what lawyers and jurors 
understand them to be saying. 
Lawyers’ conduct of cases must comply with relevant rules, guidelines and legislation. However, these 
rarely deal explicitly with DNA evidence,13 and they are rarely directed at eliminating or reducing the 
likelihood of procedural errors.14 Nevertheless, these general principles may be relevant to DNA 
                                                             
11 See for example, 5.3 at 112 and how lawyers identify contentious DNA and all of the analysis in Chapter 6 on 
difficulties with DNA evidence, particularly in identifying (or finding it difficult to identify) issues with the 
science, procedure or communication of DNA evidence in criminal trials.  
12 See interview with L34 (6 September 2011); interview with L30 (20 June 2011). 
13 See 3.6 at 76. 
14 One exception in this regard is that of the prosecutorial discretion in Victoria, see Director of Public 
Prosecutions Victoria, ‘Director’s Policy: Prosecutorial Discretion’ (24 November 2014) Office of Public 
Prosecutions Victoria, 20 <http://www.opp.vic.gov.au/getattachment/5b830306-a17b-4ada-9078-
6982539d44ac/2-The-Prosecutorial-Discretion.aspx>. 
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evidence and create a standard for knowledge about it and how lawyers manage it at trials. For 
example, expert evidence rules erect standards of authenticity and expertise in relation to DNA 
evidence and DNA experts. The rules also require lawyers to understand the knowledge area in which 
witnesses have expertise, so that they can ensure that witnesses do not offer opinions beyond their 
areas of expertise and so that the opinions they express are supported by the evidence and/or comply 
with the strictures of their discipline. The data analysed in this study suggest that lawyers do not 
always meet those standards. For example, it was found that some prosecution counsel abrogate their 
role in eliciting DNA evidence and instead rely on the experts15 to give their evidence accurately and 
in accordance with evidentiary rules. Lawyers also have an obligation under the human rights 
standards for fair trials16 to handle DNA evidence competently and to be knowledgeable about that 
evidence so that defendants are not unjustly convicted. Lawyers who make ‘tactical’ decisions to avoid 
talking to experts17 or delay in sharing information18 in a deliberate way may not meet their obligations 
under domestic and international human rights instruments or fundamental common law principles 
relating to fair trials. For example, the difficulties that lawyers have with statistics and probabilities19 
make it difficult for them to ensure that witnesses’ meaning and jurors’ understanding of statistics 
match. 
There are shortcomings in the way lawyers deal with DNA evidence — observations of judges and 
forensic scientists make this point. However, this research has found that these shortcomings are not 
necessarily due to lack of diligence or competence, or even to lack of understanding simpliciter, 
although this does play a part. Additionally, lawyers’ capacity to discharge their responsibilities in 
relation to fair trials20 and DNA evidence are constrained by conventions of the adversarial process.  
Where decisions are made not to pursue a greater understanding of DNA evidence or where 
adversarial conventions stand in the way of lawyers improving their knowledge of, and skills in, 
handling DNA evidence, their ability to discharge their domestic and international human rights 
obligations in relation to fair trials will necessarily be constrained. This suggests that what is needed 
                                                             
15 See 6.3.2 for pre-trial procedure concerns and 6.5 regarding communication between prosecutors and 
experts.  
16 See 3.4 at 57 for a discussion of the human rights framework relevant to this discussion.  
17 As some defence counsel have said they do, see 5.7.4 at 133. 
18 See 6.3.1 at 156 and 3.4.2 re international case law on delay and unfairness at 60. 
19 See 6.2 at 145. 
20 Under the Victorian and ACT human rights instruments and under the ICCPR, see 3.4.1 at 59. 
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is a greater appreciation of the negative impact of some adversarial conventions and tactics for the 
management of DNA evidence.  
8.4.1 Limitations of DNA evidence 
All lawyers interviewed understood the limitations of DNA evidence when directly asked about this in 
interviews21 in accordance with research question 2A.22 In Chapter 5, the data analysis indicates that 
contamination and transference during investigations and misinterpretation of the results by jurors at 
trial are all commonly known to limit the reliability of what is generally perceived to be a robust form 
of scientific evidence. This suggests that although lawyers rarely challenge DNA evidence, this is not 
necessarily because they don’t understand that it has limitations, or how it may be used or relied on. 
Rather, other factors are at play like inadequate information, for example, about the collection and 
analysis of the evidence in the cases in which they act, which might enable them to mount challenges 
to it. 
Nevertheless, because DNA evidence is common but rarely contentious, lawyers might assume that it 
is reliable when, in fact, it is deficient in some way. This amplifies the potential for oversights and 
errors in procedure to occur — Jama provides an example of a systematic failure by all parties involved 
to communicate with each other and go beyond the accepted reliability of DNA evidence to scrutinise 
its actual reliability. Despite the legal community’s heightened awareness following Jama and the 
Vincent Report, the potential flaws in DNA evidence collection and analysis have not been — and 
cannot be — eliminated in any Australian jurisdiction because of the human element involved in those 
processes. Clearly, this mandates co-operative investigation of the evidence by all involved in cases in 
which it is offered as significant and/or potentially contentious evidence of identification and guilt. 
This means that in such cases lawyers should routinely be given the most detailed information possible 
about the chain of evidence as well as access to the biology file. Resources including written 
materials23 to assist lawyers who do suspect an error in procedure are also needed, which should 
include unfettered access to information and experts rather than access determined by tactical 
considerations or a lawyer’s ‘side’.  
Even though, in theory, DNA evidence is to be treated in the same way as other circumstantial 
evidence,24 in practice, lawyers and jurors appear to value it more highly than other forms of 
                                                             
21 See interview schedule at Appendix F. 
22 See 4.4.1 at 84. 
23 Like those referred to as ‘useful’ by lawyers in 7.3.2 at 201. 
24 See discussion in 5.5 at 120-122.  
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circumstantial evidence.25 This view is even supported by decisional law,26 which accepts the 
proposition that a case may proceed to trial on DNA evidence alone.27 Normally, circumstantial 
evidence operates in a cumulative way, so that one item of circumstantial evidence is rarely sufficient 
to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.28 The apparently inflated value of DNA evidence needs to 
be acknowledged more openly in practice. We understand from what happened in Jama that if DNA 
is the only evidence of guilt, or one of a very few items of prosecution evidence, then lawyers must go 
beyond the forensic report and talk to experts to ensure that it is sound. Whether lawyers do this will 
depend on their own general perceptions of DNA evidence, their confidence in dealing with it and the 
extent to which they feel able to speak about it to experts. A number of lawyers who participated in 
this study expressed a lack of confidence in relation to these matters. This suggests that they need 
support in this regard, which might be provided in different forms, including through educational 
programs that foster a cultural shift in communication practices, and through easily accessible practice 
guidance. Lawyers’ appreciation of Kirsten Edwards’ ‘Ten Things Lawyers Should Know About DNA 
Evidence’ demonstrates how valuable practical guides in relation to DNA evidence can be.  
8.4.2 Lawyers’ effectiveness 
The next secondary research question asked how lawyers can be more effective with DNA evidence in 
criminal cases. Lawyers’ ability to deal effectively with DNA evidence is influenced by the adversarial 
system. Some defence lawyers avoid experts and, as far as is possible without breaking their 
professional obligations, adopt a ‘trial by ambush’ modus operandi.29 Improving communication 
between State forensic scientists and defence lawyers while there is a State-funded forensic science 
system that primarily serves prosecution lawyers in an adversarial system may take significant time. 
Cultural shifts in an adversarial system can be difficult to achieve, but not impossible, particularly if 
lawyers themselves support them. A lawyer’s ‘side’ as a prosecutor or defence lawyer influences how 
they use and understand DNA evidence30 and how much of an impact the adversarial system has on 
                                                             
25 See for example interview with L15 (7 September 2011) and interview with L22 (20 June 2011) who stated 
‘without the DNA we’ve got next to nothing, with the DNA we’ve got a good case.’ 
26 R v Forbes (2009) 167 ACTR 1. 
27 See 5.5.4 at 126.  
28 A reasonable inference can be drawn from a combination of facts, none of which viewed alone would support 
that inference: see Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; R v Sorby [1986] VR 753; Shepherd 
v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573; R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618; R v Allen [2007] VSCA 97. 
29 See 5.7.4 at 133. 
30 See 5.8. 
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their behaviour in practice because they may choose to conduct trials by ambush31 or avoid sharing 
information.32 
Lawyers will need to deal with new technologies as the science changes and develops and smaller 
amounts of trace evidence can be collected, analysed and interpreted. If lawyers are to challenge the 
scientific validity of DNA testing in some, if not all cases, then information and access to experts is 
important so lawyers feel competent and confident to gather information on these changes.  
8.4.3 The process involved 
Research question 4A sought to explore the process lawyers follow when they have a brief that 
includes DNA evidence. The answer is — ‘it depends’. It depends on the individual case and whether 
the evidence was supported by other evidence and/or contested. Predominantly though, lawyers talk 
to other lawyers, do online research in academic journals to find articles that were relevant to their 
case, look for precedent on how courts have handled other cases using the same type of DNA evidence 
or with the same issues. It may not be deemed ‘appropriate’ to talk to experts if the forensic report is 
detailed and written in language that is well understood for those without scientific knowledge and if 
there is other supporting evidence for the case. If a case is serious, with very little supporting evidence, 
lawyers are more likely to talk to experts about the DNA evidence. However, it is not common for 
lawyers to communicate pre-trial with DNA experts. The results are that lawyers may be less well 
informed about the DNA evidence in cases in which they act than they might otherwise be. 
8.4.4 Difficulties with DNA evidence 
The second primary research question focused on the training opportunities and resources available 
to lawyers on DNA evidence and what lawyers’ views are about the value of those opportunities and 
resources. Secondary research question 1B was, ‘what do criminal lawyers find most difficult to 
understand about DNA evidence’?33 
In Chapter 6, the analysis of the results reveals that most lawyers interviewed understand the 
procedural aspects of DNA collection and analysis and the chain of evidence — those areas where 
experience suggests that error is most likely to occur and to lead to miscarriages of justice. However, 
the data clearly reveal that a theoretical understanding of these matters is not sufficient to prevent 
miscarriages of justice. As already noted, a key difficulty is to apply that understanding in practice and 
expose any errors that do occur in that process. Without adequate information about the chain of 
                                                             
31 See 5.7, particularly 5.7.4 at 134 on avoiding experts and trial by ambush in an adversarial system.  
32 See 5.5.3 at 125. 
33 See 4.4 for all research questions.  
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evidence and potential sources of contamination or transference, such errors will remain hidden. 
Other sources of difficulty for lawyers revealed by this study are the science of DNA evidence, 
probability ratios and mixed profiles. Some lawyers find the numbers used to express results confusing 
and intimidating. Identifying errors, comprehending scientific reports and uncovering contamination 
in practice are procedural difficulties both in the pre-trial and trial stages. There is a significant 
mismatch that can occur at trial between what scientists understand themselves to be saying and 
lawyers’ and jurors’ interpretation of what they say. This links particularly to one of the key findings 
repeatedly emphasised throughout this thesis about the critical importance of co-operative pre-trial 
communication between lawyers and forensic scientists — a point that was stressed by forensic 
scientists and discussed in judges’ observations in the focus groups.34 
Examining and cross examining experts using the appropriate scientific language is also difficult for 
lawyers, particularly given the lack of communication pre-trial and the lack of information provided 
by some forensic reports.35 Additionally, there is some confusion about whose role it is to take 
responsibility for eliciting experts’ evidence in court. Prosecution counsel may abrogate their 
responsibility to ask questions that elicit the evidence accurately, clearly and comprehensibly and 
leave it to the witness to give the evidence as they think best. 
8.4.5 Legal education 
Three of the secondary research questions were relevant to the investigation of legal education on 
DNA evidence for criminal lawyers. This section summarises the conclusions reached in relation to the 
questions: ‘what form of continuous legal education is available to criminal lawyers in Victoria and the 
ACT on the use of DNA evidence, and how does this compare nationally and internationally (research 
question 1C)?; what is the lawyer experience of education or training on DNA evidence (research 
question 2C)? and where do criminal lawyers get information to help them with briefs containing DNA 
evidence in criminal trials? (research question 3C)? 
Lawyers rarely undertake formal education on DNA evidence beyond the workshops or seminars 
hosted by their workplaces or by the Law Institutes in their jurisdiction. Education in such workshops 
tends to concentrate on the introductory scientific principles of DNA evidence, or in some cases, the 
particulars of cases deemed to be miscarriages of justice. Conferences that bring together forensic 
practitioners and lawyers, like the Australian and New Zealand Forensic Science Society’s bi-annual 
conference, are useful not only for knowledge building, but also for building relationships and enabling 
                                                             
34 See 6.4.1-6.4.2. 
35 See 6.5.1. 
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improved communication between criminal lawyers and experts. Lawyers find information about 
basic DNA principles useful to a degree, but their attendance at programs that focus on these matters 
is limited, particularly if they are scheduled to occur during already busy working hours.  
Lawyers, particularly defence lawyers, seek information about DNA evidence on a case-by-case basis 
and predominantly when working on cases involving contentious or statistically significant results in 
relation to proof of guilt. If this is the case, they gather information from a variety of sources. They 
may rely on their own experience of using DNA evidence. Prosecutors may talk to forensic experts 
from the State forensic laboratories and, in very limited circumstances, defence lawyers may also 
approach forensic experts for guidance or clarification. However, generally defence lawyers do not 
consider it to be ‘tactically appropriate’ to talk to State forensic experts. Lawyers also learn about DNA 
evidence by talking to others in the profession who have had experience with the evidence in their 
own cases and they learn from reading information online, in text books and in case law. Lawyers also 
appear to find in-house instruction offered in some workplaces to be particularly useful. Such sessions 
can be tailored to the particular needs and areas of interest of the lawyers in those workplaces.  
 Recommendations for policy and practice 
There are several categories of recommendations that flow from these findings. These acknowledge 
that lawyers have some understanding that DNA evidence can be problematic, that it has limitations 
and what the source of its problems may be, but they, nevertheless, have difficulty in making practical 
use of that information. These recommendations are divided into four categories. The first is 
recommendations based on the adversarial nature of trials, as this has proved to be one of the most 
influential aspects of the legal system on lawyers’ behaviour in this area. The second is DNA education 
and the third focuses on improved communication of DNA evidence. The final category focuses on 
recommendations around pre-trial information about DNA evidence.  
8.5.1 Recommendations: the adversarial nature of criminal trials 
The adversarial nature of criminal trials has a marked influence on lawyers’ behaviour when using DNA 
evidence and it informs several of the conclusions drawn in the preceding paragraphs. This thesis 
makes four recommendations to ameliorate the detrimental effect of lawyers using the adversarial 
system in a strategic way in cases with DNA evidence.  
This thesis has presented some of the more negative effects of an adversarial system for lawyers using 
DNA evidence in criminal justice in Australia.36 The first recommendation is that lawyers need a greater 
                                                             
36 See 5.7.4 at p 134. 
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appreciation of the negative impact that adversarial conventions and tactics have on the management 
of DNA evidence. This thesis explains those conventions and tactics, in many cases using lawyers’ own 
words. This thesis may then form a basis for government legal organisations and Chambers to begin a 
discussion with lawyers about how actual legal practice has strayed from the ideal, and, in doing so, 
bring those tactical considerations and conventions to the fore so that all lawyers are candid and 
honest about how they are using and managing the DNA evidence in trials. This may not only lead to 
a greater appreciation of the negative impact these tactics may have, but also influence lawyers’ 
behaviour in a positive way that reduces their reliance on deleterious conventions and strategies. 
This recommendation is linked to the second recommendation in this category, which relates to the 
perception that, in practice, DNA evidence is different to other circumstantial evidence.37 This view 
should be acknowledged more openly by lawyers and by those in the legal and forensic science 
system. If it were more prevalent in discussions between criminal lawyers and their managers or 
senior barristers in Chambers, as well as in publications in this area, then lawyers might spend more 
time exploring expert credibility (see the third recommendation in this category below) and request 
more information from experts regardless of their ‘side’. 
The third recommendation is that lawyers should apply or, at the very least, consider how to apply 
the requirements of s 79 of the uniform Evidence Acts (admissibility of expert opinion and the 
exceptions to the opinion rule) with increased rigour in cases involving DNA evidence. In many cases, 
lawyers appear to accept without question the expertise of those giving evidence in forensic biology 
cases, and as cases like Honeysett v The Queen38 demonstrate, such expertise should not be assumed 
in current legal practice. Each case is factually different and experts who testify regularly must also 
have their expertise measured against the evidence in those cases. This means, as Honeysett also 
demonstrates, that lawyers should carefully scrutinise and police expert evidence to ensure that it 
does not stray beyond the witnesses’ precise area of expertise or into the province of the jury. 
The final recommendation in this area is that the system needs to overcome the restrictive access 
currently encountered by defence lawyers to forensic laboratories. Whether the restrictions are real 
or perceived, tactical considerations in avoiding talking to experts must be overcome by opening 
access to forensic laboratories to all lawyers at all stages of the investigative process. This is a move 
required of forensic laboratories and certainly the State as managers of those laboratories. Rather 
than relying on defence lawyers to request access to information, the recommendation is that at the 
beginning of a case with potentially contentious DNA evidence (it is not likely that lawyers would have 
                                                             
37 See 5.5 at p 120. 
38 [2014] HCA 29. 
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the time to do this in all cases involving DNA evidence), both defence and prosecution lawyers are 
invited to the laboratory and that they receive the same information and same level of access, if they 
require it, to the experts, to the forensic biology files and to the evidence. 
Cultural shifts in this area are important to achieve change and improve knowledge and more 
competent use of DNA evidence by all lawyers. More open communication and acknowledgement of 
the adversarial nature of these trials and the tactics that arise thus may help in reducing deleterious 
behaviour, though it may not eliminate it completely. Nevertheless, an awareness of lawyers’ common 
tactics in relation to DNA evidence and their approach to expert witnesses, as revealed in this thesis, 
creates the opportunity to move forward and create change.  
8.5.2 Recommendations: DNA education 
Interviewees made it very clear that they learn about DNA evidence on a case-by-case basis. That 
means that they seek information in a more ad-hoc manner than DNA education courses run at regular 
intervals on the basics of DNA evidence generally provide. They need information at short notice and 
often have questions or require clarification for very specific areas of the science (for example, about 
low copy DNA or how transfer might occur on certain materials). There are five recommendations that 
this thesis makes in this category and they each focus on the provision of information if and when 
lawyers need it and a more open access to a variety of learning sources. This thesis has explained the 
various ways in which lawyers learn about DNA evidence and those that they find most useful. Lawyers 
need a variety of information sources which suit their various learning styles and the variety of cases 
on which they will work. Unique cases will require lawyers to be able to access a hub of information 
from workshops, journal articles, advice from more experienced lawyers, and, most importantly, an 
environment where all lawyers can freely talk to experts without tactical considerations preventing 
them from doing so. 
The first recommendation looks at the combination of pedagogies explored in the research in Chapter 
7 and the insights from lawyers interviewed and presented in chapters 5 and 6 on how lawyers learn. 
This thesis recommends that a combined approach to DNA education for lawyers be supported and 
provided. The approach adopted needs to overcome the ‘tactical’ considerations that sometimes 
prevent lawyers from gathering the most pertinent, relevant and accurate information about DNA 
evidence. The primary consideration is that relevant information should always be available — 
suggesting a dominant role for online courses or online information portals that may contain 
contributions from Australian and, even, international specialist forensic biologists. This 
recommendation supports having the most up to date information available and it allows for leaders 
in the field of forensic biology to present the most accepted information for use in legal cases. Online 
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self-directed courses or information portals like those used in the United States39 would also allow 
lawyers to gather information in their own time and when a case requires it. Because defence lawyers 
have also noted difficulty with, or tactical concerns around, accessing experts employed by the State, 
having access via email to noted professionals through an online portal may ameliorate that access 
problem and improve knowledge and accessibility to information needed to improve knowledge on a 
case-by-case basis. One of the key considerations behind this recommendation and the provision of 
any online resources or portals is that lawyers need to be able to re-familiarise themselves with 
information about DNA evidence. This is necessitated by the fact that they seek information on DNA 
evidence on a case-by-case basis. Practical training, workshops and seminars also have a place but 
their value appears to reside principally in the information that they can convey about lessons learned 
in previous cases or about the application of DNA evidence in a practical way in a legal context.  
Because no single form of education on DNA evidence is deemed ‘the best’ and a variety of 
instructional modes should be fostered, having access to other lawyers who have worked with DNA 
evidence in major Australian cases in recent years is the second recommendation made in the area of 
DNA education. Facilitating group discussions where lawyers share their experiences of contentious 
DNA evidence and cases is important and might be organised by the Law Societies of Victoria and the 
ACT and advertised to all lawyers with current practising certificates. This may also help overcome the 
restrictive access currently encountered by defence lawyers to forensic laboratories and facilitate 
greater information sharing between lawyers, whether they are prosecutors or defence counsel.  
The third recommendation related to DNA education focuses on creating awareness of the 
relationship between forensic science more broadly and law in universities. This is not recommended 
with the sole aim of encouraging the teaching of criminal law students about the scientific principles 
behind DNA evidence. It also seeks to encourage the introduction of information about how the 
adversarial legal system works in practice in courses for forensic science students. While the NAS 
report40 suggests that university studies might incorporate more information about forensic science 
in legal curricula, Victorian and ACT lawyers who participated in this study do not consider this to be 
the optimal time to learn about the science of DNA evidence. Nevertheless, they do see value in 
forensic studies programs41 where information about the intersection between science and law is 
presented, particularly if they offer contributions from a variety of sources, including law schools, law 
                                                             
39 See 7.2.2 at p 187-190. 
40 NAS Report, above n 1, 73. 
41 See Henry F Fradella, Stephen S Owen and Todd W Burke, ‘Building Bridges Between Criminal Justice and the 
Forensic Sciences to Create Forensic Studies Programs’ (2007) 18(2) Journal of Criminal Justice Education 
261. 
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enforcement agencies and criminology departments. Such programs may build inter-institutional 
relationships and foster general understanding and knowledge of where to find further information. 
The more that universities incorporate such inter-disciplinary material into their programs, the more 
likely it is that the barriers between scientists and legal professionals will be reduced and 
improvements in education and communication will be achieved. 
Professional conferences also provide educational offerings on DNA evidence, but most significantly 
for lawyers, they provide opportunities to speak to experts and build co-operative relationships in 
areas that are most relevant to their criminal law practice. This thesis recommends that lawyers be 
encouraged to attend the forensic conferences that are available, like that of the Australian and New 
Zealand Forensic Science Society and other accredited organisations. Attendance at such conferences 
might be promoted if a greater number of CPD points were allocated for criminal lawyers to attend, 
and workplace support provided for those working in governmental legal organisations as well as 
support from other barristers in Chambers for those working independently.  
It would be remiss of this thesis to overlook the value of practical training, workshops and seminars, 
despite the fact that most lawyers interviewed for this study consider the material presented at such 
events to consist of repeated basic scientific principles. This thesis recommends that workshops and 
seminars be practically focused, looking at recent cases, scientific developments and how they might 
affect lawyers. These sessions should be tailored to the particular needs and areas of interest of the 
lawyers participating. The value of practical training, workshops and seminars appears to reside 
principally in the information that they can convey about lessons learned in previous cases or about 
the application of DNA evidence in a practical way in a legal context. This thesis recommends that 
these events continue to be offered to lawyers but in a form that recognises that their particular value 
lies in enabling lawyers to share ‘lessons learned’ from working with DNA evidence. Attendance at 
education programs or workshops of this kind with a focus on forensic evidence and DNA evidence is 
likely to hinge on their being offered to lawyers at varying times. These times might be during paid 
work hours, around other legal commitments, or outside of paid hours if lawyers agree to participate. 
It is further recommended that lawyers be paid for attending, that attendance be recognised with CPD 
points and that the subjects covered be most relevant to those lawyers attending. Education programs 
like workshops and seminars should also be devised with the tactical considerations of lawyers in this 
area and the adversarial nature of the legal system in mind but with the objective of promoting the 
abandonment of such conventions at least when they limit the acquisition of understanding of DNA 
evidence. Such programs might also promote a greater level of co-operative communication and 
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effective exploration/investigation of DNA evidence by experts and lawyers in cases where they are 
mutually involved to maximise lawyers’ understanding of the specific evidence they are dealing with. 
8.5.3 Recommendations: the communication of DNA evidence 
Improved communication about DNA evidence between lawyers and scientists and between 
prosecutors and defence lawyers will not only improve knowledge of DNA evidence but may also 
reduce miscarriages of justice. Errors like that which happened to Jama are less likely to occur when 
those involved in the collection, analysis and presentation of the evidence do not work in silos and 
provide greater access to information. This thesis makes three recommendations specific to the area 
of communication of DNA evidence. 
It is acknowledged that the provision of forensic services in Victoria and the ACT is unlikely to extend 
in the near future beyond the State-funded laboratory structure where the majority of samples are 
tested at the present time. Nevertheless, because both defence and prosecution lawyers recognise 
the value of communicating with DNA experts, it is recommended that measures be adopted to 
support and encourage such communication and, where defence lawyers are concerned, to improve 
their opportunities to engage in such communication. This may occur with organised events that bring 
experts and lawyers together for social and educational reasons, like workshops, seminars or forensic 
committee meetings with a social focus. It is every lawyer’s responsibility to be informed about the 
evidence they are dealing with at trial and this involves understanding reports, proofing experts and 
understanding the evidence so that it may be elicited effectively and cross-examined rigorously. 
Accordingly, relationships must be formed and cultivated between lawyers and forensic scientists so 
that there may be open communication between them when lawyers have concerns, 
misunderstandings or questions about DNA evidence in any cases in which they act. If tactical concerns 
continue to prevent lawyers from talking to forensic biologists in their own jurisdiction at organised 
events like those recommended here, then access to, and relationships with, interstate experts must 
be improved and cultivated through online portals, groups or national conferences. 
The second recommendation in this area overlaps with one discussed earlier and that is for 
organisations, employers and individual lawyers to create further opportunities for forensic scientists 
and lawyers to connect, for example, at conferences held by ANZFSS.42 Taking this recommendation 
further, the Australian Academy of Forensic Science (AAFS)43 has chapters in the ACT and Victoria and 
lawyers need to take advantage of groups such as these in order to learn more and communicate more 
                                                             
42 See experience of L32 (22 June 2011) at 192. 
43 Australian Academy of Forensic Science <www.forensicacademy.org>. 
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with professionals from the forensic sciences. Both the Victorian and ACT chapters of the AAFS are 
currently chaired by lawyers.44 Establishing a Chapter in every jurisdiction of Australia would help 
facilitate development of these relationships and improve communication as a result of meetings and 
events held by AAFS. This would help limit the problems with communication noted above at 6.5 of 
this thesis45 and facilitate gaining the benefits associated with learning from experts noted at 7.3.1.46 
Only when these relationships are formed may the benefit of learning from experts in their own field 
be truly realised by Australian criminal lawyers.  
The third recommendation in this area is supported by Howes’s research.47 It is that forensic biology 
reports be made easier for lawyers to understand and that they be written in plain English language 
that is easier for lawyers to follow. If this language is used by forensic scientists, then more information 
about the collection and analysis of the DNA evidence may be included in reports without 
overwhelming lawyers. This information may provide the basis for further conversations with experts 
or further investigation by lawyers. 
8.5.4 Recommendations: pre-trial information 
The more information a lawyer can gather about a case in the early stages of investigation, the more 
able he or she will be to decide whether to proceed with prosecution or, in the case of the defence, 
how best to defend a case for a client. A recommendation about the availability of more clearly written 
forensic reports has been made above. This thesis further recommends that lawyers have access to a 
‘bank’ of online written materials and videos, created for the purpose of providing them with 
information pre-trial and ensuring the adequacy of their knowledge and understanding of DNA 
evidence. 
This recommendation is for the creation of online resources including written materials and videos, to 
assist lawyers who may suspect an error in forensic procedure in a criminal case. These may be made 
available as part of an online portal as recommended at 8.4.5 above, or as part of a Law Society’s 
website. Those resources need to include not only information about the process that lawyers should 
follow when they want to ensure the quality and strength of the DNA evidence, but also the questions 
that they should ask in order to be assured of the strength of the evidence. As noted above at 8.4.2, 
                                                             
44 The ACT Chapter is chaired by Justice Richard Refshauge SC and the Victorian Chapter is is chaired by John 
Champion, currently the Director of the Office of Public Prosecutions in Victoria.  
45 See 171-179. 
46 See 195-200. 
47 Loene M Howes et al, ‘The Readability of Expert Reports for Non-Scientist Report Users: Reports of DNA 
Analysis’ (2014) 237 Forensic Science International 7. 
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this recommendation is supported by the appreciation lawyers interviewed for this study expressed 
for the advice provided by Kirsten Edwards in ‘Ten Things Lawyers Should Know About DNA Evidence’.  
 Application of the research outside Victoria and the ACT 
Victoria and the ACT were chosen for this research because of the industry partnership with Victoria 
Police, the Australian Federal Police and the National Institute of Forensic Science, all of whom were 
involved in Australian Research Council funded research based at the University of Tasmania and in 
funding the scholarship through which this study took place. These industry partners supported 
academic partners at the University of Technology, Sydney and the University of Lausanne, 
Switzerland. Forty lawyers responded to a request to participate in this study, and those who 
participated represented lawyers with a wide range of experience, a variety of roles and length of 
practice. The experiences of the lawyers, judges and forensic scientists in these jurisdictions is unlikely 
to be unique and, therefore, the findings and recommendations of this research may be relevant 
Australia wide. They may also be transferable to other adversarial legal systems worldwide. 
Accordingly, the findings of this study may be useful in explaining the practical considerations that 
influence the way criminal lawyers deal with DNA evidence in other Australian States, or indeed in 
other countries that have adversarial criminal justice systems.  
 Further research 
There remains a dearth of research of relevance to lawyers in their daily criminal practice, and 
particularly with regard to the use of DNA evidence in adversarial criminal justice systems. This is 
because much of the reporting and research in this area has focused on miscarriages of justice, on 
jurors and their understanding of DNA evidence or on the failings of lawyers and others in cases 
involving DNA evidence. This thesis has fulfilled its purpose of making a contribution to our 
understanding of what specific information and knowledge lawyers need if they are to manage DNA 
evidence effectively; how they learn in the workplace about DNA evidence and what matters influence 
their ability to learn about and become skilled in dealing with DNA evidence. However, this thesis does 
not purport to deal comprehensively or exhaustively with these matters. There is much still to learn. 
The recommendations made in this thesis are of a practical nature. Ideally their implementation 
should be accompanied by in built evaluation processes. This will enable their on-going adaptation as 
and when necessary and also help to establish which measures work best. Additionally, having 
established that systemic barriers exist to lawyers’ effective communication with DNA experts, 
questions then arise about how resistant to change they may be — whether it may be sufficient to 
encourage this to occur, as recommended by this thesis, through educational and cultural processes 
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and adaptations or whether it may be necessary to adopt more stringent interventions like the 
institution by courts of formal pre-trial processes that mandate the occurrence of such 
communication, including in the way recommended at para [1.4.1], perhaps via pre-trial directions 
hearings. 
 Conclusion 
This research brings together science and law in a practical way. It helps policy makers, researchers 
and legal professionals understand how lawyers deal with DNA evidence in Victorian and ACT criminal 
cases and what the constraints are on the way they manage this evidence. This thesis argues that to 
create change and improve understanding of complex scientific evidence like DNA evidence in 
Australian jurisdictions, we must first understand the exigencies imposed by their working 
environment on how lawyers conduct criminal cases. If we do not understand the effect of adversarial 
legal and practical influences on legal practice, then recommendations made by investigative reports 
for improved practice by lawyers will remain unrealised. This final chapter has summarised the 
findings of this qualitative investigation. It makes recommendations in four key areas — countering 
the adversarial influence of the Australian criminal justice system, DNA education, communication of 
DNA evidence and improving pre-trial knowledge and information on DNA evidence. These take into 
account the difficulties that lawyers experience in dealing with DNA evidence in practice and the 
cultural environment in which they conduct their busy criminal law practices. The greatest challenge 
will be in changing or influencing a legal culture that has developed alongside the adversarial legal 
system that operates in Australia. This adversarial system needs to find mechanisms, like those in the 
recommendations made in this thesis, to keep pace with the technological changes affecting both 
criminal behaviour and the detection of criminals in contemporary society.
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 Appendix C – Participant information sheet  
 
Plain Language Statement  
This information sheet is for you to keep. 
 
Principal Researchers: Mrs Katherine Cashman, Associate Professor Roberta Julian, Dr Sally Kelty, Ms 
Terese Henning  
Project Title: The Effectiveness of Forensic Science in the Criminal Justice System: Lawyers and DNA - 
Understanding and Challenging the Evidence  
Invitation 
You are invited to participate in a research study for the purposes of a PhD co-supervised by the 
Tasmanian Institute of Law Enforcement Studies (TILES) and Faculty of Law at the University of 
Tasmania.  The research forms part of a study on the effectiveness of forensic science in police 
investigations and court trials, focusing specifically on lawyers and the use of DNA evidence.  
The research is being conducted by PhD Candidate Katherine (Kate) Cashman, supervised by co-
investigators Associate Professor Roberta Julian and Dr Sally Kelty from TILES and Ms Terese Henning 
from the Faculty of Law. 
The aim/purpose of the research   
The purpose of this study is to identify the role and perceptions of lawyers in the forensic science 
process – specifically with regard to DNA evidence. 
By understanding how lawyers approach and deal with DNA evidence, who they talk to for information 
and what guidance/education they receive, we can assess how professional training organisations may 
better equip themselves for teaching lawyers about DNA, or if indeed this is the best way to help 
lawyers understand this complex type of evidence.  
By asking lawyers about their experiences with DNA and forensic scientists about their experiences 
with lawyers, and the problems associated with this interaction, problem areas may be identified, and 
Lawyers and DNA: Understanding and challenging the evidence 
 232 
potential solutions can be considered. This should enable lawyers to better prepare themselves for 
criminal trials involving DNA, have access to relevant material and training and better identify where 
there is a gap between knowledge and practice and in communication between forensic scientists, 
police officers and lawyers. 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate in this study because you are a forensic biologist who has 
prepared forensic reports for lawyers and/or appeared in court as an expert witness regarding DNA 
evidence.  
What does the research involve and how much time will it take?   
Approximately 40 lawyers and 10 Supreme Court judges have been involved in this qualitative study 
to date. Three quarters of the data has been collected from barristers and solicitors from offices of 
Public Prosecutions, Legal Aid, and the Private Bar in Victoria and the ACT. Focus groups with Supreme 
Court judges have been conducted in these two jurisdictions, with forensic scientists in both 
jurisdictions as the final two focus groups to undertaken. Academics and lawyers from outside the 
project jurisdictions of Victoria and the ACT have also been interviewed and an international 
comparative analysis is planned for late 2012. 
I would like to invite you to participate in a focus group that will run for between 1-1.5 hours (longer 
if all participants wish). There will be a maximum of 8 of you in this group. This will be audio-recorded 
and later transcribed.  
I am interested in your experience with lawyers and their understanding of DNA evidence, how they 
analyse it and/or present it and what role you think that lawyers should play in this process, if any. It 
is important that you understand that your involvement is this study is voluntary. While we would be 
pleased to have you participate, we respect your right to decline. There will be no consequences to 
you if you decide not to participate. If you decide to discontinue participation at any time, you may do 
so without providing an explanation. 
Being in this study is completely voluntary - you are under no obligation to consent to participation. If 
you do decide to participate you may withdraw at any stage prior to transcripts being coded (after this 
point you cannot be identified in any way and it will not be possible to find your data to destroy) or 
avoid answering questions which you feel are too personal or intrusive. 
   
233 
Are there any risks to me if I participate? 
I understand that participation in a focus group may involve some risk. The risk is that although 
information provided will be treated confidentially by the researcher, the researcher cannot 
guarantee that confidentiality will be maintained by other focus group members. I understand that 
the researcher will address this risk by asking focus group members to treat all information they hear 
in the room as confidential and by encouraging participants to refrain from using names of other 
individuals involved and in cases.  
This focus group is also likely to include colleagues of yours and this may be a small group of up to 8 
people. You accept that the researcher will attempt to mitigate this risk not only by requesting this 
courtesy from all participants at the beginning of the session, but also ensuring that the focus is on 
the role of the lawyer in the forensic legal system more broadly – rather than asking for particular case 
examples. 
If after the group you feel concerned about any issues raised there are a number of options you can 
take. You can contact the Victoria Police Employee Support Services on (03) 9301 6900. The Police 
Association and the Community and Public Sector Union also offer support services for members. 
Alternatively you can contact the principal researcher, Ms Katherine Cashman, by telephone (03 6226 
2721). Names of participants in the focus groups will not be published.  
Payment 
There are no rewards offered for taking part, financial or otherwise. 
Storage of data and confidentiality of information 
Over the course of the study, the focus group data will be in a lockable filing cabinet, in a locked office 
at the Faculty of Law, and, to further ensure confidentiality, the consent forms will be held separately 
in a lockable filing cabinet in a locked office at TILES, University of Tasmania. The only people that will 
have access to that information will be myself and my supervisors. 
After information has been collected, participants will be assigned unique codes eg FS1, FS2, and once 
information has been coded, the original identifying information will be destroyed, leaving only the 
unique code as an identifier and the original information as non-identifiable. Because the coding 
process will leave both you and your information non-identifiable, we will not be able to withdraw 
your data after coding has taken place. Data entry will be conducted by Katherine Cashman and may 
involve the assistance of my supervisors.  
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Data will be stored for a minimum of five years and then either erased (if virtual) or shredded (if in 
paper format). The DVDs containing the audio recordings will be destroyed. 
Additional Information for Participants 
Participants should be aware that Section 127A Police Regulation Act 1958, 'Unauthorised 
disclosure of information and documents' states: 
(1) A person who is a member of police personnel must not access, make use of or disclose any 
information that has come into his or her knowledge or possession, by virtue of his or her office 
or by virtue of performing his or her functions as a member of police personnel, if it is the member's 
duty not to access, make use of or disclose the information.  
Section 95 of the Constitution Act 1975 provides that officers in the public service must not: 
(a) publicly comment upon the administration of any department of the State of Victoria. 
(b) use except in or for the discharge of this official duties, any information gained by or conveyed 
to him through connection with the public service; or 
(c) directly or indirectly use or attempt to use any influence with respect to the remuneration or 
position of himself or of any person in the public service. 
Results 
If you would like to be informed of the aggregate research finding, please contact Ms Katherine 
Cashman on (03) 6226 2721 or Katherine.Cashman@utas.edu.au. There will also be a place on the 
Consent form for you to indicate whether you would like to receive results and if so, to indicate your 
preferred method of contact.  
If you would like to contact the 
researchers about any concerns or 
aspects of this study, please contact: 
If you have a complaint concerning the manner in 
which this research Lawyers and DNA is being 
conducted, please contact: 
 
Ms Katherine Cashman  
Secretariat  
Victoria Police Human Research Ethics Committee 
Corporate Strategy and Governance Department 
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Associate Professor Roberta Julian on  
T: 03 6226 2217 or F: 03 6226 2864 
Roberta.Julian@utas.edu.au. 
 
Level 5, Tower 1 
Victoria Police Centre 
637 Flinders Street 
Docklands  VIC  3008 
Tel: +61 3 9247 6756.  Fax: +61 3 9247 6712  
Email: ethics.committee@police.vic.gov.au  
Or  
Tasmanian Social Science Human Research Ethics  
Committee, the Executive Officer of the HREC 
(Tasmania) Project Number: H11621 
T: 03 6226 7479  
human.ethics@utas.edu.au 
 
Thank you for taking the time to consider this study. If you wish to take part, please sign the attached 
consent form. This information sheet is for you to keep. 
 
Roberta Julian 
               
Katherine Cashman   Terese Henning    Sally Kelty 
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 Appendix D – Interview consent form 
 
Consent Form - Interviews 
 
Principal Researchers: Mrs Katherine Cashman, Associate Professor Roberta Julian, Dr Sally Kelty, Ms 
Terese Henning  
 
Project Title: The Effectiveness of Forensic Science in the Criminal Justice System: The role lawyers 
play in maintaining the integrity of DNA evidence in criminal trials.  
1. I have read and understood the ‘Information Sheet’ for this project. 
2. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
3. I understand that the study involves participating in a 1 hour interview to discuss the involvement 
of lawyers in criminal trials involving DNA evidence.  
4. I understand that the interview will be recorded (by audio-taping or note-taking) and the 
information will be stored on secure University of Tasmania premises for up to five years, and will 
then be destroyed. 
5. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
6. I understand that any information that is on the public record may be identifiable, however the 
researchers will keep my identity confidential and that any information I supply to the researchers 
will be used only for the purposes of the research.  
7. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may withdraw at any time without 
any effect. I understand that after coding has taking place my identity and information will be 
non-identifiable and I will not be able to withdraw my data from the study. 
8. I agree/do not agree to having the interview audio-taped.  
PTO 
 
   
237 
Name of Participant: 
Signature: Date: 
 
Statement by Investigator 
 
 I have explained the project & the implications of participation in it to this volunteer and I believe 
that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of participation.  
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to them participating, the 
following must be ticked. 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been provided so 
participants have the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting to participate in this project. 
 





Signature of Investigator 
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 Appendix E – Focus group consent form 
 
Consent Form – Focus Groups 
 
Principal Researchers: Mrs Katherine Cashman, Associate Professor Roberta Julian, Dr Sally Kelty, Ms 
Terese Henning  
 
Project Title: The Effectiveness of Forensic Science in the Criminal Justice System: The role lawyers 
play in maintaining the integrity of DNA evidence in criminal trials.  
1. I have read and understood the 'Information Sheet' for this project. 
2. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
3. I understand that the study involves participating in a 1 hour focus group to discuss the 
involvement of lawyers in criminal trials involving DNA evidence.  
4. I understand that the focus group will be recorded (by audio-taping or note-taking) and the 
information will be stored on secure University of Tasmania premises for up to five years. The 
information will then be destroyed.  
5. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
6. I understand that any information on the public record may be identifiable. Although the 
researchers will attempt to encourage all focus group members to keep the information 
confidential, I understand that this cannot be guaranteed. 
7. I agree that research data gathered from me for the study may be published provided that I 
cannot be identified as a participant in either the thesis, or resulting publication. 
8. I agree to participate in this investigation and understand that I may withdraw at any time without 
any effect. I understand that after coding has taking place my identity and information will be 
non-identifiable and I will not be able to withdraw my data from the study. 
PTO 
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Name of Participant: 
Signature: Date: 
 
Statement by Investigator 
 
 I have explained the project & the implications of participation in it to this volunteer and I believe 
that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of participation.  
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to them participating, the 
following must be ticked. 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been provided so 
participants have the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting to participate in this project. 
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 Appendix F – Interview Questions 
 
The Effectiveness of Forensic Science in the Criminal Justice System: 
Lawyers and DNA – Understanding and Challenging the Evidence 
 
The list of potential areas we will explore in our interviews includes: 
1. Do criminal lawyers receive direction/training on DNA evidence for criminal trials?  
a) How do practicing criminal lawyers remain current in their knowledge of DNA and forensic 
science?  
2. What level of understanding do lawyers have of DNA evidence in criminal trials?  
a) What are the major threats to the accuracy of DNA evidence in criminal trials?  
b) What knowledge do lawyers have about contamination of evidence? 
c) Do lawyers understand the identified limitations of DNA evidence? 
d) What level of understanding do lawyers have of the potential human error involved in 
forensic science and more particularly DNA collection and analysis? 
3. What is the process involved when lawyers are faced with criminal cases involving DNA 
evidence? 
a) Do lawyers ask questions of forensic scientists? 
b) If so, what questions do lawyers ask of forensic scientists? 
c) Do lawyers ask questions of police investigators re the DNA evidence? 
d) If so, what questions do lawyers ask of police investigators? 
e) What makes an effective criminal lawyer in cases involving DNA evidence? 
f) What do lawyers do to protect their clients from possible DNA contamination? 
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g) What do case examples demonstrate of prosecutors and defence lawyers action or 
inaction in criminal cases involving DNA evidence?  
h) Should prosecutors proceed with cases when there is only DNA evidence linking a suspect 
to a crime?  
i) What have the courts said of prosecutions when DNA evidence is the only circumstantial 
evidence for a case? 
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 Appendix G – Focus group questions 
 
The Effectiveness of Forensic Science in the Criminal Justice System: 
Lawyers and DNA – Understanding and Challenging the Evidence 
 
The questions we will explore in our focus groups are the following: 
• What experiences have you had with lawyers on cases with DNA evidence that you have 
provided? 
o What experience have you had with lawyers consulting you about DNA evidence 
during the pre-trial investigation phase? 
• How do you feel lawyers understand DNA evidence? 
o How do you find they explain it for judges/juries?   
• How much should lawyers understand about DNA evidence in criminal trials? 
o What can they do better? 
• How should we endeavour to teach lawyers about DNA? 
• From your experience, how does a competent lawyer deal with DNA evidence?  
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